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FOREWORD
The rapid growth of knowledge in twentieth century
science, has had particularly important implications for
the philosophical foundations of psychology and education.
This dissertation is based upon the conviction that progress
toward more meaningful theories in psychology and more rele-
vant approaches to the practical concerns of education re-
quires increased appreciation of the historical background
of our present sciences and also a reinterpretation of the
animating assumptions upon which much contemporary theoiy
in psychology and education is based.
Within the circumscribed area of theoretical formula-
tion in the behavioral sciences, this conviction translates
into a three-phase process. First, it is necessary
to
examine the growth of psychological theory with the inten-
tion of relating the formulation of psychological
issues to
the larger context of scientific thought which
was prevalent
at that time. Second, the character of that
general ap-
proach to science must then be compared to
the current in-
terpretation of scientific knowledge. Finally,
m the third
phase, it is then possible to consider
the new possibilities
for behavioral scientific theory which
can be based upon our
more powerful modern insights into
scientific understanding
of nature and the nature of
scientific understanding.
xii
Aspects of these three phases form the content of this dis-
sertation .
Clearly, the "size" of the question one is willing to
ask will determine the outcome of such endeavors. In this
regard, I have used my intuitions and understanding of the
purpose of life as the major criterion in the choice of a
conceptual perspective for this investigation. For the
purposes of this introductory comment, there are two impor-
tant levels of this perspective which require comment.
First, as the material of the dissertation demonstrates,
the basis of any approach toward life and science is to be
found in the individual's deeply held convictions about the
final realities of existence. For my part, as a member of
the Baha'i Faith, this means that I see the current quest
for knowledge and understanding as an expression of the
ever-advancing civilization of mankind which has found its
primary direction in the centuries-long tradition of re-
vealed religion.
Man's advancement within the character of each major
epoch of civilization follows a fundamental orientation
which has been set by the prophet-founder . Whether
we have
reference to the prophets of antiquity or more
familiar
prophets such as Moses, Jesus Christ or Muhammad,
the advent
of their message has signalized the beginning
of a great new
phase in the development of humanity. In
this age, with the
xiii
advent of the prophet Baha'u'llah, man has once again been
re-awakened to the true nature of his spiritual destiny and
the realities of his material existence. Thus, the most
important determinant of the "size” of the question I am
willing to consider comes from the conviction that we are
living in a new era which offers an opportunity for change
and development which is unrivaled in its potentialities
for reform in the standards by which man conducts the af-
fairs of his life and shapes the character of his destiny.
Within this global framework, the creation and conduct of
scientific inquiry can be understood as a circumscribed but
particularly important and useful effort to transform the
reality of belief into the reality of explicit knowledge.
'pjixs brings us to the next level of importance in the
perspective which is used in the dissertation. Since man
has created science he can, and periodically does, change
the major assumptions upon which it rests. One o± the most
comprehensive attempts to change the basic assumptions of
science in a direction which I believe is also harmonious
with the demands of the modern age is the organic process
philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. Thus, the interpre-
tation of historical psychology and the efforts toward
re-establishing the conceptual framework of theoretical
psychology which are found here derive primarily
from
Whitehead's analysis of issues in basic science
and his
xiv
formulation of alternatives to the perceived limitations of
traditional science.
The assertion that the way toward improvement in psy-
chological theory and educational practice rests upon a more
inclusive insight into the nature of reality, a reality
which ultimately derives from the animating spirit of an
age, carries with it the companion assertion that some of
the most important aspects of the new view will not be con-
tained in the old approach. To achieve greater relevance in
psychology and education, we must step beyond the considera-
tion of problems which arise within the era of modern science
and ask a larger question of the era itself.
This is not to suggest that the topics and issues which
belong to this discussion are either totally new or unfa-
miliar in light of traditional thought. On the contrary,
while we may admit that the new explanatory principles must
come from outside the standard abstractions of the scienti-
fic system of things, we should aiso demand that the new
view must shed light on the same problems which have been
the major perplexities of modern times. This is however, a
non-trivial problem. To achieve our goal we must balance
the uniqueness of the alternative with the givenness of the
traditional in such a fashion that the very issues of the
old view upon which we desire to shed light will not also
so
completely determine our outlook that we can only see
the
xv
possibility of reformed ideas through the apparent gaps in
the pattern of the old fabric of ideas.
The truth of the matter is that in attempting to reach
beyond the limitations of the old system, we have no other
recourse to the basic data of existence than did those who
created the original approach to modern science. While we
may intellectually struggle to insure that the finest in-
sights and techniques which have arisen from within the sys-
tem of traditional science should also find profitable exem-
plification in any future systems, we must also realize that
the background of our intellectual struggle is both the deep
personal commitment of the individual and the coloration of
thought which is provided by the history of our era. Again,
in this aspect of our task we are no different than those
who have preceeded us.
This issue can be approached from two main directions.
Chapter One asserts that it was the faith in the possibility
of a science which derived from the traditions of revealed
religion that provided the assurance 'that scientific dis-
closure of the laws of nature was possible. Again, in
Chapter Five the same issue is broached but this time from
within the context of latter-day science which has
more com-
pletely recognized the role of this background of
thought
as it applies to the behavior of the individual
scientist.
But there is' an important difference between
the two
xvi
interpretations that we must not ignore in this context.
In the first case we have the recognition that the back-
ground of thought provides a programmatic character which
determines what is considered to be the "valid" science of
the era, and in the second case, we have the recognition
that an individual scientist, in order to proceed with the
production of any scientific data, also requires the gui-
dance of deeply held convictions about the true character of
the phenomena he is seeking to understand. Clearly, the
ideal condition for the development of science is one in
which there is a basic harmony between these two aspects of
the scientific enterprise.
As the era of modern science began, the twin functions
of this background of belief went quite unnoticed because
of the basic harmony which existed between the background
of conviction and the foreground intellectual understanding.
It is as if the direction of an individual's thoughts were
influenced in much the same fashion as the direction of a
compass needle is influenced by the meridian like action of
invisible, yet pervasive, magnetic fields. It is to the
main polarization of the era that the individual contributes
the polarization of his own being with the expectation that
the interaction of the two forces will produce a directed
movement toward the ultimate ends sought by the system
and
the individual
.
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By extension, we can say that the directional orienta-
tion of the belief structure is the least ambiguous when
the individuals who are interacting with it are farthest
away from the basic character of the ideas which polarize
the over-all orientation of the structure. In these cases
the true directions to scientific certitude form a rather
obvious and clearly marked trail about which there is little
fundamental disagreement and by virtue of which a certain
type of scientific interpretation is carried into many un-
charted regions. It happens however that the path of scien-
tific progress also brings the seeking individual closer to
the basic polarities of belief. The predictable result is
that there is a pronounced reduction in the orienting power
of the polar idea. Just as the terrestrial explorer finds
the guidance properties of his magnetic compass reduced to
the point that all directions seem equally probable when he
has attained greatest proximity to the polarities of the
globe, the conceptual explorer will also find that inter-
action of his beliefs with those of his times will be the
most ambiguous at that point in time when he has drawn
closest to the full assimilation of the explanatory capacity
of that system.
In the system of scientific explanation whose de\elop-
ment is a function of the cosmology of the modern era, it
has become increasingly clear that the orienting power
oi
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the basic ideas of the system is greatest when the questions
which are asked are farthest away from the character of
human phenomena. As the level and power of scientific ex-
planation has grown and man has sought greater scientific
unders tanding of himself, it has became increasingly evident
that our system of scientific beliefs is too much a product
of the nature of man's earlier and more limited understanding
himself and his world. As we have drawn closer to the
subjective character of those beliefs, their ability to
provide the direction and to establish the values toward
which science should aim has diminished practically to the
same level of equiprobability that characterizes the
spinning needle of a magnetic compass that has found its
true home in the heart of the polarity which had been its
faithful guide.
The task which faces us today and which has been placed
upon our scientific horizon by the collapse of materialistic
metaphysics is to once again develop an understanding of
the cosmos into which we can imbed the polarity of our own
beliefs without also drawing so close to the limitations of
that view that its directive power is significantly reduced
in the process.
In a manner suggestive of the terrestrial explorer who
is imbedded in the magnetic perplexity of a polar polarity,
we too must turn for guidance to a different realm in order
xix
that a truer direction can once again be established. Our
explorer friend can gaze into the heavens and pick a star
upon which to base his beliefs in the true direction he
should follow. Our heavens consist of a more complete
understanding of man's freedom and destiny; a truer under-
standing of the processes of life which by their progressive
development of ever novel forms of being, have acted out a
drama that demonstrates an increasing ability to seek its
meaning in that which is beyond and transcendent to itself.
It should be emphasized however, that the intent of
this study has not been to produce a work in either meta-
physics or philosophy. It is motivated purely by a concern
for the development of a conception of education that will
begin to meet the urgent needs of our times. Should the
reader be dismayed in the fact that most of the discussions
tend toward the abstract, that the topics and pages are many
and that there seems to be no immediate bridge between the
products of discussion and the pressing needs of educators,
I can only add that while I sympathize with those feelings,
moving beyond the comforting familiarity of tradition to
examine the basis of our approach toward the understanding
of man and his world require many steps and suggests a mag-
nitude of effort which lies well beyond the limitations of
a
doctoral dissertation, to say nothing of the abilities
which
a single author can bring to bear on the topic. For
me,
XX
this has been a first, large, step toward seeking disclosure
within a new framework of ideas as opposed to the stulti-
fying closure of much contemporary theory in psychology and
education. Clearly, such steps are relative to the taker;
however, the important thing is that they be taken, since,
a dissertation is, after all, part of the process of one's
own education.
xxi
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1.0 CHALLENGE OF T11E MODERN TIMES
IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
While the ways to describe our modern frame of mind are
many it is most important for the purposes of this presenta-
tion and its relation to education to seek out the roots of
our scientific and cultural tradition that are most closely
associated with the scientific and academic point s-of-view
which characterize our present understanding in the human
sciences
.
It is probably true that each age has its own pressing
problems that tax its ability to cope with its environment.
That there is also a predominant framework for its ap-
proaches to these problems seems a truism. In our age, we
have come to rely primarily on solutions which are relevant
to the immediate situation at hand because the framework of
our scientific and academic approaches to problems is pri-
marily anti-systematic and anti-metaphysical. We pride
ourselves that these characteristics also insure that we
will be anti-dogmatic in our approaches and therefore tend
to forget that a major function of our intellectual tradi-
tions is to be prescriptive of long-range goals and direc-
tions and not simply descriptive of experimental immediacy.
When viewed in a larger sense, we must recognize that our
efforts are simply the latest phase in the ages long
tradi-
tion of man's desire to find some congruity between
the
vitalities of the evolving cosmos and the heartbeat
of the
3human search for fulfillment.
In this light, we have a dual responsibility in our
efforts toward the solution of problems in general and hu-
man problems in particular. One is to apply, as we gener-
ally do, the best materials and knowledge available to us
as we seek the betterment of conditions and the other is to
realize that the apparent relevance of the solution at hand
is also imbedded in the context of a tradition which not
only represents the highest form of life we know but which
is also the basis of the astounding realization which has
dawned with the coming of the modern age--that man has the
power to determine the direction and destiny of life on
earth
.
The history of the development of Western man's cos-
mology since the Middle Ages is characterized by the devel-
opment of two important movements, both of which have their
roots in the biblical tradition and the cosmology of the
ancient world. At some point in the ancient past, before
the development of the virulence of the modern mind, man
must have had a fairly complete, if immature, understanding
of himself and his world; however, as the twin developments
of modern science and philosophy grew in importance and
reliance on their explanation of worldly and human matters
became more commonplace, man came to the scientific under-
standing of himself as a contingent being in a purposeless
4cosmos and gradually assumed a philosophical outlook which
increasingly asserted the autonomy of human reason.
Alexander Koyre characterizes the scientific revolu-
tion of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries which has
spawned the present "crisis of European consciousness," a
statement which applies equally to all Western nations, as
a time
. . .
which changed the very framework and
patterns of our thinking and of which modern
science and modern philosophy are, at the
same time, the root and the fruit.
1
These two trends cannot be divorced from their common
heritage in the mentality of the Middle Ages and the basis
of that mentality in the ancient past. Koyre has also
characterized the changes in the structural patterns of
knowledge between the old and the new world-view as reduc-
able to two fundamental and closely connected actions that
brought the "destruction of the cosmos" and the "geometriza-
tion of space." The combined effect of these factors de-
stroyed the ancient's view of the world as a finite, well-
ordered whole whose spatial structure was determined b'y a
hierarchy of perfection and value. This was accomplished
by the process of "geome trizing" space which resulted in
the picture of an infinite universe, now free of the
natural
’'Alexander Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1957
p . vii
.
5subordination to value of the older view and possessing a
new form of unity obtained by virtue of the identity of its
ultimate and basic components and laws. Aristotle's space
which consisted of a differentiated set of inner worldly
places had become the Euclidian space of infinite and homo-
geneous extension.
The spiritual basis of life inherent in the Middle Ages
was pushed aside by the development of modern science and
philosophy. Both of these trends not only threatened but,
in fact, have replaced the function previously performed by
the tradition of revealed religion. However, to hold this
view is, I believe, to ignore a major operating dynamic in
the whole character of modern thought. It is my conviction
that the type of transcendent knowledge which has histori-
cally been derived from the tradition of revealed religion
is not only an important source for understanding human ex-
perience but is also one which cannot be replaced by a sub-
stitute. As we shall see in greater detail in what is to
2 o Lfollow, many authors (Butterfield, Whitehead, Jaki
,
2Herbert Butterfield, The Origins of Modern Science
,
1 300-1800 (London: G. E. Bell and Sons
,
1967 ) , pp . 7-28 .
3Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
(New York: The MacMillan Co
. ,
The Free Press
, 19^7 )
>
pp. 1-20.
4Stanley L. Jaki, The Relevance of Physics (Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 19^6 ) , pp . 4l2-440
.
6Gi Ikejr ) have pointed out that the character of the thought
in the Middle Ages with its firm grounding in the Biblical
vision of God and the world, generated habits of thought
which were particularly suited to the rise of empirical
inquiry
.
Alfred North Whitehead sums his understanding of the
impetus behind the use of modern science as follows:
My explanation is that the faith in the pos-
sibility of science, generated antecedently
to the development of modern scientific the-
ory, is an unconscious derivative from medi-
eval theology.
^
To state that theme in another and slightly extended way,
this presentation will follow from the assertion that the
evolutionary cosmos which we have come to know in our sci-
entific understanding requires, for its intelligibility, a
cosmology of hierarchical process grounded in transcendent
purpose and that the personal fulfillment we have come to
seek in philosophical quests is to be found in a more com-
plete understanding of the spiritual generality of man's
nature. Whitehead, again states the issue poignantly
The faith in the order of nature which has
made possible the growth of science is a par-
ticular example of a deeper faith. This
faith cannot be justified by any inductive
generalization. It springs from direct in-
spection of the nature of things as disclosed
\angdon Gilkey, Master of Heaven and Earth (Garden
City, N. Y. : Doubleday, 1959 ), PP* 109 - 139 *
^Whitehead
,
Science and the Modern World , p. 13 *
7m our own immediate present experience.
There is no parting from our own shadow
. To
experience this faith is to know that inbeing ourselves we are more than ourselves:
* * * to know that while the harmony of logiclies upon the universe as an iron band neces-
sity, the aesthetic harmony stands before it
as a living ideal moulding the general fluxin its broken progress towards finer, subtlerissues .
/
Having asserted that the source of our science and philoso-
phy is a deeper faith, something which transcends them both,
we are in a better position to judge their status as shadows
of the larger reality. The intimate connection of these
issues and their affectionate articulation with larger
issues of faith is seen in the fact that all three of these
issues were often represented in the same early scientists,
e.g.
,
men like Kepler, Newton, Descartes and Leibnitz.
Thus, it is important to underline the fact that the growth
and development of modern science and philosophy also sig-
nalized a very basic change in man's cosmological view.
Seen in this light the threads of science and philosophy
are intimately tied together and interwoven into the fabric
of modern life and form by their mutual interaction a main
aspect of the pattern of life for any given age.
This then, is the challenge presented by the rise of
modern science. It is the challenge to reconcile the de-
struction of the cosmos of the ancients which resulted from
7Ibid
.
,
p. 18, emphasis added.
8the disappearance of philosophically and scientifically
valid concepts of the world as a finite, closed, hierarchi-
cal whole
. . . a whole in which the hierarchy of value
determines the hierarchy of structure of
being, rising from the dark, heavy and imper-
fect earth to the higher and higher perfec-
tion of stars and heavenly spheres.
^
with their modern replacements which have disregarded views
based on concepts such as value, perfection and purpose in
favor the ideas of
. . . an indefinite an infinite universe
which is bound together by the identity of
its fundamental components and laws, and in
which all these components are placed on the
same level of being.
9
The combined effect of this divorce of the world of value
from the world of fact has been to generate a world-view in
which man has become a homeless and contingent being in a
purposeless cosmos, a product of random variation and natu-
ral selection with nothing but himself to rely on for meaning
and survival
.
This is not an assertion that no one has or can find
meaning in the modern world. It is an attempt to say, via
an analysis of some major characteristics of science and
philosophy, that the meaning which we do find in current
8Koyre
,
From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe,
p . 2
Ibid.
,
p . 2
9scientific and philosophical thought about personality and
education is limited by the nature of the cosmological
framework into which we are attempting to place our finest
and most complete insights which we derive "from direct in-
spection of the nature of things as disclosed in our own
immediate present experience." It also involves the asser-
tion that however dim and fragmentary this experience may
be it is our only clue to the harmony of the ultimate things
in nature and is therefore the best way to validate the
worth of our scientific and philosophical thoughts about
personality and education.
To our centuries long tradition of faith in reason and
faith in science we must now add faith in man and his tran-
scendent destiny. We must recognize that education in the
art of being requires self-knowledge of the process of be-
coming.
1 . 1 THE ROOTS OF MODERN
SCIENCE AND PHILOSOPHY
As indicated earlier, many scholars who have investi-
gated the rise of modern science have focused upon the im-
portance of the ferment in the Middle Ages which was gener-
ated out of the increasing impact of modes of thought sepa-
rately derived from the Judaeo-Christian biblical tradition
and Aristotelian natural philosophy.
Of prime importance to an understanding of the nature
of these changes is the difference in the doctrines of law
10
and order which pertained between the two views. Aristotle
and the Greek tradition saw nature primarily as an organism
in which laws were based upon internal relations and were
therefore immanent in nature. This point-of-view led them
to focus upon the formal element in things and was respon-
sible for their efforts to discover the purposive form
which was efficacious in giving actual form to the material
world. Matter was seen as simply the vehicle of the eternal
form. By contrast, the point-of-view which ultimately led
to the creation of modern science and which was derived
from Judaeo-Christian beliefs, tended to emphasize, in its
stress on the law in nature as imposed by the Will of God,
a machine-like view of nature based on external relations.
This view saw God as the creator of both the material and
formal aspects of the world. Since it was the case that
God created all things, their existence had to be accepted
as a reality. Therefore, it was a natural step to the out-
come that since everything individual had an existence de-
rived from God, it also had a real self—existence and could
therefore act as an independent body capable of causal in-
teraction with other independent and self-subsistent bodies.
Whereas the Greeks had seen matter as resistant to form and
therefore incapable of exact mathematical expression, the
Judaeo-Christian view was that since all matter was created
by the omnipotent Will of God it also strictly obeyed the
11
Laws of God
.
In this way, the doctrine of creation functions in the
dual role of providing a way of understanding the physical
world and the assurance that the investigation will result
in the establishment of laws that can be expressed with the
precision of mathematical statement. Gilkey^ 1 summarizes
the assumptions of modern science which evolve directly out
of the long biblical tradition as represented in the Chris-
tian thought of the Middle Ages as three in number, each
following directly from the vision of the relationship of
the Creator to his creation. First, a created universe
requires that the perfection of God be manifested in his
creation and that that perfection would amount to an order
in nature that could be discovered. Second, since the order
is expressed in the happenings of nature, the place to seek
an understanding of it is in nature itself; therefore,
knowledge of reality is to be obtained through empirical
study. Third, the focus upon the material aspect as opposed
to the formal aspect of things further emphasizes the trend
toward quantitative examination and mathematical expression
of God's perfection as manifested in nature.
That the foundation of modern science was closely
G. von Weizsacker, The Relevance of Science (New
York: Harper and Row, 196 ^ ) , pp • l 62 -l 6 k
.
i:LGilkey, Maker of Heaven and Earth , p. 115*
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aligned with the biblical tradition seems clear enough;
however, in our times we also recognize that the biblical
basis for the role of a transcendent creator has dropped
out of the picture of modern science. Thus, elements which
were central to the character of modern science in the
thinking of its sixteenth and seventeenth century creators
are now regarded as antiquated doctrines of the dim past.
We easily feel that science is our only guide to the truth
and that scientific truth is our only reliable source of
insight into that which is really real. However, it is not
equally obvious that in dropping the biblical tradition from
the explicit basis of justification for scientific inquiry,
we have elevated the status of present scientific methodol-
ogy to that of metaphysics.
In the past, Newton, for example, believed as his stu-
dent and editor Roger Coats tells us in the introduction to
the second edition of the Principia :
The business of true philosophy is to derive
the natures of things from causes truly exis-
tent, and to inquire after those laws on which
the Great Creator actually chose to found the
most beautiful Frame of the World, not those
bv which he might have done the same , had he
i
J Ip
so pleased. t
Similarly, the great Leibnitz, though differing sharply on
the proper role to be ascribed to the place and function of
12Isaac Newton, Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy , p. 85* Ibid . , p. 12.
13
God, felt that:
Sir Isaac Newton and his followers, have a
very odd opinion concerning the work of God.
According to their doctrine, God Almighty
wants to wind up his watch from time to time:
otherwise it would cease to move. He had not,
it seems, sufficient foresight to make it a
perpetual motion. . . . According to my opin-
ion, the same force and vigour [ sic ~] remains
always in the world, and only passes from one
part of matter to another, agreeably to the
laws of nature, and the beautiful pre-
established order. 13
Stanley Jaki
,
in his penetrating analysis of the relation
between physical and theological thought, holds that this
mechanistic world-view of a clockwork cosmos had the impor-
tant effect of clearing away the impediments of past views
.
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which had assigned "intelligences" to the heavenly spheres.
Though this was a blow to astrology it did pave the way for
a more mature understanding of the physical universe. Once
the Aristotelian view that it was desire and love in the
heavenly bodies that produced their physical motion as an
imitation of the "Prime Mover whose life was an everchanging
spiritual act" 15 had been dispelled, it was then necessary
to assume that the movement of the heavenly bodies
was the
result of the motion imparted to them at the time of
creation
15Got tfried Wilhem Leibnitz, quoted in A. Koyre ,
From
the Closed World to the Infinite Universe, p. 23b.
l4jaki, The Relevance of Physics , pp . 412-440.
15 Ibid.
,
p» 4l4.
It is Jaki ' s opinion that:
. . . had it not been for the Christian idea
of creation, it would have easily led to a
wholesale doubting whether the world was
really rational in all its parts. Granting
the supreme rationality of a personal Crea-
tor, as conceived in the Christian context,
his handiwork too had to be supremely ra-
tional. Such a view furthermore was not
merely a hesitating play with premises and
conclusions
,
.
",
lo
He concludes this thought by quoting with approval White-
head's cogent summary of the situation as being the result
of far more than a "hesitating play" but rather, the issue
of an "unquestioned faith of centuries" and "an instinctive
tone of thought" which created,
. . . an inexpugnable belief that every de-
tailed occurrence can be correlated with its
antecedents in a perfectly definite manner,
exemplifying general principles . 1?
Jaki drives the point home by citing the results of Joseph
Needham's study of the history of scientific development in
pre-revolutionary China. Needham, who he claims was "no
particular friend of Theology" was only able to explain the
Chinese failure to build a systematic science, while at the
same time demonstrating great technological proficiency and
inventiveness, as the result of the fact that the Chinese
traditions did not include a faith in a supremely rational
1 f)
Ibid .
,
p. 4l8, emphasis added.
^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 12,
quoted in Jaki, Ibid . , p". 4-19 •
15
and personal creator. Needham continues:
there was no conviction that rational person-
al beings would be able to spell out in their
lesser earthly languages the divine code of
laws which he (the Creator) had decreed fore-
time . 18
Thus, modern science can stress its view that the cosmos is
a vast, self-contained system only by replacing the assur-
ances which early scientists had derived from the nature of
God's participation with the idea that the scientific method
and its philosophical justification are as dignified and
potent bringers of order and understanding to the world as
had been the God of the "ancients." In this way, science
has come to see its true nature as the non theological search
for and explanation of the nonpurposive natural forces
which animate the material world. Once again, we find
Whitehead ready with penetrating insight and suggestive
metaphor; he states:
The soil, the climate, the seeds were there,
and the forest grew. Science has never shaken
off the impress of its origin in the histori-
cal revolt of the Later Renaissance. It has
remained predominantly an anti—rationalist ic
movement, based upon a naive faith. What rea-
soning it has wanted, has been borrowed from
mathematics which is a surviving relic of
Greek rationalism. . • . Science repudiates
philosophy. In other words, it has never
cared to justify its faith or to explain its
Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China,
II, History of Scientific Thought ( Cambridge : Cambi-idge
University Press^ 1956 ), p* 581 , quoted in Jaki , Ibid.,
p. 419 .
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meanings; and has remained blandly indiffer-
ent to its refutation by Hume
.
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1.2 THE SCIENTISTS AND THEIR
THOUGHT: SELECTED EXAMPLES
The best way to characterize the changes in perspec-
tive which attend the rise of modern science and their re-
lation to the educational and psychological problems of
today is to appreciate the historical development of the
newer view as it is manifested in the lives of the key fig-
ures in the transition. Accordingly, the following treat-
ment of limited examples of selected seventeenth century
founders of modern science, i.e., Copernicus, Galileo, Des-
cartes, Newton, and Locke, attempts to capture the flavor
of the individual's thought and to pinpoint the development
of those theoretical constructs which have proven to be of
lasting interest and crucial importance in modern times.
1.2.1 NICHOLAS COPERNICUS ( 1473-1 543)
Copernicus, who is widely recognized as one of the
central figures of the new scientific revolution, was actu-
ally not very far removed from the basic traditions oi the
past. For example, he felt that,
It is fitting for us to follow the methods oi
the ancients and to hold fast to their obsei-
vations which have been handed down like a
Testament. And to him who thinks that they
are not to be entirely trusted in this respect,
the gates of our science are certainly closed.
19Whitehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 16.
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. . . he will get what he deserves for be-
lieving that he can lend support to his own
hallucinations by slandering the ancients.^®
Arthur Koestler points out that Copernicus' real motive
originated in a desire to remove a minor blemish from the
Ptolemaic system of astronomy; but instead,
He was led to reversing the Ptolemaic system
by his desire to preserve it— like the maniac
who, pained by the mole on his beloved's
cheek, cut off her head to restore her per-
fection . 21
The very feature in the change which Copernicus ushered
in was his combined use of mathematical reasoning and ex-
perimental observation. Mathematics played an important
role because the algebraic formulations which Copernicus
had at his disposal were a much more powerful tool than the
geometric methods available to Ptolemy. The geometric
foundation of the older system, which make astronomy appear
as a branch of geometry, simply did not have the descriptive
power of the new algebraic expressions and Copernicus found
great delight in being able to assimilate the older scheme
with its cumbersome and arbitrary explanations into his view
that the movements of the planets and earth around the sun
created a much more elegant mathematical description of the
deserved data.
po
Nicholas Copernicus, quoted in Arthur Koestler, The
Sleepwalkers (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1963 )* P* 200.
21 .Ibid.
,
p. 203.
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The importance and depth of this shift in cosmological
emphasis can be shown in two ways. First, as E. A. Burtt
indicates
The question went pretty deep, it meant not
only, i s the astronomical realm fundamentally
geometrical, which almost anyone would grant,
but is the universe as a whole, including our
earth, fundamentally mathematical in struc-
ture? 22
and second, in the words of Alexander Koyre
,
... it seems to be psychologically quite
normal that the man who took the first step,
that of arresting the motion of the sphere of
fixed stars, hesitated before taking the sec-
ond, that of dissolving it in boundless space;
it was enough for one man to move the earth
and to enlarge the world so as to make it im-
measurable
. .
. ;
to ask him to make it infi-
nite is obviously asking too much. 23
Thus the revolution which sometimes bears his name is seen
to require more than Copernicus' enjoyment of mathematical
elegance and conservative tendencies. It also required the
outright assertion that the cosmos is infinite, a statement
that Copernicus was unwilling to make. The distinction of
adding this most characteristic and important element to
the new world view is given by A. 0. Lovejoy to Giordano
Bruno
.
Though the elements of the new cosmography
had, then, found earlier expression in
22
Edwin A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Physical Science (London: Routledge and Kegan
,
1932), p. 52.
*~^Koyre, op . ci t .
,
p.
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several quarters, it is Giordano Bruno who
must bo regarded as the principal represen-
tative of the doctrine of the decentralized,
infinite and indefinitely populous universe;
for he not only preached it throughout west-
ern Europe with the fervor of an evangelist,
but also first gave a thorough statement of
the grounds on which it was to gain accep-
tance from the general public. 24
These changes and many more like them are indicative of the
process which was bringing in the idea of quantitative
relationships as a replacement for the qualitative thought
of the earlier times. The universe increasingly became a
place that had a mathematical structure as opposed to a
place that had a purposeful structure with natural places
for things like fire (up) and earth (down) and where the
rain fell to water the crops.
1.2.2 GALILEO (1564-1642)
This new attitude which found one of its early and com-
plete formulations in the mind Galileo is described by
Whitehead as follows:
This new tinge to modern minds is a vehement
and passionate interest in the relation of
general principles to irreducible and stub-
born facts. All over the world and at all
times there have been practical men absorbed
in "irreducible stubborn facts"; all over
the world and at all times there have been
men of philosophical temperament who have
been absorbed in the weaving of general
principles. It is the union of passionate
interest in the detailed facts with equal
24Arthur 0.
bridge : Harvard
Love joy, The Great Chain of Being (Cam-
University Press, 1936 ) , p~i 11^ •
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devotion to abstract generalization which
forms the novelty. 25
Ian Barbour pinpoints this new "novelty*' of detailed passion
and devoted abstraction in the behavior of Galileo by demon-
strating the unique combination of abstract generalization
"thought-experiments" and interest in detailed facts which
characterized Galileo's approach. He sights Galileo's de-
scription of his experiments with the inclined plane as a
"classic example of the combination of induction and deduc-
tion, reasoning back and forth between theory and experi-
ment."^ In these experiments, Galileo made great use of
concepts like length, time, and velocity which were amenable
to mathematical expression. He tried many theoretical as-
sumptions, calculated the predicted experimental results
and made tests to verify his findings. Barbour asserts
that in this is to be found all the characteristics of the
new science.
the distinctive type of concept, the combina -
tion of theory and experiment, and the goal
of expressing laws of nature as mathematical
relationships among measurable variables . 27
It is important to note that the creation and use of a
method which explicitly formulated the use of both inductive
^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 3, quoted
in Ian G. Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (Englewood
Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1966), p. 24.
26Ibid .
,
p. 25.
27 Ibid., p. 25, Barbour's emphasis.
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and deductive procedures also opened the possibility of
separating the two and concluding, as Bacon, Hume and the
modern positivists have done, that science simply consists
of the collection and classification of observations. Such
simplistic definitions of empiricism leave out the theoret-
ical or abstract side of science and therefore fail to cap-
ture the role of the creative imagination of the scientist.
To make the character of Galileo's contribution more
explicit it is necessary to contrast the results of his ap-
proach to that of the Aristotelian background he was re-
acting against. To see this point clearly is to understand
why "Galileo keeps harping on how things happen, whereas
his adversaries had a complete story as to why things hap-
,.
28pen . "
Aristotle was also keen on observation, but failed to
add the incisive theoretical clarity to his observations
that characterized Galileo's approach. When Galileo ob-
served motion, for example, he departed from the naive un-
examined immediacy characterizing Aristotle's approach by
the addition of abstract concepts which could not be exem-
plified in their own right but only in the behavior of
things. He saw motion as the interaction of the continuing
inertial motion of the body and a frictional retarding
^Whitehead
,
Science and the Modern World , p.
phasis added.
8
,
em-
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force. Aristotle had observed that things Left to them-
selves would stop, Galileo explained the theoretical basis
of the phenomena. He handled his analysis of pendular mo-
tion in the same way. Whereas the ancients had focused
upon the stone's final state of rest at the center of its
swing (its lowest, therefore natural, position) Galileo,
ignoring the incidental properties, saw the pendulum's swing
in a new light and explained how the motion of the pendulum
is naturally damped by the friction of the air.
It is obvious from this that Galileo found no need to
concern himself with the purposes of objects when he could
not only adequately explain how they were moving, but also
had an apparently general system which applied to all bodies
in motion. In this way, the character of man's examination
at his world became fundamentally different than it had been
in the past. Aristotle believed that if one did not know
the cause of something he was merely stating an opinion and
did not possess knowledge of the event. Accordingly, ho had
conceived of four types of causes, ranging from the lowest
or "material" cause through the successive stages of "formal"
cause, "efficient" cause and "final" cause which were all
required in order to fully explain the why of nature. Now,
we see that scientific interest came to ignore the linal
cause which was directed at the future and also the formal
cause which was seen to be of the essence of the object
\
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itself in favor of explanation in terms of efficient causes
which act on the material (material cause) to produce the
observed phenomena. This state of affairs is also a good
indicator of the "shrinkage M of the world-view which was
occurring with the rise of science: all-embracing meta-
physical systems, based primarily upon the naive issue of
unexamined sense perception, were being replaced by abstract
descriptions of limited phenomena.
While we owe a great debt to Galileo's creative genius
in firmly establishing the methods of science, we are also
deeply involved in the modern version of some of the prod-
ucts of the content of his thought. Galileo's quantitative
states of motion led him to assume that the matter, whose
motion he was observing, was ultimately constructed of in-
definitely small indivisible atoms. In this assumption he
is simply forming an up-dated version of the atomism of the
ancient Greeks by adding the rigor of modern scientific ex-
pression to the purely philosophical and speculative ac-
counts which are to be found in the words of Democritus.
In what must be one of the clearest and longest standing
anticipations of subsequent developments, Democritus in the
fifth century B.C. maintained that:
By convention sweet is sweet, by convention
bitter is bitter, by convention cold is cold,
by convention hot is hot, by convention color
is color. But in reality there are the atoms
and the void. That is, the objects of sense
are supposed to be real, and it is customary
24
to regard them as such, but in reality they
arc no t . Only the atoms and the void are
real . ^9
Burtt observes that while the precise historical parents of
Galileo's atomism are unknown, it is probably true that,
Galilean atomism and its mechanical corol-
laries were due to the percolation through
the intervening ages of some fragmentary
ideas from the great Greek materialist.
. . .
Certainly the doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities, with causality lodged in
the atoms . . .
,
exhibits strong marks of a
Democritanism brought up to date and fitted
into the new mathematical programme \ sic ] . 30
In coming to this phase of Galilean thought we are on the
threshold of one of the most significant developments of the
whole modern era. This development is none other than the
formulation of the seventeenth century version of "corpus-
cular philosophy." This philosophy, which was more than
the atomism of ancients and less than the atomic theory of
the nineteenth century, should be seen as one of the most
fundamental characteristics of the modern era. For it was
by virtue of this view that birth was given to two very
im-
portant trends; namely, the twin children of the modern
age,
science and philosophy. This is not to say that there
were
no antecedents of this view or that all credit and
or blame
^Democritus
,
quoted in
Modern Age (New York: Basic
added.
A. Wheelis, The End oi the
Books, 1971), P- 32, emphasis
3°Burtt, Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physica
_L
Science
,
pp. 77-78.
should be given to Galileo; lor, whatever our historical
preferences may be and however we may wish to add up the
fragmentary ideas which "percolated through the ages," the
fact remains that in the thought of Galileo we have the
first major metaphysical step in the banishment of man from
the world of nature and the subsequent creation of the meta-
physical and epistemological problems which have character-
ized the entire modern age.
Focusing first on the human implication of this view
and recalling our earlier discussion of the character of
most ancient and medieval thought, we are reminded that the
natural tendency was to see both man and nature as important
parts of the whole cosmos. Plato, and his student Aristotle,
always had man in a fundamental position in the value of
things and never regarded him as in any way associated with
the poorer half of any dichotomy between primary and secon-
dary or being and nonbeing. Man was seen as the micro-
cosmic exemplification of the splendors of the macrocosm.
The elaboration of the doctrine of primary and secondary
qualities marks the beginning of man's spectator status in
the universe. Burtt asserts that:
Now, in the course of translating this dis-
tinction of primary and secondary int o terms
suited to the new mathematical interpretation
of Nature, we have the first stage in the
reading of man quite out of the real and
primary realm . 31
-^
1
Ibid.
,
p. 79 » author's emphasis.
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He goes on to elaborate with the observation that man him-
self is a poor subject for the mathematical study required
by the developing science since those qualities seemingly
most characteristic of man e.g., his life of colors, sounds,
hopes, pleasures, passionate loves and intense agonies
belong only to man and are not to be found in the world of
resting and moving material objects. Hence, the assumption
that the real world was outside of man and that contrary to
the ancient tradition, especially Plato and Aristotle,
which saw a higher reality in Ideas and Forms which man is
able to contemplate in the full reality of his immediate
experience, in the light of all his faculties, the new view
now classed as secondary just those very features which had
seemed most important. For man, now conceived as an assem-
blage of secondary qualities, the only hope was to rely
upon that aspect of his nature which could alone provide
knowledge--his theoretical and mathematical mind.
Turning now to the scientific impact of this view, we
see that Galileo arrived at his form of "corpuscular philos-
ophy" as a result of his willingness to generalize the cate-
gories he found useful in describing the phenomena of matter
in motion he observed with the naked eye. Galileo's thought
focuses upon the categories of mass, space and time not only
because they could be treated mathematically but also be-
cause they fitted the scheme of atomism which was
constrained
27
to see the world as composed of particles which were totally
described in terms of their mass and velocity. Now that
the formal and final causes had been shown away from the
basic system, it was no longer possible to meaningly view
change as the transition of potentiality to actuality; on
this view, one was constrained to see only the efficient
and material causes as represented in the rearrangement of
material particles (material cause) in accord with the math-
ematically describable laws of motion (efficient cause).
This said, we can best conclude this summary of Galileo's
scientific thought by briefly looking at the basic meaning
it had for the issues of primary and secondary qualities
and the phenomenon of time. Both of these issues are of
immanent importance to the psychological and educational
topics that are to follow.
First, Galileo called the qualities of mass and veloc-
ity primary because he viewed them as belonging only to the
external world and therefore independent of the observer.
His criterion in this choice was to focus the "permanence"
of the qualities in question and to assign secondary status
to anything that was "added" to nature by the subjective
reaction of the individual and his sensory modalities. It
is important to observe that Galileo also held an implicit
criterion for this choice; namely, the ability to choose
phenomena that were amenable to quantitative mathematical
28
description . Galileo, in terms reminiscent of his ancient
predecessor Democritus, is very explicit about the matter:
But that external bodies, to excite in us
these tastes, these odours \ sic 1 and these
sounds demand other than size, figure, number,
and slow or rapid motion, I do not believe;
and X judge that, if the ears, the tongue,
and the nostrils were taken away, the figure,
the numbers, and the motions would indeed re-
main, but not the odours nor the tastes nor
the sounds, which without the living animal,
I do not believe are anything else than names,
just as tickling is precisely nothing but a
name if the armpit and the nasal membrane be
removed; ... 32
As an indication of the ultimate fate of the scientific as-
pects of this formulation of the primary qualities of mass
and velocity it is important to jump into the twentieth
century for the insight that modern relativity theory ex-
actly contradicts this position in its assertion that these
qualities of mass and velocity are not independent of but
relative to the observer.
Turning now to the impact this new philosophy had on
the meaning of time, we find another important assumption
which still serves to color our modern thinking.
Aristotle
and the medieval thinkers who followed his thought,
saw
temporal processes as the continuous transformation
of po-
tentiality into actuality—both relying heavily on the
mys-
tical experience of mortal man in his role as the
highest
-^Galileo, quoted in Ibid., p* 78.
of the hierarchy of formed mat tor. God was seen as tin'
eternal and self-sufficient power which drew out of crea-
tion all that is potentially capable of being actualized.
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"To put this in modern terms," Burtt writes, "the present
exists unmoved and continually draws into itself the fu-
ture";^ the apparent absurdity of that statement must be
viewed in light of the fact that as the modern inheritors
of Galileo's thought, we too, have banished man from the
real world and have no place for time as something lived
but only for time as an abstract category represented by a
measurable continuum—a hypothetical construct in which the
present is simply a timeless dividing time between past and
future. Seen in this light, the true nature of time is one
of the greatest unsolved philosophical puzzles of the modern
era and has, of course, been a primary topic in the work of
many important modern philosophers, e.g., Bergson, James
and
Whitehead
.
We will meet the issues of primary and secondary
qual-
ities, and the other metaphysical and epistemological
prob-
lems inherent in this in these foundations of the
modern
era many times in what is to follow; in the
present context
it is most relevant to remark that both the
developing con-
ceptualization of a mechanical world and the belief
in God
were reconciled within the founding fathers'
philosophy.
33Ibid.
,
p. 85
.
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Galileo, for example, held that since sensory observations
derive from nature and as God is the author of nature then
there should be no conflict between the two sources of
knowledge
.
I think that in discussions of physical prob-
lems we ought to begin not from the authority
of scriptural passages but from sense-
experiences and necessary demonstrations, for
the holy Bible and the phenomena of nature
proceed alike from the divine Word. . . . For
that reason it appears that nothing physical
which sense-experience sets before our eyes,
or which necessary demonstrations prove to
us, ought to be called into question (much
less condemned) upon the testimony of bibli-
cal passages which may have some different
meaning beneath their words. For the Bible
is not chained in every expression to condi-
tions as strict as those which govern all
physical effects; nor is God anyless excel-
lently revealed in Nature’s actions than in
the sacred statements of the Bible. 3^
In taking this view, Galileo is however, marking an impor-
tant shift in the biblical frame of reference. Whereas the
centuries long tradition had viewed an understanding of na-
ture as subordinate to the revealed theology of the Bible,
Galileo's asserting that knowledge of nature and knowledge
of scripture should be placed on the same level and given
equal status in the approach toward God. But the equal
status was to be short-lived for it was all too easy to
focus greater and greater importance upon the "clear
and
distinct" products of the new science whenever there was
^Galileo
,
quoted in Barbour, Issues
Religion
, p. 3°
•
in Science and
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uncertainty about the vague connotations of the scripture.
We find this interpretation in many of the important
thinkers of that time, for example, Kepler wrote:
As the ear is made to perceive sound, and the
eye to perceive color, so the mind has been
formed to understand, not all sorts of things,
but qualities. It perceives any given thing
more clearly in proportion as that thing is
close to bare quantities as to its origin,
but the further a thing recedes from quanti-
ties the more darkness and error inhere in
it. 35
Closeness to bare quantities and clear and distinct sensory
information become the hallmarks of the new science; Gali-
leo's own words are an appropriate indication of the legacy
he left,
Philosophy is written in this great book, the
Universe, which stands continually open to
our gaze. But the book cannot be understood
unless one first learns to comprehend the
language and to read the letters of which it
is composed. It is written in the language
of mathematics and its characters are trian-
gles, circles, and other geometric figures,
without which it is humanly impossible to
understand a simple word of it; without these
one wanders around in a dark labyrinth. ->
1.2.3 RENE DESCARTES (1596-1650)
For the final touches on the development of the chai
-
acter of scientific thought in the seventeenth century, it
is to Rene Descartes that we must turn for the
philosophical
^Johannes Kepler, quoted in L. Mumford, The Myth 9 t
the Machine (New York: Harcourt , Brace, Jovanovitch, 197 ),
p"] 140
.
36Galileo, quoted in Ibid . , p. l40
.
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justifications of the now model of man. In Descartes we
find the full development of the philosophical and psycho-
logical implications of those doctrines which have been
"percolating through the ages." Descartes, as we have
seen, decidedly did not create the famous mind-body dualism;
instead, he functioned to bring to critical focus and ex-
plicit statement, those centuries long traditions which
formed the foundations of his age.
Dualism in the Middle Ages, following the lead of
Aristotle, was preoccupied with the idea that the body was
rather like a container into which the soul was placed at
conception-- there to remain until the moment of death. In
some ways Descartes’ criticism of his predecessors is simi-
lar to that which much modern psychology and education has
of its immediate antecedents, including the traditions
which are founded upon Descartes’ thought. That is to say,
a main part of his motivation is to be found in his dissat-
isfaction with the extant view which made the relation be-
tween mind and body appear' rather like a puppet and pup-
peteer. Descartes insisted.
It is not sufficient that the soul be lodged
in the human body like a pilot in his ship,
unless perhaps for the movement o.L its mem-
bers. ... It needs to be joined and united
with it more closely, in order that, in ad-
dition to any such mo tor-function , it may
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liavo sensations* and appetites and thus con-
stitute a true inan.37
Seen in this light, Descartes' efforts are more appropri-
ately viewed as an attempt to unify the mind and the body
rather than to sunder the relationship as is often supposed.
Given that Descartes is a product of the seventeenth
century, it is natural that his philosophy should reflect
the increasing influence of those views which asserted the
autonomy of the mind and its ability to discover the nature
of the Creator via the rational and mathematical study of
the character of creation. This new outlook found expres-
sion in a desire to make the scientific and philosophical
view of the causal relationship between the soul and body
not only explicit but also, and most importantly, mutual.
This coloration of Descartes' thought by that of his age is
to be seen in the important factors which entered into his
philosophy. First, was his firm conviction (which he ob-
tained when visited by an "Angel of the Lord" in a dream)
that mathematics was the way to knowledge; everything, he
felt, would ultimately be reduced to a geometrical descript-
tion— a second important factor in his system. For Des-
cartes all non-geome trical properties had to be taken from
37 ,Rene Descartes, in N. K. Smith, ed. and trans.
,
Descartes' Philosophical Writings (London: MacMillan,
1952 ) , pi 1^9 , quoted in Richard Lowry, The Evolution of
Psychological Theory (New York: Aldine-Atherton
,
1971 )
>
p. o.
j'l
tlio world and located in the mind, whose nature as a non-
extendod thinking substance, made it not only totally sep-
arate from matter but also of such unique character that
there was no comparison between the machine- like qualities
of extended space and the unextended thinking spirits.
Part of the reason for the radical dualism he estab-
lished is to be found in his rejection of the medieval doc-
trine of the tripartite "nutritive," "sensitive" and "ra-
tional" souls. Descartes in a manner suggestive of the
contemporary rejection of "formal" and "final" causes re-
tained only the doctrine of rational soul and saw it as
responsible for all thought processes. The other phenomena,
i.e., life functions and sense perceptions, formerly as-
cribed to the nutritive and sensitive souls, were now sim-
ply an inherent function of the body itself--and bodies, it
will be remembered, are totally determined by the immutable
laws of nature which act upon extended matter in space.
That Descartes explicitly inverts the teleological structure
of past ages is shown in this rejection of the medieval po-
sition that the vitality of the body is dependent upon the
nutritive and sensitive souls. This error he felt:
. . .
arises from the fact that from observing
that all dead bodies are devoid of heat and
consequently of movement, it has been thought
that it was the absence of the soul which
caused these movements and this heat to cease;
and thus, without any reason, it was thought
that our natural heat and all the movements
of the body depend upon the soul: while in
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fact wre ought on the contrary to believe that
the soul quits us on death only because this
heat ceases, and the organs which serve to
move the body disintegrate . 38
From this basic position, many important consequences
follow. For example, all living bodies including man’s are
now ’’automata," self-moving machines, only the rational
soul distinguishes man's existence from the rest. To ac-
complish the interaction between mind (soul) and body he
required, Descartes elaborated a "psychophysiological " the-
ory which related many current doctrines of the times into
a "coherent" scheme. From anatomy he borrowed the central
importance of the brain as a directive center as opposed to
the heart or liver; from the current technology came the
hydraulic analogy responsible for nerve-hydraulics which
gave meaning to animal-spirits moving from the brain to
operate the muscles. Obviously, Descartes was building
upon centuries of tradition in formulating this view; he
synthesized, but he also hypothesized and in so doing added
a new dimension to modern thought.
In responding to his conviction that "the soul be
lodged in the body" in a closer fashion so that it would
form the basis for "sensations and appetites and thus con-
stitute a true man," Descartes laid the groundwork for the
conceptualization of reflex mechanisms. His mental
^Descartes
,
quoted in Ibid . , p. 8.
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hydraulics led, quite naturally, to an understanding of the
possibility that excitation at a sense organ could be medi-
ated by the brain and therefore, communicated to a muscle.
Of course, his whole system requires just such a view.
Automata must be so constructed as to be self-sufficient in
the sense that a stimulus elicits a response in virtue of
the interconnections within the system. The problems which
flow naturally from the formulation are all too familiar to
modern psychological theory. Though the term "reflex" did
not arise for another century, Descartes, many of his con-
temporaries and an embarrassing number of moderns were all
involved in the tasks of sorting out why some stimuli create
specific responses and why some create varied responses by
way of attempting to justify a purely machine-like model of
an automatic human body. Descartes failed and modern psy-
chology is beginning to wonder.
We, for reasons similar to the original objections
Descartes raised about his predecessors, are finding that
the psychophysical dualism he fostered, though long aban-
doned in an explicit sense, is still with us and leaves too
little room for the expression of those qualities which
"constitute a true man."
1.2.4 RENE DESCARTES
AND JOHN B. WATSON
In earlier sections we dwelt at length upon the shrink-
age of world-view that has characterized the rise of modern
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science and. the attendant diminution of (die position of man
in the cosmos; here too, we can pause for another statement
of this theme. This time however, we can be more specific
both in example and in relevance to modern times.
"Possibly the best way to bring out the contrast be-
tween the old psychology and the new," wrote John B. Watson
in 1924
is to say that all schools of psychology ex-
cept that of behaviorism claim that "con-
sciousness" is the subject matter of psychol-
ogy. Behaviorism, on the contrary, holds
that the subject matter of human psychology
is the behavior or activities of the human
being. Behaviorism claims that "conscious-
ness" is neither a definable nor a usable
concept; that it is merely another word for
the "soul" of more ancient times. The old
psychology is thus dominated by a kind of
subtle religious philosophy . 39
Here, Watson rejects the "soul" which Descartes found neces-
sary and concentrates instead upon behavior. His view of
the nervous system, though he could make use of modern elec-
trical knowledge in forming a metaphor and also by then had
benefit of a rather fully elaborated reflex theory, bears a
striking similarity to that of Descartes.
When a stimulus arises in a receptor . . .
the stimulus is carried off along preformed
and definite arcs to the effectors in the
order in which the arcs offer the least
resistance to the passage of the current.
^^John B. Watson, Behaviorism (New York: Norton, Id,, i),
p . 3 •
. . .But there is no formation of new path-
ways . ^0
Thus, Watson retains the machine-like physical body of
man and rejects the "soul" as the result of the domination
of a "kind of subtle religious philosophy." What seemed
subtle to Watson was a central factor to Descartes; for far
from being an incidental characteristic, religious philoso-
phy was central to Descartes' formulation. For Descartes,
it was only possible to explain the interaction of the mind
with the body by including the two in a larger more meaning-
ful framework. That is, he explained that a) the extended
physical body can give rise to sensations in the unextended
mental substance and b) the unextended mind can have valid
conceptualizations of the external world because God had
made the world of matter in such a fashion that the purely
mathematical concepts which were intuited by the mind were
perfectly applicable to it. Descartes' system required for
its complete meaning, a metaphysical wedding between the
world of extended matter in space and the world of unextended
thinking spirits--a wedding performed upon the altar of God.
By the time of Watson, psychology was no longer vexed by the
problems of wondering about the "true" relation of such
widely divergent entities and was unconcerned with whether
or not our scientific picture is a true copy of the real
^Watson, Behavior: An Introduction to Comparative
Psychology (New York: Holt , 191^+ ) > PP • 16-17 •
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extended world or if, in fact, it was simply a convenient
ordering of our unextended experiencing mind. It makes one
wish that Watson had taken the time to be more explicit
about his vision of the fulfillment he foresaw for individ-
uals in the behaviorist scheme when he expressed the senti-
ment that:
I wish I had the time to describe this, to
picture to you the kind of rich and wonderful
individual we should make of every healthy
child if only we could let it shape itself
properly and then provide for it a universe
in which it could exercise that organization--
a universe . . . free of foolish customs and
conventions which have no significance in
themselves, yet which hem the individual like
taut steel bands. . . . For the universe will
change if you bring up your children not in
the freedom of the libertine, but in behav-
ioristic freedom--a freedom which we cannot
even picture in words, so little we know of
it . 4l
Perhaps Watson would never admit to a vision from God
which was purveyed by "an Angel of the Lord" in a dream, yet
the scope of his thought seems hardly more circumscribed;
for he not only thought in universal terms but also sought
to "change" the universe by "controlling" behavior. One
way or another, it would seem, man needs both a vision of
what "constitutes a true man" (the human potentialities
which lie before him), and also a method to reach his goal;
for, sooner or later, and even if the explicit principles
of the science forbid it, man's desire to control his
fate
^Watson, Behaviorism , pp. 247-248.
in relation to nonmateriai ends always manifests itself.
In some very important ways, Descartes was simply more
honest than Watson, though it is doubtful that Watson was
intentionally dishonest since his limited materialistic
metaphysics simply did not allow the formulation of larger
questions
.
Whatever the problems which existed in the forefront
of the minds of those in the seventeenth century may have
been and however we wish to describe them today, it is im-
portant to note the tremendous contrasts which have arisen
between the Galileo-Descart es world-view, which itself was
a tremendous departure from that of the medieval tradition,
and the view of a large portion of modern psychologists.
In concluding an earlier section we asserted, that the
rise of modern science and philosophy, has had the combined
effect of divorcing the world of value from the world of
fact
—
primary and secondary qualities are an expression oi
that cleavage. We also asserted that the collapse of the
hierarchical teleology of the Middle Ages into the infinite
and indefinite universe in which all components and laws
were placed on the same level of being amounted to the cre-
ation of a world-view in which man became a homeless and
contingent being in a purposeless cosmos, a product of ran-
dom variation and natural selection with nothing but him-
self to rely on for meaning and survival—we see Watson's
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psychology as an expression of that existential crisis.
It is an expression of the spirit of man made homeless by
its progressive banishment at the hands of theory, experi-
ment and mathematical laws--the shiny surface of our pure
knowledge has become such a small facet of total being that
it can no longer reflect an adequate image of man. Watson
attempted, but was "unable to part from his own shadow."
His formulation of a method by which one could rely on one-
self for meaning and survival in the face of materialistic
response determinism is to be seen in the light of those
"larger" aspects of being which, while not recognized by
the theory, are, nonetheless, the stimuli for the type of
response toward a "universe unshackled" that characterized
the background of Watson's thought.
We must now begin to move more rapidly through the
historical channels that lead to modern psychological
thought. We have dwelt at length upon many issues of a
larger or cosmological nature in order to provide the type
of perspective that will form a useful contrast in latei
chapters when various alternatives to modern interpretations
are explored. The intent of the remainder of the historical
material of the seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth cen-
turies is to show: a) its relation to the roots already
presented and b) the continued and progressive narrowing of
the scope of phenomena considered meaningful for psychology.
Two seventeenth century thinkers oi' importance to the
present context remain to be considered: one scientist and
one philosopher.
1.2.5 ISAAC NEWTON ( 1642-1727)
Isaac Newton, it is often remarked, was born in the
same year that Galileo died, 1642; thus the two men repre-
sent, within their span of two generations, the formulation
of the basic doctrine of modern science. Newton's inventive
genius is widely known and his contributions of the calculus
and system of physical laws are, in many ways, the capstones
of the innovations of his great predecessor Galileo.
In terms of general scientific thought, Newton held
firmly to the principle that the scientist's role was to
describe and not to speculate, to create literal representa-
tions of the "laws on which the Great Creator actually chose
to found the Frame of the World. " Newton clearly saw the
world as a law abiding machine in which the laws of motion
and gravity were seen to apply to the smallest particle and
the farthest planet. The laws of the "Great Creator" were
the source of ordered forces on masses as opposed to a hier-
archy of purposes. This view contains the perfect justili-
cation that the world is completely predictable and it is
easy to see how Newton's belief in the existence of an in-
telligent Creator could eventually be dropped out in favor
of a purely self-contained mechanical system that had no
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room for human meaning and purpose.
Since Newton's scheme epitomizes the concentration
upon qualities that are treatable in quantitative ways it
naturally came to treat mass and velocity as the basic
terms of description. In this way Newton's considerable
weight and authority in matters scientific and philosophi-
cal was thrown squarely behind that of Galileo and final
causes were totally replaced by efficient causes; causality
became viewed as simply the action of forces between atoms
and all change was seen as totally explainable in terms of
the rearrangements of atoms.
1.2.6 JOHN LOCKE (l632-1704)
John Locke is an important philosopher in that he
wrote with a knowledge of Newtonian physics and therefore
elaborated a doctrine which was completely in keeping with
the status of physical science in the late seventeenth cen-
tury. When he wrote his famous Essay Concerning Human
Understanding in 1690
,
Locke elaborated a theory of psycho-
logical mechanism in which the basic elements were "ideas"
that behaved in ways very similar to Newton's "particles."
Of central concern to Locke in his treatment of ideas
as analogues of atoms was to establish how it was that
these ultimate particles came about. For many reasons
Locke found it necessary and advisable to restrict the
origination of ideas strictly to the results of experience,
he held that the mind was a "void of all characters, with-
out any ideas" until written upon by experience. "Let is
suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all
characters, without any ideas," Lock wrote as he posed the
question of how it might be that, "... it becomes fur-
nished?" and "Whence comes it by that vast store which the
busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an
endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason
and knowledge?" To these questions Locke had one answer,
a total and complete description of reality that left no
remainder. In framing that answer Locke created the first
real expression of a psychological empiricism when he re-
sponded to his rhetorical questions with, "To this I answer,
in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is
founded and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our
observation employed either, about external sensible objects
or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and
reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our undei-
standing with all the materials of thinking. These two are
the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we
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have, or can naturally have do spring."
Psychological empiricism then, is really a psychology
in which the basic units "ideas" form the atomic texture
^John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding,
ed. by A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Clarendon, 1894), quoted in
Lowry, Evolution of Psychological Theory, p. 19*
of mind. Locke elaborated this psychology by keying Ills
mechanistic mental description directly into physical the-
ory. He held that there were two kinds of ideas "simple"
and "complex." Simple ideas, he believed were those which
were derived directly from experience with the primary
qualities in nature and complex ideas were his way of main-
taining a strict empiricist position upon the derivation of
ideas, i.e., from experience, while at the same time being
able to explain how other ideas which did not derive from
experience came about. Since some ideas, for example the
concept of infinity, were obviously not derived from direct
experience of primary qualities Locke held that they re-
sulted from the compounding of simple ideas which were ex-
perienced directly.
In providing for the compounding of simple ideas, Locke
used the term association of ideas and thereby created the
"psychology of association" as a description of how ideas
became connected with one another. Since Locke's times were
still greatly reliant upon the order of nature as created by
God and the mind's ability to know that order directly as we
have seen in Descartes and Newton in particular, Locke did
not find it necessary to elaborate in great detail on why
some ideas allied with others. He just assumed that the
order was inherent in nature; wrong ideas therefore, were
simply those associated by chance ordering rather than
nature
'
s ordering.
Thus, Locke became the founding father of a psychology
which was explicitly based upon the new cosmology of modern
science and one which also opened up the way for many sub-
sequent "developments" in psychological theory-many of his
successors were to struggle with issues relating to the
formation of complex ideas, i.e., how they happen and what
accounts for the naturalness of some connections and the
unnaturalness of others.
1.3 THE WHITEHEADIAN FALLACY
OF MISPLACED CONCRETENESS
AND ITS RELATION TO THE
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY
Before closing this summary of the seventeenth century
it is well to consider some of the issues which, though
they belong to this time, were not obvious to the people
involved and only result from our modern interpretation of
their thought. A major interpretation of these times that
will be useful in later discussions is that of Whitehead.
Whitehead locates many of his central criticisms of
traditional science here in the seventeenth century.^
Central among these criticisms is what he calls the "Fal-
lacy of Misplaced Concreteness." This fallacy has three
major presumptive components, each of which was firmly es-
tablished in this epoch. First, there is the assumption of
43Whitehead, Science and the Modern World
, pp. 39-33.
"simple-location" which is the view that matter or material
can he completely described by the property of being simply
located in space and time. This assumption, Whitehead as-
serts, is a useful abstraction but one which totally in-
hibits the recognition that entities and processes do not
exist in isolation from one another and do, in fact, require
an explanation which involves other regions of space and
time. We will meet this assumption again in the next cen-
tury when we consider how Whitehead can assert that modern
science "has remained blandly indifferent to its refutation
by Hume." Another important presumption of the over-all
fallacy are the closely related categories of substance and
quality. Whitehead's main point here is that any analysis
of nature is based upon abstract concepts which are simpli-
fications of experience. He further points out that we
should always question just how "concrete" our thinking is
when it is based upon the "concrete" categories we are
using as the basis of our logical system. The substance-
quality problem arises from the character of that age which
believed in the absolute independence and reality, therefore
concreteness, of the indes true table particles of matter
which were the building blocks of nature. Thus, objects
were observed to have various qualities, some of which
we
predicated as belonging to the substance itself (pnmaxy
qualities) and others were accidental (secondary); that
is,
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added Lo the primary spatio- tempo ra L relationships that,
constitute the real world. The third element is not quite
as visible from what has been said as the other two have
been. This is Whitehead's "Doctrine of Mere Sensation" in
which he summarizes the tenor of empiricist thought by
pointing out that the early thinkers had assumed that the
primary activity in an act of experience is simply the bare
subjective entertainment of the datum. Under this assump-
tion they were happy in the concrete assurance that the
data of experience were true and not distorted by any sub-
jective form of reception.
From these examples and in conjunction with the pre-
vious material we see that misplaced concreteness is not
the result of an explicit decision to believe certain facts
within the framework of the knowledge and understanding of
an age but is, rather, a statement of the perpetual blind-
spot in the foveal vision of each age. When it comes to
comparing ultimate point s-of-view, science cannot be objec-
tive enough to weigh and measure the subjective parts of
its own existence.
Certainly the creative geniuses of the seventeenth
century would have been surprised indeed by Whitehead's
colorful summary of the practical outcome of their scienti-
fic philosophy. In characterizing the enormous success of
age, based as it was on the concepts of matter simply
49
located in space and time and mind as the perceiving and
reasoning but not interfering substance, he concluded that:
Thus nature gets credit which should in truth
be reserved for ourselves: the rose for its
scent: the nightingale for its song: and
the sun for its radiance. The poets are en-
tirely mistaken. They should address their
lyrics to themselves, and should turn them
into odes of self-congratulation on the ex-
cellency of the human mind. Nature is a dull
affair, soundless, scentless, colourless;
merely the hurrying of material, endlessly,
meaninglessly . 44
1.4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The proper conclusion of this chapter is a summary of
the main descriptive points which are central to the over-
all theme of this presentation. In outline form and not
necessarily in order of greatest importance, the following
points have been elaborated and to some extent justified.
First--we have witnessed the displacement of man from the
center of the cosmos and the gradual demise of his perceived
importance to that system.
Second--has been the increased emphasis placed upon the
power of reason as the basis for man’s dignity.
Third--is the all important rise of modern science with its
shift of emphasis from purposive explanations to experimen-
tation and theory in the language of mathematics. Mathemat-
ical description of "efficient” causes replaced teleological
emphasis on "final" causes.
44Ibid.
,
p . 54
.
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Fourth— Divine? purposes in nature worn increasingly ro-
placed by explanations of tho mechanico-mathematicul typo.
Wo moderns see that the seventeenth contury reaction to a
prior age which was dominated by religious thought lias cre-
ated tho modern ago which is dominated by scientific thought
and aro increasingly coming to seek a balance between tho
two types of explanation.
Fifth--wo have soon that the mechanistLc world-view, which
was part of the larger cosmology of tho seventeenth century,
and which was originally closely associated with tho methods
of science has become the modern metaphysics. At some point
scientific conclusions are also philosophical interpreta-
tions which tend to survive even when tho specific fact is
modified. Subsequent chapters will touch upon the "truth"
of materialism, determinism, and atheism which find their
"roots" in this age and which acted to dissolve man into a
solution of natural facts subject to mechanical law.
Sixth--The great success of physical thought carried over
into psychological thought with the result that only math*
-
matically doscribable elements of experience could be
classed as primary qualities of the external world.
view of nature was largely static because material configu-
rations were predictable by law so that no Fundamental ly
new novelty was soon as possible.
Seventh--in terms of the specific psychological issues w*>
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have seen the creation of the explicit mind-body dualism
and the beginnings of the long-standing problems of how to
deal with tho two abstract entities. Wo saw Descartes es-
tablish the closely allied doctrine that tho body has a
primary vitality of its own which is responsible for tho
theory of automata and ultimately leads to Behaviorism.
In Joim Loclco we found the elaboration of total psycho-
logical empiricism; ideational atomism with complex ideas
formed by association of simple ideas, and tho translation
of the physical doctrine of primary and secondary qualities
into psychological reality.
Tho amount of space which has been devoted to the
seventeenth century is, perhaps, large in relation to the
remainder of the material that must be covered. Yet, it is
only the barest sample of the volumes that have been written
and the material which could have been presented which also
would have been relevant to the topic at hand. Perhaps the
importance of the issues arising in this, the earliest cen-
tury of scientific development, is best underscored by
Whitehead's terse comment to the effect that the tremendous
success of the major assumptions of this age has "foisted
onto philosophy the task of accepting them as the most con-
crete rendering of facts. Thereby, modern philosophy has
45been ruined.
"
4.5Ibid.
,
p . 55 •
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2.0 THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY:
AN ENLIGHTENED AGE
In assessing the eighteenth century and its further
impact upon the development of modern thought we are imme-
diately confronted by the great difference between it and
its predecessor, the century which Whitehead referred to as
the "century of genius"; and of which he was willing to say,
A brief, and sufficiently accurate, descrip-
tion of the intellectual life of the European
races during the succeeding two centuries and
a quarter of our own times is that they have
been living upon the accumulated capital of
ideas provided for them by the genius of the
seventeenth century. ^6
The eighteenth century, like its immediate successors, was
a time in which the influence of the ideas of modern science
spread into many and diverse areas of human activity. There
were further developments in the physical sciences; biology
was founded in the pioneering work of Linnaeus and zoology
was launched by Buffon. It was an age of transition in
which the major characteristics of the modern cosmology:
its sharp distinction between the categories of mind
and
material, were gradually elaborated into a view of
nature
which was deterministic and reductionistic . It
was an age
which purchased its optimistic view of man's
perfec tabili ty
through reason at the expense of shifting from
concepts in-
volving the role of God, to the assumption of
skeptical,
^Whitehead
,
Science and the Modern World, p. 39 *
atheistic philosophies which venerated material scientific
progress
.
Before discussing the specific events which are most
relevant to the content of current psychological and educa-
tional theory, it is important to catch some flavor of the
over_all context of the times which spawned these specifics.
The eighteenth century, also known as the Age of Rea-
son, was one which venerated, above all else, the Newtonian
paradigm of scientific discovery as the pattern upon which
the acquisition of all knowledge should be based. While
Newton had firmly established the principles of satisfactory
scientific explanation, there was apt to be a great devia-
tion from his findings in the outcome of the application of
those principles. This is clearly shown in the work and
thought of Laplace, who, one hundred years after Newton,
put the final touches on the creation of the infinite uni-
verse of modern man. Newton had believed that the clock-
like world would run down if it were not for the energetic
God who ran the world according to His free-will and
deci-
sion. Even in his own time Newton was opposed by
Leibnitz
who was concerned to show that the world mechanism
was
self-sufficient and neither required nor admitted the
in-
tervention of God— though He was still seen as its Creator.
However, in the time of Laplace some of the
phenomena which
to Newton, were signs of God's hand in nature
were reduced
to mathematical formulation, i.e., scientific explanation.
For example, Newton had seen in the irregularities of plan-
etary orbits the requirement for God to interact; otherwise,
the imperfections might grow to unmanageable proportions.
Laplace, on the other hand, achieved a mathematical analysis
of these phenomena which related the questionable behavior
to the mutual attraction of the planets. Such empirical
success, combined as it was with an equally deterministic
theory of the origin of the solar system (his nebular hy-
pothesis) which apparently explained the original ordering
without the need of referring to God, is reported to have
prompted Laplace to respond to Napoleon's question about
why the role of God was missing in Laplace's volume System
of the World in which he had explained creation--"! had no
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need of that hypothesis."
This is a simple example of the widely used asseition
that belief in God must be exclusively located in a gap in
the scientific account of nature. A scientist with a faith
in God and also a faith in the advance of scientific in-
quiry found it increasingly difficult to reconcile the two
views, and Laplace seemed to heighten the discrepancy to
its limits by the forthright assertion of strict deter-
minism .
^Pierre Simon Laplace, quoted in Koyre , Closed Worl d
to Infinite Universe, p. 276.
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We ought then to regard the present stale of'
the universe as the effect of its anterior
state and as the cause of the one which is to
follow. Given for one instant an intelli-
gence which could comprehend all the forces
by which nature is animated and the respec-
tive situation of the beings who compose it--
an intelligence sufficiently vast to submit
these data to analysis--it would embrace in
the same foundation the movements of the
greatest bodies of the universe and those of
the lightest atom; for it, nothing would be
uncertain and the future, as the past, would
be present to its eyes. 8
In addition to the determinism expressed in the above quo-
tation is the associated view that "the same foundation of
movements" applies to all bodies in the universe. In other
words, all phenomena are seen as yielding to an ultimate
explanation in terms of physical laws. This iorm of reduc-
tionism has two main components. First ol all it relates
to Laplace's epistemology in that it contains the assoi t ion
that knowledge is knowledge of physical laws and second,
there is a relation to Laplace's metaphysics which holds
that reality is actually a composition of matter in motion.
We will meet this assumption again in the near future in
connection with the psychological theorizing of La Mettrie.
Here however, it is useful to note the importance of these
two notions for the belief that causality is shown by the
impact of one particle upon another. These views require
that cause and effect should be explained in terms
of
(New
^Laplace, A Philosophical Essays
York: Dover^ 1961 ) , P* iv.
on Probabilities
mechanical forces between two moving bodies--a view soon to
be exploded by Hume.
Along with the epistemological and metaphysical changes
relating to the new scientific doctrine there was a primary
effect upon the conception of God and His place and func-
tion in the lives of people. This transition has been
traced by Barbour^ and is formulated in three overlapping
stages. In the first stage, the earliest part of the cen-
tury, broad based support was to be found for traditional
revealed religion and also for rational religion which was
seen as an equally efficacious route to the same basic
truths. In the second stage of development, rational re-
ligion gained prominence and scriptural relevance was di-
minished in authority. In this view, the Benevolent Father
in Heaven became simply the Progenitor of the world-machine
the Cosmic designer of a world left to run on its own.
Finally, in the third stage of transition, people
became
increasingly dissatisfied with such a do-nothing God
who
was so irrelevant to everyday life and were
inclined to
view the church as an enemy of progress and
freedom.
Combined with this reaction to the established
tradi-
tion was the development of an increasingly
positive ap
praisal of the station of man and the power
of his reason.
Out of this trend grew the accolade, The
Enlightenment, as
49Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion, PP
•
60 - 62 .
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a description oi the now intellectual climate which saw the
power oi reason as the key to man's problems in all areas
of life-- science
,
religion and human affairs. The concept
of social law seemed a natural extension of the successes
obtained in discovering physical laws and their discovery
was seen as the key to the well-being of society and man.
What was wanting, was a Newton-like bringer of the knowl-
edge and understanding by which society could be regulated.
It was an age of implacable optimism in which freedom of
expression and opposition to dogmatism were important
values in the translation of the centuries long religious
view of man's salvation into a view which sought human per-
fection in man's unaided efforts to build a society on
earth which would be the modern version of the ancients'
"City of God.
2.1 THE ROMANTIC MOVEMENT: A
PLEA FOR INTERNAL REALITY
If it is true that the seventeenth century had pro-
duced a world which was seen as the result of the mechanism
of God and the mechanism of matter, it is also true that
the scientific scheme has outlived the religious scheme.
In the demise of that second great portion of its all too
limited metaphysics, modern science has lost the ability to
5°Charles L. Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eight-
eenth Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1932), Chapter 4.
give t lioorotrica I expreawlon lo man 1 h mo.si. inward and con-
crete thoughts. While competent engineering seemed to be
a complete replacement for religious teleology to some, the
age was not unanimous in its rejection of aspects of expe-
rience which did not fit within the neat schemes of scien-
tific thoughts. Accordingly, a movement known as the ro-
mantic reaction achieved visible status by the middle of
the eighteenth century.
There are two aspects of this movement which are most
relevant to our concerns. First, in the minds of those
involved in the movement there was the feeling, and ulti-
mately the assertion in poetic form, of the awareness that
the beauty of nature held a deeper spiritual reality which
linked all things together. In the poets' intuition is
found a greater apprehension of the reality of personal ex-
perience and the beauty of nature than can be found in the
cold categories of abstract science. Therefore, the liter-
ature of an age is a good clue to those inward thoughts of
a generation which are not expressible in terms of the laws
of nature and or the "laws" of society. Second, awareness
of the character of the romantic reaction is useful in
formulating a criticism of and a response to those limita-
tions we now perceive in that system.
For Whitehead , the topic is of such importance that
51Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , Chapter 5-
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lio (l«;vo Low an onhire rlin p l.<> r I n il,,s (,roa (moil l . II. i ,s his
endeavor to show that materialistic scientific phi losophy
is incapable of expressing the fundamental intuition of
mankind. Further, he asserts, (and we include this state-
ment as an indicator of things to come rather than an ex-
plication of Whitehead's position) "... that the whole
concept of materialism only applies to very abstract enti-
52ties, the products of logical discernment" and that there
is nothing sacred about these abstractions that renders
them irreformable or unalterable. His philosophy of organ-
ism is an attempt to bridge the gap between materialistic
science and the fundamental intuitions of the poet. For
example, he quotes Wordsworth's The Prelude as expressive
of the human feeling for nature, with its character of en-
twined and intermingled entities each suffused with the
presence of the others:
Ye Presences of Nature in the sky
And on the earth! Ye Visions of the hills!
And Souls of lonely places! can I think
A vulgar hope was yours when ye employed
Such ministry, when ye through many a year
Haimting me thus among my boyish sports,
On caves and trees, upon the woods and hills,
Impressed upon all forms the characters
Of danger or desire; and this did make
The surface of the universal earth,
With triumph and deli
Work like a sea? . .
ght
,
with hope and lear,
.
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^ 2Ibid.
,
p . 79 •
"^William Wordsworth, The Prelude quoted in Whitehead,
Science and the Modern World, p. 84.
It is Whitehead's intent to show that the standardized
concepts of science are too narrow to contain the expres-
sion of the more concrete facts of our apprehension and
that in relation to that basic apprehension the view of
nature which modern science imposes upon our thoughts is
very strange and paradoxical indeed. However one wishes
to describe the immanence of God in the world, it seems
strange indeed that the apprehensions wo know in our finer
moments of commerce with experience, undistorted by scien-
tific analysis, bear such little resemblance to the Being
early science saw as the external creator of an impersonal
machine
.
The poet's statement is a statement of divine indwell-
ing, an awareness of the spirit pervading man and nature as
known in man's own experience.
Whitehead's criticism of scientific abstractions is an
effort to establish a new doctrine which will be consonant
with the vivid expression of personal experience and one
which will "transfer to the very texture of realization in
itself that value which we recognize so readily in terms of
human life."^ However, before seeking the characteriza-
tion of this replacement view we must first trace the his-
torical foundation in the thought of the major figures who
simultaneously created the character of modern science and
^Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 9 3.
the need 1'or an alternative dor I. r i m;
.
(>2
Accordingly, we mu si
now move' to a discussion of those' i nd i v i < lua I s tlial limn I ho
major landmarks on our historical trek into modern limes.
This and subsequent treatments will become more narrowly
defined in terms of the specific topics of psychology as a
science as those topics begin to raise above the general
stream of scientific and philosophical thought and assume
an independent status. It has been the intent to establish
a broad enough view of the cultural milieu at the time of
the birth of modern science so that the personality charac-
teristics we will find in the later adolescent and early
adult stages of scientific thought will be more intelligible
on the one hand and more amenable to alteration on the
other
.
2.2 PSYCHOLOGY IN THE
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY
As one would expect, the psychological thought of the
eighteenth century mirrors many characteristics which are
contained in the age in general. In overview, we find that
the self-endowed accolade The Enlightenment carries the
very important connotation of being "enlightened" m rela-
tion to "darkness"— the darkness of the Middle Ages, of
course. For psychology this means that the new view of
man, which developed out of the characteristics of seven-
teenth century thought, contains several basic
implications
of the over-all paradigm shift that had taken
place. For
example, the shift from "the closed world to an infinite
universe" and i Ls attendant portrayal of man as a contin-
gent being in a purposeless cosmos created the basis for
psychology to view man not as a divine performer in a cos-
mic drama but as an animal, the most evolved animal, but
none- the-less an animal in a mechanical universe. Simi-
larly the new metaphysics had no room for the soul as a
first principle in the structure of reality; further, it
didn't simply ignore the concept it abhored it, with the
result that psychology found itself predisposed to eschew
the ancient concept of innate ideas in favor oi a thorough-
going empiricism. Within this over-all framework, we can
now treat the development of some specific psychological
issues as they occurred in the thought of the age.
The first point of note about eighteenth century psy-
chology is that two quite distinct trends are seen to evolve
out of the thought of its prime seventeenth century ances-
tors; Rene Descartes on the one hand and John Locke on
the
other. Descartes, it will be remembered, was heavily in-
volved in conceptualizations which utilized physiological
models of mental processes while Locke, being
thoroughly
imbued with the new Newtonian metaphysics, was content
with
creating a miniature mental cosmos in which all
the primary
factors in the operation of his mental mechanism
were di-
rect translations from the new metaphysics and
epistemology,
r»/i
i.o., ma I- 1- or in mo l ion.
Demonstrating the contrasts between the two views is
easiest if the topics are handled separately. Accordingly
we will treat Locke's followers first and then the heirs of
Descartes. It is also important to observe, at this junc-
ture, that in entering into the construction of psycho-
logical theory we are adding another order of magnitude to
the abstractive hierarchy of modern psychological knowledge.
That is to say, in the seventeenth century the split between
mind and matter was firmly established as the first abstrac-
tive steps in sundering the relationships between man and
the cosmos and of course, ultimately God. Here in the
eighteenth century, as we begin the formulation of theories
pertaining to the mind, we are building on a basis which
assumes the validity of its foundations and abstracts from
that abstraction, as it were, a new set of hypotheses which
are to help explain the basis from which they are derived.
This realization is important to the relevance of White-
head’s comments about the Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness,
and the character of the "high abstractions" which are in-
volved in it. Our present concerns here in the eighteenth
century are simply the next logical step in the abstractive
hierarchy which ultimately leads to the dizzying heights
of
specialization which characterize the modern sciences.
2.2.1 GEORGE BERKELEY ( 168 5- 17 5'})
In. Berkeley we have a lipure that is highly represen-
tative of the over-all changes that were taking place and
the way in which those changes influenced the specific
theorizing of the age. Berkeley, Whitehead observes,
"launched [a] philosophical criticism against the whole
55basis of the system." His primary motive in this came
from deeply held religious convictions which ran counter to
the train of thought which had been developed by Descartes
and Locke. Berkeley felt that the problems derived from
the supposed existence of matter which made it easy for
"impious and profane" persons to deny providence and to
attribute "the whole series of events either to blind
56
chance or fatal necessity.
"
In his criticism of the whole system Berkeley intro-
duced a great variety of arguments, some of which bear di-
rectly upon the psychological basis of mental mechanism.
Since Berkeley did not believe that the object of scientific
cognition was an independent and inert material substance,
he found it impossible to accept the distinction between
primary and secondary qualities. He wrote:
They who assert that figure, motion and the
rest of the primary or original qualities do
^Ibid
.
, p . 75 •
56George Berkeley, quoted in W. T. Jones, A History—oj_
Western Philosophy (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1952), P . 753
r
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exist without the mind, in unthinking sub-
stances, do at the same time acknowledge that
colours, sounds, heat, cold and suchlike sec-
ondary qualities, do not; which they tell us
are sensations, existing in the mind alone,
that depend on and are occasioned by the dif-
ferent size, texture and motion of the minute
particles of matter. . . . Now, if it be cer-
tain that those original qualities are insep-
arably united with the other sensible quali-
ties, and not, even in thought, capable of
being abstracted from them, it plainly fol-
lows that they exist only in the mind. . . .
In short, extension, figure, and motion, ab-
stracted from all other qualities are incon-
ceivable. Where therefore the other sensible
qualities are, there must these be also, to
wit in the mind and nowhere else. 57
Clearly, Berkeley’s attack on the doctrine of primary and
secondary qualities hits at the entire modern movement.
Ultimately, his arguments led him to the philosophical posi-
tion known as subjective idealism since all phenomena were:
a) in the mind and nowhere else (subjective) and b) the
result of having existence in God's thoughts rather than
empirical reality (idealism). Of primary concern here, of
course, are the implications of his position for psycho-
logy. It is not necessary to explore the explicit character
of Berkeley's philosophy.
Berkeley's argument against primary and secondary
qualities was extremely effective in its criticism of
Descartes and Locke because Berkeley showed that both the
vaunted primary and the secondary qualities are "inseparably
"^Berkeley
,
quoted in Jones, A History of Modern
Philosophy
, p. 75^ > Berkeley's emphasis.
In taking this posi-united" and exist "only in the mind."
tion Berkeley is, however, agreeing wi Lh Descartes and
Locke that sense perception is a subjective affair; he sim-
ply equates the two qualities which had earlier been placed
on different ontological levels.
This extreme form of subjectivism created the need to
explain the apparent existence of the external world of
sense objects. To do this, Berkeley relied upon Locke's
doctrine that ideas were the basic building blocks of the
mind and added the doctrine of contiguity as the means by
which the ideas are associated with one another. This
formulation led ultimately to Berkeley's famous saying of
objects that their "esse est percipi" that is, to be real,
a stone for example, required the coexistence of the visual
ideas of color, shape, texture, etc. and also the ideas of
resistance and pain so that the whole complex would add up
to the proper sensation when one's toe came in contact with
the stone.
Berkeley extended his views and elaborated them into a
theory of vision in which he asserted that the perception of
distance is not a pure perception at all but is, on the
contrary, simply a construction which relies upon the \ e-
peated and contiguous association of the relevant ideas
that constitute the perception of depth. Depth perception,
he believed, was constructed out of experience with visual
68
impressions (two dimensional retinal images) which wore as-
sociated with tactile and kinesthetic sensations. In this
theoretical account primacy in the determination of depth
perception is given to tactile as opposed to visual sensa-
tions and creates an issue that will grow to be of great
importance in later theoretical contexts.
In sum, we see Berkeley's psychology as continuing,
with major modification, the mental mechanist views of
Locke and leaving in its wake a more firmly established
tradition of mentality as composed of the association of
ideas and the operation of contiguous paring. On the phi-
losophical side, we have ignored the traditional account of
subjective idealism but must, at this point, pause briefly
to explore a topic that will be of importance to the devel-
opment of Whitehead's alternative to materialism and its
uses in psychology.
2.2.2 WHITEHEAD ON BERKE-
LEY AND PREHENSION
Whitehead goes back to those criticisms of the basic
system which are found in Berkeley and remarks that Berkeley
. . .
failed to affect the main stream of
scientific thought. It flowed on as if he
had never written. Its general, success made
it impervious to criticism, then and since
.
The world of science has always remained
perfectly satisfied with its particular ab-
stractions. They work, and that is suffi-
cient for it. 58
58Whitehoad, Science and the Modern World , p. 66,
emphasis added.
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Whitehead's contention is that modern scientific thought
(ours included) rests upon assumptions (abstractions) which
are too narrow for the concrete facts of our intuitive ex-
perience. Berkeley, he believes, is an important clue to
that wider basis for scientific thought. It is important
to note that, with the development of this topic, we are
anchoring a modern philosophical criticism of past philo-
sophical thought in the context in which that past thought
originally arose. This departure from historical sequence
is important because it can allow some anticipation of the
modern Whiteheadian position as we move through the subse-
quent stages of thought as developed by Berkeley's eight-
eenth, nineteenth and twentieth century successors.
Whitehead asserts that Berkeley was, in effect, denying
59
the notion of simple location when he said in his Prme 1 -
pies of Human Knowledge :
When we do our utmost to conceive the exis-
tence of external bodies, we are all the
while contemplating our own ideas. But the
mind taking no notice of itself , is deluded
to think it can and does conceive bodies
existing unthought of or without the mind,
though at the same time they are apprehended
by or exist in itself. . . • It is very ob-
vious, upon the least inquiry into our
thoughts, to know whether it be possible lor
us to understand what is meant by the abso -
lute existence of sensible objects in them-
selves. or without the mind. To me it is
5^cf
. ,
chapter 1, Section 1.3> The Whiteheadian Fallacy.
of Misplaced Concreteness and its Relation to the Seventeenth
Century .
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evident tlioso words mo rk out oillior a direct
contradiction, or else nothing at all.
. . .
^
As we have seen, Berkeley held an extreme idealist po-
sition in which the ultimate reality of the mind is struc-
tured by the unity of nature as it arises from the unity in
the mind of God. Whitehead offers an alternative to this
view which he calls a "provisional realism" and by which he
proposes to widen the scientific scheme in a way more useful
to science than Berkeley's metaphysical tactics. The key
to this all important Whiteheadian alternative lies in the
nature of one's view of the process of perception. For
Whitehead
,
the traditional topic of perception is a confused
issue because the elaboration, through the centuries, of
the basic assumptions we have seen develop in the thoughts
Descartes and Locke have clothed the topic with many
meanings. Specifically, perception is primarily associated
with the idea of cognition or cognitive apprehension.
Whitehead is at pains to cut beneath these common usages
and to get at the idea of apprehension as devoid of cogni-
tion. To accomplish this feat he is forced to add another
neologism to the specialized Whiteheadian vocabulary that so
often frustrates initial attempts to understand his scheme
of ideas. For the notion of uncognitive apprehension
Whitehead substitutes the term "prehension" as a means of
Berkeley, quoted in Whitehead, Science and the Mod -
ern World
,
p. 68, Whitehead's emphasis.
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providing the:
• • . vehicle by which one actual entity be-
comes objectified in another
. . . they[prehmsionsi] are "vectors"; for they feel
here. 6? itiS£S-
and transfo™ it into what is
a more complete definition, but one which requires for its
complete understanding, greater explication than is possible
in the present context is:
a
p
;
eh®nsion consists of three factors:) the "subject" which is prehended, namely,the actual entity in which that prehension'
it. a concrete element; b) the "datum" whichis prehended; c) the "subjective form" whichxs how that subject prehends that datum. °2
Prehension then, is primarily a means by which it is
possible to explain the fact that things here in this place
where the perceived happens to be can have reference to
other places there where the porceiver happens not to bo.
Berkeley, in the passage quoted above, held that it was a
delusion for the mind "to think it can and does conceive
bodies existing [there ] unthought of or without the mind."
In other words, Berkeley asserts the subjectivits position
that in order for entities to be real they must be perceived
within the unity of the mind and that the mind should not
forget itself in the process. For Whitehead, prehension is
a substitute for Berkeley's mind and is a process by which
61
Whitehead, Process and Reality
, p. 133, Whitehead's
emphasis
.
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Ibid
.
, p. 35.
the realization of a perception arises as a result of the
. .
.
gathering of things into the unity of a
prehension; and that what is thereby realized
is the prehension, and not the things. This
unity of a prehension defines itself as here
and now, and the things so gathered into the
grasped unity have essential reference to
other places and other times. ^3
Thus, prehension describes a progressive real izal ion
of natural occurrences in which the idea of process is a
concrete fact and functions in lieu of the "concrete" farts
of the old system which had the property of simple location.
Process replaces matter and is a main metaphysical assump-
tion of the philosophy of organism. In the process frame-
work, space and time are not the containers into which mat-
ter can be placed and therefore simply located; rather, a
region of space and time is a simply located unit of real-
ized experience.
The apparent unintelligibility of that last statement
should be viewed in light of the fact that Whitehead is de-
veloping a parallel line of argument which bases its system
of thought upon the concept of organism and not upon i he
concept of matter. And, for the moment, we must concur
with his statement to the effect that a considerable expan-
sion is required as well as a confrontation with the actual
implications of the view in terms of concrete experience
before the organismic concept of prehension can become
^Whitehead
,
Science and the Modern World , p. bd.
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i ii t (' 1 I i.g i b l o .'
Surely il is true that "the main si roam ol sc Lon li lie
thought . . . flowed on as if [Berkeley] had never written"
and a different basis of abstraction seems strange indeed.
This disparity of views is another example of the type of
disparity referred to earlier in connection with the con-
trast between the idea of time as it appeared to Aristotle
64
and Galileo and suggests that the threshold of cosmo-
logical change has again caught the toe of the practical
foot of scientific progress.
2.2.3 DAVID HUME (1711-1776)
In David Hume we come to the first Important departure
from the general trends we have been considering up to this
point. Hume, unlike the others, was a man who held no
reverence for religious views and saw the appeals to God
so characteristic of Berkeley's thought as a form of mys-
ticism. The depth of his conviction is amply demonstrated
by the response he gave, while on his death bed, to a ques-
tion about the after-life. Hume is reported to have re-
sponded that
:
It was also possible that a piece of coal
wheh put upon the fire would not burn.
[That] men should exist forever [was] a most
unreasonable fancy. • • • The trash of even a
age must then be preserved, and . . . new
.
,
Chapter 1, Section 1.2.2, Galileo .
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universes . . . created to contain such in-
finite numbers. 65
A rationalist to the very end like Hume can be expected to
create some unusual ripples in the pool of accumulated
knowledge and wisdom--such, indeed, was the case.
As Berkeley's successor, he was a mental mechanist who
accepted the dissolution of the distinction between primary
and secondary qualities and also had great affinity for
most of Locke's psychological theory. Hume's most salient
general characteristic is, then, aside from the incisive
genius with which he is generally credited, his departure
from the "constraints" of religious influence and the com-
plete reliance upon the issue of a clear logical intellect
as the ultimate source of truth.
Once the covering hypothesis of God had been stripped
away, Hume saw, more clearly than his predecessors, that
the whole idea of mental mechanism was keyed into the basic
idea of association. Unless he could explicitly determine
the nature of association Hume saw no hope of establishing
a reliable basis for human knowledge.
In his analysis, Hume started from the position that
the only place reliable knowledge is to be found is in
sense impressions; in this, his epistemological basis for
^David Hume, from Private Papers of James Boswelj-,
G. Scott, and F. A. Pottle, eds., quoted in Jones, A His-
tory of Western Philosophy, p. 764.
knowledge was not only coinp Into but also quite explicit:
7 r>
When we entertain, therefore, any suspicion
that a philosophical term is employed without
any meaning or idea (as is but too trequent),
we need but enquire, from what impression is
that supposed idea derived? And if it be
impossible to assign any, this will serve to
confirm our suspicion. By bringing ideas
into so clear a light we may reasonably hope
to remove all dispute, which may arise, con-
cerning their nature and reality.
Hume therefore, is wedded to an atomistic view in
which the only road to clear and precise knowledge is to
refer to the succession of individual sense impressions.
Obviously, the relation between these sense impressions
must be all-important to a concept of mind which is based
upon their storage, rearrangement and comparison.
Up to this point, Hume has essentially been summarizing
the earlier empiricist psychologists; however, he goes
on
to elaborate the necessary relationship between
ideas m
the mind and sense impressions in finer detail:
... we may divide all the perception of the
mind into two classes or species, which are
distinguished by their different degrees ot
force and vivacity. The less forcible and
lively are commonly denominated Thoughts 01
Ideas. The other species want a name in
our language , and in most others; I suppose,
because it was not requisite for any, but
philosophical purposes, to rank them undei
general term or appellation. Let us, there-
fore, use a little freedom, and call them
Impressions. ... By the term impression
I mean alTour more likely perceptions when
quo
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ted
Hume
,
An
in Jones,
Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding,
' A History of Western Philosophy, p. 7^1
76
we hear, or see, or te.Ll, or love
,
or hate
or desire, or will. And impressions are dis-
tinguished from ideas, which are less lively
perceptions, of which we are conscious, when
we reflect on any of those sensations or
movements above mentioned. 67
Hume, then, felt he was creating a new category of
understanding by developing the concept of impressions--one
which "wants a name in our language." An important attrib-
ute of this formulation is that it creates an explicit basis
in mental mechanism for the assertion that "ideas" and "im-
pressions" stand in a one-to-one relationship and differ
from one another only in terms of how lively they are. In
other words, ideas are generated by impressions and are the
faint copies of which we are aware of when we "reflect."
Another important insight into the specifics necessary
to make the mental machine an operable mechanism is found
in his assumption that both impressions and ideas, which
fit under the general classification of perceptions, can be
analyzed into their primitive components.
There is another division of our perceptions,
which it will be convenient to observe, and
which extends itself to both our impressions
and ideas. This division is into s impl
e
and
complex . Simple perceptions or impressions
and ideas are such as to admit of no distinc-
tion or separation. The complex are contrary
to these, and may be distinguished into
parts. Though a particular color, taste,
and smell are qualities all united togethei
in this apple; it is easy to perceive that
67 Ibid.
,
p. 766
.
they are not the same
,
but are at least dis-
tinguishable from each other. 68
Thus, complex ideas are seen to derive from the discrete
sensory qualities of the original complex sensation and are
the result of recombination in the mind of those elementary
sensations according to the laws of association. Hume
found it impossible to account for the apparent fact that
simple ideas can be associated into complex ideas which are
a veridical, if weaker, copy of the original complex sensa-
tion without having some sort of universal principle to
guide the process. While it was clear to Hume that such a
principle was needed, it should also be pointed out that
neither Locke or Berkeley had required such a principle be-
cause they had direct recourse to a belief in God and the
order of his nature. Hume, on the other hand, having cut
himself off from that source of order and meaning, holding
as he did that it was mostly nonsense, needed some bond
between simple ideas which would account for the observed
natural affinity of some ideas for other ideas. According-
ly, he posited that:
There is a kind of attraction, which in the
mental world will be found to have as extra-
ordinary effects as in the natural, and to
show itself in as many and as varied forms.
^Hume
,
A Treatise on Human Nature , quoted in R.
Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory , p. 28.
^Ibid.
,
p . 29 •
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In this, Hume, duo to tin* in II none <> oC Now Ionian cosmology
in his thinking, can be soon to be seeking the universal
he requires as an analog to the universal force of gravity
which made Newton's world work. In Hume's mental world
the universal was the association of ideas which functioned
according to two laws: resemblance and contiguity.
Hume's elaboration of the mental mechanist view of
perception (a category in which he placed all mental opera-
tions) led him to challenge the traditional view of cau-
sality. In the very beginning of the development of modern
science Galileo, as we have seen, looked closely into phe-
nomena and observed their behavior in terms of abstract
qualities such as velocity and friction. In operating with
the quantifyable abstractions which resulted from this
analysis, it was a natural step for Galileo and subsequent
physical scientists to come to the conclusion that the
condition of a physical body at any one moment is the
direct result of its condition at a preceding moment.
Physical events came to be viewed as necessarily determined
by their antecedent events and such "necessary determina-
tion" means the same thing as a law--a necessary connection
by which the operation of a cause must always lead to an
effect
.
Cause and effect for Hume, according to his theory of
mental operation, was simply the repeated temporal
succession
of sense impressions in which the only real connection was
a psychological expectancy that was gradually built up
rather than the operation of any real "law" in nature. The
laws of nature thus became the force of habit which is de-
termined according to the principles of association--reality
is constructed out of simple ideas. An important implica-
tion of this formulation is that science does not observe
necessity in the connections of the physical world but only
the operation of probable expectation based on previous
experience
.
Hume's extreme empiricism actually amounted to a refu-
tation of the supposed efficacy of reason which was a major
characteristic of his age. In particular, he refuted the
explicit foundation of all modern science in his assertion
that science instead of being able to demonstrate the rea-
sons why events occur according to the laws of nature, is
limited to empirical generalization. Given Hume's view on
causality, i.e., habit as opposed to law, it was quite
natural for him to assert that the inductive procedures of
science amount to nothing more than the observation of past
experience. Further, he compounded the problem with the
acute observation that no matter how many times event "A"
had been followed by event "B," there was absolutely
no
basis for saying that the same sequence would
necessarily
pertain in the future, even if one admitted the
probabilist
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nature of the connection. This condition was true, Hume
asserted, because there was no intrinsic reason In the
nature of events that made one event necessarily more prob-
able than any other. He considered every datum in the
world as loose and discrete and that the process of logical
inference was simply a best guess based on past experience
(habit). Not only did he show that general laws cannot be
derived from particular observations as above, but he also
closed the door on the process by demonstrating its
circularity
.
We have said that all arguments concerning
existence are founded on the relation of
cause and effect; that our knowledge of that
relation is derived entirely from experience,
and that all our experimental conclusions
proceed upon the supposition that the future
will be conformable to the past. To endeavor,
therefore, the proof of this supposition by
probable arguments, or arguments regarding
existence, must be evidently going in a cir-
cle, and taking that for granted, which is
the very point in question. 70
One of the main points upon which we will later criti-
cize Hume * s empiricism is his failure to account for the
role of the creative human intelligence (self) as the in-
ventor of the concepts by which the data is interpreted.
Hume was prevented from realizing such a concept by the
narrowness of his premises on the one hand and the rigor of
his logic on the other. Since all ideas are not only
^°Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , quoted in Jones,
A History of Western Philosophy , p. 768
.
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derived from impressions but are also only found in the
form of simple ideas, they must be compounded by experience
into complex ideas. Therefore, Hume was faced with two
problems: first, any way of adding up simple ideas is re-
stricted to the production of the complex ideas of things
which exist only in the external world and is therefore
incapable of generating the complex idea of "self"; second,
given the first constraint, Hume is then restricted to
finding the source of self in some simple idea. Now simple
ideas can only result from simple impressions so he must
find a simple impression that will account for self. To
this possibility Hume responds:
. . . from what [simple] impression could
this idea be derived? . . . Pain and pleasure,
grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed
each other, and never exist at the same time.
It cannot therefore, be from any of these im-
pressions, or from any other, that the idea
of self is derived; and consequently there is
no such idea . 71
Here, we can anticipate our future commentary with a
few remarks. First of all, Hume was restricted by his
principle of contiguity from reaching beyond the succession
of momentary sense impressions and thus exemplifies White-
head's more general criticism of abstract theories which
holds that
:
^Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , quoted in Lowry,
The Evolution of Modern Psychology, P~T~30, emphasis added
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The relevance of evidence is dictated by
theory. For you cannot prove a theory by
evidence which that theory dismisses as ir-
relevant . 7 2
The evidence in question here, is the evidence of experi-
ence which Hume ignored in his theory and which later
formed the basis for William James' criticism and alterna-
tive view:
. . . the attempt to treat "cause, " for con-
ceptual purposes, as a separable link . . .
has led to the denial of efficient causation,
and to the substitutes for it of the bare
descriptive notion of uniform sequence among
events [Hume's position]. Meanwhile the con-
crete perceptual flux, taken just as it
comes, offers in our own activity-situations
perfectly comprehensible instances of causal
agency. The transitive causation in them
does not, it is true, stick out as a sepa-
rate fact for conception to fix upon. Rather
does a whole subsequent field grow continu-
ously out of a whole antecedent field because
it seems to yield new being of the nature
called for, while the feeling of causality-
at-work flavors the entire concrete sequence
as salt flavors the water in which it is dis-
solved . 7 3
As suggested by James, there is perhaps an entire alterna-
tive view of the content of experience which not only makes
a place for the self but also does away with the atomistic
view of experience in favor of a view which not only
recognizes the "concrete perceptual flux" in which
"causality-at-work" stresses the contextual character of
^Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas , p. 284.
^William James, Some Problems in Philosophy (New York
Longmans, Green, 191l)> PP» 217-218.
knowledge but also posits the appreciation of wholes as
well as parts and connections between them that are closer
to organismic relations than mechanical ones.
David Hume, no doubt, would have found William James'
statement quite unpalatable and completely without the
savor of the salt of self that flavors the entire concrete
sequence in which it is dissolved. Yet, surely, the poet
Wordsworth would have appreciated the taste and found in
it a place for the entwined and intermingled entities,
each suffused with the presence of the others, that he knew
in his deeper intuitions. However, in the nearly two hun-
dred years that separate the comments of Hume and James,
the mainstream of scientific thought remained truly imper-
vious to changes in course, flowing on instead, in its ma-
terialistic channel, while busying itself with the task of
wearing a deeper canyon in the territory of abstractions.
2 . 2 .
k
THE PHYSIOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE
The line of development that has been considered so
far is, as we have repeatedly asserted, primarily inspired
by analogies which derive from the Newtonian physical
theory. Mental mechanism, as it was developed by Locke,
Berkeley and Hume was always inspired by a basic assumption
of the Newtonian metaphysics; namely, that matter can be
thought of as having the property of simple location, i.e.,
the assumption that matter can be completely described by
8>i
Locating it in space And t-iino without reference to any
other entity. The mental mechanists did not deviate from
this formulation in applying this metaphysical assumption
to the description of the phenomena of the human mind.
Thus, they unflinchingly and unswervingly analyzed all com-
plex mental phenomena in terms of distinct elementary com-
ponents. However, the application of metaphysical princi-
ples did not necessarily suffice to formulate a complete
explanation. In particular, the reference to atomistic
sensations failed to capture another very important aspect
of that metaphysics, namely, motion. Matter and motion
were hand and glove concepts and the use of one without the
other created, in some minds, the feeling that something
was missing.
In light of this feeling, there were some (those who
followed the lead of Descartes) who were less metaphysical
and more physical. That is, while the mechanists had never
specified just what it was that an "idea" was, and were
happy with the metaphysical similarity between the mental
and physical worlds; others wanted to pin down the piecise
nature of what an idea was and to define it in physical
t erm s
.
However, the problem was not simply restricted to ef-
forts to do a better job of mental engineering through a
more successful application of scientific principles, the
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question went deeper than that. On the mechanist explana-
tion Hume had finally come to the point of even being skep-
tical of self and, as we shall see, the efforts on behalf
of the physiological explanation are to accomplish much the
same goal. At stake here, then, is the original insight of
Descartes as to the separation of mind from body. Descartes
saw, because of his religious conviction, that the body of
man was animated by the same sort of spirit that animated
other animal bodies but also, in addition, contained a ra-
tional soul that was the directive force for its behavior.
He found that he could doubt everything except the fact
that he thought; and was able to use this assurance as a
validation of the fact that in addition to an animal body,
he also had a rational soul that could assert its own exis-
tence in "cogito ergo sum." However, much of the certitude
of that view comes from Descartes' assumption of two types
of matter, one physical and extended, the other mental and
unextended. As long as physical and extended matter could
be kept in its place, Descartes' position was unassailable;
however to those who saw no need to make such a distinction
it seemed an obvious move to view thinking as a natural
function of the highly complex organization of matter which
is found in man.
Such a view was first put forth by Julien de La Met-
trie in the middle of the eighteenth century. In 17^8
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La Met trie published a volume called Man a Machine which
contained the explicit assertion that it was simply the
complexity of his organizational structure that separated
man from the ape. Thinking was simply the natural function
of the brain in just the same way that breathing is to the
lungs or secretion to the glands. Lowry remarks that
La Mettrie's "... concern was to present a programmatic
outline for a theory, based upon the concept of complexity
of organization, . .
.
[and] his effect upon the subsequent
history of psychological thought must be seen chiefly as a
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stimulus and as a challenge," and then goes on to conclude
with La Mettrie's closing words to his L' Homme Machine :
Let us then conclude boldly that man is a ma-
chine, and that in the whole universe there
is but a simple substance differently modi-
fied. . . . Such is my system, or rather the
truth, unless I am much deceived. It is
short and simple. Dispute it now who will. 1 5
2.2.5 DAVID HARTLEY (1705-1757)
La Mettrie's programmatic proposal was also quite con-
sonant with another and contemporary view which was being
independently developed by David Hartley in England. Since
Hartley was a physician it seems natural that he would lean
more toward some sort of "physiologizing" than otliei fol-
lowers of the British school of Associationistic philosophers
^Lowry, The Evolution of Psychologi cal Theory, p. 45.
7
^julien de La Mettrie, L 1 Homme Machine , quoted in
Ibid.
,
p . 45
•
«7
whose theories of mental mechanism we have been following.
Accordingly, Hartley started from a definition of associa-
tion which paralleled that of his contemporaries and gave
prominence to the idea of contiguity.
Any sensations A, B, C, etc., by being associ-
ated with one another a sufficient number of
times, get such a power over the corresponding
ideas a, b, c, etc., that anyone of the sensa-
tions A, when impressed alone, shall be able
to excite in the mind b, c, etc., the ideas
of the rest. 76
Hartley, however, was quick to move well beyond the
mental mechanists by postulating the actual physiological
basis for the association of ideas. Here again, we see the
presence of the Newtonian influence in psychological theory.
In this case, Hartley called upon the same type of argument
that Newton had used to make an important aspect of his
theory intelligible. The problem for Newton was to explain
a phenomenon labeled "action at a distance" in a nonmysti-
cal way. That is to say, any consistent theory which is
based upon a model of a mechanical universe requires some
principle to explain the influence of one particle upon the
77
other when there is no obvious contact between them.
Newton chose to call his explanatory mechanism aether
^David Hartley, Observations on Man: His Frame, His
Duty, His Expectations" quoted in Ibid., p. 4bV
^An illuminating history of action at a distance is
to bo found in M. Capek The Philosophical Impac t of Con-
temporary Physics , pp. 83-89.
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(other) which was thought to ho a continuous medium ot con-
tiguous particles that transmitted forces at a distance by
their vibratory motion. Accordingly, Hartley felt perfectly
justified in creating a corresponding mechanism for mental
phenomena which regarded sensations as the initiators of
vibration in the material of the brain.
Of course, Hartley's speculations upon the nature of
the physiological mechanism for the association of ideas
did not rest upon the results of experimental inquiries;
but then, neither did Newton's. What was wanted was a
coherent explanation of the facts as given and this is ex-
actly what Hartley found in his "vibratiuncles " (little
vibrations). Now that he had a physical concept to work
with as opposed to the metaphysical nature of the mecha-
nists' "ideas," Hartley went on to elaborate the explana-
tory power of his idea. Specifically, he held that each
sensation generated a localized vibration in the brain.
From this it followed quite naturally that: a) the vibra-
tion would die out gradually when the sensation was re-
moved; b) vibrations could and would diffuse in the brain
and thus become associated with one another when their
sensations were contiguous.
In addition to these concepts, Hartley also developed
an explanation of motivation in which the physical action
observable as the result of motivation was explained by the
"fact" that motory vibrat iuncles had become associated with
those of ideas so that ideas could then excite the muscles
and make them contract. Apparently he did not think to
inquire why a shower of ideas was not generated when, for
example, someone's arm is pumped up and down without their
willing it.
2.2.6 ENLIGHTENED EGALITARIANISM
At the beginning of our consideration of the eighteenth
century we pointed out that its character differed signifi-
cantly from that of its predecessors. We referred to it as
an "enlightened" age which professed great optimism about
the outcome of its new intellectual adventures in competent
engineering as opposed to the old view which found its
meaning in religious teleology. We aJ so paused brio! Ly (o
describe some of the reactions that developed to the narrow
efficiency of scientific thought and developed some prelim-
inary discussion of modern criticisms of those early as-
sumptions. Now, in concluding the direct commentary on the
eighteenth century, it will be useful to once again take
an over-all view of the character of eighteenth century
thought but to do so, this time, from the perspective of
some of the detailed psychological arguments that have
developed during the period.
In earlier discussions we have often referred to the
shifted cosmological picture in which man came to see
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himself as a contingent being in a purposeless cosmos.
Here, at the end of the eighteenth century, we see that one
of the implications of that over-all shift has been to re-
move the extreme differences that had existed between the
relative status of men and animals. Beginning with Descar-
tes, there was a progressive tendency to equate not only
man's animal body with nature but also to explain all his
mental attributes and finer sensitivities as simply the
result of his complex neural organization. Thus, man was
seen as differing only in degree from the animals at a time
well before Darwin's great discovery.
Of equal importance was the increased emphasis on
theoretical explanations which placed the primacy of all
intellectual life upon the ideas generated by experience
(Empiricism). While the earliest theorizers, Locke and
Descartes for example, had ascribed a definite place to the
role of innate ideas which presumably were related to God's
nature, the shift to increasingly empirical formulations,
as a result of the influence of the success of the Newto-
nian cosmology, brought the neglect of "nativism" m favor
of a view which stressed nurture as opposed to nature. And
both prevalent psychologies, mental and physiological,
were
agreed upon the primacy of the environment as the source of
the ideas that distinguished man from animals.
be said of the wholesale environmentalismThus, it can
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which prevailed in the latter eighteenth century that Llio
basis of three important characteristics of the modern out-
7 8look had been firmly established. First, to understand
man, one needed simply to understand his environment since
he was a product of that environment. Second, since the
observed differences between men are due to environmental
influences, the old divisions between princes and paupers,
haves and have nots, were no longer tenable and a new
social-political philosophy developed which asserted the
intrinsic equality of all men. And finally, a third major
implication was that, man, now beholden only to his envi-
ronment, had the right to manipulate that environment for
his own purposes and to his own ends. No longer could the
divine right of kings be viewed as an acceptable doctrine;
men now had the power to define their own ends based upon
their intrinsic human equality.
Perhaps nowhere is the spirit of this age better
summed up than in the expressed sentiments of a dissident
group of people, who, from their remote and savage corner
of the globe, in early July of the year seventeen hundred
and seventy-six, launched a movement, destined to become
one of the greatest adventures in the history of man, with
the following immortal words:
7 8
Lowry, op . ci
t
.
,
p. 55*
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We hold these truths to bo self-evident; that
all men are created equal; that they are en-
dowed by their creator with certain unalien-
able rights; that among these are life, lib-
erty and the pursuit of happiness; that to
secure these rights, governments are insti-
tuted among men, deriving their just powers
from the consent of the governed; that when-
ever any government becomes destructive to
these ends, it is the right of the people to
alter or abolish it, and to institute a new
government, laying its foundations on such
principles, and organizing its powers in such
form, as to them shall seem most likely to
effect their safety and happiness.
2.3 IMMANUEL KANT: TRANSITION
TO THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
As the eighteenth century drew to a close, the scien-
tific enterprise seemed to be in rather serious philosophi-
cal trouble; recall, that Hume had succeeded, via his
scepticism, in demonstrating that there was no validity to
inductive inference and that scientific thinking amounted
to nothing more than a "leap in the dark." Apparently, the
working scientists of the day were not bothered by the fact
that they were wondering in the dark and kept right on
making advance after advance; all the while becoming more
secure in the knowledge that science was the way to under-
stand the facts of the universe. Of course, since the ma-
terial universe was seen as a deterministic machine, they,
along with Hume, saw little possibility of including the
traditional teleological and valuational views of life
within the scientific enterprise which concerned itself
with the world of neutral fact.
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It, was the German philosopher Tmmanuel Kant who saw
most clearly that something had gone wrong with the scien-
tific account of reality. Kant (1724-1804), labored to
bring together the two major trends of empiricism and ra-
tionalism which existed at that time. Kant’s solution was
to combine the apparently divergent approaches into a novel
synthesis which left room, within the methods of scientific
thought, for religious and moral thought. He accomplished
this synthesis by pointing out that earlier scientists and
philosophers had tended to concentrate upon either the ra-
tional or the empirical aspect of experience to the exclu-
sion of the other one. Specifically, the rationalist trend
had taken mathematics as the ideal standard of knowledge
and therefore tended to see all knowledge as relations
which existed between mathematical propositions. Because
they saw the Will of God as the important source of order
in the world, an order knowable in mathematical terms, they
rejected perception as an unworthy and unreliable method of
acquiring knowledge. This, of course, was the approach
taken by Descartes. On the opposite side of the picture
stood the empiricists, who asserted that whatever came from
the rationalistic analysis was based upon the immediate
data of self-awareness and that all knowledge therefore was
based upon the awareness of mental states. John Locke and
the mental mechanists exemplify this trend; and, as we have
seen, the argument had reached a genuine .unpass in Hume '
s
thought
.
Kant started from the position that both factors, the
empirical and the rational, were important not only to the
philosophical basis of science but also to the long-standing
problem of how to make a place for value in a world of
fact. In this, he was actually providing for a reconcilia-
tion between science and religion and saw that one of the
main impediments to his task was the metaphysical dualism
of Descartes. Since Kant did not wish to reinforce his ar-
gument by metaphysical considerations, his was to be a Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, he had little use for the old separa-
tion of the knower from the known and of the subject from
the object because that separation, which had appeared real
to Descartes, was not a real substantive one. On the con-
trary, the introduction of independent minds and independ-
ent bodies (substances) created the need to have an inter-
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vening layer of "ideas" to act as a medium between them.
On this account, Kant saw little difference between the ap-
proaches of the empiricists and the rationalists since both
were pursuing the implications of a faulty doctrine.
Kant surpassed the limitations inherent in the oldei
view by admitting, with Hume, that all knowledge (not just
scientific knowledge) arises from experience since without
79Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 814.
experience there would be no way to awaken the faculty of
knowledge into action. "In order of time, therefore," Kant
continues, "we have no knowledge antecedent to experience,
and with experience all our knowledge begins"; however,
though experience is a necessary condition, it is not in
itself a sufficient condition. Kant elaborates,
But though all our knowledge begins with ex-
perience, it does not follow that it all a-
rises out of experience. For it may well be
that even our empirical knowledge is made up
of what we receive through impressions and
of what our own faculty of knowledge (sensi-
ble impressions merely serving as the occa-
sion) supplies from itself. 80
He went on to specify that if it is the case that we make
this sort of contribution to knowledge, then it will only
be with a great deal of effort and skill that we can come
to separate out the two components of our knowledge. He
felt that the problem not only called for closer examina-
tion but would yield an answer to the question of:
whether there is any knowledge that is in-
dependent of experience and even of all im-
pressions of the senses.
Such knowledge, he felt, should be
. . .
entitled a priori and distinguished
from the empirical, which has its sources
a posteriori, that's, in experience. 81
Kant, as we have said, was a philosopher and not
Immanuel Kant, quoted in Jones, Ibid . , p. 820
8
1
,
. ,Ibid
. ,
p
.
822 .
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therefore, strictly interested in psychological questions.
Yet, at this stage of scientific development it is hard to
tell the two apart and Kant's formulations are destined to
have important implications for psychological thought, es-
pecially that of his countrymen who were preparing to
launch the psychological arck upon the scientific sea.
Of particular importance was his formulation of the
hypothesis that knowledge is a joint product of sensory
impressions and the structure of consciousness as given by
the categories of human thought (a priori ideas). From this
point-of-view, Kant saw that the spatial and temporal rela-
tions which we know in experience were universal in nature
not because we experience space and time directly but
rather, because space and time are forms of thought which
determine the way we see the world. They are the framewoik
of the world within which such problems as the one which
plagued Hume, causality, are seen to be "categories of
understanding." These categories are brought to the inter-
pretation of sense impressions rather than being derived
from sense impression. Therefore, it is the mind of man
that provides the important notions with which he operates
intellectually and scientifically.
An important implication of this position is
that what
is given in perceptual experience is only an
appearance of
what things are in themselves. That is, we
can know only
<n
tho "phenomena" and not the "noumona" because we can never
escape the distortions introduced by the processes of our
knowing the world. This realization led Kant to limit the
realm of intellectual and scientific knowledge to those as-
pects of the world which are knowable in terms of the* cate-
gories of understanding. Since we have no category of
understanding which is capable of interpreting the world as
a whole, but instead are restricted to the serialization of
causality in time and space, Kant held that there was no
method by which human intelligence could prove or disprove
the existence of God.
This limitation upon the efficacy of reason, in the
material world, led Kant to formulate a fundamental thesis
which included two kinds of experience, each with different
criteria of meaning and truth. The first, which we have
already covered dealt with problems of reason, the second
dealt with values and not facts. Since he saw that man
experiences values as well as facts, Kant felt that there
must also be categorical imperatives in the moral realm
that matched the categories of understanding in the physical
world. These categorical imperatives were, he believed
responsible for the fact that:
. . .
the moral worth of an action does not
lie in the effect expected from it, nor in any
principle of action which requires to borrow
its motive from this expected effect. . . .
The preeminent good which we call moral can
therefore consist in nothing else than the
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conception of law in itself, . . . this is a
good which is already present in the person
who acts accordingly, and wo do not have to
wait for it to appear first in the result. ^2
Categorical imperatives are to be seen then, as uni-
versal obligations which apply to all men irrespective of
personal feelings and inclinations. These considerations
led Kant to reject the concept of association by which
Hume, for example, would have explained the gradual accrual
of experience into a form which only "seemed" to have the
nature of a categorical imperative. In this way, Kant's
formulation of categorical imperatives also provides an
answer to the problem of free-will and determinism. lhis
is the case because strict determinism can be viewed as op-
erating in the realm of the sciences which are ultimately
accountable to the categories of understanding; whereas,
the categorical imperatives of the moral realm create an
entirely different basis for religious and moral thought.
This basis, Kant conceived, derived from man's practical
reason, as opposed to his pure or theoretical reason and
provides the ground for man's response to purpose and
beauty
.
Kant's philosophy has had many and profound effects
upon wide areas of human knowledge and understanding.
01
primary importance to the present context is that Kant's
82
Kant, Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic o£
Morals
,
quoted in Jones, Ibid., p. 852.
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new and unique synthesis of the rational and the empirical,
finding as it did, an important place for the contribution
which the mind brings to the confused flux of fragmentary
sensory impressions, created a valid place in subsequent
psychological thought for reference to the inherent opera-
tions of the mind. Therefore, Kant provided an alternative
to psychological empiricism which was a true alternative in
that it permitted speculation about the nature of psycho-
logical endowment without having to refer to the time-worn
doctrine of innate ideas.
2 . 4 WHITEHEAD ' S INVERSION OF KANT
As we leave Kant, here on the threshold of the nine-
teenth century and its direct contribution to the rise of
modern psychology, it is important to single out several
central concerns. First, Kant and those he influenced
were still operating under the Newtonian cosmology and
therefore can be expected to see the character of the newly
revalidated, inherent operations of the mind, in just that
light; therefore, their formulations are subject to the
same limitations as their predecessors. Second, this real-
ization provides the opportunity to make an important con-
trast between traditional philosophy and the philosophy of
organism proposed by Whitehead.
Kant's innovation in philosophy was the introduction
of the categorical scheme which provided for the ordering
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of experience as a function of man's subjective nature.
Whitehead criticizes this position because Kant is still
assuming, along with the entire post-Copernican era, that
the sense objects which account for the sensory impressions
are, in fact, disconnected, nonrelated bodies. This,
Whitehead flatly denies as an example of the doctrine of
simple location. Whitehead consistently maintains that the
datum always contains its own interconnections and that
these interconnections can only be ignored at the peril of
completely inverting the true principles by which we func-
tion. That is, Whitehead asserts:
The philosophy of organism is the inversion
of Kant's philosophy. The Critique of Pure
Reason describes the process by which subjec-
tive data pass into the appearance of an
objective world. The philosophy of organism
seeks to describe how objective data pass
into subjective satisfaction, . . • for Kant,
the world emerges from the subject; for the
philosophy of organism, the subject emerges
from the world. &3
And again, so that the full impact will be felt:
Thus for Kant the process whereby there is
experience is a process from subjectivity to
apparent objectivity. The philosophy of or-
ganism inverts this analysis, and explains
the process as proceeding from objectivity
to subjectivity, namely, from the objectivity,
whereby the external world is a datum, to the
subjectivity, whereby there is one individual
experience
.
8
^Whitehead
,
Process and Reality , p. 135*
84
Ibid., p. 236 .
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An important clue to a more complete understanding of
Whitehead' s intent is to be found in the realization that
the type of experience which traditional philosophers have
talked about is habitually conceived as "experience [which]
is the product of operations which lie among the higher of
85the human modes of functioning." Whitehead is asserting
that by restricting awareness to this level, we ignore more
primitive forms of experience which he terms as the caus-
ally efficacious or noncognitive aspect of prehension,
mentioned above in connection with Berkeley's philosophy.
Thus, for Kant, his predecessors and a goodly portion
of his successors, especially in psychological fields, the
goal or end product of the whole perceptual/cognitive en-
terprise is the "apparent" objective content of knowledge
(objects). For Whitehead, objects are entities that have
the potentiality for being included in the "feeling" (non-
cognitive apprehension, or prehension) which ultimately
passes into the subjectivity or cognitive satisfaction oi
the experience. This end product or satisfaction, White-
head terms "superject" rather than "subject" in an effort
8 6
to show that it is in the "satisfaction" of the prehen-
sive unity that we find our final awareness and highest
8 ^Ibid
. ,
p. 172 .
86 See the second definition of prehension given in
Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2.
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expression of human capabilities.
It is not possible, at this time, to go beyond this
brief excursion into the Whiteheadian alternative to tradi-
tional thought. Here, as with the thoughts of the other
major formulators of the modern scientific and philosophi-
cal tradition, we have endeavored to plant the seeds of
Whitehead's critical arguments in the same soil out of
which grew the majority of the concepts which pertain to
modern psychological and educational thought. Whitehead,
as we have begun to show, implicates the whole modern era
in his reappraisal, or better, inversion of philosophical
understanding. In terms of impact upon psychological
thought, one of the first manifestations of the conceptual
rebirth inherent in the philosophy of organism, can be
expected to come in matters which touch upon the topics of
perception and cognition. This, as we shall more clearl)
see as time goes on, is not due to the character of While-
head's thought but is, rather, a function of the fact that
the older system developed those topics first and has dwelt
upon various aspects of these topics the longest.
The philosophical development which followed upon
Kant's approach was carried on primarily by Hegel and
Schelling ; both of whom attempted to establish a new basis
for physical thought but instead of "giving physics wings"
as they intended actually were putting "physics on the
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skids of fancy." Whatever their effect and importance to
philosophy, the line of development which leads to modern
psychology does not follow their lead. In fact, James re-
marked that the "true time of philosophical development
8 8
lies . . . not so much through Kant as around him"; and
for our purposes it is particularly important to note that
Whitehead considers his work as a "recurrence to pre-Kantian
89
modes of thought."
2
. 5 THE EARLY NINETEENTH
CENTURY IN ENGLAND
As far as the beginning of the nineteenth century is
concerned, there were two trends of importance to the de-
velopment of psychology, one English, the other German. In
England, associationism was receiving its final expression
in the work of James Mill and the beginnings of its
trans-
lation into a new physiological psychology were evident
in
the work of Alexander Bain; while on the continent,
German
science was reaching a new level of maturity in the
work of
men like J. F. Herbart. The character of
Herbart ' s work is
important for two reasons. First, his approach is
more
closely related to British associationism than
it is to
that of his countrymen who were under the
influence of Kan
8
7Jaki
,
The Relevance of Physics , p. ^ >•
88James, The Principles of Psychology I, P-
—
89Whitehead, Process and Reality, p
•
vi
.
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And second, he not onLy contributed to the development, of
psychology but is also known as the father of scientific
.
90pedagogy
.
2.5.1 JAMES MILL (1773-1836)
Taking the direct line of development of associ ationism
first, we can characterize the work of James Mill as repre-
senting the culmination of the whole association! stic move-
ment. Also, in view of the proximity in time of his thought
to the actual development of psychology as a science, it
will be possible to focus increasing emphasis upon issues
which are very close to those of much modern psychological
thought
.
By this time it seems hardly necessary to assert that
we can expect to find a heavy Newtonian influence in Mill's
thought, since Mill was indeed the true heir of the tradi-
tion spawned by Locke and carried forward by Berkeley,
Hume
and Hartley. Yet, there were also important differences
in
the details which Mill saw as important to the
over-all
associationist scheme.
One important shift to be found in Mill's thought
is
that in his discussion of association he actually
used ob-
jects rather than sensible qualities as the basis of the
discussion. In his description of the associative
nature
9°Edwin G. Boring, A History of Experimental
Psychology
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1929), P- 25
U.
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of consciousness, Mill pointed out that:
Thought follows thought; idea follows idea,
incessantly. If our senses are awake, wo are
continually receiving sensation, . . . but
not sensations alone. After sensations, ideas
are perpetually excited of sensations formerly
received; after those ideas, other ideas; and
during the whole of our lives, a series of
those two states of consciousness, called
sensations and ideas, is constantly going on.
I see a horse: that is a sensation. Imme-
diately I think of his master: that is an
idea .
9
1
In making the separation that he does between the "two
states of consciousness"--sensation and ideas--M:Lll is ac-
tually bowing to two important aspects of his philosophical
ancestry. On the one hand, the need to make sensation pri-
mary and separate from ideas is a continuation of Locke's
empiricism while, on the other hand, the need precisely to
specify the elements of association (ideas), is surely a
continuation of Hume and Hartley. Mill also went a step
further with this sort of separation and in so doing,
avoided the problems Hume had run into concerning
causality
Here, Mill made the sharp separation between
sensation and
ideas work in his favor by restricting the
operation of the
law of association to the realm of ideas. That
is to say,
in those cases where sensations habitually
occur in
junction with one another, Mill was willing to allow
that
they did so according to the laws of nature
which applied
91James Mill, The Analysis of the Phenomena
of »
_Hil
Human Mind, quoted in Boring, Ibid., P-
223-
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lo the ubjttcLs llial produced I, ho son sn I i oils . Thus, the law
of association of ideas is soon as a consequence o (‘ the
concurrence observed in sensations which derive from the
laws of the objects, and is an excellent case in point re-
garding Whitehead's assertion that modern science has re-
mained "blandly indifferent to its refutation by Hume."
From this assumption, it naturally followed that contiguity
would be the single important variable of association.
In elaborating the nature of contiguity, Mill speci-
fied that there are two types of contiguity; he wrote:
Of the order established among the objects of
nature by which we mean the objects ol our
senses, two remarkable cases are all which
here we are called upon to notice; Lho syn-
chronous order, and the successive order. The
synchronous order, or order of simultaneous
existence, is the order in space; the succes-
sive order, or order of antecedent and conse-
quent existence, is the order in time. Thus
the various objects in my room, the chaiis,
the tables, the books, have a synchronous or-
der or order in space. The falling spark,
and the explosion of the gun powder, have the
successive order, or order in time.
Actually, Mill believed that the successive order of
contiguous existence was the more important of the two be-
cause that is the mode of the sequence of thoughts as
they
appear in words and therefore, it is more frequent.
This
consideration leads into the criteria that Mill proposed
lo
account for the variable strength of associations and,
^ 2Mill, Ibid . , quoted in Lowry, The Evolution oi—EXiL"
chological Theory , p. 35 *
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since he had established a separation between sensations
and ideas, he needed two sets of principles. On the per-
ceptual or ideational side Mill had three principles:
l) permanence, to express the fact that permanent convic-
tion must be stronger, 2) certainty, an expression of the
subjective assurance felt in the association and 3) felic-
ity, or the ease and speed with which the association is
93formed. As Boring points out, this last principle is very
closely linked to the modern formulation of reaction times
as a measure of associative strength. On the side of sen-
sation, Mill established the ideas of frequency and vivid-
ness as the prime determiners of the conditions of associa-
tion .
One of the prime implications of this view, leads
right into modern American psychology as the association
theory of meaning that was proposed by Titchener in the
early twentieth century. This implication primarily flows
from the fact that Mill's view of association leads to a
condition in which objects gain their objectivity by syn-
chronous association. That is to say, in the idea of a
tree or a house there are a great many simple ideas which
have been united by association. Thus, meaning is seen to
derive from the intimate natural association between the
simple ideas which forms the context that accrues to either
^Boring, A History of Experimental Psychology , p. 224.
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initial sensation or initial ideas.
For the reason why James Mi. I L is often characterized
as the last associationist in the line of inontal mechanism
we have only to look at the outcome of his psychological
theorizing. Here, Mill represents the inevitable outcome
of Locke's empiricism because he takes the doctrine that
ideas exist as Newtonian-like atoms in the mind (simple
ideas) which are direct copies of the discrete sensory
input and combines them, according to the Millian princi-
ples of contiguity, into complex ideas. Once complex ideas
had been created, it was a natural step to carry the process
to its conclusion by postulating that complex ideas them-
selves could be associated with one another by the same
principles of contiguity so that one could end up with
"duplex," "triplex," etc., ideas. Mill speaks directly to
the point
:
Brick is one complex idea, mortar is another
complex idea; these ideas, with ideas of po-
sition and quantity, compose my idea of a
wall. ... In the same manner my complex
idea of glass, wood, and others, compose my
duplex idea of a window; and these duplex
ideas, united together, compose my idea of a
house, which is made up of various duplex
ideas. How many complex or duplex ideas are
all united in the idea of furniture? How
many more in the idea called Every Thing?
This statement, when quoted, usually prompts the
94Mill, Ibid .
,
quoted in Boring, A History of Experi-
mental Psychology , p. 226.
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following sort of comments from those who have used it.
Boring, for example, labels Mill's final theorizing "reduc-
tio ad absurdum" the result of utilizing a rational prin-
95ciple to "carry us even to the brink of absurdity."
Lowry is a bit more gentle but the devastation of the doc-
trine is just as complete when he comments to the effect
that: "After James Mill's Analysis, there was simply
nothing that Lockean mental mechanism could do for an
encore. Its accounts with reality were now closed, and
there was nothing further that could be said about the
matter. . . . Given any complex mental phenomenon, the
theory could— in principle—resolve it into its component
96parts .
"
And so, the long line of associationis t development
finally came not only to its logical end but also to its
actual conclusion in that its "success" was its failure.
That is to say, Mill brought the doctrine closer to an ap-
parent account of actual experience than any of his prede-
cessors; thereby, exposing the superficial aspects of the
underlying doctrine.
2.5.2 JOHN STUART MILL (1806-1873)
The next step in theoretical progression is found in
John Stuart Mill, James' son. John Stuart avoided the
^Ibid.
,
p . 226 .
^^Lowry, ojd. ci
t
. ,
p. 37*
1 ] o
reduction that had proved his father's undoing by shifting
the metaphysical basis of mental structure from a mechani-
cal to a chemical analogy. This shift is important for two
reasons. First, was the effect on the direct evolution of
associat ionis t thought and second, in the character of the
shift in metaphor we find the first clear example of a
theme that will be of great significance in later discus-
sion; namely, the concept of levels of explanation and
reality. Mill expressed his understanding of the matter as
follows
:
It is obvious that the complex laws of thought
and feeling not only may, but must, be gener-
ated from these simple laws [of association].
And it is to be remarked, that the case is
not always one of Composition of Causes: the
effect of concurring causes is not always
precisely the sum of the effects of those
causes when separate, not even always an ef-
fect of the same kind with them. ... So it
appears to me that the Complex Idea, formed
by the blending together of several simpler
ones, should, when it really appears simple
(that is, when separate elements are not con-
sciously distinguishable in it), be said to
result from or be generated by , the simple
ideas, not to consist of them. . • • These
are cases of mental chemistry in which it is
possible to say that the simple ideas generate,
rather than that they compose, the complex
ones
.
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This formulation led Mill into a new arena of theo-
retical understanding. Since it was seen to be impossible
John Stewart Mill, System of Logic RatiocinaUvo ^ -'Ill-
Inductive
,
quoted in Boring, o£. cit_. , p. 230, Mall's
emphasis
.
to predict the character of a compound even if all the laws
of the elements are known, Mill maintained that it was not
only impossible to reason from the simple to the complex
but also, in the case of mental phenomena, the only way to
understand the phenomenon was to go directly to the expe-
rience to discover how a complex idea has been generated;
reason alone is an insufficient proof. This emphasis on
experiencing the resultant combination led directly into a
position which helped to transfer the main force of psycho-
logical theorizing from the armchair to the laboratory.
This shift of emphasis was also aided by the additional im-
plication of Mill's formulation which held that even in
those cases where the so-called "generative process" was
known, it was impossible to deduce the laws of the resul-
tant in advance. Thus, the laws of the resultant complex
idea are only obtainable by reference to and direct experi-
ment with the resultant. This emphasis upon experiment and
reference to direct experience of the phenomenon, which
grows naturally out of Mill's position, is a major factor
in the transition which was to bring the label "psycho-
logist," as opposed to philosopher, to those who followed
J. S. Mill.
The second important aspect of Mill's theory, his in-
troduction of a more inclusive, higher-order, metaphor m
the explanation of mental phenomena (a translation of mental
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mechanism into mental chemistry), is fin intimate part o I a
larger topic that is best treated as a unit. Accordingly,
it is more appropriate to complete the introduction of the
remainder of the individuals who stand on the threshold of
modern psychological thought first, and to consider the
broader implications of the whole movement when that is
achieved
.
2.5.3 ALEXANDER BAIN (l8l8-1903)
The last English philosopher-psychologist of importance
to the rise of psychological thought is Alexander Bain.
E. G. Boring concluded his review of Bain's work with the
following summary:
... we see that Bain anticipated much of
later psychology, just as he represented the
culmination of the old. . • • He stands ex-
actly at a corner in the development of psy-
chology, with philosophical psychology
stretching out behind, and experimental phy
s
iological psychology lying ahead in a new di-
rection. The psychologist of the twentieth
century can read much of Bain with hearty ap-
proval; perhaps John Locke could have done
the same. 98
We may characterize Bain as representing the end of
empirical associationism and the beginning of physiological
experimental! sm primarily because of some of the implica-
tions which flowed from his over-all point -of -view.
First,
he saw that in every psychological question
there were two
sides to consider, the "physical side" and the
"mental
^Ibid
. , p • 240
.
side .
"
This parallelism of mind and body in Bain can be99
seen in the light of the positions on the issue that had
been generated practically two hundred years earlier. We
earlier characterized Descartes as a dualist because oi his
separation between mind and body. Bain, while dualistic,
was also a parallelist in that he did not specify that mind
and body interacted explicitly as Descartes had done. In
this, his thought can be traced to another seventeenth
century thinker, G. W. Leibnitz, who had originated the
interpretation. This problem was perhaps more acute for
the nineteenth century thinkers because of the tremendous
elaboration of physical thought which had occurred in the
interim period. Whatever, Bain was loath to define mind
or
soul in such a way as to "materialize" it and so,
main-
tained a separation between the two.
Separating mind from body in this way, is apparently
one of the best ways to insure that a theorist
will focus
upon physiological phenomena as explanations of
mental
events, since there seems no other alternative.
In addi-
tion, Bain wrote at a time when great advances
had been
made in the various areas of brain function,
sensation,
nerve excitation and reflexology. Thus,
having a wealth of
99 -JTn Bain, and his near contemporaries in the early
H half of the nineteenth century, we will
see an ln-
second i n
asoects of physical and
creasing emphasis upon the dual p y y
mental approaches to psychological
phenomen .
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technological information at hand, Bain could and did de-
vote a lot of time to those topics. When he turned to dis-
cussions of the older more general philosophical issues, he
often (usually) failed to draw any important connections
between the two."*"^^ Of course, this situation is neither
unique to Bain nor is it restricted to the nineteenth cen-
tury and the reasons behind this condition will form an im-
portant topic of discussion in the next section when the
general nature of the transition from philosophy to the
natural science of psychology is discussed.
In addition to the older philosophical characteristics
which are found in Bain's psychology, there is also a
strictly associat ionistic view of mental functioning which
required both contiguity and similarity as basic principles
of operation. Since additional inquiry into the nature of
associationism as used by Bain would not add significantly
to that which has already been presented, it is best to
leave Bain at this point, standing on the corner as it were,
and to conclude the consideration of the history of British
associationism with a general summary of its main charac-
teristics .
2.5.6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE
OF ASSOCIATIONISM
In this presentation of British associationistic
^O^Ibid.
,
p. 238.
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psychology and its derivation From tho school of empirical
philosophy, we have repeatedly asserted that the entire
movement was inspired by, modeled on, and overshadowed by
Newtonian physical theory. Accordingly, it is most fitting
to summarize the entire movement from this perspective.
One of the first and most consistent points of corre-
spondence between Newtonian mechanics and mental mechanics
is the ever-present underlying assumption that because
physical phenomena resolve into elementary particles, men-
tal phenomena should do the same. All mental mechanists,
of whatever stripe, were united in the view that whatever
it was that went on as a result of sensory stimulation
(sensations, impressions, etc.), was to be seen in terms of
elementary mental particles. It does not matter whether
they were called "ideas," "images," "copies," or repre-
sentations" in each and every case that which constituted
the lowest order of internal mental structure was conceived
to be a punctiform mental particle which was a direct copy
of its physical counterpart.
In terms of the Whiteheadian arguments presented ear-
lier, specifically The Fallacy of Mi splaced Concreteness,
it is clear that the doctrine of simple location in which
entities are seen to be isolated and separately describable,
requiring no reference to other entities for their existence
is perfectly applicable to mental ideas as represented
116
in the associationist tradition. A second aspect of the
over-all fallacy is the so-called doctrine of mere sensa-
tion which asserts that the primary activity in the act of
experiencing is simply the bare subjective entertainment
of the sensations. That is, the data of the world are not
distorted by the subject’s form of reception. Obviously,
in empiricism we have found nothing to contravene this
assertion and have, in fact, seen its truth demonstrated.
For the sake of completeness, we should also note in pass-
ing, that the third factor in the fallacy, the substance-
quality separation is not accentuated in this case due to
the nature of empiricist thought. Certainly, the extieme
idealism of Berkeley with its total lack of reliance upon
external or substantive existence plays down this aspect of
the fallacy, though it hardly seems necessary to point out
that this only postponed the consideration of the problem
and was not a solution.
Another important point of correspondence between
Newtonian and mental mechanism is the general need which
mental mechanists found to postulate some sort of relation
existing between the isolated ideas. This is the problem
of "action at a distance" mentioned earlier and Newton's
solution of the problem, achieved by the caveat of
creating
the ether, was mirrored in many of the associations
ts
'
Locke spoke of "agreement" and "repugnancy"theories
.
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between ideas and we have quo tod Hume to the effect that
"there is a kind of attraction, which in the mental world
will be found to have as extraordinary effects as in the
natural." Additionally, we have seen that the consideration
of this matter was an important catalyst in Hartley's crea-
tion of "vibratiuncles . " It is also interesting to note,
that James Mill was not concerned with this issue and found
no place for it in his "complete" system of mental mechan-
ics. This situation is, in all probability, due to the
fact that in Mill we find the retention of the ubiquitous
atomism but with the added character that the elements are
now ideas of sensible objects rather than sensible qualities
Thus, Mill's use of objects as elements introduced a level
of phenomenal reality that obviated the need to postulate a
force by which simple elements could be compounded. Of
course, this created other problems, but the point at issue
is the fact that an apparently innocent shift in level of
description has profound implications for the basic ab-
stractions of the system. Had Mill realized this point,
it
seems doubtful that he would have gone on to the ultimate
extremes that he did.
While associationism was able to animate its function-
ing entities to some degree with various ad hoc
assumptions
it never did achieve what can be considered to
be an active
In this regard it is even lessview of mental processes.
118
active than its physical model since notion and dynamism
had always been important components of the parent meta-
physical view. This condition, no doubt, was largely at-
tributable to the predominant empiricist position which was
generally held by the associationist s and, of course, was a
main factor in the criticism which Kant levied against
them. The logic underlying the whole formulation was also
strictly Newtonian in nature, briefly considered, it amounts
to this.
All mental mechanists had been concerned with the fact
that sensations of objects were actually given in experi-
ence as a variety of separately distinguishable sensory
qualities (except for Mill, who operated with ideas). Now,
because of the original Newtonian assumption regarding the
character of sensations and ideas, i.e., simply located en-
tities, the mental mechanists were obliged to assert that
the sensation of a whole object was broken down or repre-
sented in perception as an assemblage of separable sensory
qualities. Further, these decomposed sensations which re-
sulted in "simple sensations" were restricted to giving
rise to "simple ideas" out of which, according to some
principle, e.g., contiguity, it was possible to reconstruct
a complex idea of the original object.
It seems fair to assert that the primary reason
for
the associationists' commitment to this complex
mental
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paradigm was their prior commitment to the doctrine of sim-
ply located entities. For, had they been able to avoid
that prior assumption there would have been no need to
elaborate the intervening stages of conversion which first
created the simple out of the complex and then recreated
the complex out of the simple. Surely, there was no other
restriction which prevented them from making the direct and
equally reasonable assumption that complex sensations are
directly responsible for the creation of complex ideas.
In addition to those aspects which are directly at-
tributable to the Newtonian cosmology, we should also remark
that the original separation between mind and body which
arose in the thought of Descartes has not only been con.
ued but actually heightened by the progression of the move-
ment. To the end, as seen in the thought of Alexander Bain,
the problem was not only implicit in the whole era but at
times was explicitly formulated as an important principle
of scientific explanation.
2.6 THE EARLY NINETEENTH
CENTURY IN GERMANY
The first half of the nineteenth century in Germany
was an important time in which the foundations for the
founding of experimental psychology were laid. Up until
this time there had been little direct contribution
from
the Germans; however, the work of Immanuel Kant
was coupled
with a general increase in the tempo of intellectual
lite
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that seems to have provided a favorable environment for
broad scale development in the physical and mental sciences.
As might be expected in the type of theorizing that went on
in those early decades of the nineteenth century that is
relevant to the continued rise of psychological thought, we
can find the further elaboration of the earlier traditions
of mental and physiological mechanism. An important aspect
of the material to be considered in this section is the
continued impress of the Newtonian cosmology. In this
treatment, we will be less concerned to demonstrate the
validity of that continued assertion and will pay more at-
tention to the character of the theorizing which results
from the further elaboration of concepts in the physical
sciences
.
When we first considered the early nineteenth century
in England, there was no great need to include the cultural
background of that time as an important factor in the de-
velopment of the empiricist associationis t thought. This
is primarily due to the fact that the modes of thought
which were relevant to our concerns were outgrowths of
long-
standing traditional doctrines and were not heavily influ-
enced by the influx of information from the rapidly
devel-
oping corpus of scientific knowledge. The corresponding
situation in Germany is quite another matter.
The early part of the nineteenth century was a
fruitful
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time of great technologic*! I advances which were combined
with an optimistic outlook in diverse areas of life. While
the industrial revolution was born in England, it was the
Germans who realized that great gains were also to be had
by combining an intimate and disciplined intellectual study
of scientific ideas with the search for new technology.
Whitehead remarks of the German intellectual that "their
feats of scholarship during the nineteenth century were the
admiration of the world.
Those aspects of the historical development of psycho-
logical thought which will be covered in this section are
important examples of that high water mark of intellectual
achievement. In addition, a good portion of that history
will show the narrowing trend which is engendered by the
increased specificity of the developing fields of investi-
gation. Here, as we seek critical insight into the nature
of those times, it hardly seems necessary to point out that
seeds of the specialized disciplines which were sown during
these early days of scientific development have, today,
grown into the great compartments of specialized knowledge
by which we name our disciplines and structure our univer-
sities .
"There have always been people who devoted their lives
to definite regions of thought" Whitehead remarks concerning
] 01Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 97 *
the developing specialization of the early nineteenth
century;
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In particular, lawyers, and the Clergy of the
Christian churches form obvious examples of
such specialism. But the full self-conscious
realization of the power of professionalism
in knowledge in all its departments, and of
the way to produce the professionals, and of
the importance of knowledge to the advance of
technology, and of the methods by which ab-
stract knowledge can be connected with tech-
nology, and of the boundless possibilities of
technological advance--the realization of all
these things was first completely attained in
the nineteenth century; and among the various
countries, chiefly in Germany. ^2
And indeed it was that "chiefly in Germany" came the
impetus to a greatly sophisticated style of psychological
thought, a style which will increasingly emphasize restrict-
ing the psychological field to sense objects and minor as-
pects of human sentience. Yet, for all its success, it has
never been without opposition from those who sought to in-
clude a more complete repertoire of human behavior within
the domain of psychological science. We will trace this
all important interaction between the two main contrasting
views of psychological science in the next section; for
the present, it is important to consider the general scien-
tific tenor of the times.
2.6.1 J. F. HERBART (l776-l84l)
Herbart is important in the present context because
102
Ibid.
,
p . 97
•
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his work was a direct influence upon both Fechner and
Wundt, two figures of primary importance in establishing
experimental psychology; he was a transition figure in the
shift from philosophy to experimentalism and combined many
diverse concepts into what appeared to be a complete psy-
chology .
Herbart maintained that psychology was a science
( Wissenshaft ) which was grounded in experience; yet, he
also held that since there was no obvious way of experi-
menting with the mind, psychology could not be experimen-
tal. Instead, the basis of psychology was seen to be meta-
physical, which meant to Herbart that it was possible to
create a mathematical description of the metaphysical ele-
ments which comprised the mind. While Herbart held that
the mind was unitary and could not be divided into func-
tional parts, he readily allowed the influence of both the
Newtonian idea of attractive and repulsive forces and the
character of his mathematical treatment of the metaphysical
"ideas" to lead him into explicit formulations concerning
the character of mental operations. It is necessary to
touch on these factors because some of them are to become
very important in the history of psychology.
Herbart 1 s "ideas" were seen to interact and to have
varying strengths; accordingly, they could attract or repel
each other in ways which were expressable in mathematical
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equations. In this over-all view he is rather close to the
line of mental mechanists we have followed; but, he also
added an important element. Clearness in consciousness, he
felt, was related to the force of action of an idea, and
active ideas were conceived of in strict Newtonian fashion:
Every movement of the ideas is confined between
two fixed points: their state of complete in-
hibition, their state of complete liberty, and
there is a natural and constant effort of all
the ideas to revert to their state of complete
liberty (absence of inhibition) . 103
This dynamic view of mental mechanism underlies the
creation of an entirely new aspect of mental science and
one which will become of increasing importance. The gene-
sis of the concept goes like this: ideas which are not
opposed to one another may coexist in consciousness and
contribute to a simple mental act. However, since we are
not simultaneously aware of all ideas, it must be that in
those cases where ideas oppose one another the stronger
(clearer) of the two must repel the other out of conscious-
ness. These suppressed ideas were seen to have passed from
a "state of reality" to a "state of tendency" and a "state
of tendency" is another name for an unconscious conscious
or unconscious. Thus, we have the first explicit formula-
tion of the unconscious within the ranks of psychological
10
-^Johann F. Herbart , quoted in Boring, ££. cit . ,
p. 255-
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theorists. We did not meet this earlier because the Brit-
ish had not discriminated between consciousness and mind
and simply assumed that they were identical.
In extending this mechanical analogy, Herbart came up
with another important concept-- threshold or, in his termi-
nology, limen of consciousness.
By the limen of consciousness I mean those
limits that an idea seems to overlap in
passing from a state of complete inhibition
to a state of real idea. 1^4
Thus, mental content which is suppressed still exists and
according to its "natural and constant effort to revert to
a state of complete liberty" is actually attracted back
into consciousness by its own efforts. Therefore, the un-
conscious is also seen to be dynamic and as such can have
an effect upon conscious thought. For this mechanism
Herbart recurred to the philosophy of Leibnitz and borrowed
the concept of "apperception" which he felt explained how
conscious ideas could select from among the unconscious
ones those which were consonant with themselves. Since his
doctrine explicitly stated that consciousness was a unitary
-thing, the assimilation of ideas into it from the uncon-
scious, was seen as adding to the totality of ideas which
already existed there and which he named, the "apperceptive
mass." The concept of apperceptive mass became, in the
104Ibid
. ,
p . 256
.
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late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries an important
characterization of the psychological processes which were
thought to underlie the process of education.
Herbart
,
then, can be seen as the popularizer, within
psychological theory of the idea of the unconscious,
Leibnitz being the chief philosophical mentor. His concept
of limen (threshold) is obviously well known and became an
important tool in the hands of Fechner whom we shall con-
sider shortly. Also, Wundt will be seen to recur to the
Herbartian unconscious in order to explain perceptual phe-
nomena. However, lest we be carried too far along by the
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similarity of the formulations, Boring points out that
Freud's concept of the unconscious could have come from
Herbart but in fact did not; we will however, be able to
attribute the origin of the concept to Fechner and also
demonstrate its link to the physical sciences.
2.6.2 M. W. DROBISCH ( 1802-1896)
In Drobisch are to be found the seeds of another
mechanistic formulation of a higher-order mental phenome-
non; this time, the concepts which were developed by
Herbart are extended to include emotion and motivation.
In this, we have another clear example of the theoretical
dynamics which characterize the increasing elaboration of
the Newtonian mechanism. First, for the basis of Drobisch s
"'"^Boring
,
ojd. ci t .
,
p. 257»
127
system we find Herbart 1 s psychology:
The fact that only a few ideas can enter our
consciousness at once, shows to be sure at
first glance, that they displace, suppress,
therefore, as it were, expel one another; but
also on the other hand, that they are not
able to avoid one another, but are held to-
gether by an attractive force. The same
thing likewise appears in associations, those
quite involuntary and artless combinations of
simultaneous ideas. It is, therefore, possi-
ble to attribute similar attractive and re-
pellant forces to ideas, after analogy of the
physical-chemical hypothesis of attractions
and repulsions of elements.1^6
Drobisch's commitment to mental mechanism ended in a
Newtonian theory of motivation and emotion because he con-
ceived of the relationship between conscious and unconscious
as a state of dynamic equilibrium . That is to say, since
new perceptions were always adding new ideas there must be
a continued rebalancing between the two. Since he felt
that the state of equilibrium was more natural, the state
of disequilibrium would be unnatural, therefore unpleasant
and would be the source of our feelings and desires.
If I have a feeling of . . . equilibrium, a
change in it will be a feeling of disturbance.
. . .
The feeling of psychological equilibrium
is precisely similar to that of bodily health,
of both there exists no positive feeling. The
body as well as the mind is in a state of e-
quilibrium when one has no feeling of its ac-
tivities, just as a machine in which there is
the least possible friction makes but little
noise. Desires and feelings are, therefore,
the indices of the deviation from the state
10
^Moritz W. Drobisch, quoted in Lowry, ojo. ci£* »
p. 73.
128
107
of equilibrium of ideas.
2.6.3 TRANSITION TO PHYSIO-
LOGICAL THEORIZING
With this brief introduction into some of specific ex-
amples of theorizing in the early nineteenth century, we
are in a better position to explore tho general character
of the transition to more empirical forms of psychological
theorizing. In this, we will see that the overt and thoro-
going metaphysical approach which was evident, for example,
in Herbart does not survive but that aspects of his psy-
chology which derived from that metaphysic, his empiricism,
mathematics, notions of activity and the concept of thresh-
old, are all taken over and built into a now structure which
is heavily influenced by physiology and physics.
An interesting summary of the character of these times
has been provided by Lowry
108 in which he recounts the
nature of the changes that were taking place in the area of
physiological mechanism at the beginning of the nineteenth
century. First of all, there was an elaboration of the
original doctrine of physiological mechanism which is
found
in the philosophy of Descartes. We have seen how
Des-
cartes' opposition to the ancient view of vital bod i
I
y
10
^Drobisch, quoted in Ibid . , p. •
108Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory,
Chapters 5 and 6.
109Cf., Chapter 1, Section 1.2.3, Ren6 Descartes.
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activities as imposed by an external source grew out of his
conviction that only unextended mental substance could re-
spond to such external, spiritual influence. Bodies on the
other hand, were "mechanical" in nature and their vital
functions of heat and movement were seen to be the natural
outgrowths of mechanical action. Thus Descartes could hold
that the soul left the body because the heat and movement
had stopped rather than the reverse.
Through the intervening ages there was an increasing
dialogue between the vitalists and the mechanists in which
the mechanists, largely under the influence of physiological
discovery finally won out. However, not all vitalism was a
simple mystical doctrine as indicated in the following rea-
soned statement made by an English anatomist in the last
quarter of the eighteenth century. John Hunter felt that:
Animal and vegetable substances differ from
common matter in having a power super added
totally different from any other known prop-
erty of matter, out of which arise various
new properties; it cannot arise out of any
peculiar modification of matter, but appears
to be something super added. . . • Organiza-
tion may arise out of living parts, and pro-
duce action; but life can never arise out of,
and depend on, organization. . . • Organiza-
tion and life are two different things.
In this example, Hunter is pinpointing an important
property
of organizational hierarchies that will figure
significantly
in future discussion. Here, we will simply
note that such
110John Hunter, quoted in Ibid., P- 75 *
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styles of thought were effectly swept aside by the great
successes of those mechanistic physiologists who saw all
phenomena as directly caused by combinations of elementary
particles which existed at the same level of being. Nor is
all the credit or blame to be given to the physiologists
since it was a character of the age that the idea of ato-
micity should permeate all phases of scientific activity.
For example, biological thought had assumed a new maturity
and also contributed to the acceptance of the validity of
the atomistic interpretation when Schleiden and Schwann
established cell theory in 1839* "Thus by 1840," Whitehead
remarks, "biology and chemistry were established on an
atomic basis. The final triumph of atomism had to wait for
the arrival of electrons at the end of the century."
1 '1"'1'
An example of the transition to complete mechanism is
this 1842 version of the doctrine of vitalism which was ex-
pressed by the chemist Justus Liebig:
The vital force causes a decomposition of the
constituents of food, and destroys the force
of attraction which is continually exerted
between their molecules. . . . It causes new
compounds to assume forms altogether different
from those which are the result of the attrac-
tion of cohesion when acting freely . . .
there is nothing to prevent us from consider-
ing the vital force as a peculiar property,
which is possessed by certain material bodies
and becomes sensible when their elementary
particles are combined in a certain arrangement
111Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 100.
1 'JJ
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or lorni.
Liebig's thoughts on digestion arc also indicative of
the main character of thought concerning the nervous sys-
tem. In this case the central issues of concern involved
the nature of nervous activity, the type of conduction
which was involved in nervous activity and the type of
scientific explanation which was appropriate to describe
the phenomena. Focusing first upon the nature of nervous
activity, we find that the naive doctrines of Descartes
(hydraulics and tubes) and Hartley (vibratory motions) have
been displaced by Galvani ' s 1780 discovery that nervous
activity is electrical and by the continued elaboration of
increasingly sophisticated elec trophysiological teclmiquos,
e.g., Volta in 1800, such that, again, by 1840 nervous ac-
tivity was universally viewed as being electrical in nature.
Further since even the "electricians" of the age, as those
who studied electrical phenomena called themselves, were
convinced that electrical phenomena could be explained by
Newtonian principles there seemed to be an important meta-
physical similarity between the various branches of the
scientific enterprise.
Not only were the general electrical properties known
and understood but also their unidirectional nature was
widely accepted. Broad scale studies of the peripheral
112Justus Liebig, quoted in Lowry, o£. cit . , p. 76.
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nervous system had shown tliut llio pe r i plie ra.L nerves conduet
in a "forward" direction, afferent activity, and that motor
nerves, on the other hand, were essentially efferent in
nature. With this knowledge of the nature of the inputs
and outputs of the central nervous system, it was all too
compelling to view its activity in terms of another very
important and central part of a seemingly similar communi-
cations apparatus-- the telephone system; and so, in the
wake of A. G. Bell's first telephone conversation on the
twenty-third of May in the year 1844, man's central nervous
system became a very complicated elec Lri cal switchboard.
It is important to note that in spite of the modern
technological basis of this analogy, the long-standing re-
flexive character of the nervous system is retained, due to
the fact that the functional nature of the system does not
depend upon the exact technology involved.
2.6.4 CONSERVATION OF ENERGY:
A NEW PRINCIPLE
In the earlier discussion of the underlying dynamics
which operated to channel the theorizing of the British as-
sociationists into an otherwise unnecessary and excessively
complex doctrine of mental functioning, i.e., the transla-
tion from complex to simple sensations and from simple
ideas to complex ideas, primary stress was placed upon
their prior commitment to the physical and metaphysical
validity of the existence of isolable elementary particles;
hence, the applicability of’ Whitehead's doctrine of simple
location. Of importance in the present context is the fact
that having accepted the doctrine of atomicity and the laws
attendant to those assumptions, physical scientists were
moving to understand further implications of those laws.
Thus, at a time when there was great interest in the ideas
of conservation of force and energy, the reflection of
those thoughts is also to be found in physiological science
and ultimately in psychology. Therefore, it is not sur-
prising to find the same sort of underlying dynamic which
was implicit in the earlier century in operation here.
We have said something of the conflict between the
mechanists and the vitalists as regards the nature of bio-
logical functioning but it is important to pursue the mat-
ter a little further in order to detect the greater delicacy
of the issue. In this discussion, the figure of Hermann
Helmholtz will loom large because he was an important figure
in physics, physiology and psychology.
The whole argument will boil down to the fact that
the
mechanists can be construed as saying that all phenomena,
including those of living matter, will ultimately be ex-
plained in terms of the established principles of the phys-
ical science. ^However, that is to form an arbitrary
di-
chotomy between a fancied mystical vitalism and an
exag-
gerated mechanistic determinism which is really an
insult
13 ^
to the genius and integrity of tho individuals involved,
the real issue is a bit more involved than that.
An important aspect of the whole issue involves the
"theory of heat" as known to physicists. As in so many
other areas of scientific endeavor, the older caloric con-
cept of heat which involved the interpretation of the phe-
nomenon as a fluid which flowed from place to place, i.o.,
hot to cold, was being replaced by the experimentally de-
rived interpretation that heat resulted from tho "vibration
of the corpuscles of bodies." Joule had finally established
the so-called mechanical equivalent of heat and Helmholtz's
first scientific paper was a work in which he tied together
the various mechanical forces in the universe in such a way
that the heat which was a necessary by-product of all such
action became an important factor in the formulation of * ho
"constancy principle." The constancy principle means that
the various forms of physical energy can be converted into
one another with no gain or loss in the process. Now for
an individual who was both a physicist and a physician
trained in physiology, it was only natural that such a con-
cept should also apply to the matter which happened to
be
associated with living organisms. And so, the vitalist
mechanist controversy reached a new level of sophistication
with the realization that vital processes did not
have to
create something out of nothing, as it were, but
in accord
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with the principle of constancy it is possible to conceive
that a vital process is simply one in which there is a
qualitative transfer of energy within the system while the
total energy of the system remains quantitatively constant.
This formulation of the quantitative constancy of energy
can be seen as a further elaboration of Newton's three
principles of motion which essentially asserted the con-
stancy of motion or the conservation of force as opposed
to the conservation of energy.
However, the fact that simple-minded vitalism is in-
compatible with the conservation of energy does not mean
that Helmholtz and his contemporaries held out for a
strictly mechanical interpretation of life. In fact, there
was widespread support for the position that physics could
not subsume all biological phenomena. What the true mecha-
nist assertion came to then, was the fact that while physi-
cal life processes could conserve heat, and perhaps be
modeled on a model of a steam engine, there was no need to
equate life with machine processes. For his part, Helmholtz
held that since the life processes produced mechanical
and
chemical effects, "their effects must be ruled by
necessity,
and must always be the same when acting under the
same con-
ditions; and so there cannot exist any arbitrary
choice in
the direction of their actions."
113 Seen in this light,
113Hermann Helmholtz, On the Application of the ^
Conservation of Force t o Organic Nature, quoted in
Jaki
, .
Relevance of Physics, p. 298.
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the actual position taken by many prominent men of that
time was more of the nature of an assertion that physical
processes were, after all, physical processes and that
while life did not necessarily have to be totally identi-
fied with mechanical processes, its interface with the ma-
terial world certainly did have to conform to established
law. Yet, it is also true that the only way for physiology
to advance was to seek the continued explanation oi all
life phenomena in terms of the physico-chemical processes
upon which they were based.
That it is possible to temper mechanistic determinacy
when focusing upon specific issues of a highly quantifyable
theoretical nature, should not however, foster the conclu-
sion that the overriding cosmology of the entire age was
not, to the depths of its mechanical heart, built upon a
conceptualization of an indefinite and infinite universe,
bound together by the laws of its components which all
oc-
cupy the same level of being. Perhaps the following
arc
more indicative of the over-all frame of reference. In
the
mid-eighteenth century, we find Voltaire expressing the
sentiment that it would be strange indeed:
that all nature, all the planets, should obey
eternal laws, and that there should be a lit-
tle animal, five feet high, who in contempt
of these laws, could act as he pleased, solely
according to his caprice. He would act at
random, but we know that randomness means
nothing. We have merely invented the word
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to denote the known effect of all unknown
i 14causes .
-
And, lest we are too inclined to excuse the "ignorance" of
early scientists and men of letters and pride ourselves on
the maturity of modern science, we should not forget that
standing upon the threshold of our own century we find the
same point-of-view represented in no less a thinker than
Bertrand Russell, who, with zeal reminiscent of religious
fervor proclaimed:
. . .
man is a product of causes which had no
prevision of the end they were achieving;
that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
fears, his loves and beliefs, are but the
accidental collocations of atoms; that no
fire, no heroism, no intensity of thought
and feeling, can preserve an individual life
beyond the grave ; that all the labors of the
ages, all the devotion, all the inspiration,
all the noonday brightness of human genius,
are destined to extinction in the vast death
of the solar system, and that the whole tem-
ple of Man's achievement must inevitably be
buried beneath the debris of a universe in
ruins--all these things, if not quite beyond
dispute, are yet so nearly certain, that no
philosophy which rejects them can hope to
stand. Only within the scaffolding of these
truths, only on the firm foundation of un-
yielding despair, can the soul's habitation
henceforth be safely built. 5
J Actually, Russell is right, as far as he goes; for it
is true that there can be no other alternative except
H-^Voltaire, Ignorant Philosopher , quoted in Ib i d.. ,
p. 375-
11
^Bertrand Russell, A Free Man's Worship, quoted m
Ibid
. ,
p . 379
•
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"unyielding despair" for a system which is based upon a
mechanistic cosmology. Now, however, there are alternatives
to this view which not only include Russell's science but
also modern science within a framework which unites the
separate universes of physical and mental existence into a
meaningful whole. We will consider the foundations of this
view in the next chapter after the relation of modern psy-
chology to the older view has been examined.
2.6.5 FURTHER DEVELOPMENTS IN
PRE-EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
The next major step in the transition from metaphysi-
cal to physiological psychology is found in the successor
of Herbart, Rudolph Hermann Lotze (l8l7-l88l). Lotze was
opposed to pure materialism and sought anti-mechanical sys-
tem while at the same time bringing a greater wealth of
physiological fact into psychology. He is best known for
his theory of space perception in which he tried to
combine
the modern understanding of the nervous system and
its
electrical characteristics into meaningful description
of
how space is perceived.
We have seen that the old empiricist view
somehow en-
tailed the notion that small copies of objects are
repre-
sented in the mind in ways which yield the
direct percep-
tion space and therefore the objects are perceived
spa-
tially. By Lotze's time, this view had
become untenable
due to the fact that the nervous system
was now seen as a
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complex of individual circuits which in some way conducted
impulses to the central nervous system. Therefore, Lotze
held that while the retina is stimulated by a spatial sig-
nal, the image on the retina was sent to a projection area
in the brain where it was known to the mind not as an ob-
jective image but as the perceived condition of the nerves
in that area.
Since advanced anatomical and physiological under-
standing dictated that whatever information reached the
central nervous system had to be in the form of discrete
elements, it was a pressing problem to describe how it was
possible that unified perceptions could be formed. In the
various answers to this problem are found the beginnings ot
the controversy, within modern science, betweeen the na-
tivists and the empiricists. For his part, Lotze took a
rather Kantian nativistic outlook by asserting that the
mind could not conjure up space out of something which was
not spatial and therefore the ability to perceive space
must be due to some inherent property of the mind. To make
this intelligible, Lotze had to specify that the excitation
of any receptor neuron produced two signals: one which
was
representative of the content of the image of excitation
and the other which was a "local sign" or a signal to
the
mind which allowed it to determine which receptor had
been
excited. From the combined information contained in
the
i4o
local signs of the whole image the mind was supposed to
have derived a pattern of intensities which could be corre-
lated with the movements of the body to produce the percep-
tion of solid space.
In terms of the nativist empiricist controversy, LoLze
actually included both views since the theory required re-
peated experience with sensations and signs in order to
perceive space and yet there was also a requirement to have
an inherent capacity which could interpret the signs in
order to arrange the content spatially.
Herbart ' s concept of the unconscious also came into
the picture as a description of how it was possible that
all of the processing relating to local signs could go on
without conscious recognition of the process. Lotze also
used this explanation in cases where there was perception
of objects without any movement of the body by postulating
that it was possible for the mind to experience an "incip-
ient movement" which was known only in the unconscious.
Note that the concept of unconscious here takes on a new
coloration in that it now includes mental contents which
are actually operations whose outcome is required for
normal
conscious sentience rather than simply a store house for
excess ideational elements.
One of the major alternatives to the theory put forth
Ewald Hering ( 183^-1918 ) . Hering isby Lotze came from
I 41
n 1 so known I’or his theory o I c o I o r vision. In ho I. h (.In*
case o I' space perception nml color vision, Ih'i'ing found
himself at odds with Helmholtz who also had theories for
those typos of phenornona. The groat controversy between
thorn is variously known as tlio nativist empiricist or
nature nurture question and is, obviously, still an open
issue in most psychological theory.
Hering is identified as a proponent of nativism be-
cause his theory of space perception, which ho put forward
as an alternative to Lotze's, relied upon a good deal of
internal preprogramming in order to explain space pei < <i
,_
tion. Lotze’s local signs wore too cumbersome lor Hering
since that postulate effectively doubled the neural hard-
ware required for visual processing. Instead, Hering
relied upon an analogy of a simple coordinate system
in
which each retinal receptor was thought of as fitted
into a
grid such that it actually produced three signals
or "spa-
tial feelings" as Hering called them. These are
simply, "
today's language, signals on the X, Y and Z
axis wliuh
yielded, in Hering' s view, information about
the horizon-
tal, vertical and depth "feelings" of a given
retinal stim-
ulation. In accounting for stereoscopic vision
liering was
forced to assume that the third signal, or
depth signal,
could assume either positive or negative
values.
Helmholtz on the other hand is an empiricist
whose
<
roots are to be found in John Locke. Therefore, in con-
trast to the rather popular Kantian influence, Helmholtz
was maintaining that an object was nothing more than an
aggregate of sensations which fitted together because they
were habitually found together. However, in line with the
more recent views which espoused an active nature for the
mind, Helmholtz believed that mental processes contained an
active unconscious; and the unconscious processes that ac-
tually transformed the punctiform sensations which had been
projected to the cortex, were "irresistible" in the sense
that they were automatic and not subject to conscious re-
cognition. Those processes which were viewed as among the
"irresistible" operations of the unconscious, were thought
to have been developed in empirical fashion by association
and repetition. In addition to an empirically derived ir-
resistible structure for the active unconscious, Helmholtz
also held that the form of the process in the unconscious
was the same as for conscious inferences from analogy. In
this way, Helmholtz sought to insure the possibility that a
conclusion could be reached in a novel case or in the case
of an ambiguous perceptual illusion that shifted its per-
ceptual appearance. Perhaps the true meaning of unconscious
inference is best summed up by Helmholtz himself in a pas-
sage from his work concerning physiological optics:
The psychic activities, by which we arrive at,
the judgement that a certain object of a
certain character exists boforo us at a cer-
tain place, are generally not conscious activ-
ities but unconscious ones. In their results
they are equivalent to an inference
,
in so far
as we achieve, by way of the observed effect
upon our senses, the idea of the causes of
this effect, even though in fact it is invari-
ably only the nervous excitations, the ef-
fects, that we can perceive directly, and
never the external objects. ... It may be
permissible to designate the psychic acts of
ordinary perception as unconscious inferences
as this name distinguishes them sufficiently
from the ordinary, so-called, conscious in-
ferences. While the similarity of the psychic
activities of the two cases has been doubted
and will perhaps always be doubted, still no
doubt can remain of the similarity of the re-
sults of such unconscious . . . and conscious
inferences
.
Thus, the Helmholtzian theory of perception is one which at-
tempts to provide for the outcome of observed experience as
well as giving a reasonable account of the scientific data
relevant to the matter. In including these aspects,
Helmholtz is opening the way for Wundt to formulate the ex-
plicit mechanism of introspection.
An important aspect of Helmholtz's theory is that it
is the tie between the tradition of British associationism
and the German roots of psychological theory found in
Wundt's introspective psychology. Since this is the
case, it is well to focus more clearly upon the important
operating characteristics of the theory. The basic term in
ll6Helmholtz, Handbook of Physiological Optics, quoted
in Boring, ££. cit., p. 309, Helmholtz's emphasis.
'*' 1
^Boring, ojd. cit . , p. 312.
tho theoretical structure is the bare sensory pattern which
is derived from the object. This pattern is however, rare-
ly pure since it is almost always added to by the results
or the irresistible unconscious processes and supplemented
by memory. Thus, objects in the world are the product of a
Lock i an associa tionism supplemented by the observer's men-
tal apparatus, especially the unconscious. This formula-
tion also retains the doctrine of primary and secondary
qualities because it clearly specifies that in the trial
and error accumulation of unconscious experience, wo per-
form a sort of "mental experimentation" by which wo learn
which properties of tho objects can be changed by our addi-
tions (secondary qualities) and which properties cannot be
changed (primary qualities).
In closing this account of Helmholtz's perceptual
theory, we should note that cases where the mind is active
without receiving sense impressions are called imagination.
Such experiences were labeled Vors t ellungen by Helmholtz, a
word which is usually rendered as idea in English, but
which, in the original, carries the definite connotation of
something that is cast up out of the unconscious into tho
conscious; it thus seems to imply a more active derivation
for the experience while at the same time indicating that
it came from somewhere intimately associated with its host
as opposed to coming from "out of the blue," as it were.
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At this point in the discussion, as wo turn to tho ac-
tual birth of experimental psychology, it 1 h essential to
make two major elements in the discussion quite explicit.
On the one hand, wo will attribute the actual creation of
experimental psychology to Gustav Fechner rather than
Vilhelm Wundt and therefore, (jive a more complete account,
of his psychology than is usually the case, while on tho
other hand
,
we will utilize the riegioctod half of Fechnor’s
psychology as a major element in structuring the remainder
1 1 H
of our consideration of the development of psychology.
In considering the "founding" of experimental psychol-
ogy, it is important to see tho "new" developments in light
of their historical context. In actuality, the development
of this now phase of psychological thought is simply the
confluence of two long-standing streams of historical
thought, modern science and modern philosophy. We have
quoted Alexander Koyre ' s statement to the effect that the
crisis of the modern consciousness is a result of the
I 1 K
No loss an authority than Boring feels quite an am-
bivalence about tho matter: "One may call him [Fechner]
tho founder of experimental psychology, or one may assign
that title to Wundt, I I. does IK) I inn I lor " > Boring, 0X1 - 1 • j t . ,
p. 295, emphasis added.
For reasons that will become clearer in what is to
follow, what matters is that Wundt offectivoly developed
only half of Fechner' s psychophysics and the neglected hall
not only haunted him then, but is still with us today, as
wo will endeavor to show.
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scientific revolution which has colored the entire history
ol western man since its inception in the sixteenth centu-
ry. His assertion is that this revolution has:
. . . changed the very framework and pattern
of our thinking and of which modern science
and modern philosophy are, at the same time,
the root and the fruit.
The importance of that statement is, perhaps, a bit more
obvious now that we have traced a good deal of the content
of that revolution with the intention of concentrating on
those aspects which have the greatest bearing on psycho-
logical history.
Before we touch on the meeting of those two main
streams of modern science and modern philosophy as "roots"
of our traditions, it is important to remark that in this
discussion we are dealing with their "fruit" as it is mani-
fest in the life of one individual, Gustav Fechner. While
that statement mostly serves to make the obvious explicit
,
it is also intended to open the way to an appreciation of
the spirit of the times " Zeitgeist " as it is evidenced in
Fechner' s life and as it was manifest in the culture in
general. Since the proper treatment of this all important
topic would not only require more space than is available
but would also take us from the study of psychology into
the fields of history and literature, to say nothing of the
author's inability to pursue such topics, we must be con-
tent with the barest intimation of' the central content of
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the change as it relates to psychology.
That part of the great drama of man's unfolding nature
as it is mirrored in the narrow aspects of the philosophy
and science that we are considering, gives us an important
clue to the character of the developments we are seeking.
The author feels that it is highly significant that we
find, in the last half of the nineteenth century the com-
bined developments of: a) the meeting of modern philosophy
and modern science, b) the birth of a new dimension in the
awareness of man's nature; hence, the development of the
scientific study of man and c) an organic change in the
whole character of western thought.
Whitehead admirably recounts the major dynamics of
these times which were animated by the impulse of great
technological discovery and the excitement of new vistas in
scientific theory. Of these times he remarks:
Both the material and the spiritual bases of
social life were in the process of transfor-
mation. When the century entered upon its
last quarter, its three sources of inspira-
tion, the romantic, the technological, and
the scientific had done their work.
Then almost suddenly, a pause occurred ;
and in its last twenty years the century
closed as one of the dullest stages of
thought since the time of the First Crusade.
. . .
The period was efficient, dull, and
half-hearted. It celebrated the triumph of
the professional man.^^
^^whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 101,
emphasis added.
This then, is the context in which we find the devel-
opment of modern psychology; it is a time carried on by a
professional dynamic but also one which found the heart of
its whole cosmology shaken to the core. We have seen some-
thing of the rise of the idea of the conservation of energy
in earlier sections, and have appreciated the rather uni-
versal nature of the concept. Whitehead believes that the
rise of this concept, that is, the ability to consider en-
ergy as a quality in its own right, was not only a challenge
to the basic notion of mass (matter) in the old cosmology
but actually succeeded in replacing it as a basic metaphys-
ical category. In fact, Whitehead asserts that:
Later on, we find the concepts of mass and
energy inverted; so that mass now becomes the
name for a quantity of energy considered in
relation to some of its dynamical effects.
This train of thought leads to the notion of
energy being fundamental, thus displacing
matter from that position. 120
Thus far, we have touched upon the development of the
concept of the conservation of energy in the work of
Helmholtz, its creator, and we will now see its further
elaboration as one of the key elements in the creation of
the metaphysical fusion which lies at the heart of the de-
velopment of psychological thought. The new foundation of
physical reality which is evident in the transition to
an
inverted concept of mass in which it simply "...
becomes
120Ibid., p. 102, emphasis added.
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the name Tor a quantity <>l' energy eons i derod in ro l at, ion to
some of its dynamical effects," can aLso bo seen as an im-
portant basis for the Whiteheadian alternative of organism
as a replacement for matter. In this view, the identifica-
tion of a basic happening (event, or elementary unit) avoids
the old description involving matter with the fallacious
property of simple location by substituting the notion that
"
. . . energy is merely the name for the quantitative as-
pect of a structure of happenings; in short, it depends on
121
the notion of the functioning of an organism." In this
first superficial mention of the organismic alternative, it
is important to note that one of the basic principles of
that alternative includes the recognition that the happen-
ings involved in any phenomenon contain two fundamental as-
pects. That is to say, each event has an intrinsic and an
extrinsic reality, the event is its own prehension and it
is also the prehension of other events. There is, in fact,
both a within and a without in nature that must be consid-
ered in any system that would aspire to understand reality.
Detailed evidence for this view, which supplements that
which Whitehead provides, will be given in later chapters.
For the present, we will proceed on the assumption that the
most developed aspects of contemporary science are harmo-
nious with this interpretation and will therefore: a) fool
121 Ibid.
,
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free to use these categories as basic criteria in structur-
ing our further consideration of psychological thought and
b) take great pleasure in noting that these same categories
are to be found within the entire development of psycho-
logical thought. Thus, we do not consider that the rendi-
tion of psychology which is to follow is distorted by the
imposition of abstract categories which bear a rather tan-
gential relation to the actual animus of psychological
thought. On the contrary, this treatment will allow the
data to speak for themselves, as it were, and if therefore
the resultant seems a distorted image of more familiar in-
terpretations, we will be more comfortable in asserting
that new "irresistible" operations of the interpretative
Helmhol tzian unconscious are required for the more adequate
assimilation of the data presented rather than easily ca-
pitulating with an admission that the old frame of refei-
ence is equally efficacious in its disclosure of reality.
In closing this section, it is appropriate to remark
that the events we are about to observe in history and in
Fechner's life stand in the same relation of within to
without that we have asserted is a primary characteristic
of the new metaphysical basis for psychological, philosoph-
ical and scientific thought. That is to say, the twin
strands of modern philosophical and modern scientific
the internal (within) reality of thethought can be seen as
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unfolding drama of western man; they are the pattern of his
collective existence which has translated across time.
Now, when we come to their union (or better, re-union), in
the life of Fechner, they become the extrinsic factors
(without) which are relevant to the unfolding of the in-
trinsic (within) reality of his own prehension into the
unity of a new creative synthesis of the various data
which present themselves as relevant to that process.
Whitehead calls this process "concrescence" and we mention
it here, along with that which immediately preceeded it, in
an effort to: a) indicate that it is the complete senti-
ence of the whole individual which is most efficacious in
the advancement of knowledge (an obvious statement it it
were not for the second point) and b) to underline the fact
that the only place novelty can be introduced into man’s
philosophical and scientific system is within that same
sentient individual. Accordingly, it is to the understand-
ing of that new novelty which was animating Fechner while
apparently stultifying the wave of progress which had been
founded upon the old notion of simply located matter, to
which we now must turn.
3 . 0.1 GUSTAV FECHNER (I8OI-I887)
In considering the external aspects of philosophy
and
science which were united in Fechner’ s unique vision,
we
can begin with the clear-cut dualism which was
lirst
1 5 3
formulated by Descartes in I65O. As wo have soon, this
dualism was a main characteristic of the entire phase of
British empiricism (Locke, Berkeley, Hume, Hartley, the
Mills, and Bain, to name only those few that have been ex-
plicitly considered)
;
Fechner repudiated this dualism and
sought to defend spiritualism against materialism. In terms
of the current scientific doctrines of the day, Fechner,
who had become a professor of physics at an early age, was
well grounded in all phases of science and mathematics.
Particularly important to the development of his ideas wore
the modern understandings of the electrical nature of the
nervous system and the newly developed principle of conser-
vation of energy. These two concepts led to the natural
conclusion that a system which simply conducts electrical
energy (the nervous system) must also conserve energy, that
is, it will not gain or lose energy in the transformations
which take place between stimulation and sensation. From
this it naturally followed that the greater the stimulus
the greater should be the sensation. These basic relation-
ships are central elements in Fechner 1 s system.
To this brief account of Fechner’ s place in the history
of philosophy and science, we should also add that he was a
rather unusual and creative genius. He was a poet, a sati-
rist and intimate friend of many important artists of his
day, Mendelssohn and Schumann being two examples. He also,
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in the last decade of his life, attempted to found an ex-
perimental aesthetics. Perhaps one important aspect in
shaping his theorizing was an unusual period of three years
in which he suffered an extreme depression during which he
not only resigned his professorship but also became a com-
plete recluse. This period, 1839-1841, is credited with a
lasting influence upon his outlook, his interest in relig-
ious thought and the true place of the soul in the scheme
of things. His publications tell the tale: in I 85 I came
the Zendaves ta
,
literally "the revealed word," which among
other things, argued that consciousness is to be found in
some degree in every created thing, and that the soul does
not die. Earlier, in 1936 there was a book that concerned
life after death in which he asserted that the true solu-
tion to the materialistic problems of the world was to be
found in the affirmation of the spiritual principle that
there was an identity between mind and matter and that an
enlightened view point was one that held that the entire
universe should be regarded as to its consciousness. He
called this view "Tagesansicht " or daylight view and con-
trasted it with the materialistic assumption of inert mat-
ter which he labeled "Nachtansicht 11 or night time view.
Needless to say, his assertions that things like plants
possessed consciousness did not make him a popular figure
in the more materialistic scientific centers.
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Fechner considered himself as a philosopher with a
mission to implant the idea that everything in the world
could be viewed in two ways, as mind or matter, within or
without, and his efforts to give expression to this view
led directly to the creation of a new science--psychophys-
ics. "While the knowledge of the material world has blos-
somed in the great development of the various branches of
natural science and has benefited from exact principles and
methods that assure it of successful progress," Fechner
wrote in the Introduction to his Elements of Psychophysics ,
"and the knowledge of the mind has, at least up to a cer-
tain point, established for itself a solid basis in psy-
chology and logic, knowledge of mind and matter, body and
soul, has up to now remained merely a field for philosophi-
cal argument without solid foundation and without sure
122
principles and methods for the progress of inquiry.
Fechner based his search for sure principles and meth-
ods upon a basic set of truths "factual circumstances"
which he felt opened the way to a solid foundation for
scientific knowledge. First of all, the external world is
known by the senses and given in experience such that we
can know its external relationships, this knowledge being
limited by the acuity of our sensory apparatus. He also
122Gustav Fechner, Elements of Psychophysics, H. E.
Adler, trans., D. H. Howes and E. G. Boring, eds . (New York
Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1966), I, !•
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felt that wo could have direct knowledge o (' our "inner
world" by direct observation. This knowledge, too, was
limited, but this time, it was the limitation of the mind
rather than the senses which determined the precision of
the knowledge. On this latter point he is, no doubt, re-
ferring to the new German physiological psychology of
Herbart
,
Lotze and Helmholtz. Fechner 1 s unique contribu-
tion was his further observation that while these two sepa-
rate approaches could each give "basic facts, basic laws,
and basic relationships" in their separate fields, there
was no way in which those isolated efforts could actually
describe the relationship between mind and body. These
were separate areas of discourse in which "the situation
was not the same," as when one attempts to understand the
relationships between the material and mental worlds, be-
cause :
each of these two inextricably associated
fields enters into immediate experience only
one at a time, while the other remains hid-
den .123
Here then, is Fechner' s formulation of the internal/external,
within/without relation to which point, because of its im-
portance to our concerns, it is better to allow Fechner to
speak for himself:
At the moment when we are conscious of our
feelings and thoughts, we are unable to
123-!-. • , 1Ibid.
,
p • 1 *
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perceive the activity of the brain that is
associated with them and with which they are
in turn associated-- the material side is then
hidden by the mental. Similarly, although we
are able to examine the bodies of other peo-
ple, animals and the whole of nature directly
in anatomical, physiological, physical and
chemical terms, we are not able to know any-
thing directly about the minds that belong to
the former nor of God who belongs to the lat-
ter, for the spiritual side is hidden by the
material . 124
Perhaps this formulation should be called the Fechner
inclusion/exclusion principle of conscious awareness since
in it he established that mental life includes physical
life, but is not directly conscious of it— for the material
side is hidden by the mental side; while, at the same time
mental life is excluded from direct knowledge of the mental
life of others by their physical bodies--the spiritual side
is hidden by the material.
He attributed the confusion and argumentation which
resulted from this limitation to the simple fact that the
normal mode of observation of things was to see things in a
cause-effect relationship which usually occurred contigu-
ously in time. In the case of mind and body however, this
was never true; in fact, in the absolute nature of this
permanent exclusion, Fechner saw a fundamental truth that
forever determined, for example, that when you stood inside
a circle the convex side would be hidden by the concave
124Ibid
. ,
p • 2
.
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side. However, since "both sides belong together as indi-
visibly as do the mental and material sides of man [they]
can be looked upon as analogous to his inner and outer
12 5
sides." His intent, he stressed, was not to enter into
dogmatic dicta regarding the metaphysics of the matter, on
that score, he felt, everyone should seek his own answer;
his concern was to build upon the simple observational fact
of inclusion/exclusion. And so he did:
The whole world . . . prove [s] to us that
what is in fact one thing will appear as two
from two points of view. . . . Who would not
admit that it is always thus and cannot be
otherwise? . . .
What will appear to you as your mind
from the internal standpoint, where you your-
self are this mind, will on the other hand,
appear from the outside point of view as the
material basis of this mind. There is a dif-
ference whether one thinks with the brain or
examines the brain of a thinking person.
These activities appear quite different, but
the standpoint is quite different too, for
here one is an inner, the other is an outer
point of view. [Thinking of the mind height-
ens the differences] for the twofold mode of
appearance of the circle . . . was after all
basically gained by taking two different ex-
ternal standpoints. . . . The appearance of
the mind to itself, on the other hand, is
gained from the truly inner point of view of
the underlying being regarding itself, as in
coincidence with itself, whereas the appear-
ance of the material state belonging to it
derives from a standpoint that is truly ex-
ternal, and not in coincidence. 126
Before we turn to more specific issues within the psycho-
^
^Ibid
. , p • 2 .
126Ibid
. ,
p . 3
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physical formulation, there arc two additional elements ol'
the over-all programmatic proposal that should be mentioned.
First, his position on the unity of a "single thing."
The natural sciences consistently employ the
external standpoint, . . . the humanities are
internal. The common opinions of everyday
life are based on changes of the standpoints,
and natural philosophy on the identity of
what appears double from two standpoints.
A theory of the relationship of mind to body
will have to trace the relationship of the
two modes of appearance of a single thing
that is a unity . 1^7
We will have more to say about the importance of the
two modes of appearance in the next section, here we shall
briefly nod to its significance and elaborate slightly with
the second of the programmatic elements we are recounting.
The whole of nature is a single continu-
ous system of component parts acting on one
another, within which various partial systems
create, use, and transmit to each other ki-
netic energy of different forms, while obey-
ing the general laws through which the con-
nections are ruled and conserved. . • •
We know, even without awareness of the
special nature of psychophysical processes,
what we have to understand by their magnitude,
if we are clearly to relate psychophysics
with physics, physiology, and everyday life,
and we can base generally valid conclusions
on the universal conditions and laws of ki-
netic energy. 128
Clearly, Fechner's psychophysics are an example of
the interpretation which Whitehead gave to the
general
12
^Xbid.
,
p. 5» emphasis added.
~^^Ibid.
,
p. 23*
metaphysical meaning oi' the transition from simply iocated
matter to energy as the basis of scientific thought.
Fechner's appreciation of the meaning of this change and
the formulation which he gave to some of its consequences
provided the key to the novel view he attained regarding
the relation between mind and body and the proper approach
to the study of that relation. To see this more clearly,
we will need to explore the specific interaction of the
principle of conservation of energy, the electrical nature
of the nervous system, and the theory of sensations more
carefully as they operate in the basic assumptions of the
theory
.
It is best to start with an explicit statement of
Fechner's actual methodological strategy:
To sum up, we may say that the production as
well as the use of the kinetic energy of the
psychophysical processes within us, as far
as we can observe it or make deductions about
it from our observations, obeys everywhere the
same laws as kinetic energy of nonpsychophysi-
ological activities within us and outside us.
As free as the mind may be, it still cannot do
anything contrary to this law, but only what-
ever is based on this law. 129
From this, we see that Fechner needed to establish a
quantitative identity between the mental and the physical
effects of stimulation in order to give empirical justifi-
cation for his theory. His problems, of course, were
129Ibid.
,
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nontrivial since he hud to deal with the measurement of the
mental products of sensation, a task which, before Fechner,
was considered impossible, due to the fact that there was
no way to measure the specific values of the actual inner
energies deep in the nervous system. Fechner' s solution to
this dilemma proposed that even though it is impossible to
measure the activity deep in the nervous system, it must,
according to theory, be at least a dependent function of
the external stimulus energy. With this assumption firmly
in hand, Fechner took the next step by assuming that, if he
could measure the magnitude of the mental effects and show
that they were also a dependent function of the external
stimulus energy then, he would have a method of demon-
strating the quantitative identity between the mental and
the physical. This quantitative identity, when established,
was to have defined the fundamental facts and laws which
pertain to the connection of outer to inner psychophysics.
Even before the means are available to
discover the nature of the processes of the
body that stand in direct relation to our
mental activities, we will nevertheless be
able to determine to a certain degree the
quantitative relationship between them. Sen-
sation depends on stimulation; a strongei
sensation depends on a stronger stimulus; the
stimulus, however, causes sensation only ’via
the intermediate action of some internal
process of the body. To the extent that law-
ful relationships between sensation and stim-
ulus can be found, they must include lawful
relationships between the stimulus and this
inner physical activity, which obey the same
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general laws of' i n I o rnr I i on of bod i ly proc-
esses and thereby give us a basis for drawing
general conclusions about the nature ol' this
inner ac tivi ty . 1
Before considering Fechnor 1 s method of measuring the
magnitude of mental effects, the previously impossible task,
it is important to underline, once again, the centrality of
the concept of conservation of energy to formulation of the
psychophysical system. Actually, Fechner's use of this
principle stems directly from Helmholtz. "This is the
great principle of the so-called conservation of energy
,
he wrote in granting Helmholtz his due,
which
,
while related to the law of conserva-
tion of kinetic energy, is even more universal
in importance. This principle, while founded
on long-known general principles of mechanics,
was first clearly developed by Helmholtz, who
pointed out its full meaning and explained its
most important applications. . . • Up to now
no one has found reasons to doubt its general
applicability in the areas of the organic and
the inorganic . !31
The one aspect of the kinetic energy principle which
derives from the generality of the conservation of energy
which has not been covered to this point, refers to
its il-
lation to the metabolic processes of the body. This
energy
which is a function of the body's general health
and condi-
tion is seen to be subject to:
^-^Ibid .
,
p. 10*
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rather sudden redistributions, accomplished
partially either through stimuli or through
voluntary direction of attention or change
of the field of activi ties . 132
In terms of the physical relations within the body, this
means that the energy which underlies "chopping of wood" or
thinking are "not only quantitatively comparable but each
can be transformed into the other." In this transformation,
"partially [a.ccomplished] either through stimuli or through
voluntary direction of attention," are to be found the
basis of the argument Fechner would have used against mod-
ern behavioristic stimulus-response theories. Fechner says:
The idealist may trace the action of the
stimuli to a mental reason, the materialist
may attribute choice and attention to a ma-
terial reason.
and then concludes with the position which comes naturally
to someone utilizing a view espousing organismic relations
rather than mechanical ones
We, however, take the facts as they appear
directly on observation, where at one time
the material side (or mode of appearance),
at another the mental sides provides the
evidence for the changed distribution . -^33
Then, as if to answer the materialists once and for all, he
concludes his chapter on kinetic energy with a statement
that would have made Hume on his deathbed more serene, if
not more humble;
132Ibid
.
,
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. . . concerning freedom of the will. . . .
By the explicit statement that the general
laws of kinetic energy merely limit its free
disposal in general [we have assumed that],
freedom is given every right which it truly
deserves. The law of conservation can nei-
ther dictate whether and how we transform
potential energy into kinetic energy, nor
whether and in what direction it should be
transmitted. In this respect the will re-
mains completely free within the limitations
set by this law. 134
In this, we find an extended and spiritualized version of
Helmholtz's more cautious assertion against the vitalists,
which we have already quoted to the effect that, since life
processes produced mechanical and chemical effects, "their
effects must be ruled by necessity . . . there cannot exist
any arbitrary choice in the direction of their actions."
Of course, the two men are talking about the same thing,
and it is the difference in their points-of-view, external
for Helmholtz and internal for Fechner, which therefore
casts an entirely different light on the issue; actually,
both are right since freedom is never arbitrary. We will
also ultimately conclude that such "decided"condi tions do
not banish freedom but only qualify it. However, it should
also be noted that the organismic alternative to which we
will turn requires more than the simple assumption of an
internal/external Fechnerian frame of reference. This con-
dition will become more apparent at the beginning of the
134Ibid.
,
p . 37
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next section when the concept is formal l.y introduced.
We must now treat the actual rationale for the psycho-
physical measurements which were to demonstrate the empiri-
cal validity of Fechner' s theory. In this, we will have
the opportunity of including the important and prior work
of E. H. Weber and also, we will be able to form a bridge
into the experimental psychology of W. Wundt.
Fechner, it will be recalled, needed to establish the
functional relationship between stimulus intensity and the
resultant intensity of the mental sensation. The obvious
solution, that of applying just enough stimulation to pro-
duce a sensation, i.e., overcome the threshold value,
yields only one point of correspondence between the two.
Clearly, this is insufficient and Fechner* s solution was an
ingenious one. He established the "differential threshold
whose property it was to detect the difference between two
stimuli. In this, he reasoned that it is always possible
to state whether one stimulus is greater or less than an-
other such that the "just noticeable difference" between
the two can become a means of pinpointing the magnitude of
the sensation that corresponds to the stimulus intensity.
Now, it is at this point that Fechner' s treatment of
the phenomena becomes heavily influenced by the require-
ments of the mathematics he was required to use. Fechner
recognized the problems in this area and even included an
app°logia to both the nonmathematicians (those who would
not understand) and to the mathematicians (those who would
understand) in the introduction to his Elements of Psycho -
physics . These assumptions are, perhaps, the archetypal
case of mathematical and statistical imperatives dictating
the character of the treatment which is afforded to psycho-
logical phenomena. Certainly, the assumptions of "true
score theory" in testing psychology and the assumptions,
often violated, of the standard analysis of variance model
in experimental psychology are but the modern variants of
the assumptions which Fechner included in his measurement
system.
Specifically, and briefly, he had to assume that both
the scale of stimulus intensities and the resultant scale
of sensation magnitude estimates had the properties of an
interval scale. That is, that both scales had an absolute
zero point and that the increments in the scale were equal
to one another. In the case of the stimulus dimension thi
seemed a reasonable assumption; however, in the case of
sensation magnitudes, this is a completely unsubstantiated
assumption. In Fechner' s words, we see the importance oi
this assumption:
. . .
the intensity of a single stimulus it-
self can be looked upon mathematically as the
sum of positive increments starting with zero,
... a sensation of difference can be looked
upon mathematically as a positive or negative
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increment to one or the other sensation
[therefore] . . . such would be looked upon
as the sum of positive increments starting
with [a difference of] zero. Now if the
functional relationship between the sum of
stimulus increments starting from zero and
the sum of the related sensation increments
is known, the problem resolves itself for
every degree of the stimulus and the result-
ing sensation . ^ ^5
At the conclusion of this consideration of Fechner 's
thought, we will be able to relate the above assumption to
Freud's theory of the unconscious but for the present, we
need to see that Fechner established the equal increments
of his scale by assuming that the just noticeable differ-
ences of threshold he could detect were, in fact, the equal
increments he required for his scale.
In principle, then, our measure of sensation
will consist of dividing every sensation into
equal divisions (that is, equal increments),
which serve to build it up from zero. The
number of equal divisions we conceive is de-
termined, like inches on a yardstick, by the
number of corresponding variable stimulus
increments that are capable of bringing about
identical sensation increments. 1 ^
With this principle, firmly established as the correct ap-
roach, Fechner had the method he needed for the determina-
tion of the magnitude of the sensation:
... we determine the magnitude of a sensa-
tion, which we cannot do directly, by asking
how many times it contains the same unit, an
^ ^ ^ Ibid
.
,
p. ^9
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operation that we are able to perform direct-
ly, and road off the result not as a number
of sensations but as the stimuli that deter-
mines the sensations and that are easier to
read. 137
E. H. Weber of whom Fechner said "in my opinion [he]
1 38
should really be called the father of psychophysics,"
had already given a considerable amount of empirical support
to the measurement of sensation magnitude. His true contri-
bution lay, according to Fechner, in the fact that he gave
an exact formulation which stated that:
the magnitude of stimulus increment must in-
crease in precise proportion to the stimulus
already present, in order to bring about an
equal increase in sensation.
Always one to show deference to his mentors, Fechner con-
cluded, "I have therefore called it Weber's law." We should
stress, at this point, that the principle of conservation
of energy was an important factor in Fechner' s willingness
and security in the assumption that the stimulus and the
sensation would covary. That the fundamental relation be-
tween the two was not a direct but a proportional covar i a-
tion was not upsetting because Fechner believed that once
methods were developed which could actually measure the
translation of stimulus energy into kinetic energy, "or
some other specific function of the underlying psychologic 1 I
1 ^ Ibid
.
, p . 51 •
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processes," then, this would yield a law which "will take
on lor the field ol mind-body relations just as general and
fundamental a meaning as the law of gravitation in the
lieLd of celestial movement." Can there be any doubt
that Fechner's cosmological picture was only partially
shifted from mechanism to organism? That he is still seek-
ing an ultimate solution in terms of the Newtonian gravita-
tional analogy is not only similar to the approach we have
seen in many others but also reminds us of the situation
with regard to another great pioneer in new vistas of
thought, Nicholas Copernicus. Recall Koyre 1 s assessment
that it was enough for one man that he should have arrested
the motion of the sphere of fixed stars, "to ask him to
make it infinite was asking too much. " In much the same
way, we have in Fechner the pioneering spirit of a new view
which recognizes in the "unity of every single thing" both
a mental and a physical existence which is a part of the
one continuous system of the whole of nature. Surely it
would be asking too much to require him to see beyond the
task of formulating the relationships of the two modes of
experience into their natural implications for a reformu-
lated cosmology similar to Whitehead's philosophy of organ-
ism. To continue the simile a bit further, we may say that
just as Copernicus required the assistance of Giordano Bruno
139Ibid
. ,
p . 37 •
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lo make Uie univorso infinite, wo can find, lor Forlmcr, a
similar helpmate in the figure of Wilhelm Dilthey. Wo will
touch on Di 1 they at greater length in subsequent sections.
Here, let us simply remark that if Fectiner and Dilthey are
equivalent to Copernicus and Bruno, the next figure we
should expect on the scene is the psychological version of
Galileo. Where is this Galileo of the psychic world? On
this point we can lament with William James that:
at present psychology is in the condition of
physics before Galileo and the laws of mo-
tion, of chemistry before Lavoisier and the
notion that mass is preserved in all reac-
tions. The Galileo and the Lavoisier of psy-
chology will be famous men indeed when they
come. . . . Meanwhile the best way in which
to facilitate their advent is to understand
how great is the darkness in which we grope,
and never to forget that the natural science
assumptions with which we started are provi-
sional and revisable things. 1^0
Our position, as is obvious from the nature of our polemic,
is that the natural science assumptions have yet to be seri-
ously challenged. True, they have often been ignored as in
most humanistic approaches but only at the price of losing
the scientific status of the effort. Where is our Galileo?,
we are not prepared to make a definite assertion but we are,
however, prepared to categorically assert that when the true
alternative is specified, it will involve a cosmology oi
hierarchical processes which is grounded in a transcendent
1+0James
,
The Principles of Psychology (New York:
World Publishing^ 1892 ) , ij 46>7 •
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purpose and which emphasizes Ihe spiritual generality of
man's being. The main thrust of this presentation is an
effort to prove this Galilean assertion.
Since in this presentation we have referred to Fechner
as the father of experimental psychology, we will conclude
this section with a short summary of his lasting contribu-
tions to psychological thought.
First of all, it is accurate to say that it was Fechner
that actually established the basis of psychology as an ex-
perimental science, an exact science which was modeled on
physics. He accomplished this feat by the brilliant appli-
cation of the new ideas of conservation of energy to the
phenomena that had simply been a part of the physiological
mechanism of the earlier German theorists. In so doing, he
created a new way of looking at organic functioning and
felt that it was the intricate energy exchanges in the sys-
tem that made the various activities of "chopping wood" or
"thinking" possible.
Another important aspect of his contribution was, oi
course, the elaboration which he gave to the doctrine of
thresholds. We have seen this concept in other contexts,
specifically Herbart and Weber, but it is Fechner' s right
to claim priority in elaborating the meaning of a scale oi
sensations which equated the absolute threshold of sensa-
tion with the mathematical zero point of sensory stimulation.
The final aspect of Fechner's contribution that wo can
touch on here is his relation to Freud's thinking. To go
back a bit, we saw that Fechner equated the intensity of a
stimulus, which started from zero intensity, with the in-
tensity of a sensation, which was also seen as a continuum
of sensations starting from zero (in this case, of course,
it is zero sensation and not zero stimulation). Now one
could look upon the following situation as a mathematical
antifact but to Fechner, and ultimately Freud, there was
real meaning in the fact that it is possible to measure
stimulus values which are smaller than we can sense directly
with our sensory apparatus. In these cases, Fechner's meas-
urement formula yields a negative value for the sensation
that should accompany the stimulation--negat ive sensation.
In his chapter on Thresholds in Elements of Psycho -
physics
,
Fechner asserts, that since it is possible to
measure these small stimulus values without being able to
sense them it is therefore possible to "refer to the thresh-
old of a sensation ... as well as to the threshold value
of a stimulus ." 1 ^ 1 This realization, rather than presenting
a problem, is actually a central part of his system since
he felt that:
. .
.
psychophysics may be divided into an
outer and an inner part, depending on whether
consideration is focused on the relationship
1
^Fechner
,
Elements of Psychophysics , p. 199 -
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of the psychical lo l ho body's external as-
pects, or on those internal functions with
which the psychic are closely relat ed . 1^2
Also, "since the body's external world is functionally re-
lated to the mind only by the mediation of the body's in-
ternal world," the inner part of psychophysics which are
unconscious must also conform to the same laws that regu-
late the external psychophysics.
. . . since general higher phenomena of con-
sciousness also have a point of expiration
and a point of origination, we will be able
to generalize the concept and expression of
threshold to them. Examples of this type of
phenomenon would be the level of total aware-
ness with respect to sleeping and walking,
the way single thoughts become conscious,
and the focusing of attention in a given di-
rection. In these instances we cannot speak
of a threshold value of an external stimulus
responsible for lifting consciousness above
threshold. But the question may be raised
whether we would not have to assume a
threshold value of the underlying [inner]
psychophysical processes and whether stimu-
lus thresholds, . • . do not exist as far as
sensations are concerned only to the extent
can be translated into such pro-
With this, we have the formulation of a dynamic unconscious
which is also related to the outside world and sensitive to
it. Not only is the analogy to Freud's unconscious com-
pelling, it is also direct: Freud says:
1 ^ 2 Ibid
.
,
p. 9, emphasis added.
~*~^Ibid.
, pp . 199-200.
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I was always open to the ideas of G. T.
Fechner and have followed that thinker on
many important points.
Additionally, the notion of psychic energy is directly re-
lated to Fechner' s application of the principle of conser-
vation of energy to mental phenomena. And finally, "the
role Freud assigned to the unconscious in The Interpreta -
tion of Dreams had its acknowledged source in Fechner'
s
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writings."
Before moving on to Wundt and the subsequent develop-
ment of psychological thought, we should summarize those
aspects of Fechner' s thought which were most neglected by
his immediate contemporaries and a major portion of the
main stream of psychological thought. Since we will develop
these aspects more fully in subsequent sections it is im-
portant to highlight them here.
First of all, from our vantage point and the meaning
which we ascribe to the development of the Helmholtzian
concept of the conservation of energy, we have labeled
Fechner as the first psychologist to explicitly recognize
the major implication of that formulation. Whitehead as-
serts that conservation of energy had the effect of removing
dead matter from the basic assumptions of scientific
lZ|Z+
Sigmund Freud, Autobiographical Study , quoted in
Elements of Psychophysics , translator's preface, p. xix.
lZ+
^Adler, in Elements of Psychophysics , p. xix.
metaphysics by replacing it with the concept of a quantity
of energy which can only be considered in relation to its
dynamical effects. He called this situation an "inversion”
which places primary emphasis upon the quantitative aspect
of a structure of happenings-- "the notion of a functioning
of an organism." Fechner's psychophysics can be seen as
an exemplification of that new meaning since it represents
the first attempt to formulate a scientific approach aimed
at understanding both the internal and external reality of
all things as being the two separate perspectives or modes
of appearance "of a single thing which is a unity." Fur-
ther, the unity he saw was not a restricted unity. Recall
his statement:
The whole of nature is a simple continuous
system of component parts acting on each
other, within which various partial systems
create, use, and transmit to each other ki-
netic energy of various forms, while obeying
the general laws through which the connec-
tions are ruled and conserved.
Another important aspect of this early organismic view
is the stress Fechner placed on the associated doctrine
that each individual unity can be regarded as to its inter-
nal or external aspects. In this, he departed from the
past dualistic formulations of the mind-body relationship.
We would assert, in line with the position taken in Chapter
One, that it was Fechner's animating spiritual passion to
know something of the mind of God and the minds of the other
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unities o I" nature whose "spiritual side [s] an 1 hidden by
the material [sides]," that formed the central determina-
tion of his day and night view of mental knowledge and ma-
terial knowledge. As we have seen, the mental and the
physical were important principles upon which he constructed
the edifice of his psychophysics. The depth of his convic-
tion on this account is amply shown by the place which he
ascribed to the operation of free-will and the possibility
of viewing the expenditure of kinetic energy by an individ-
ual as being the result of either internal or external con-
trol .
Fechner' s goal was to describe the relation between
mind and body in a scientific fashion. Key to his position
was his conviction that minds alone had been studied for a
long time as had bodies and matter. His insight was that
their interrelation was occluded by the fact that focusing
on mind hides the body while focusing on the body hides the
mind. Further, knowing them separately is not equivalent
to knowing them both in relation to each other. Natural
science, he believed, focused mainly on the external aspects
of phenomena, leaving to the humanities the task of studying
the internal aspects of human life. Thus, to the knowledge
we gain by the examination of the external world via our
sensory apparatus, he wanted to add the knowledge we could
gain by the direct observation of our inner experiences oi
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mental life. That psychophysics could only deal wi th stim-
ulation and sensation should not be allowed to obscuro the
fact that its role was to form the scientific basis upon
which higher-order levels of understanding could be built.
Clearly, Fechner accepted the highest levels of mental and
spiritual life as well as the reality of the lowest levels
of physical processes as being relevant to the true under-
standing of man. His labor was to bring the two together
into a meaningful system.
Since we see in Fechner none of the British associa-
tionist philosophical psychology which had influenced
Helmholtz and which will become important to Wundt, and
precious little of Kantian nativism, it seems safe to as-
sert that his vision was far more global than those we have
considered to this point. Yet, it is the very expanse of
his vision which provided his undoing at the hands of his
successors. The world was simply not ready for a transi-
tion beyond the dominant and externally oriented world-view
which characterized the atomism of physical science and the
elementism of psychological science. Thus, the sophisti-
cated methodological approach which Fechner had elaborated
in an effort to measure the interface of the two great
worlds of physical and mental, body and mind, external and
internal phenomena, fell into the hands of those who were
still trying to explain the world from the bottom up, as it
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wore, and who could only hoc I. lie task of [isycholog i on 1 sci-
ence in terms ol its ability to emulate the successes of
the physical sciences.
Therefore, in those who followed Fechner and formed
the main stream of psychological thought, we will search in
va i-n for greater insight into the issues of mind and body,
free-will and the unity of the whole of nature. But treat
them we must and so, it is to the nonspiritual experimen-
talism of Wilhelm Wundt that we must turn for the next ma-
jor segment of our story.
3.0.2 WILHELM WUNDT ( 1832-1920)
First, let us start with the fact that Wundt was not a
complete experimentalist. That is, from the very beginning
of his published works he held the position that there were
actually two psychologies. The one, which we know as ex-
perimental psychology and which focused upon the natural
scientific approach of discovering the elementary contents
of experience, was actually the one to which Wundt devoted
most of his career, the other, which Wundt thought of as
dealing with the higher mental processes, was called
"Geschicht
e
11 or natural history of man, whose role it was
to study the behavior of groups of men--a sort of social
psychology. The important thing about this division, is
that Wundt felt that:
It is true that the attempt has frequently
been made to investigate the complex functions
L79
of thought on the basis of mere introspec-
tion. These attempts, however, have always
been unsuccessful. Individual consciousness
is wholly incapable of giving a history of
the development of human thought. . . . The
problem of [Geschichte] relates to those men-
tal products which are created by a community
of human life and are, therefore, inexplica-
ble in terms merely of individual conscious-
ness, since they presuppose the reciprocal
Aside from the utter falsehood of the main premise, if one
accepts the validity of Piaget's genetic epistemology that
is, we see that Wundt is making a sharp separation between
the two psychologies. Even his vaunted method of intro-
spection was unsuitable in the case of Folk psychology, as
he also called it, since it is clear that such a study can
never be experimental but only historical.. This being the
case, it seems quite natural that the entire stress which
Fechner had placed upon the inner aspect of unified things
would get lost in the shuffle, as it were, and receive
almost no attention while, at the same time, those aspects
of his experimental method which suited the experimental
task of dealing with immediate sensations would receive
great attention.
Wundt's system is known as the structural school of
psychology because of its primary emphasis upon the genera-
tion of sensation by stimulation and on the interconnections
action of many.l^
E. L.
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in consciousness of the various sensations. Structuralism
had a threefold impact upon the development of psychological
1^7thought. First it helped via Fechner's psychophysical
method to establish the experimental nature of psychology.
Second, it provided a thorough test of the method of intro-
spection which, incidentally, was imported to this country
by E. B. Titchener in 1898 . And third, its strong orthodox
positions were good targets, especially in this country,
for the alternative systems of psychology to react against.
Behaviorism, functionalism and gestalt psychology all found
a fertile field in which to plant the seeds of their criti-
cisms.
Wundt, like Helmholtz and unlike Fechner, borrowed
from the old system of British empiricism and took over the
associationists mental mechanism almost completely. Again
like Helmholtz, he fitted this together with the popular
and more advanced German physiological mechanism. Obviously,
these views are mutually congenial since they have a common
derivation from Newtonian physics and therefore share the
common goal of explaining how the simple, elementary sensa-
tions can be associated into a whole unified perception.
Since we have already covered both of Wundt's primary
sources in rather great detail we will not enter into a
l47
M. H. Marx and W. A. Hillix, Systems and Theories
in Psychology (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963) > P* 61 •
thorough discussion o I I hat background material. Instead,
we will focus upon the new ways in which Wundt utilized
those resources.
To begin with, it should be noted that Wundt did not
succeed in actually creating his uErfahrungswissenshaf
t
11 or
"science of experience." In general, what he succeeded in
establishing as the result of his experimental program, was
to provide illustrations of the principles which supported
his important systematic concepts and did not achieve an
experimental proof of those concepts. Since what was known
of the electrical nature of the nervous system indicated
that only punctate elements of stimulation could be provided
to the projection areas of the brain, Wundt's program was
to analyze the components of experience which he knew to be
physiologically given as elements. In this, unlike Fech-
ner's unified entities, Wundt assumed that the mind and the
body, because they belonged to two totally separate uni-
verses, could never be compared. His position on the mat-
ter is often known as psychophysical parallelism. In this
view, physical and psychical processes are believed to be
concurrent but not identical or even causally related. Be-
cause of this strict separation and also because of his
focus upon the analyses of experience Wundt actually played
down the role of the body and failed to grant it a very im-
portant role in behavior. Certainly this must have been
part of the reason for Watson's subsequent frustration.
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To elaborate on his commitment to the elements of con-
sciousness we find Wundt generalizing his knowledge that
the nervous system is composed of many interconnected ele-
ments :
The principle of the connection of elements
may be understood in an anatomical, a physio-
logical and a psychological sense. Anatomi-
cally regarded, the nervous system is an uni-
tary complex of numerous elements; ... in
more or less close connection with the others.
. . . Physiologically, the principle of the
connection of elements implies that every
. .
.
[activity of the nervous system] is
composed of a large number of elementary
functions, the nature ... of which we can
never completely isolate from the given com-
plex activity. . . . Lastly, there is a psy-
chological . . . formulation of the principle.
It means, psychologically, that . . . the
facts of consciousness always presuppose as
their physiological substrate, complex nerve
processes, the result of the co-operation of
many elementary parts. This complexity of
the physical condition of elementary psychical
facts manifests itself in . .
.
[the observa-
tion] that the psychical elements, simple
sensations or simple feelings are always
products of psychological abstraction, and ^g
never actually occur except in connections.
For all of its sophistication, this statement adds very
little to the content of John Locke's associationism . Of
course, Wundt was also concerned with the means by which
these elements were connected and the determination of the
laws of their connection, as any good associationist would
be. Accordingly, he found that the concepts of association
1
^Wundt
,
Principles of Physiological Psychology ,
Edward B. Titchener, trans. (New York: Macmillan, 1904),
I, 320-321, quoted in Lowry, ojd. ci t . , pp . 105-106.
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by contiguity and association by similarity were adequate
to describe the phenomena of consciousness. As might be
expected, he was, therefore, forced to see all mental expe-
rience even "higher psychical processes" as simply a complex
reordering, under the laws of association, of the various
sensory elements which were the basis of mental life.
In earlier sections we have seen that British associa-
tionism had rather dried up on the vine, as it were, and it
is interesting to inquire into Wundt's ability to plump it
up again. There are two important and related factors.
The one, which we have already mentioned, was the new impe-
tus provided by the modern German physiological discoveries.
The other was Wundt's addition of an experimental paradigm
which based itself upon the analysis of immediate experience
via the process of "Introspection. " Since this process is
often mentioned but seldom explained in any detail, we will
mention it here in the context of its creation by Wundt.
Using the experimental method assured Wundt that he was
creating a "Naturwissenschaf
t
" or true science modeled after
the image of physics. By using the method of introspection
" Selbstbeobachtung " Wundt, sought to insure that the study
focused upon the immediate experience of the subject. In
this respect, psychological knowledge was seen to be differ-
ent from physical knowledge because knowledge of the self
as given in introspection was "immediate" or not mediated-
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direct, whereas, knowledge about something other than sell
must be mediate or involved with the character of that ob-
ject and not pure "immediate" experience. In order to be
useful for scientific purposes, introspection had to be
carried out in a controlled laboratory environment under
experimental conditions.
All accurate observation implies that the ob-
ject of observation (in this case the psychi-
cal process) can be held fast by the atten-
tion, and any changes it undergoes attentively
followed. And this fixation implies . . .
that the observed object is independent of
the observer.
This thesis, if one can go along with the assumption
that the object is independent of the observer, was sup-
ported by the experimental method which created external
conditions designed to produce specific mental processes
and to make it possible for the observer to maintain a par-
ticular state of consciousness. In addition, the observer
had to receive a great deal of training so that he would be
able to separate the meaning which he naturally attributed
to the sensation from the sensation itself so that he could
identify the pure parameters of the sensation.
Before summarizing the over-all effect of structural
psychology, there is one important point about Wundt’s ele-
mentalism that should be underlined. Probably due to the
static character of most British associationism as regards
148
Ibid.
, p . 107
.
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actual mental operations and also duo to the highly struc-
tured impression one gets when thinking of tho fact that
psychic procsMHCH aro directly resultant from tho "physio-
logical substrate," Wundt's system is often seon to have a
statLc flavor in which tho contents ol consciousness liavo
the same rigid character as tho norvos from which they
arise. Ilowovor, it is not the case that Wundt felt strongly
committed to a static view. "As a matter of fact," ho
stated, "ideas, like all other mental experiences, are not
149objects
,
but processes
,
occurrences . " We point this out
as a caution for those times in future discussion, when Un-
concept of process is introduced in the organismic context.
From this example, it should bo evident that tho simple as-
cription of bare process to a phenomenon, actual or theo-
retical, whose main characteristics are seen as a reflection
of the atomistic Newtonian metaphysics is not sufficient to
guarantee an improvement in the explanatory power of the
conceptual system. In fact, such half way attempts to In-
still the notion of process in any other than its rightful
metaphysical milieu should be seriously questioned and care-
fully scrutinized so that the uncritical crossing of meta-
physical contexts will become evident.
1
^Wundt
,
Human and Animal Psychology (New York: Mac-
millan, 1894), p. 236, quoted in Marx and Hillix, o^. cj_U ,
p. 63
,
Wundt's emphasis.
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3*0.3 WUNDT
,
TITCHENER AND THE END
OF STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
At this point, more for the sake of completeness than
anything else, we can consider the net effect of Wundt, his
ma
-*-n disciple E. B. Titchener in this country, and the
whole school of Structural Psychology. This is possible
primarily because the development of structural elementism
largely came to an end with Titchener* s death in 1927.
Structuralism as a method always held firmly to the prin-
ciple that its brand of introspection was the only way to
study consciousness and its dogmatism on this matter was
one of its main failings. True, it tried to cope with the
obvious problems that arose from within like, for example,
the fact that the observer in observing his own experience
was also changing his experience. Or the fact that differ-
ent introspectionist s kept getting different results from
similar experiments. However, the telling challenges came
from without. For example, psychologists could produce
many changes in animal behavior without any reference to
"introspecting rats" and psychoanalysts were making great
headway with their concepts of unconscious influences as
important determinants of critical mental balances.
In addition to these criticisms, the rising tide of
gestalt psychology which explicitly formulated the meaning-
fulness of the whole as opposed to elements of construction
provided other important challenges. To further insure the
final demise of the venerated tradition, there came the
American functional school closely followed by the behav-
iorists
. Functionalists could not see that the so-called
elements of experience really made any important difference
in anything— they truly seemed to have no function. And,
of course, the behaviorists denied consciousness. But,
interestingly enough, they did not simply deny the concept
out of hand, they disproved it by applying the principle of
conservation of energy. Thus, the final irony is that a
doctrine, which at least in its German physiological half
was inspired by the same man who had created the doctrine
of conservation of energy, is now defeated by application
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of that same principle.
In brief, the argument went like this. Since all
energy in a physical system is theoretically accountable in
physical terms, conscious processes would have to be viewed
as either adding or substracting energy, or mass, if they
are to affect the behavior of the body. But this sort of
addition or substraction is just what the principle of con-
servation of energy denies. Now, here is where the behav-
iorist is often misunderstood in his criticisms of con-
sciousness. Wbat he is saying is that if you hold that
^^^An excellent discussion of the various mind-body
positions in relation to the doctrine of conservation of
energy can be found in Marx and Hillix, Systems of Psy -
chology
, pp . 141-145.
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ideas can, for example, move muscles, as we all would, then
you must also restrict ideas to the same phenomenal level
of the physical events in the nervous system. Ideas so re-
stricted can be viewed as nonmental and restricted to
operation within the physical system. On this account the
behaviorist can, with some reason, assert that consciousness
is a meaningless concept while also admitting that ideas,
in his sense of the word, do in fact move muscles.
This account of the principle of conservation of energy
is clearly a total refutation of the entire rationale of
the introspectionist school and, by implication, the allied
doctrines of mental and physiological mechanism. In this
\
demise of structuralist psychology it is interesting to
note that it seemed to succumb to the same general malaise
that affected the physical sciences in the last half of the
nineteenth century. That is to say, focusing upon the
character of energy, as we have often asserted, has the ef-
fect of killing whatever explanatory vitality existed in
the older material based views. Even Wundt's attempt at
inserting process in place of static elements did not pre-
vail against the more basic metaphysical challenge which is
offered by the organismic nature of a dynamical quantity of
energy.
In quite another context, in a subsequent section we
will again have the opportunity to meet this behaviorist
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interpretation of conscious processes. For the present, we
simply remark that the strict physical interpretation
°f all mental phenomena as merely a description of the way
physical events function was seen by the behaviorists as an
excellent scientific refutation of the old system which
ascribed to consciousness an independent status as unique
experience. Further, it is also a corroboration of their
own point-of-view. In this argument is also to be found
the completion of the scientific banishment of the mind of
man from the meaningful cosmos— a theme that seems to re-
quire no further elaboration now that the final proof is in.
3.1 THE COEXISTENT ALTERNATIVE
TO EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
Up to this point, we have been considering approaches
to the study of psychology which were heavily patterned
after the mode of understanding which was provided by the
natural sciences. Yet, as we are well aware today, there
are many contemporary psychologists who do not feel that
aspiring to create a psychology based on the natural scien-
tific model is either desirable or possible. We have de-
veloped a rather extensive literature which is a reaction
1
"^Critiques of psychological theory which are in line
with the material presented here can be found in J. F. T.
Bugental, The Search for Authenticity (New York: Holt,
Reinhart and Winston, 1965 ) » Lyons , Psychology and the
Measure of Man (London: Free Press, 1963) > and A. Vann
Kaam
,
Existential Foundations of Psychology (Pittsburg:
Duque sne Univ. Press , 1966 )
.
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to the perceived premature delimiting of psychological phe-
nomena which is inherent in the psychology of earlier times.
Over and over, one hears the complaint that psychology
lacks unity; direction; that its emulation of the physical
sciences has prevented it from investigat ing meaningful
phenomena; that those phenomena which it does investigate
which also happen to have intrinsic meaning are, neverthe-
less, handled in an unmeaningful way; that the atomism of
our methodology prevents recognition of the whole phenomena
which rightfully belong to the human person. However, the
problem does not stop there since the seeker of greater
knowledge and understanding is soon swept up into a great
divergence of opinion, fact and theory regarding the matter,
once he ventures outside of the narrow confines of psycho-
logical science and seeks to find firm ground in any of the
"more established" areas of discourse--scientific and phil-
osophical .
One finds great argument over central issues like the
role and nature of experience and interpretation in sci-
ence/^ The deep and aesthetic nature of the commitment
which goes into scientific creativity is often composed
153
with the fields of art, history, literature and music.
i52
F. S. C. Northrop, The Logic of the Sciences and
the Humanities (New York: Macmillan, 19^7)*
Bronowski
,
Science and Human Values (New York:
Julian Messner, 1956).
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Iho importance of the .social nature of Lho scientific coni-
raumty has been admirably portrayed in singularly different
ways by Michael Polanyi 1 and Thomas Kuhn . 153 Finally,
great debates rage over such basic issues as the relation
of scientific concepts to reality. The result has been a
plethora of divergent views which seem jointly to demon-
strate their paucity of philosophical content. Psychology
has been rocked by the successive impacts of posi tivism
,
1 55
operationism
,
idealism 5 and finally, realism''"^ arrives
on the scene with something to say to each of the other po-
sitions and also something of its own to add.
Our ultimate position, following the process philosophy
of Whitehead
,
will involve a realist epistemology which
rejects, as we have seen, the positivism originating with
Hume
,
and the idealism and a priorism due to Berkeley and
Kant, in favor of the interpretation of personal experience
154Michael Polanyi, Personal Knowledge (New York:
Harper and Row, 1964).
155Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolu-
tions (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962 )
.
156 .Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science (New York:
Macmillan, 191l).
157Percy Bridgman, The Logic of Modern Physics (New
York: Macmillan, 1927)*
158Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy of Physical Science
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1949 )
•
159 /Ernest Nagel, Structure of Science (New York:
Harcourt Brace and World, 19^1 )
•
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a.s a unity in intimate interaction with its environment.
Whitehead, unlike the majority of those wo have considered
to this point, finds that the most basic aspect of our
awareness of the world is that of being in a world as given
in immediate experience such that it is erroneous to con-
sider that it is necessary to construct what we know to be
real. That is to say, it is our awareness of the world
which arises out of our basic participation in the network
of relations, including both the knower and the known in
mutual interaction, which forms the basis for knowledge.
The over-all position is called realism because it is a
basic principle of the organismic cosmology that the world
can only be understood by having reference to the existent
beings with whom we are participating in the life of the
cosmos
.
Organism suggests process and process implies that
events and not things are fundamental. Also, complete
understanding of an organism involves understanding both
its sides (internal and external). "We must start with the
event as the ultimate unit of natural occurrence," Whitehead
asserts, "an event has to do with all that there is, and in
particular with all other events. ..."
There is . . . an intrinsic and an extrinsic
reality of an event, namely, the event as in
its own prehension, and the event as in the
prehension of other events. 1^0
l60yj1itehead, Science and the Modern World, p. 103 *
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By now the theme of within and without, intrinsic and
extrinsic is becoming more familiar, and we have hinted at
it m those places where the character of history seemed
most receptive to such an interpretation. Thus far, its
grand master is Gustav Fechner and that is why we have cho-
sen to label him as the father of psychology. Wundt, the
prodigal son, attempted in his later years to develop his
"Geschichte"
;
yet, was not successful in the attempt and
did not, in any case, undertake to recant his original
heresy of developing only the external part of Fechner'
s
psychophysics
.
1
This section is labeled a "coexistent alternative to
experimental psychology" because, it is now possible for us
to do two important things. On the one hand, we can apply
the Whiteheadian assertion that what is most basic in the
world is the wholeness of our immediate experience (its
internal and external connectedness); while on the other
hand, we can develop an important and often neglected aspect
of the history of psychology which is highly relevant to
our theme
.
What we mean by applying Whitehead's basic assertion
is this: since immediate experience is the totality of our
awareness, scientific languages and theories are a selective
abstraction from that total situation. Up to now we have
dealt with many such selective aspects but have never been
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able to achieve their useful reintegration into a complete
picture of man. We have also placed the problem squarely
upon the mechanistic nature of the Newtonian cosmos and its
simply located bits of matter. Additionally, by our men-
tion of the indirect influences of cultural milieu and
poetic insight we have tried to show that the wholeness of
immediate experience does, in fact, contain factors which
are excluded from, but none- the-less important to, the goal
of meaningful scientific disclosure of reality. Therefore,
in presenting the following history of psychological
thought we can accomplish an important reality check on a
key Whiteheadian assumption. If, as Whitehead asserts,
immediate experience is the pristine pure mode of man's
knowledge of reality, in this case his own psychological
nature, why does it appear that the idea is unique to
Whitehead? Surely other intelligent human beings must
have come to a similar, if differently phrased, under-
standing. As is obvious from our rhetorical tone, and the
title of this section, there is in fdct a line of individ-
uals, whose work bears a specific relation to psychology,
that have recognized the same truth contained in White-
head's assertion. For our purposes, we have begun with
Fechner, though it is possible to go back well beyond him
[to the Renaissance if desired], in locating the roots of
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the view. This view can be callod many things and for
the present it is best to eai I it a humanistic view rather
than an organismic one. This is because it is not until we
got to the modern era and Whi t ehead 1 s complete cosmology
that we will find a clear unwavering apprehension of the
basic cosmological change which is an important character-
istic of the new era in which we live. Let us say, then,
that we are now about to recount a history of psychology
as a human science as opposed to psychology as a natural
science
.
3*1.1 WILHELM DILTHEY (l833-191l)
Dilthoy was a contemporary of Herbert, Helmholtz,
Foeliner and Wundt, wrote extensively in psychology, but was
primarily a philosopher with an eye to the broad aspects of
nature and life. He published widely in the fields of lit-
erature, music, religion, history and, of course, psychology.
His influence in psychology has been restricted not only by
the fact that he was a philosopher and spoke the philoso-
pher's tongue at a time when psychology was learning an
entirely new language but also, and more importantly, be-
cause he saw psychology as a human rather than natural
D. Hodges, The Philosophy of Wilhelm DilLhey
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd., 1952), p • xiii.
1 am indebted to Dr. Juan Caban of the IJ. Mass. School
of Education Faculty for his insight into the sixteenth
century thinker Gambiattista Vico and his relation to the
approach which underlies this segment of psychological
development
.
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science. It is this aspect of his basic approach that
probably accounts for his invisibility in modern experimen-
tal psychology. We note with interest, that Boring's au-
thoritative History of Experimental Psychology
,
which is a
sort of "Old Testament" for the revealed word of modern
positivistic psychology, neither mentions Dilthey in its
index nor includes any reference to him among the copious
chronicle of "begats" that are important to the spread of
the seed of modern scientific psychology.
In entering into Dilthey' s thought, we do not intend
to provide even a sketch of his complete works. Our concern
is to sample the character of his psychological thinking
and to trace its influence into modern times. Dilthey, un-
like those whom we have considered to this point, did not
start his theorizing from a basis of mathematics and science
but, rather, drew mostly upon inspiration from historical
studies and aesthetics. Yet, his concern was to show that
human science could be just as rigorous and systematic as
the natural sciences but in a different way.
Dilthey believed, in line with the thesis we developed
in our consideration of the early development of scientific
thought, that one of the main attractions of the reliance
upon mathematics and natural sciences was the fact that
they offer an apparent method of obtaining not only exact
knowledge but also ultimate control over nature. He was
J
()7
intimately familiar with the history and character of the
centuries long traditions which led to the modern view and
came to see that it really represented only half of the
"globus intellec tualis "
:
the other half is composed of the study of
man in society and in history. Here we meet
with a different type of study. Instead of
observing our object directly, we have to
approach it indirectly through written tes-
timony and other similar evidence; instead
of clearly formulated theories which can be
tested by experiment, we have an attempt to
analyze and describe the concrete complexi-
ties of life; instead of explanation of par-
ticular events and processes through general
laws, we have an appreciative understanding
of the meaning and value of the unique in-
dividual. There is no reason why the one
sphere of knowledge should not be as thor-
^ ^
oughly studied by philosophers as the other.
The above statement by Hodges, who is the main interpreter
of Dilthey for the English speaking world, is meant to
summarize Dilthey' s main intentions. We can best relate
these intentions to our approach by first taking a brief
look at Dilthey' s relation to philosophical thought and
then focusing on the more detailed area of his psychological
thought
.
Since modern psychology had grown up with modern phi-
losophy, Dilthey' s over-all view shares an intimate rela-
tion to the aspects we have covered in earlier sections.
Dilthey, like Helmholtz and Wundt was closer to the British
162
Ibid., pp. xiv-xv
.
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r j.ca.1 philosophy which derived I'rum llumc than ho was to
tiis diroc t German ancestry in Kant. There is, however, an
important difference in Dilthey's approach, as contrasted to
either Hume or Helmholtz and Wundt. Seeing this difference
is important to being able to accurately place Dilthey's
efforts toward the creation of a human science of psychol-
ogy in the scheme of things.
To digress a bit, we have been asserting that the
basic characteristic of the rise of modern science is its
adherence to and belief in the underlying validity of the
basic metaphysical categories of time, causality, mind and
matter. From an ever increasing reliance on the truth of
these basic assumptions, the movement toward scientific
explanation gradually elaborated an epistemology which was
harmonious with those basic elements. This epistemology
saw its methods of inquiry, its criteria of truth and de-
fined the relation between the knower and the known in
strict conformity to the dictates of the basic metaphysical
imperative of the age. Now, before focusing on the major
difference between Dilthey and his antecedents, it is im-
portant to discuss the more basic similarity that exists
between them. This similarity also forms a common bond
between all of the scientists, philosophers and psycholo-
gists that we have discussed; for that matter, it is also a
major characteristic of many psychologists which remain to
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bo discussed. Wo are rei'orriri^ to tho basic metaphysical
similarity that underlies the whole era of scientific de-
velopment, especially that portion before the twentieth
century when the basic categories of matter, energy, time,
etc., were drastically revised. These underlying metaphysi-
cal assumptions were, as we have seen, generally rather
tacitly assumed as the proper starting point for one's ap-
proach to philosophy, science and psychology. Out of these,
were generated the epistemological systems which were to
account for how knowledge was possible.
At this point we can return to our consideration of
the differences between Dilthey and the others with tho
realization that the differences we are observing are epis-
temological rather than metaphysical. Dilthey, unlike
Helmholtz and Wundt, did not accept the critical episte-
mology which characterized Hume. Hume's total metaphysical
atomism had led him to the skeptical denial of causality
,
God and even self. He ended up with a picture of man s
mind based on the association, through repetition, of the
elements in the world which were given in experience. This
is why Hume spent so much time on the nature of the mini]
and associationistic psychology. For Hume, mind was basic
and natural science and even theology had to be based upon
the logical and epistemological foundation that could only
be provided by the science of the mind. We have also seen
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that th i s is the point of dopar tuj'n for Kant's divoi’genco
trom Hume. Kant asserted that aiL knowledge, including
psychological knowledge, is derived from more basic, a
priori
,
relations which exist between the mind and its ob-
ject. He was however willing to hold, with Hume, that "all
our knowledge begins with experience" but he departed from
Hume by asserting that "it does not [necessarily] follow
that it arises out of experience." Instead, he asserted
the requirement for the "faculty of knowledge to . . . sup-
ply from itself" the basic epistemological structure of the
world
.
The stage is now set for the introduction of Dilthey's
psychological thought. Dilthey denied Kant's claim that
the psychology of the mind was not basic to science and,
while he therefore accepted Hume ' s position, he did not also
accept his total skepticism. Hodges summarizes the multiple
aspects of Dilthey's psychological position by recounting
• x. n
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his position regarding the basic issue of epistemology.
Dilthey did not need an epistemology to convince him that
he had knowledge because he already knew he had knowledg
In any case, epistemology itself has to presuppose the
knowledge that there is such a thing as knowledge in order
to have something to talk about. Similarly, he did not
need an epistemology to tell him what the test oi knowledge
163Ibid.
,
pp . 37-38
.
201
ox- truth was because ho, like ovorybody o.Lse, Ixad loarned
the basic tests of knowledge in childhood and utilized them
throughout life. Realizations of this type were the basic
empirical facts that Dilthey felt should be handled by any
psychological theory worthy of the name. He did not need
an epistemology to tell him that the real world exists be-
cause the world is a fact of consciousness; if this were not
the case, there would be nothing for epistemology to talk
about. The questions which naturally arise about the na-
ture oi the real world should, he felt, be referred to the
science of psychology for a close analysis of consciousness
itself. Epistemology finally fitted into the picture only
after the basic empirical facts of consciousness had pre-
pared the foundation upon which its articulate superstruc-
ture could be built.
It is through this approach to psychology that Dilthey
intended to prepare the way for a fruitful study of the
other half of the "globus int ellec tualis . " For Dilthey it
was impossible to attempt to build an epistemology without
laying its foundations in psychology, he saw that the only
real question was whether one decided to do it consciously
and therefore critically or pretend to do something else
and therefore do it amateurishly. To claim independence
from psychology is not so much as to free oneself from its
bonds as it is to insure that they will actually become
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stronger
. Dilthey says of one who attempts such efforts:
lie presupposes it. He makes use of it.
But he does not control it. ^4
For Dilthey there were two main failings of the psy-
chology of his day. First, was its inability to meaningly
treat man's higher mental functions. Pronouncements about
sensations and the association of simple ideas did not
possess very much explanatory power from his point-of-view.
He wanted a psychology which would at least be open to
meaningful consideration of creative imagination, sense of
values, religious devotion and poetic insight. At the
heart of this criticism was his feeling that there is a
reality of man's inner life (he called it instinctive)
which is the actual basis of moral and spiritual life. To
this inner aspect of man one must also add the outer or so-
cial aspects of life of which he is both a product and a
source. In a statement that we will ultimately relate to
an important principle in Whitehead's cosmology, the so-
called ontological principle. Dilthey asserts that:
Man as a fact prior to history and society is
a fiction of genetic explanation; the man
whom sound analytical science has for its
object is the individual as an element in
society. 1&5
By way of contrast we will insert a statement of Whitehead's
l64Wilhelm Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften , V, 149,
quoted in Hodges, Philosophy of Dilthey , p. 38.
"*"^^Dil they
,
quoted in Ibid .
,
p. 40
.
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P r^nc -* Pi e so that the similarity will be clear.
The ontological principle assorts the rela-
tivity of decision; whereby every decision
expresses the relation of the actual thing,
for which a decision is made, to an actual
thing by which that decision is made. 1^6
In the present context, one should simply draw a parallel
between Whitehead's use of "actual entity" and Dilthey's
use of "man" as the basic unit of explanation. Dilthey’s
purpose is humanistic while Whitehead's is cosmological,
and the difference between the two is the difference be-
tween metaphysics and epistemology. Dilthey simply re-
formed epistemology based upon the "basic empirical facts"
of which he was naturally aware, but did not go beyond that
point to a reformulation of metaphysics; the times simply
were not right for it. By the time Whitehead was writing,
half a century later, conditions were remarkably different.
Thus, we find in Whitehead a new basis for the humanistic
epistemology of Dilthey; and humanistic epistemology re-
quires organismic metaphysics. But we do not have to become
involved in intimate details at this point. Dilthey repre-
sents an important new view upon the scene and we should
not occlude our appreciation of his historical importance
with too many outside excursions. Until we come to White-
head, "men" and "actual entities" will have to be synonymous.
l66Whitehead, Process and Reality
, p. 56 , Whitehead's
emphasis
.
20U
We can make this equation because both writers use the same
criterion of knowledge.
Whitehead's basic position was that:
All human discourse which bases its claim to
consideration on the truth of its statements
must appeal to the facts. . . . The final
court of appeal is intrinsic reasonableness.
'
Dilthey wanted a psychology which recognized its basis
in:
The mighty reality of the content of mental
life • •
• [known in experience] which is
consciously lived and originally given with
immediate power . 168
Whitehead said of his "actual entities" that:
in separation from [them] . . . there is
nothing, merely non entity--"The rest is
silence . "1°9
Dilthey could not have seen that only silence existed
outside his epistemology because the old metaphysics was
still there with its noisy hurrying and scurrying of ele-
mentary particles. He would however, and in fact did, feel
that in relation to his epistemology the old point s-of-view
were nothing, merely non entities derived from partial con-
sideration of the internal and external aspects of the in-
dividual and social nature of man.
1 67 Ibid.
,
p. 52 .
-I /TO
Dilthey, quoted in Ibid .
, pp . 131-132.
169Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 53» emphasis
added
.
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To return to our consideration of Dilthey's criticisms
of psychological thought, wo find him putting his finger
directly upon the pulse of materialistic metaphysics and
the mechanist epistemology which it inspired in the earlier
psychologists. Psychology, he felt, is mainly characterized
by the uncertainty of its results, and he saw that this
derived from the adoption of the method of physical sciences.
Physical sciences had near certitude in the realities of
mathematics and the assumptions of atomic physics which
existed at the time. However, early psychologists, Hume is
a good example, were led astray when they assumed that the
procedures of physics were applicable to mental life. Ac-
cordingly, their attempts to reduce all varieties of mental
life to the combinations and interactions of simply located
sensations and ideas held together by the laws of associa-
tion, created the problem of how to verify the psychological
analogues of physical phenomena because of the basic differ-
ences in their natures. Physical science could progress
because its basic elements are always open to direct exper-
imentation and its exact measurements were separately re-
peatable by the community of scientists. Psychological
science on the other hand, did not have such direct recourse
to measurement. Even if elementary principles of the rela-
tion between mind and body can be experimentally derived,
there is no corresponding method by which we can check the
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precision of the hypotheses wo make about tho higher-order
phenomena of the mind. The possible hypotheses are many
and experimental controls are not available.
Thus, in his criticisms of psychological theorizing,
Dil they recognized the limitations of materialist meta-
physics and chose to supersede them by relying upon the
phenomena of experience as he knew it. His problem in
creating a psychology then, was to come up with a rigorous
and systematic position which would rival the older systems
without also having to assume the same limiting metaphysical
basis. He published his answer to this problem in the year
189 ^ in a work titled Ideas Concerning a Descriptive and
Analytical Psychology .
Dilthey's attempts to construct an alternative psy-
chology were based on a premise that there are actually two
kinds of science--descriptive and explanatory. Both, of
course, had to start from a contemplation of the object of
their efforts so that its natural and irreducible units
could be obtained and so that the laws which express their
interrelation would be evident. For Dilthey, a descriptive
science was one which went beyond this point by building
upon the units and laws which resulted from this analysis
of actual experience. Explanatory science, on the other
hand, is one which takes a prior stand on the proper units
and laws which are appropriate to the phenomena and then
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jjroceeds to analyze the phenomena in terms of them. In
this case, all that can arise upon these foundations is a
hypothetical assumption. In Dilthey's eyes the classic
example of an explanatory science was modern physics.
Physics was restricted to the use of explanatory method
because the data of human experience could provide no direct
perception of the unity principle that applied to the phe-
nomena. Therefore, physicists were required to "explain"
the world of atoms in terms of the primary qualities which
made that world appear meaningful. Dilthey recognized that
this explanatory influence was evident in psychology and
accordingly held that psychology should not start with ex-
planations based on hypothetical units of sensations and
feelings which "go behind the facts of experience" but,
rather it should seek, in the data of inner perception, the
principles of order which bring coherence to mental life.
For his task only a descriptive approach will suffice.
Mental life, on this view, is an irreducible unity
which is devoid of more fundamental units. Its natural
unit is the total reaction of the whole self to the situa-
tion which confronts it. Rather than importing external
elements of explanation like sensation, and feeling or even
attempting more global, but ultimately just as limiting,
constructs like intentional actions in which content is
something separate, Dilthey's descriptive psychology was
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based upon an analysis of the whole self into three basic,
mutually dependent and equally important elements. He says
!
The various types of relation [the cognitive,
affective and conative attitudes of mind]
stand to one another in a relation of cause
and effect; one of them evokes the other.
Images presented by the senses, or thoughts
about them, give rise to feelings of satis-
1 action
,
of expansion of our personality and
fulfillment of our being, and these in turn
produce the effort and the resolve to main-
tain this state of things.
As he continues, recall the arguments of Hume and the em-
piricists; especially, the skepticism of Hume in which he
came to doubt even the concept of his own self due to the
fact that a rigorous application of the explanatory princi-
ples he utilized was incompatible with the phenomena he was
explaining. Ask yourself which basis seems more applicable
to naive experience. Returning to Dilthey's analysis, we
have
:
This causal process, which leads from objec-
tive apprehension to feeling and from that to
will and action, falls within inner experi-
ence. . . . The causation itself is con-
sciously lived; if it were not consciously
lived, then it would not find so direct and
powerful expression in poetry and history.
It is not that a regular sequence of particu-
lar states is given and their causal connec-
tion inferred, but the power of causation,
the irres tibility with which an apprehended
object sets all our feelings in tempestuous
motion, the irres tibility with which a man,
in spite of all reason, is as it were en-
chanted and constrained to snatch to himself
the object of these feelings. . . . Only from
the depths of lived experience can the strong
impressions of these things be drawn--it is
not from inferences that our knowledge of
209
&LiSci t i on
,
which makes bbo bruo sysbem of
life accessible bo us, has orison. *70
We have quoted at such length from the original because
the heart of Dilthey's psychology is of such a fundamentally
<^-*- :^e:ren^ character than anything we have considered to this
point. We should also note that it is different still from
the psychologies of Brentano and Husserl which we have yet
to discuss. These later psychologies, which spawned modern
phenomenological psychology, retain a more elementaristic
flavor since they still seek explanations in terms of iso-
lated "intentional acts" which have some "content."
Dilthey takes a giant step toward Whitehead’s position
in postulating the basic triumvirate of cognition, feeling
and conation as the "ground-rhythm" of mental life. This
is not to say that Whitehead uses those elements in that
order, in fact he does not, but that is another story for
another time. What is similar however, is the idea of a
unit-reaction in which the basic elements always participate.
For Dilthey, cognition comes first, then feeling and then
conation. From the point-of-view of "lived experience" as
the basic empirical fact for psychology to deal with the
argument runs as follows: "I cannot cognize a thing with-
out being interested in it and also having feelings or de-
sires about it. X cannot feel unless I have an idea of the
1
^°Dilthey, in Lived Experience, Expression and Under-
standing, quoted in Ibid., p. 246.
2 10
object, and looling tends to pass over into action. J
cannot act unless I know the situation and my own aim, and
action is usually motivated and always accompanied by
171feeling." Dilthey refers to this shifting interrela-
tionship as a "structural system." It is this structural
system which makes possible a descriptive psychology as
given in lived experience as against the explanatory sys-
tems which must rely on hypothetical inference.
Briefly, what this means to psychologists is that they
should view conscious life as an activity (our complete
activity) which is mostly directed toward other people and
things in the world. That is to say, wo do not usually
focus attention upon ourselves--we cognize others and things
and react to them. However, consciousness of other things
is also accompanied by an awareness or "enjoyment" of our
own mental processes and actions but this awareness is not
explicitly presented to consciousness. As Dilthey would
have it, we can only see ourselves out of the corner of our
eye, as it where, and then only while our attention is fo-
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cused on something else.
"'^Hodges, Philosophy of Dilthey
,
p. k '}
.
172Note the functional similarity of this view with
Fechner 1 s view that mind and body are not known simultane-
ously but, in fact, hide each other. Dilthey' s position
also has important relations to Polanyi ' s "tacit knowing"
and Whitehead's split mode of perception.
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When we direct the focus of our attention inward,
Dilthey claims that what we observe is not the entirety ol
our mental structure but only fragments of it which are
describable in terms of the basic structure of the three
elements. Thus, the succession of events which we observe
as "belonging together" do not require an associative bond
between them which is based on the explanatory hypothesis
of contiguity but are rather, related due to the fact that
they are themselves successive elements which are part of
the larger reaction pattern which is the unit of lived ex-
perience. To Dilthey, it was obvious that learning of a
friend's death would bring sorrow as a natural consequence
just as the suffering of injury or insult could lead to
anger. This type of unity of patterned action, was
seen n
functional and teleological terms. That is, we
know the
link between the various segments of the
experience because
they are parts of the structural system
within ourselves
and from which we derive the idea of causality.
These
structural relations may be contrasted with the
relations
which are postulated by any view which
relies upon the
association of elements of consciousness as
the basis of
mental life. Recall also, Hume's criticism
of the concept
of causality as it applied to the material
world. He could
find no significance in the concept and
concluded that the
only thing we observe is the temporal
relation between the
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cause and the effect. Hume became skeptical of everything
and Kant tried to resolve the problem by providing that
causality is an a-priori category of the mind. Dilthey
would claim that they both failed because they are attempt-
ing to explain the successive stages of a single reaction-
pattern by analogy to causal associations and mechanical
habits between isolated mental constructs. In such cases
we can, with Hume, Kant and anyone else who is utilizing an
elementaris tic epistemology as the basis of his thought,
only infer an apparent cause-effect relationship to explain
succession in time. This approach is completely without
the ability to see any meaning or significance between the
two events. It is rather like taking one critical focus
on the mouth of a baby and another critical focus upon the
baby's finger, and then wondering how the finger gets into
the mouth without taking into account that both belong to
the same baby. Dilthey' s structural sequences by contrast,
contain the meaning in themselves and it is our experience
of this meaning from which the idea of causality is derived.
Dilthey' s approach to the analysis of individual con-
sciousness was balanced by an historically based view which
he saw as able to give some insight into the early stages
of the development of various human achievements which were
now sunk deep into man's unconscious. He did not feel that
introspection was the way to approach the study of the
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unconscious
.
Wliat man is, he learns not by rummaging
about in himself, nor yet by psychological
experiments, but by means of history. 173
Seeing the products of past lived experience, now sta-
bilized by the objectivity of history, in light of the same
structural system which applied to immediate experience,
was to have provided an assurance that explanatory entities
which were foreign to conscious life were not imported into
the system from external sources. Similarly, Dilthey felt
that if there were areas of understanding which were not
adequately resolved in this manner, then it was permissible
to develop hypotheses and explanatory investigations as
long as the hypotheses are derived from the basis of the
structural system itself.
Now that we have given some consideration to Dilthey'
s
basic programmatic position, we can conclude our treatment
of his psychology with a brief look at the main divisions
he thought were appropriate to the framework of psychology
.
As regards the divisions which were appropriate to a
psychology which is based on the "structural system,"
Dilthey held that the first major division was the study
of the structural system itself. This would provide a
clearer understanding of the various elementary functions
which go into the cognitive, affective and conative activity
'"^Dilthey
,
quoted in Ibid .
,
p. 45*
and also, it would yiofd inlonnation relating to the natu-
ral., © 1 e o 1 ogi cal onds, toward which the conativ© behavior
was directed. One of the strengths of this interpretation
is that it focuses upon those ends as natural concomitants
of the whole sequence which represent the subjective satis-
faction of all the impulses which wore involved in the
uni t- reac t ion . This is the inner awareness Dilthey spoke
of as a natural concomitant to our consciousness of other
things. His word for this was "Innowerden 11 which can be
translated as "enjoyment" of those mental states, processes,
and activities which accompany all consciousness but which
are actually below the explicit threshold of consciousness
in the sense that we mobilize them and utilize them for L t
process of attending to the focal aspects of our conscious
lives. Again, for Dilthey, the ends toward which the whole
system drives must only be interpreted in terms of the evi-
dence of consciousness itself. Attempting to equate this
understanding with a hypothesis from biology regarding the
preservation of the individual and species is to distort
the argument's structural image of the consciousness of man.
This aspect relates directly to the second major division
of Dilthey 's psychology. Here, the laws of development
would be studied with an eye toward defining how the "ac-
quired system" of man's conscious life has been developed
and also how that system functions in influencing future
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events. Di 1 limy Uiouglit llial. pools and novelists had do-
veloped the greatest insight into these areas and that psy-
chology needed to develop its own characterization of these
phenomena based upon the structural system.
Important ingredients in Dilthey's observations on the
development of a new human scientific psychology were the
natural facts with which psychology should explicitly deal.
For example, he saw that the common mental structure and
the common external world which was shared by all men led
to similar fundamental presuppositions about the world and
about behavior, i.e.
,
personal obligation, cooperation,
obedience, etc. This was the natural starting point for a
truly psychological epistemology. From this position he
saw that the processes of human development which lead to
the mature individual were not quantitatively different
between human beings but qualitatively different in the
sense that all development involves the same elementary
capacities which constitute human nature. The great varia-
tions in qualitative development were seen as the joint
product of physical environment, social environment and the
inherent capacity of the individual.
In summarizing the psychology which results from this
approach, we see two important conceptualizations which
Dilthey has added to the development of psychological
thought. First, was his assertion that mental processes
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are predominately purposive or structural and that they
tend toward the building of an integrated mind and charac-
ter. He held that the elements of cognition, feeling and
conation were always present though their mutual importance
would vary with circumstances. The second important addi-
tion which is truly unique up to this point is the fact
that he developed a highly empirical epistemology without
also having to create an associationist psychology in order
to explain mental processes and life experience.
Dilthey's own words place the appropriate stress upon
the character of his basic contributions to psychological
science.
All knowledge is knowledge of experience; but
the original unity of all experience and its
resulting validity are conditioned by the
factors which mold the consciousness within
which it arises, i.e., by the whole of our
nature. . . . In the veins of the knowing
subject constructed by Locke, Hume
,
and Kant
runs no real blood, but the diluted fluid of
reason in the sense of mere thought-activity.
But I was led, by my concern as historian and
psychologist with the whole man, to make this
whole man, in the full diversity of his powers,
his willing, feeling, thinking being, the
foundation for explaining even knowledge and
its concepts (such as those of the external
world, time, substance, cause), however much
it may seem that knowledge weaves these con-
cepts only from the material of perception,
imagination and thought. 1?4
For Dilthey the important elements in the way we pic-
ture and structure the reality of the external world, the
174Dilthey, quoted in Ibid . , pp . 113-114.
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existence of life in others and our interactions with them,
can only be explained in terms ol the whole nature of man
in which volition, feeling, and thought are seen as simply
different sides of a single real-life process. Man's aim,
he felt, was to act and the true character of that action
should always be guarded by a psychology which protects the
inner nature of man, "which ought to be sacred to us" from
the "rashly experimental hand" of explanatory science.
3-1.2 FRANZ BRENTANO (1838-1917)
In Brentano we have another psychologist and philoso-
pher who was actively concerned about the application of
the methods of natural science to the "sciences of the
mind." In fact, Brentano was also concerned about the ap-
plicability of the same inductive approach to science that
we have seen Whitehead criticize. A. C. Rancurello who has
recently translated Brentano ' s Psychology from an Empirical
Standpoint into English also has documented the approaches
and attitudes which Brentano felt were deterimental to the
17
sciences of the mind and points to their modern relevance.
Brentano felt that: a) the adherence to the cannons of sci-
entific methodology was an easy way to mask the inner lack
of "all earnestness" in the actual conduct of research,
b) there was a "dilettante encroachment" upon the sciences
1
^Antos C. Rancurello, A Study of Franz Brentano
(New York: Academic Press, 1968 ) , p. 24
.
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or the mind by the export* in natural science, e) it was a
vam effort to attempt to give meaning to the sciences of
the mind by simply exerpting principles of explanation
from the natural sciences, d) the failure to recognize that
'the boundaries between formal learning and scientific and
artistic tact" cannot be ignored and e) the "logical un-
knowledge" of the true nature and foundation of the induc-
tive process which is usually found in those who practice
the scientific method.
Given this type of approach at a time when psychology
was Li ying so hai'd to become a science it seems strange
that Brentano was recognized as a psychologist or that he
had a very wide influence. Yet on both accounts he seems
to have succeeded very well.
Brentano, the man, is interesting because at heart he
was really a philosopher rather than a scientist and in
psychology he was an empiricist rather than an experimen-
talist. Because of his training as a priest (a position he
resigned because he was unable to accept the doctrine of
Papal infallibility) he had an extensive background in phi-
losophy and religion which greatly influenced the character
of his contribution to psychology.
In historical perspective, we find Brentano 1 s influ-
ence attenuated by the fact that in the separation which
occurred between philosophy and psychology at the beginning
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of the twentieth century, there turned out to be little
room for doctrines which viewed the relation of mental phe-
nomena and mental contents from the perspective of both
psychology and philosophy. Philosophers, for their part,
were disregarding the old psychologically based view of
logic and were turning instead to principles of logic which
were independent of the way a person thinks. This shift
marks the beginning of the development of linguistic analy-
sis in philosophy and also the analysis of language itself
which has become a major characteristic of modern American
philosophy. Of course, psychology had taken the other fork
at the crossroad and was about the business of eliminating
philosophical issues as sources of its experimental ap-
proaches to research topics.
The separation which occurred between psychology and
philosophy also had another important effect. Once the two
were sufficiently separated it was possible for each to
ascribe to the other any problems which seemed unsuitable
in terms of the basic assumptions of the discipline. Phi-
losophers came to increasingly assert that the nature of
the mind is a factual problem which the psychologists
should investigate experimentally; while the psychologists,
for their part, were unwilling and also unable, because of
their methodology, to tackle problems that did not fit the
direct mold of the basic assumptions they had borrowed from
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the physical sciences. Thus, psychologists quite easily
formed the counter assertion that the nature of the mind
was really a problem for the philosophers and philosophical
analysis. Seen in this light, both modern science and
modern philosophy have ignored the direct study of the mind
of man in favor of radically reduced views of human exis-
tence which focused upon highly abstractive explanatory
principles
.
Brentano is difficult to place in any particular psy-
chological context because he stood upon the threshold of
that transition to de-psychologized philosophy and de-
philosophized psychology. In the middle of this transi-
tion we find Brentano with a stake in both camps, claiming
that the mind should be understood in terms of the inten-
tional relations which always exist between the mind and its
object of contemplation. Mental events, for Brentano were
really mental acts or processes in which it is not the con-
tent but the process that is important. Thus, if we see or
hear something, the truly mental act is seeing or hearing
and not the object or its physiologically based sensation.
"My position in psychology," he claimed, "is that of
empiricism"
:
experience alone is my teacher: but along
with others I am of the opinion that such a
position is quite compatible with a certain
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idealistic v io wpoint . ' ^
^
As wo elaborate Brenlano's psychology a little further, it
Li seen that he retains a basic elementaris tic view
toward psychic phenomena. He defined psychology as the
"science of psychical appearances" but went on to specify
that the purpose of his "descriptive psychology" was to:
... show forth the totality of psychic ele-
ments, the combination of which makes up all
psychic phenomena, in the same sense in which
the letters of the alphabet make up all the
words .177
Brentano 1 s insight, as we have said, was that the psychic
phenomena which result from such combinations of letter-like
elements was the act of presentation and not the contents
of the act. To achieve this separation Brentano specified
that there are two classes of things. One was simple sensa
like colors and tones— things or qualities input by the
senses and the other was simple acts. Simple acts were
things like the seeing of colors, the hearing of tones or
the feeling of heat, etc. But in addition to these, and in
order to account for higher mental phenomena, Brentano also
specified that there were psychic acts which corresponded
to judging and remembering and also to such things as
"^^Franz Brentano, Psychology from an Empirical Stand -
point
,
p. 1, quoted in John J. Sullivan, Franz Brentano and
the Problem of Intentionali ty in Benjamin J. Wolman, ed.,
Historical Roots of Contemporary Psychology (New York:
Harper and Row, 19^8")"^ p~! 250
.
~^^Ibid.
.
p. 254.
222
emotions. In short, he developed an inventory of psychic
acts which had throe basic categories: presenting, judging
and emoting. It was from these basic categories that Bren-
tano sought to describe mental activities.
One of the first characteristics which he ascribed to
the psychic phenomena was a rather curious quality known as
"intentional inexistence.” What he was attempting to do
with this concept was to explain the ambiguous relation
that existed between basic psychic phenomena and the various
objects with which they could be associated. Each act had
an object but the objects varied markedly, ranging from
physical things to imaginary objects. Thus, Brentano as-
serted that
:
Every [psychic phenomenon] contains something
as its object, but not every psychic phenom-
enon does so in the same manner. In presen-
tation something is presented; in judgement
something is affirmed or denied; in love
something is loved; in hate something is
hated . . . and so on.
This intentional inexistence is exclu-
sively characteristic of mental phenomena.
No physical phenomena manifests anything
similar. Thus, we can define mental phenom-
ena as include an object intentionally
within themselves
.
178
In formulating the concept in this way Brentano was
very close to the long-standing dualism of mind and matter
that is usually present in scientific psychology. His for-
mulation was, however, different in the sense that he
178Ibid
.
,
pp. 256-257.
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(U sUuguishod between art and in ton I. i on and not mind and
matter, Sullivan observes that thi s distinction has a very
important property. First of all it establishes the
traditional two-level world of physical phenomena and men-
tal phenomena. But beyond that, there is the fact that the
classical distinction of form and matter refers only to
physical phenomena whereas, the act— intention formulation
applies only to mental phenomena and not physical phenomena.
To speak of act-physical or matter-mental is nonsense ac-
cording' to the logic of the system.
Important ramifications of this condition are found in
several areas of modern psychology. For example, the
Gestalt tradition of the relation of wholes and parts is a
theory which relates the physical world and psychophysical
properties and does not produce theoretical statements which
relate directly to the character of perceptual processes.
Speaking of this relation, which is known in Gestalt theory
as "isomorphism," Wolfgang Kohler stated:
. . . actual perception is in every case
related by real structural properties to the
psychophysical processes (phenomenal and phy-
sical) that belong to it; the union is not
left to chance: it is subject to laws. 1^0
Thus, it is theoretically inappropriate for someone to
17
9
Ibid
.
,
pp. 257-258.
l80Wolfgang Kohler, On Isomorphism
,
quoted in Richard
J. Bernstein and Edwin G. Boring, A Source Book in the
History of Psychology (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1965 ), P- 264 .
22 ^
a l Li ibu t o LIlo Goh La L I, not. ion o T a whole Lo a perceptual
process since according to the theory wholes ultimately
derive from the structural psychophysical processes and the
outside world. We should also add that "outside world" in
this case refers to all events which have anything to do
with the material world. This includes, of course, the
psychophysical processes of one's own body such that only
conscious phenomena (phenomenal qualities) may, on this
basis, be viewed as the mental counterparts of the psycho-
physical Gestalt qualities.
In the same vein, we can observe that in reinforcement
theory, the laws of reinforcement are simply relations be-
tween the stimulus operations in the physical world and
their corresponding responses also in the physical world.
Thus the generality of any reinforcement situation must
always be restricted to a class of behavior and the rein-
forcement operations appropriate to it to which it is re-
lated by the "laws of reinforcement."
In both these examples, as we have said, the theories
are restricted to the physical world and can only formulate
a form-matter distinction between their theoretical terms.
The act-intention relation we are considering with Brentano
is however, not of this type. Act-intention is strictly
limited to the logical and linguistic domain and is not a
theory which derives basically from a prior position relating
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to either the phenomenal or physical domains. This distinc-
tion is important because Brentano
' s influence is primarily
felt in the tradition we have labeled psychology as a human
science and is one of the reasons why the two psychologies
have been so difficult to bring together. At this beginning
level of distinction between the two, we have the contrast
portrayed in its clearest form. Brentano ' s system is organ-
ized around the psychical act whereas Wundt's system was
based upon sensory contents. Since both men were contempo-
raries there was, as one would expect, great controversy
between the "Act" psychologists and the "Content" psycholo-
gists. Of course, the "content" school is the one which
operated within an experimental paradigm and the "act"
school focused upon the description of pure consciousness
by immanent inspection. This basic emphasis is responsible
for the development of the very influential school of
"Phenomenology" which is rather closely associated with the
human scientific trend in psychology.
One important aspect of this sort of psychological de-
velopment is the fact that Brentano, and as we have seen,
Dilthey both thought that their psychologies were empirical
yet neither was experimental. We often equate the two by
thinking that the only way to be empirical is to be exper-
imental. Yet, it is that very experimental approach that we
have also seen is the primary reason why modern American
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psychology was created in the image of the physical sci-
ences as opposed to the human sciences. It is obvious how-
ever, that being empirical in the sense of Dilthey and
Brentano does not require one to reject the experimental
approach out of hand. Actually, both men had respect for
experimentation as long as it could operate within the
larger explanatory context of their empirical psychology.
As we have said, Brentano, though he focused on mental
phenomena as empirical facts, retained a much more elemen-
taristic approach than Dilthey did. Thus, Brentano' s psy-
chology is actually closer to the basic metaphysical assump-
tions of standard physical and psychological science than
were those of Dilthey' s psychology. Perhaps this is one of
the reasons why Brentano became a more direct influence in
the subsequent development of psychological thought. In the
present context, the important distinction that we must form
' v
is that the basic characteristic which underlies the sepa-
ration of the natural and human scientific approaches to
psychology is that the human scientific must: a) study
characteristically human phenomena in a rigorous but human
way; this means recognizing the presence of mind, b) recog-
nize that mental phenomena have an empirical validity which
is given in immediate experience, c) recognize that mental
phenomena are not directly reducible to physical or physio-
logical or psychophysical processes and d) recognize that
mental phenomena have a basic intent ional character in that
they always have directedness toward an object.
3.1.3 EXTENSIONS OF DILTHEY
AND BRENTANO IN
PRESENT PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this section is to briefly consider the
historical importance of the human scientific alternative
we have found in Dilthey and Brentano so that its influence
will become clearer. In tracing this history, we will find
a continuity of development which moves away from a psy-
chology that consists entirely of content and toward one
that is based on psychical functions.
We have seen that the development of psychological
thought in nineteenth century Germany was primarily charac-
terized by a heavy reliance upon physiological mechanism
and experimental techniques. Wilhelm Wundt as the champion
of this view believed that introspection was the method by
which the mind could be observed and analyzed. Psycholo-
gists of this era also explicitly separated mind from mat-
ter. Given this separation and the belief that the mind
should have the same structure as the physical world, intro
spection became a tool for the analysis of consciousness
that sought to reduce it to elementary sensations and ele-
mentary ideas.
The view which we have characterized as the human sci-
entific alternative to such elementarist ic approaches held
228
that the only appropriate way to observe truly conscious
phenomena was as they were yivon in immediate experience.
This view, it should be added, does not necessarily require
that one give up dualism as a description of mind and body.
This is particularly noticeable in Dilthey and we have as-
serted that one must change the basic metaphysical assump-
tions of scientific description before a meaningful alter-
native to dualism can be found.
The alternative movement was arguing simply that the
analysis of consciousness into elements via the method of
introspection destroyed the true nature of the phenomenon
since consciousness is essentially a unitary thing that
consists of functions or acts and not sensations and images.
An important aspect of the shift to functions or acts
of a unitary consciousness was the dynamic character it
imparted to psychology. Wundt and the associationis t s had
only been able to describe a passive mind which weakly
reacted to sensory stimuli. Conscious functions and acts,
on the other hand, gave the mind an active role in perceiv-
ing, judging and feeling. The old doctrine of associa-
tionism, which we have traced through two centuries of de-
I
velopment, lost out as a fundamental description of mental
phenomena once the mind was endowed with the power to act.
Others who can be viewed to have at least partially
ascribed to this position are William James, James Ward,
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Edmund Husserl
,
Edward Sprangei'
,
William McDougall, and
finally many more modern psychologists like Donald Snygg,
R. B. McLeod and Gordon Allport. We will touch on key
aspects of most of these men as we recount the development
of this type of psychology. Obviously there are many im-
portant names which are left out; however, this simply is
not the pj.ace or time to dwell exclusively upon history and
of those we do cover we shall only be able to show the
barest elements of similarity to the new alternative.
Following upon Brentano 1 s work, there was a growing
importance to the study of the phenomena of the mind. In
I 9OO Edmund Husserl greatly popularized the movement and
succeeded in establishing "Phenomenology" as a method of
psychology which sought to describe pure consciousness by a
process he called "immanent inspection. " There were also
many others in Germany who, around the turn of the century,
were deciding that the new psychology had a lot to offer
and was, in fact, closer to reality than Wundt had been.
Specifically, Carl Stumpf (1848-1936) who was a major com-
petitor of Wundt showed the characteristic human scientific
approach when he held that the proper way to study the per-
ception of auditory tones was not, as Wundt would do, to
employ trained introspec tionist s who were supposed to intro-
spect the pure sensation of the tone, but to use expert mu-
sicians. Stumpf, like Dilthey thought of phenomenology as
a basic science out of which ail other sciences could bo
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derived. It is interesting to note that three of his stu-
dents became quite famous by founding Gestalt psychology
(Wertheimer, Kohler and Koffka). Also Kurt Lewin (who we
shali consider in a later section), an important field
theorist, was one of Stumpf's students.
An interesting aspect of Stumpf's work was his attempt
to show that mental acts or functions and their contents
could independently vary. For example in observing a color,
the mental function can change from noticing to judging
while the content of the color remains the same. Of course,
the content could change while the mental act remains the
same. In this we can see part of the reason for the demise
of Wundt's introspective structuralism. Wundt was con-
strained to see only sensations and to explain these only
in terms of the physical dimensions of the stimulus. Those
who were considering higher-order perceptual processes
found characteristics that could not meaningly be reduced
to the qualities of sensation.
Max Wertheimer launched Gestalt psychology in 1912
with an observation similar to but far more conclusive than
Stumpf's had been. Wertheimer was able to show that motion
could be perceived when there was no motion in the stimulus.
This finding which was both experimental and easily replic-
able made it clear that there were types of experience
231
which could not be reduced l.o Wundt's elementary visual
sensations. Certainly, this type of development was an im-
portant confirmation of the basic trends of the phenomeno-
logical movement.
We should note however, that Gestalt psychology is
only partially in the camp with phenomenology. The Gestalt
approach focused primarily upon the mechanisms of percep-
tion and generally sought to explain territory, which had
previously been explored, by adding interpretations in
terms of their own methodology. Others who were part of
the movement away from elementism stayed much closer to the
basic view point of intentionali ty as a key factor in men-
tal phenomena.
William James (1842-1910) is a good example of the in-
tentional trend. James' own colorful words are the best
indicators of the reaction which had developed against the
old school:
Within a few years what one may call a micro-
scopic psychology has arisen in Germany, car-
ried on by experimental methods, asking of
course every moment for introspective data,
but eliminating their uncertainty by operating
on a large scale and taking statistical means.
Their method taxes patience to the utmost,
and could hardly have arisen in a country
whose natives could be bored . . • • The mind
must submit to a regular seige in which min-
ute advantages gained night and day by the
forces that hem her in must sum themselves up
at last into her overthrow. 1
181James, The Principles of Psychology , I, 192, James'
emphasis.
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James usually spoke of purposivism rather than intention-
ality but the meaning is much the same. In the German
the main connotation is process or action whereas
in the American version there is, in addition to the action-
oriented flavor, a definite indication of purpose; Ameri-
cans seemed to require processes that did something useful
also. So James' psychology is characterized by a purposive
approach to mental phenomena which were a continuous "stream
of consciousness."
The pursuance of future ends and the choice
of means for their attainment are thus the
mark and criterion of the presence of men-
tality in a phenomenon. We all use this test
to discriminate between an intelligent and a
mechanical performance. 10^
James' "stream of consciousness" has much the same deriva-
tion as Dilthey's empirical structural system. James ob-
served that the main characteristics of consciousness were
its individualistic nature (it belongs only to single in-
dividuals); its ever changing nature (stream); its conti-
nuity of personal identity (in spite of lapses in conscious-
ness as in sleep, etc.) and its selective or attentional
character which belongs to purposiveness.
Another individual who belongs to this line of theo-
rists is Edward Spranger ( 1882 -1963 )* Spranger is inter-
esting because he was successor to Dilthey at the University
182 Ibid.
,
p . 8 .
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of Berlin and also strongly influenced by him. Spranger,
like Dilthey, took his departure from cultural rather than
1 83physical sciences. His Psychology is sometimes known as
"Understanding Psychology" because he sought to exp Lain the
interrelations between meaningful aspects of the inner lives
of individuals. He also recognized that the individual's
subjective experiences were interwoven with the events of
the social and historical world. This view led him to deny
purely subjective states and to focus upon consciousness as
it relates to objective reality. With reasoning reminis-
cent of Dilthey' s approach, he considered that the objec-
tive reality of mental relations is assured by the fact
that: a) mental relations are attached to physical forms
and can either receive value from the world or give it to
the world--as in art forms, b) mental relations are devel-
oped in interaction with many single subjects such that
they are collectively determined forms of meaning relation-
ships and c) mental relations are seen as objective pre-
cisely because they have a supra-individual validity which
seem to function as the norms by which the individual cre-
ates some mental fact.
In this approach which emphasizes an explanation of
objectivity in terms of the activity of the knowing mind,
Edward Spranger, Types of Men , J. P. W. Pxgors
,
(Halle: Niemeyer Publishing, 1928).trans
.
Spranger felt that ho had solved the age-old mind-body
problem; and also had formulated an explanation of why the
natural scientific approach should be avoided. In this
case, Spranger held that the so-called objective world or
external nature to which elementaristic psychology was at-
tempting to relate its basic sensations, was, in fact,
nothing more than a correlate of a special cognitive atti-
tude. Since he placed such emphasis upon interrelations as
opposed to elements Spranger, like Dilthey, thought of his
psychology as a "Structural Psychology."
Spranger also developed a typology of personality
types which was a strong influence in Gordon Allport's work
and led directly to the famous Allport-Vernon Study of
-i QU
Values Test, 1931. Allport used the six fundamental
types of subjective evaluation which Spranger had developed
as the basis of his rationale. It is interesting to note
that the actual scales on the test instrument theoretic,
economic, aesthetic, social, political and religious--
derive from Spranger's analysis which he carried on in the
tradition of human scientific theorizing. It is unfortunate
indeed that the underlying philosophical differences between
the tradition to which Spranger belongs and the more ele-
mentaristic and behavioral traditions so prevalent in thxs
P«
l84Marx and Hillix, Systems
426.
and Theories in Psychology,
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country arc not morn dourly niuln ph l.ood and morn widely
publicized. If this were the case, it is doubtful that the
various "trait slices" of human personality would have been
so proliferated in modern psychology. Since our American
psychology is so anti-philosophical, the tendency has been
to turn to techniques for "construct validation" as a means
of compensating for the lack of a clearly established phi-
185losophical basis.
In addition to the influences between German and Amer-
ican thought that we have been tracing, there was also an
i-nfluence that came from England. Two names are important
to this phase of development, James Ward (1843-1925) and
William McDougall (1871-1938).
Ward was primarily a philosopher but wrote extensively
in psychology. He, like his contemporary Brentano, did not
adhere to the older views of a passive associat ionis tic
mind. Ward’s basic premise is, however, different than the
German approach in that he held an evolutionary view of
consciousness in which mental processes were seen to have
evolved from indifferent ialed mentality. For Ward an ele-
mentary sensation was simply an erroneous abstraction be-
cause even at its first appearance in psychic life one must
consider that a sensation is really a modification of a
^';Lee J. Cronbach and Paul E. Meehl , "Construct
Validity in Psychological Tests," Psychological Bulletin ,
LIT (1955), 281-302.
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pre-existing presentation and that it is also true that the
resultant whole presentation is more complex than it was
before. Further, in this complexity we never experience
any parts which are as discontinuous as the supposed ele-
ments in physical nature. 18^
Ward also spoke out against the reductionism of com-
paring higher mental states with lower. We noted earlier
m connection with the mental chemistry of J. S . Mill that
it formed a more inclusive concept than the older mental
mechanics. Here we find Ward questioning the "propriety"
of physical analogies and wondering if analogies to living
objects would not be more appropriate for mental processes.
We shall find in the growth of a seed or an
embryo far better illustrations of the un-folding of the contents of consciousness thanin the building up of molecules: the process
seems much more a mere segmentation of what
is originally continuous than an aggregation -
of elements at first independent and distinct. 187
In William McDougall we find the extension of Ward's
psychology and also close contact with modern American
psychology since McDougall spent most of his professional
life in this country, first at Harvard and than at Duke.
McDougall was an interesting mix between psychology as the
study of consciousness and psychology as the study of
186 TJames Ward, "Psychology," Encyclopedia Britannica
,9th ed.
,
XX, 46 in Herrnstein and Boring, op. cit
., p. &08
187Ibid
.
,
p . 606
.
behavior
.
However, by behavior he did not mean the type of
behavior that Watson was popularizing at the same time; for
McDougall behavior was a purposive action in which the
whole animal was involved. In his comprehensive work The
Outline of Psychology
,
published in 1923, McDougall listed
seven marks of behavior which made it necessary to consider
behavior as purposive. In order of appearance, they are:
l) spontaneity of movement, 2 ) persistence of activity in-
dependent of the continuance of the impression which may
have initiated it, 3 ) variation of direction of persistent
movement, 4) cessation of movements upon achieving a par-
ticular kind of change in the situation, 5 ) preparation for
new situation toward the production of which the action
contributes, 6 ) learning, i.e., improvement in the effec-
tiveness of behavior when it is repeated under similar con-
ditions and 7 ) the total involvement of the organism. From
this list of purposive characteristics McDougall drew the
conclusion that reflex based behaviorism does not meet
the criteria for a true behavior theory which should be a
"purposive behaviorism."
McDougall 1 s efforts to deal with something more con-
crete than mere sensations are clearly shown in the follow-
ing warning which he placed in the preface of that same
1923 Outline.
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The psychophysiology of the senses is a rich
field in accumulated observations, the fas-
cination of which as a field of research is
not unknown to me.
. . . The student who ap-
proaches psychology by this route is almost
inevitably led into the mechanical, atomistic
way of thinking which I would have him avoid.
• • • The study of the senses is seductive;
for this is one way of simplifying psychology
and of enabling the student to feel that he
is acquiring a solid basis of facts. But it
is a simplification achieved at the cost of
an abstraction from actual experience, the
degree of which the young student does not
easily understand.
. . . We do at least deal
with concrete realities rather than with ab-
stract and artificial entities such as "the
sensations" are. 1^8
The fact that McDougall's seven marks of purposive be-
havior are oriented toward animals should not lead to the
impression that he dealt only with animals. He preferred
to define psychology as "the positive or empirical science
of conduct or behavior" and in this sense empirical means
the same type of psychology that was to be found in Bren-
tano. In fact McDougall was very close to Brentano 1 s psy-
chology in many ways. For example, on the issue of the in-
terpretation of experience McDougall, like Brentano felt
that
:
Experience is not made up of things; it is a
process and perhaps a train of activity.
The most general and fundamental facts about
experience as we know it, or enjoy it, are
two. First, experience or experiencing is
always an experiencing of something . . .
even when, as in psychologizing , that object
l88William McDougall, Outline of Psychology (New York:
Scribner's and Sons, 1923) » P» xi
.
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is itself an experiencing or thinking. Second,
all experiencing or thinking is the experi-
encing or thinking of someone, some person,
some organism. So far as we positively know,
this someone, this subject, is always a mate-
rial organism or is embodied in and manifests
itself to us only in and through the medium
of a material organism. 189
He followed this statement with an elaboration of the use
of the verb "to think" in which he likened his usage to
that of Descartes' famous "cognito
,
ergo sum" by way of
indicating that he saw this as the most general form of
experience. This generalized form of experience was, for
McDougall
,
a unitary whole in which aspects may be seen as
distinguishable but not separable. His programme for the
construction of a psychology which would deal with the
unitary whole of experience was outlined as follows:
The psychologist . . . build [s] up his de-
scription of the human mind by inference
from the observed facts of behavior, the be-
havior of men and animals and from the ob-
served facts of experience, facts of his own
experience observed introspectively , and
facts of others' experience described and
recorded by them . 190
From McDougall ' s critique of elementism and the "accumu-
lated observations" of "mechanical and atomistic ways of
thinking" it is obvious that the introspection he speaks
of above is not the same introspection practiced by Wundt
and Titchener. McDougall argued forcefully against
^^^Ibid
.
,
p. 40.
190Ibid.
,
p . 38
.
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"in t rospoc tivc mechanical psychology" and also against tho
"behavioral mechanical psychology" which was being pro-
pounded by Watson.
This criticism of Watson's psychology by McDougall
,
points up the fact that when Watson stated his original
position in 1913 > be was reacting to both the tradition of
introspection (Wundt and Titchener) and also the study of
consciousness (Brentano and McDougall). The extent of his
criticisms, while well known today, still seems shocking,
to this writer at least, since, in the first major theoret-
ical publication he made after taking his original stance,
Watson undertook to explain mental images as implicit lan-
guage responses and also to define affect as slight vase ul
changes in the genitalia.
Given this type of disparity it is not surprising th
the strongest American proponent of "mentalism" and the
creator of behaviorism should find ample opportunity foi a
clash of opinion. Their debates over the issues were pub-
lished in 1929 under the title of The Bat tle of Behavioi 1
In this volume, we find Watson maintaining that:
He who would introduce consciousness, . . .
does so because of spiritualistic and vital-
istic leanings. ... The behaviorist can
find no consciousness in the test tube of his
science. He finds no evidence anywhere for
a stream of consciousness . . . L but J he does
24l
l'ind convincing proof of an over- widening
stream of behavi or
.
Part of McDougall • s rejoinder included the following
colorful account of some missing aspects of behaviorism.
I come into this hall and see a man on this
platform scraping the guts of a cat with
hairs from the tail of a horse; and sitting
quietly in attitudes of rapt attention, are a
thousand persons who presently break out into
wild applause. How will the Behaviorist ex-
plain these strange incidents: How to explain
the fact that the vibrations emitted by the
cat-gut stimulate all the thousand into abso-
lute silence and quiescence; and the further
fact that the cessation of the stimulus seems
to be a stimulus to the most frantic activ-
ity? Common sense and psychology agree in
accepting the explanation that the audience
heard the music with keen pleasure and vented
their gratitude and admiration for the artist
in shouts and hand clappings. But the Behav-
iorist knows nothing of pleasure, pain, of
admiration and gratitude. He has relegated
all such "metaphysical entities" to the dust
heap, and must seek some other explanation.
Let us leave him seeking it. The search will
keep him harmlessly occupied for some centu-
ries to come . 192
Perhaps even Watson chuckled at McDougall 's comment in
which the concept of consciousness could be approached in
such a light hearted way. It is doubtful, however, that he
would have found amusement in McDougall' s more serious and
theoretical attempts to explicate the role of consciousness.
In attempting to relate his knowledge of neural
191John B. Watson and McDougall, The Battle of Behav-
iorism (New York: Norton, 1929), P- 26 ‘
192Ibid.
,
p. 63 .
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processes to his conception of a unitary consciousness,
McDougall was up against the same problem that the German
physiological psychologists had faced. Their solution was
to borrow British associat ionism as a basis for mental op-
eration. McDougall, of course, was not willing to admit
any explanation that did not meet his empirical criterion
of the unity of consciousness which he knew directly through
introspection. Thus, in his first published work, a volume
titled Physiological Psychology
,
McDougall solved the prob-
lem by postulating a unitary psychic entity as follows:
We are compelled to admit, or so it seems to
the writer and many others, that the so-called
psychical elements are not independent enti-
ties, but are partial affections of a single
substance or being; and since, . . . this is
not any part of the brain, is not a material
substance, but differs from all material sub-
stance in that, while it is unitary, it is
yet present, or can act and be acted upon, at
many points in space simultaneously (namely
the various parts of the brain in which
psycho-physical processes are at any moment
occurring)
,
we must regard it as an immate-
rial substance or being. And this being,
thus necessarily postulated as the ground of
the unity of individual consciousness, we may
call the soul of the individual . ^93
With this statement, we have come to an important
crossroad in the development of psychological thought. Up
to this point, we have traced the rise of modern psychology
from philosophy and into various versions of theory. We
1
^McDougall
,
Physiological Psychology (London: Dent,
1905) , p. 78, McDougall' s emphasis.
have also characterized I. ho development of modorn psychol-
ogy in two mutually exclusive ways by considering the main
development of psychology as psychology developed in the
image of the natural sciences; a view which we have con-
trasted with its antagonist psychology as a human science.
With this statement of McDougall we have come to the inter-
esting comparison of the two views and the problems that
exist between them.
3.1.4 A COMMON PROBLEM IN
NATURAL AND HUMAN
SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
We have placed McDougall in the human scientific camp
because of his basic theoretical position and fundamental
similarity to Brentano. Thus, his over-all emphasis is
toward the appreciation of immediate experience and the
fundamental recognition of awareness as the most general-
ized form of experience. Recall that he likened Descartes'
"cognito" to his "think" and that he asserted that the psy-
chologists' description of the human mind was born out of
observation--observation of others' behavior, self -observa-
tion, and the reported self-observations of others. Yet,
in the above quotation we find McDougall struggling with
the same issue that Wundt was struggling with; namely,
how
do you account for the unity of conscious phenomena
when
the obvious facts of the biological body assert that
every-
the body has a rather discretething that goes to make up
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oharac tor? Certainly, we are not nurpri h(m! to soo tli j h fir-
gument because variations oi' It have been involved in most
of the philosophy and jjsychology we have considered to this
point. The fact that Wundt and the Structural school of
psychology, appear to have ended up in the same place that
human scientific psychology also naturally gravitates to,
requires that we resolve the apparent lack of utility in
the human scientific approach if we are to continue its
meaningful use.
As psychologists, both Wundt and McDougall were con-
cerned to explain consciousness. Wundt
,
good Newtonian
that he was, started from the bottom up, as it were, and
found that he could only explain the complexity of mental
life by assuming that the elements of experience had some-
how become associated with one another. Further, he was on
solid ground in assuming the elemental nature of conscious-
ness because; a) the entire cosmos appeared to be composed
of elements and laws and b) nervous sensations in the brain
were obviously punctiform sensations which had arisen in
the sensory surfaces of the body. McDougall, for his part,
followed Dilthey and Brentano and basically asserted that
the unity of man's conscious life was a more important fact
and a better place to start a description of man's con-
sciousness than any other.
When they met in the middle, we find that each seemed
to be missing something. Wundt, as he reached into the
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upper ranges of mental phenomena found himself severely
criticized by Dilthey, and others, because the picture he
was painting was not remotely related to life as they knew
it. McDougall
,
as he descended into more intimate inter-
face with physical phenomena found himself severely criti-
cized by Watson, and others, because the description he was
making apparently relied upon the out-worn doctrines of
spiritualism and vitalism.
"The time seems to have come when psychology must dis-
card all reference to consciousness"; Watson retorted as bo
delivered the opening salvo in his reaction to Wundt,
McDougall and the theories they represented:
When it [psychology] needs no longer delude
itself into thinking that it is making men-
tal states the object of observation . 19
This was also the reaction of a good portion of American
psychology and signaled the rise of a very pervasive aspect
of the character of modern psychological thought.
Since we are not interested in giving up the human
scientific approach to the characterization of the history
of psychology, it is appropriate to turn briefly
from di-
rect historical concern and to consider the underlying
character of the alternative view in greater detail.
194Watson, "Psychology as the Behaviorist Views
if,"
Psychological Review , XX ( 1913 ) 158 - 177 *
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3.2 NATURAL SCIENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY
AND DETERMINISM VS. HUMAN SCI-
ENTIFIC PSYCHOLOGY AND FREEDOM
"Understanding has two modes of advance, the gathering
of detail within assigned patterns, and the discovery of
novel pattern with its emphasis on novel detail. The his-
tory of thought is a tragic mixture of vibrant disclosure
and deadening closure. The sense of penetration is lost in
the certainty of completed knowledge. This dogmatism is
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the antichrist of learning. " This sweeping statement by
Whitehead is an appropriate opening to this section for we
must now touch upon one of the classic problems of the
modern era.
Our task is to define the issues of human freedom,
which require a novel pattern of understanding, and mechan-
ical determinism, which is the standard pattern of under-
standing, in such a manner that we can pass between the
horns of the dilemma upon which Wundt and McDougall find
themselves impaled.
In the psychology we have considered to this point,
there has never been any doubt about the fundamental meta-
physical validity of a completely determined world of
atomic elements and immutable laws. Additionally, we have
been at pains to show the relation between those basic
193Whitehead, Modes of Thought (New York: Free Press,
1968 ) , p . 58
.
assumptions and the types of psychological theory that was
created
.
The first significant departure from tradition that we
found was the psychology of Wilhelm Dilthey which derived
from his insistance that the "individual as an element of
society" was the basic fact upon which psychological theory
should be based. The approaches of this type which we have
followed up to McDougall, generally have a significantly
greater breadth and intrinsic satisfaction in their formu-
lations about the character of consciousness than is to be
found in other types of psychological theory. However, as
we have seen with McDougall, changes in the epistemological
basis of the system also require changes in the underlying
metaphysic if greater fundamental coherence is to result.
So far, the human scientific alternative has not represented
such a shift.
The need for this shift and the lack of it was best
illustrated in the discussion of Brentano 1 s concept of "in-
tentional inexistence" which he used as a paradigm case for
the act-intention distinction which was basic to his psy-
chology. As we pointed out then, it is not possible, when
using distinctions of this sort, to cross the boundaries
between the physical and mental worlds without also reducing
the argument to absurdity. Thus, Brentano could formulate
the act-intention distinction, but could not meaningly treat
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a matter-intention distinction. It is for this reason that
McDougall
' s explanation of consciousness sounds so spiri-
tualistic to someone with a material ear and a mechanical
heart
.
The issue is physical determinism versus human free-
dom. All along the historical trail, the orthodox position
of hard-headed physical science has been that the absolute
determinism which exists at the atomic level must also
exclude the possibility for human freedom. We observed
Laplace's statement that the exact future could be pre-
dicted if we knew the exact state of all particles at one
particular point. La Mettrie and Russell were quoted in a
similar vein of "hard determinism." Further, this is also
the view of modern behaviorism whose basic "Laplacian"
assumption is that if we knew all the conditions (stimuli)
then we could exactly predict behavior since the behavioral
responses are lawful functions of external factors. That
we are not able to completely predict behavior is attributed
by Skinner, and most others, to our lack of knowledge of
the causal stimuli. While more timid souls are inclined to
ascribe the uncertainty to personal freedom, Skinner's
sentiments are clear enough:
If we are to use the methods of science in
the field of human affairs, we must assume
that behavior is lawful and determined. We
must expect to discover that what a man does
is the result of specifiable conditions and
Lha t one o these coudi I ions have Ixmmi discov-
ered, wo can anLicipal-o and to some oxlojit
determino his actions.
. . . The so Li' is
most commonly used as a hypothetical cause
of action. So long as external variables go
unnoticed or are ignored, their function is
assigned to an originating agent within the
organism. If we cannot show what is respon-
sible for a man's behavior, we say that he
himself is responsible for it. 196
As Skinner would have it, human freedom is simply another
name for ignorance of the actual causative stimuli.
In this day and age it is difficult to excuse Skinner
for such a hard determinism, based as it is upon the cau-
sality notions which derive from classical physics. This
is for two reasons: First, classical physics has given way
to atomic physics in which the concept of atomic causality
is no longer applicable since the advent of the indetermi-
nacy principle of quantum mechanics. Second: even the
early concepts of Helmholtz and Fechner seem to be more
advanced. Recall that they both left open the possibili ty
that the operation of the mind could interface with the
known facts of the law of conservation of energy in such a
fashion as to: a) preserve the validity of the law and
b) insure the freedom of the mind.
Before moving to other aspects of the discussion we
will balance Skinner's behaviorism with the view of another
B. F. Skinner, Science and Human Behavior (New York:
The Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 6, 283 quoted in Barbour,
Ibid
. ,
p . 306
.
important contemporary psychologist thereby showing that
the Wundt-McDougall problem is still with us. Carl Rogers
states
:
I believe that psychological science will
advance along the lines of' discovering the
order which exists in human behavior and ex-
perience. . . . As a psychologist I am always
looking for the invariant relationships. . . .
But I am also a therapist, a person who
has lived deeply in human relationships. . . .
X value the person. Of all the incredi-
ble forms of life and non-life which exist in
the universe, the individual human being
seems to me to have the most exciting poten-
tial, the greatest possibilities for an ex-
panding development, the richest capacities
for self-aware living. 197
Rogers, then, can be said to exemplify a modern expression
of the old desire for scientific expression which relates
behavior to prior causation, and the equally great desire
to recognize the fact of responsible personal choice as it
exists, prior to any scientific description, as a prominent
fact in our lives.
3.2.1 THE ACTIVITY OF SELF
AND THE LAWS OF ATOMS
It seems evident that we can neither deny the possi-
bility of behavioral science nor ignore the experience of
responsible choice. But if we are not careful, we will
find that we have not advanced much further than Descartes
did when he formulated his original solution to the problem
1C
^Carl R. Rogers, On Our Science of Man in William
Coulson and Rogers, eds . , Man and the Science of Man
(Columbus, Ohio: C. E. Merrill Company, 1968), p. 5».
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or how l.ho "soul could 1)0 lodged ill Uio body" so U.at i I
could not only enjoy motor functions but also "have sensa-
tions and appetites and thus constitute a true man." Re-
lating the activity of self to the laws of atoms has led
either to Descartes' sort of dualism and its many sub-
varieties or to a reductionist point-of-view which asserts
that the laws of higher levels can be explained in terms of
the laws which explain the lowest levels of existence,
i.e., a physico-chemical explanation. Determined atoms
thus add up to determined people. And some method of in-
troducing "slack" in the system seems to be required if we
are to provide for the scientific possibility of human
freedom. William James struggled with this issue and con-
cluded that the universe requires some "looseness" or "dis-
connectedness 1 ' if man's experience of moral responsibility
198is to be considered as a viable scientific fact.
The first problem to overcome is that of the "split-
level" universe which was created as a result of the sepa-
ration of mind from matter. Early scientists needed to
push mentalistic concepts out of the way so they could get
at a more meaningful description of the physical "facts"
and modern psychologists need to push physicalis tic con-
cepts out of the way so they can get at a more satisfying
^^James, The Dilemma of Determinism in The Will to
Believe (New York: Longmans Green and Co., 1921 )
.
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description of menial "facts. " Modern Physics, with its
indeterminate atoms is often looked upon as an excuse lor
"sol'tening" the do tortninisin of past scientific views. How-
ever, the assertion here is that there is no more "mental"
or "spiritual" in the probability-wave of modern quantum
physics than there was in the old world of billiard-ball
atoms. Either view is equally reductionistic in terms of
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supporting a concept of human freedom.
We will develop this topic at greater length in future
discussions; for the present, we can rely upon the Gestalt
insight that "the whole is more than the sum of its parts."
On this view, complexly organized human behavior is an as-
pect of higher-order levels of complexity whose principle-
of operation are not derivable from levels of organization
which are of inferior order. This distinction can be
translated through all biotic levels and into the various
hierarchies of the material world. However, befoie we g<
into details it is necessary to tease out the general mean-
ing of the proposition and to understand it in terms of I be
psychological issues we have been treating.
When Dilthey's thought was introduced, we sought to
demonstrate that his departure from traditional psychology
was a change in the epistemological basis of psychological
theorizing. In seeking explanations in terms of the
*
^Barbour, op . c i t . , Chapter 10.
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empirical facts of his own awareness, he, like the others
who followed him, saw that there were no separate entities
in the unity of consciousness. This denial of the appro-
priateness of elemental descriptions of consciousness has
subsequently been corroborated by modern physics which lias
shown that in the physical realm the old concepts of visu-
alizable, independent atoms and the total separation of
the observer from the observed are naive assumptions. In
their place, we have stress on the interaction of the ob-
server and the observed and the weakness of visual models
in portraying the reality of atomic events. With these
developments came the realization that the connection be-
tween theory and experiment is very indirect and that
theory can no longer be viewed as a literal representation
of reality.
One of the ways which the physical sciences reacted
to this situation was to conclude that theories ai e only
useful means of coordinating observations. Percy Bridgman
developed the view that concepts should be totally identi-
fied with performable experimental observations. "The con-
cept is synonymous with the corresponding set of operations
he said, and the subsequent effects of "operational defini-
tion" upon the approaches thought useful to psychological
experimentation are well known to even the beginning
2 r)k
student of modern psychology .
The development of opera tionism was a substantial con-
tribution to all types of scientific inves tigation and we
see its epistemological implications as a major corrobora-
tion of the human scientific insistence upon the empirical
validity of the unity and scientific knowability of con-
scious life. Of course, this comparison is not to suggest
tha L the methods which seemed appropriate to human scien-
tists and the methods which are appropriate to operational
definition in the physical sciences bear any obvious simi-
larity. Rather, both operationism and the human scientific
approach are to be seen as reactions, which came at differ-
ent times, in different ways, and for different reasons, to
the inappropriateness of attempting to account for the
basis of knowledge with an epistemological atomism. As we
have said earlier, epistemological changes are insufficient
to resolve the basic issues which inhibit meaningful inter-
pretation of the interface between physical and mental phe-
nomena. It is not until we change the metaphysics of mate-
rialism which was the basis of the old atomistic episte-
mology that we will be able to escape the dilemma upon
which the spirits of Watson and McDougall are still
00Bridgman
,
The Logic of Modern Physics (New York:
The Macmillan Co
.
,
1927 ) » P* 5*
See Chapter 5 for an expanded discussion of the char-
acter of scientific knowledge and its relation to philoso-
phy and psychology.
skewered
.
# ) r r
This point is also coiTohoral.i'd by t'lio l‘a< I. I.hal.
their modern counterparts, Skinner and Rogers, seem headed
lor the same late in spite of the intervening years of sci-
entific progress in the behavioral sciences.
3.2.2 THE LAWS OF ATOMS AND
THE ACTIVITY OF SELF
In focusing more closely upon the basic issue of meta-
physics and its relation to the problems of psychological
theory, we should also survey a Little larger piece of the
landscape as we begin to burrow into metaphysical abstrac-
tions .
In his poem "In Memoriam" Tennyson invokes a priestess
from the vaults of death and implores her to reveal her
secrets: "’The stars,’ she whispers, ’blindly run.’"
"Tennyson goes to the heart of the difficulty" Whitehead
writes
:
and states starkely the whole philosophical
problem. . . . Each molecule blindly runs.
The human body is a collection of molecules.
Therefore, the human body blindly runs, and
therefore there can be no individual respon-
sibility for the actions of the body. If you
once accept that the molecule is definitely
determined to be what it is, independently of
any determination by reason of the total or-
ganism of the body, and if you further admit
that the blind run is settled by the general
mechanical laws, there can be no escape from
this conclusion . 201
In this poetic statement and Whitehead's assertion, we have
20iWhitehead, Science and the Modern World , pp . 77-7<s »
Ili<' conl-rai problem ol I, Ik* relation bo Lwoon mind and body
Llial has charac torizod I, ho entire development of western
thought. Since we have soon the historical eoritoxl, we can
now focus upon the issues i.hernsolvos.
Our problem is this, since mental experiences derive
from (die actions of the body, including its internal ac-
tions, we seem forced to conclude that they are either to-
tally determined by the body or at least are restricted lo
those types of occurrences which do not determine the mo-
tions of the body. In neither case do wo find a position
that is useful for human scientific psychology. If we opt
for the view that the mind cannot originate experiences
then we siial I have to assort that the human being lias no
responsibili ty for the actions of his body. On the other
hand, oven if we admit the possibility of some undetermined
mental experiences, we are still without a means of affect-
ing the body because the theory does not provide that men-
tal experiences can act on bodily functions. But, the
human scientific tradition asserts that we know this action
intuitively. "The mighty of the content of mental Life
. . . which is consciously lived and originally given with
immediate power" was the way Dilthey described it; however,
this view does not prevail against the arguments of deter-
ministic psychologists, e.g., Skinner, unless we can modify
the basis for argumentation.
2 r)7
Wl M *1 1 I * V O I ' | >S y < I M > I Off i m I ! i I II I V < > III I .« * II 1 1 ) I <>( I to I'o I 'III 1 1 I . I Id ,i
I lii’u ry of volJ I- I on n n« I inn li vn li on I . I m » y have IiiuJ In roly on
souk' expression of tho auLocodcmt states ol' Iho mind or i ho
states of the body, or both, and a groat deal of time,
ta l ont and effort has gono into the creation of the various
theories that characterize modern psychological thought,
hut we do not need to go into them here because the way tin'
present argument is formed (assuming its validity) the ren I
issue is quite simple.
This statement would be a. proof of the behavioris!
claim if it wore not for tho fact that modern science has
shown that tho basic evonts of the molecular world are not
independent of the external world. We now know that tho
Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle applies to a world thal is
nothing like the atomic entities which have been assumed as
the basis for the metaphysics and epistemology of modern
psychological thought. Tho key to this criticism of the
doctrine of materialism is to be found in Whitehead’s as-
sertion that tho whole concept of materialism applies to
very abstract entities. By this he means that the original
doctrines wore established as a result of abstracting
Either tho bodily molecules blindly run or
they do not. If they do blindly ran, tho
mental states in discussing
bodily actions.
202
Ib id
. ,
p . 79 •
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spec xal descriptive terminoLogy which applied only to very
narrow aspects of the real phenomena; thereby, ignoring the
richness of the interrelationships of the entities in ques-
tion. In his words, we have:
The concrete enduring entities are organisms,
so that the plan of the whole influences the
very characters of the various subordinate
organisms which enter into it. In the case
oi the animal, the mental states enter into
the plan of the total organism and thus mod-
ify the plans of the successive subordinate
organisms until the ultimate smallest or-
ganisms, such as electrons, are reached.
Thus an electron within a living body is dif-
ferent from an electron outside it, by reason
of the plan of the body. . . . And this plan
includes the mental state . 203
The elements which are so modified by the plan of the body
are still viewed as "blindly running" only they now do so
in accord with the properties of the organism in which they
find themselves. Whitehead calls this doctrine a substitu-
tion for the doctrine of materialism and appropriately
names it "The Theory of Organic Mechanism."
With this formulation, we are back to the necessity of
unders tanding the relationship between the whole and the
part. To psychologists, already familiar with the Gestalt
tradition that it is possible to discern immediate wholes
in primary perception, the statement that a whole is not
simply a juxtaposition of previously separate elements is
quite acceptable. However, since the Gestalt whole is
203Ibid., p. 79 » Whitehead's emphasis.
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v i ( * w < '< I as a physiologically based p roross , which ( «xisl,h
prior 1.0 and independently of whalcvor l.lio elements of
s t i mu La t Lon aro
,
there has not been very much emphasis upon
going beyond the bare formulation of the dependence of the
pari on the whole.
However, on the organismic concept, we can recognize
that there are organisms of different complexities. In
broadest terms they can be said to range from electrons,
atoms, molecules, cells, organs, organisms, groups and
communities. Such a generalized approach to organism imme-
diately suggests that various levels of analysis are appro-
priate to understanding the various levels of "wholes”
which are to be found in existence. Since these various
levels differ as to the complexity of their organization,
the concept of level forms an important part of the meta-
physical alternative which is offered by the organismic
concept
.
In this view, a level of being is actually a meta-
physical concept. In the older atomistic view the ideas of
mechanistic laws (physical and psychic) were defined in
terms of a methodological program and were not seen as
metaphysical concepts. The fact is however, that such
mechanism usually became a one-level metaphysics of mate-
rialism or atomism. This tendency is especially marked in
American psychology which has had such a long-s tanding
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abhorrence of' philosophical issues. Since the focus upon
materialism has been so dominant in the modern era, psy-
chology has always been at a loss to surmount the charges
of vitalism and spiritualism whenever they were levied
against any theory that sought to raise its head above the
lowest level of "real" things. Any transition from dead
matter to living func tion--ospeci a Lly conscious functions--
is viewed with suspicion and alarm by those who have truly
fathomed the meaning of materialism.
3.3 the philosophy of organism
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY
What we have seen of the philosophy of organism to
this point is essentially those aspects of its fornmlat ions
which have some direct articulation with various problems
of traditional psychology. Rather than continuing to "back
into" the highly complex and abstract system which Whitehead
has created, it will be more useful if we briefly introduce
Whitehead’s philosophy in a more formal fashion.
Interestingly, Whitehead, like those in the human sci-
entific trend which we have followed, uses systematic con-
cepts which are derived from basic aspects of human expe-
rience .
We can refresh the idea in our minds with a few cita-
tions from earlier material:
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Fochner stated:
VTtiat will, appear to you as your mind from the
internal standpoint,, where you yourself are
this mind, will on the other hand, appear
from the outside as the material basis of the
mind
.
and
,
The idealist may trace the action of the
stimuli to a mental reason, the materialist
may attribute choice and attention to a mate-
rial reason. We, however, take the facts as
they appear directly on observation, where at
one time the material side, at another the
mental side provides the evidence for the
changed distribution.
From Dilthey we have:
. . . only from the depths of lived experience
can the strong impressions of [satisfaction,
expansion and fulfillment] bo drawn— it is not
from inferences that our knowledge of causa-
tion, which makes the true system of Life ac-
cessible to us, has arisen.
In Brentano we find:
My position in psychology is that of empiri-
cism, experience alone is my teacher. . . .
and, the science of psychical appearances should:
. . . show forth the totality of psychic ele-
ments the combination of which makes up all
psychic phenomena.
Finally, there is McDougall
The psychologist . . . build [s] UP his de-
scription of the human mind by inference from
the observed facts of behavior of men and of
animals and from the observed facts of expe-
rience, facts of his own experience observed
intro spec tively and facts of other's expert-
described and recorded by them.ence
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Each in his own way, the early pioneers of the human
scientific approach felt the need to establish the validity
of the personal experience which was the main part of their
personal identity.
Whitehead takes a radical stand on the matter:
. . . any doctrine which refuses to place hu-
man experience outside nature, must find in
descriptions of human experience factors
which also enter into the descriptions of
less specialized natural occurrences. If
there be no such factors, then the doctrine
of human experience as a fact within nature
is mere bluff, founded upon vague phrases
whose sole merit is a comforting familiarity.
We should either admit dualism, at least as
a provisional doctrine, or we should point
out the identical elements connecting human
experience with physical science. 204
We have seen that Whitehead's metaphysics is a set of gen-
eral principles which are applicable to all levels of
events and that the universe which is constructed with such
levels and events is therefore both continuous and inter-
related. In the abstract, all that sounds rather remote
but it is also obviously true that man is a part of that
universe and is therefore subject to the same descriptive
properties, with one important addition. Namely, human
consciousness is our direct awareness of the one portion of
reality that wfe can know from the inside.
As Whitehead moves to the description of different
20
^Whitehead
,
Adventures of Ideas (New York: The Free
Press, 1967 )) PP • 184-185*
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entities which, exist on different ontological levels, he
maintains the coherence of the system by asserting that the
same internal processes of which wo are conscious, in the
portion of reality of which we are internally aware, are
also present in all other entities on all other levels.
This realization is the basis for Whitehead's departure
from the old metaphysics and can also be seen to far sur-
pass the assertions of the human scientific psychology sts
who were merely attempting to chip away enough of the mono-
lithic material world to give their spirits, which they
knew they had, enough room to breathe. For Whitehead, by
extreme contrast, human experience is the paradigm case of
all events in nature and therefore it is taken as exempli-
fying the generic attributes of al
1
experience of anj ac-
tual entity on any level in the whole universe.
Whitehead, has therefore turned the tables on the sci-
entific world, instead of explaining human experience in
terms of low level entities, he explains low level entities
in terms of human experience.
Another important aspect of human experience was men-
tioned earlier in connection with the philosophy of Kant.
Thus, for Kant the process whereby there is
experience is a process from subjectivity to
apparent objectivity. The philosophy of or
ganism inverts this analysis and explains
the process as proceeding from objectivity
to subjectivity, namely, from the objectiv-
ity, whereby the external world is a datum,
to the subjectivity, whereby there is one
individual experience . 205
A key word in this quotation is the word "inverts." White-
head makes infrequent but important reference to the idea
of inversion when he is attempting to show that the normal
methods of analyzing material or mental phenomena are actu-
ally based upon the use of mental operations which are
among the highest and most sophisticated modes of human
functioning. He does not condemn this process but tie is
extremely forceful in rejecting it as constituting the sole
method of human experience. Undue concentration upon the
world of abstract thought has led us away from the realiza-
tion that we also can and do know an important part of re-
ality from the inside. Hence, Whitehead never misses an
opportunity to get things inverted (in this case, the re-
sultant would be right side up) so that he can begin to
focus upon the validity and explanatory power, of which
are immediately aware and know by virtue of the fact that
human experience, as an important instance of an event in
nature, also demonstrates generic features of all experience.
3.3.1 MATERIALISM AND ORGANISM
Now that we have human experience firmly established
within nature we can reexamine the all important problems
of volition, intention, purpose, act, etc., that have been
' (J ;Whitehead, Process and Reality , p. 236 , emphasis
added
.
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til ic interpretation of experience. We are not treating
these categories simply because they seem like important
loose-ends xn the traditional approach. On the contrary,
the precise reason for their apparent ad hoc character
under the old metaphysics is to be found in a central as-
pect of the organismic alternative.
The core of the argument runs like this, The natural
science out of which psychological thought grew was based
upon principles which essenlially assorted the position
thal nature was dead—mater j ul bodies and inexorable lows.
Wc have i ollowed the development of these concepts and h
appreciated the fact that, while there originally was a
broad cultural and spiritual context of meaning in which
the increasing specificity of scientific thought could
grow, the scientific picture of reality gradually assumed
prominence and claimed to be a complete system of truth.
However, we now find cause to criticize the basic assump-
tions of that whole era. In place of materialism we have
organism, and it is in organism that we can find expression
o ± the self- creative aspects of being that were excluded in
the old view. We can say that these aspects were excluded
because of the following reasons: First, take Hume 1 s anal-
ysis of causality. He basically ended up concluding that
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what we know in sense perception does not provide the data
for its own interpretation. So causality just became a
habit of the mind and nature was without its own reasons
for doing things. Second, Newton had created a great edi-
fice of physicaL understanding whoso main ingredients, ma-
terial bodies and laws oT motion, had no intrinsic relation-
ship. The Newtonian concept mass, for example, gradually
became understood to offer no reason for the law of gravi-
tation .
These two dominant factors of the scientific era pro-
vide a picture of nature in which no reasons can be found
for the events of nature— sense perception is devoid of any
data for its own interpretation and the basic system of
scientific interpretation does not offer any reason wiiy the
phenomena behave as they do. What has happened in this
progressively abstract development of science is that those
aspects of the universe which we directly experience and
the ways in which we experience them have been gradually
pushed aside. The increasing adherence to the idea of iso-
lated material entities and imposed laws has led to the
conclusion that nature aims at nothing. When all scien-
tific knowledge is restricted to a metaphysics which is
based on narrow abstractions which give no reasons for the
possibility of life and the phenomena of life are therefore
forced to appear illusory. Dead nature can give no reasons
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for events since only life can express aim at value.
\
Whitehead thereto re
,
wants to invert things precis** l.y
because if we continue to generalize about nature by basing
those generalizations only on the highly abstract knowledge
which is acquired on the basis of sense perception, we will
find no reasons, and we will forever be unable to recognize
our intuitive modes of understanding. It is in our own
deep experience "the mighty reality of the content of men-
tal life" that we find the penetrating understanding which
enables us to realize that it is the essence of life to
exist for its own sake and to exist as the intrinsic reali-
zation of absolute self-onjoymon t , creative activity and
206
aim.
3.3.2 EFFICIENT CAUSE
AND FINAL CAUSE
Against the old sharp division between nature and Lite
Whitehead is asserting that the two should be fused together
into a system which sees them as "essential factors in 1 be
composition of 'really real' things whose interconnections
„207 _
and individual characters constitute the universe,
the resultant web of interconnected entities which inter-
penetrate each other's boundaries, Whitehead stresses the
necessity of also regarding each event as an entity which
Whitehead
,
Modes of Thought , p. 152.
"'^Ibid.
,
p. 150*
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lias its own .perspective* on the world. Tho event LLseir
- an
bo considered as a moment of experience which takes other
events into account and which responds to them.
In contrast to Hume's causality, Whitehead finds that
causality is far more than a mere habit of mind. Causality
in the organismic framework is a complex process in which
the internal and external factors in the awareness
of an entity are woven into the pattern of self-creation.
Thus, every new event is partially a product of the condi-
tions which preceeded it. These previous events are its
data to which it must conform but by which it is not totally
determined. We may say that these data are the efficient
cause of tho event Ln question. This is Hume's causality
whose relation with the other aspects of Aristotelian cau-
sality we have already explored. In addition to efficient
causality, each entity contains an element of self-causation
or self-crea t ion in which it is in the nature of an entity
to take account of or unify the data which are presented to
it. The event unifies the data in its own manner and in
accord with its own perspective on the universe. Thus each
event is seen as contributing something unique to the
process of its creation. Events, then, are not simply re-
quired to repeat the past but can also select from various
possibilities that are open to them and thereby produce a
novel synthesis which is more than the sum of its parts.
Given this sort of interaction of efficient cause and
self cause we find that the resultant of the process is to
pi'ovide, via the mechanism of creative selection of unreal-
ized potentiality, in terms of the entities’ own goals and
aims, the equivalent of final causation.
This self-creation which ultimately results in final
causation is seen to operate under what Whitehead terms
J e c t ive aim. " Subjective aim is an expression of the
internal reality of things. It is also Whitehead's way oi
phrasing the insight of internal/external and within/without
that we have found useful in earlier discussions. Here,
however, in the philosophy of organism, the concept finds
it most mature expression. In this view, each event is an
individual instant of experience which is controlled by its
own subjective aim. Antecedent events which are the influ-
ence of the past upon the present event can be viewed ex-
ternally a!s efficient causality, they can also be viewed
internally as the objectified past which produces a defi-
nite pattern for the new momentary subject to reproduce.
Were it not for the possibility that each new subject can
also possess an element of creative freedom there could be
no escape from empty reenactment of past experience. How-
ever, each subject is able to influence the coming together
of the data which are presented to it and thereby create a
new unity which combines past experience with present
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experience and which, in turn, presents itself to the world
as a datum for the future experience of other entities and
also, of course, as a datum for its own future experience.
Thus, if we focus on the external view and consider
only efficient causality we are then concerned only with
the transition between events. In Fochner's words, "flu*
material hides the spiritual." On the other hand, if we
focus on the internal view and consider only final causality
we are then concerned only with the ephemeral process ol'
change . Again in Fechnor's view we have "the spiritual
hiding the material."
Another way of phrasing the Whi teheadian insight is I >
roaiizo that both the material and the spiritual are re-
quired to be fused together so that we can realize that
that which is "really real" is the actual entity which com-
bines them both into the unity of its existence.
in separation from actual entities the;ro is
nothing, merely non-entity-- "The rest is
silence .
"
The reality of the actual entity is contained in its sub-
jective aim, its identity, its own inner awareness of its
own being and its own destiny. It is this reality that
Whitehead would have us enjoy and not turn away from in
favor of abstract scientific views which focus only on ef-
ficient causality and the external aspects of entities.
This also applies to the transcendental philosophical views
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In the progressive no I ua I i za l i on of l he pattern and
potentiality ol the past under the momentary influence of
1 j na 1 causality, the actual entity is actualizing its own
synthesis by a process which Whitehead calls "conceptual
prehension .
"
The point to remember is that the fact that
each individual occasion is transcended by
the creative urgo
,
belongs to the essential
constitution of each such occasion. It is
not an accident which is irrelevant to the
completed constitution of any such occasion.
In the formation of each occasion of ac-
tuality the swing over from re-enaction to
anticipation Is duo to the intervening touch
of mentality. Whether the ideas thus intro-
duced by the novel conceptual prehension bo
old or now, they have this decisive result,
that the occasion arises as an effect facing
its past and ends as a cause facing its fu-
ture. In betweon there lies the teleology
of the Uni verse . 2(5%
3.3*3 IMPLICATIONS
Lot us go back for a moment and review the basic as-
sertions. First, the philosophy of organism puts forward a
metaphysical view which is applicable to all events on all
levels. Second, the universe is clearly seen to be unified,
continuous and interrelated. Man is therefore obviously a
part of this system and we therefore arrive at another im-
portant realization. Third, it is in human experience that
wo can know this one aspect of nature from the inside. W<‘
'^Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas
, pp . 193-1-9^ > empha-
sis added.
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are deeply aware of this internal reality and in its es-
sence it forms "self." It is where we entertain the data
ol the past and respond to I he destiny of i'uture ends. It
is really that in between where "there lies the teleology
of the universe."
For the purposes of psychological theory and educa-
tional practice, we must realize that both mind and matter
are simply two separate aspects, two different patterns of
events, which have been abstracted from a single unified
but complex entity. If we are concerned to educate chil-
dren, we should not shrink from the realization that the
highly abstract knowledge which we consider to be the es-
sence of education has by and large been developed in ex-
clusion from the complete reality of existence. However,
it is one thing to criticize the mataphysics and epistemol-
ogy of the materialist cosmology; it will be quite another
to see the implications of the new view and to revise our
approach to the psychological foundations of education and
curriculum construction in accordance with them.
We must now seek to balance whatever "vibrant disclo-
sure" is to be found in the philosophy of organism against
the "deadening closure" of the philosophy of materialism.
We cannot heighten our ability to know unless we enhance
our ability to appreciate the sense of penetration which
comes from the "discovery of novel pattern with i ts emphasis
273
on novel detail.- In this task, we share a common goal
with those we would presume to educate for the teleology of
the universe truly operates in the being of man.
Further aspects of the organismic reinterpretation of
issues m science, philosophy and psychology will be con-
sidered in Chapters Five and Six, after consideration of
the historical development of psychological thought is com-
pleted in Chapter Four.
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;l.O EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY
AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY
By now, we have considered enough of the history of
psychological thought to be able to develop the implications
of Whiteheadian process philosophy. As we have seen, the
basic metaphysical issues which Whitehead raises apply to
concepts which were primarily developed in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries. The result of this is that it is
therefore possible to talk about the psychological implica-
tions of Whitehead' s thought with considerable disengage-
ment from the topical issues of current psychology. How-
ever, while that is possible it is not desirable since it
is important to understand something of the relationship
between any new development and its predecessors. In addi-
tion, if our intent is to understand rather than to pre-
scribe, to describe rather than decry, we must seek to ar-
ticulate the relationship between alternative points-of-
view.
Appearances to the contrary not withstanding, the in-
tent of the previous historical material has been to provide
a preparation for the introduction of the process alterna-
tive rather than to compile a history of the development of
psychological thought. In past centuries and until the
early part of this one the central issues with which we
have dealt are rather closely related both in terms of the
ideational base and also in terms of their relative
geographical diffusion. In the twentieth century the situa-
tion is quite different, for we now have the burgeoning
growth of American psychology to deal with. Since we have
already made the basic statement as to the departures which
are suggested by the organismic alternative we can now,
with this portion of the history, focus primarily upon the
contrasts between the organismic approach and the various
dominant schools of psychological thought. Thus, the fol-
lowing rendition of psychological history will be even more
stylized and topical than that which has already been pre-
sented. In a very important way, this is purely a practi-
cal matter since it is obviously impossible to serve the
purpose of this presentation while clinging to the goal of
a detailed account of modern psychology.
Twentieth century American psychology is generally
recognized to have begun its mature formulation just about
the turn of the century. The initial phase of this devel-
opment which lasted until about 1930 is a period in which
psychology was divided into various "schools." These main
divisions are generally agreed to encompass: a) associa-
tionism, which is the old British school reshaped into the
American stimulus-response format, focused primarily on
learning and memory, b) structural psychology, the develop-
ment and demise of which we have already considered--Wundt
and Titchener being the key figures, placed greatest
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emphasis upon sensation, c) functional psychology, the
fiist American school, tended to be diffuse but generally
focused on "what" was done and "why," d) behaviorism, orig-
inated with Watson in 1912, primarily concerned with motor
activity, e) Gestalt psychology, originated in Germany in
1912, primarily concerned with patterned perception and
f) psychoanalysis, originated in Austria in 1900 with Freud.
At the beginning of the twentieth century the situa-
tion with the developing schools was quite similar to the
conditions which prevailed at the beginning of its prede-
cessor, the nineteenth century. In both cases, the growth
and development of the newer views was being spurred on by
a strong reaction to the older traditions. At the begin-
ning of the earlier century, psychology gave up the philos-
ophier's armchair for safety and security of the laboratory
and its recorded data. By 1900 the trend was so well es-
tablished, that psychologists were finding far more inter-
esting subjects for empirical investigation than the "old"
subject of consciousness. Associationism was the main
theoretical position that was available, although even
before the advent of Behaviorism there was a shift of em-
phasis toward the study of behavior and the use of objec-
tive methods as opposed to introspection. In general, at
the turn of the century there was an abundance of open and
interesting questions to pursue, a generally accepted
27 «
rejection of the "classical'' approach to the study of con-
sciousness and a youthful vigor and optimism. E. G. Boring
writing in 1950 stated:
Psychology as an institution, replicating thelife of an individual, has now passed beyond
the adolescent to an independent maturity ofboth living and thinking. 209
Thus, the period of the "schools" in psychology is equiva-
lent to the thirty year adolescence of the "being" we know
today as modern psychology. Boring follows the above
statement with the observation that, "Actually the change
has been secured more by proliferation than by individual
growth." We would certainly agree in the sense that the
fractionated personality of modern psychology is probably
a direct result of the deep conflict and extreme identity
crisis which it suffered during its adolescence.
With this brief over-view we can now turn to the sto-
ries of the schools themselves. Taking them in the order
mentioned above, the first major division is that of Asso-
ciationism
.
4.0.1 ASSOCIATIONISM
Associat ionism is obviously an old school of thought
whose history we have covered in considerable detail. The
figure of one man looms of considerable importance for the
doctrine of associat ioni sm in the nineteenth century
209Boring, History of Experimental Psychology
,
p. 742.
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because he simultaneously deflected the course of the doc-
trine and created a new and important approach to psycho-
logical experimentation. Hermann Ebbinghaus (I85O-I909)
also came about his important discovery in an interesting
210
way. Boring relates that Ebbinghaus, at an early point
in his career, spent seven years in independent study during
which he ran across a copy of Fechner's Elements of Psycho -
physic s in a second-hand bookshop in Paris, became inter-
ested in the possibility of exploring the higher mental
processes and set to work on the problem. He did most of
the work on his formulation while living in England and
therefore quite naturally came across the associationist
approach to mental functioning. With the theory from Eng-
land and the method from Fechner, Ebbinghaus created the
first empirical study of association or (in the new frame
of reference) memory. His was a rare pioneering effort in
its own right and doubly significant because his original
data yielded memory curves which are still valid for that
type of experiment and, of course, the nonsense syllable
will forever stand as a symbol of his inventive genius.
Needless to say he gave associationistic theory a big boost.
Ivan Pavlov ( 1849 -1936 ) was also operating at this
time with quite another slant on associationism. The ver-
satility of the doctrine is shown by the fact that Pavlov
210Ibid., pp. 386-387.
280
the physiologist could also apply it, to the relations be-
tween glandular secretions and muscular movements. This
adaptability of the associationist doctrine brings to mind
Lowry's cryptic comment regarding J. Mill's associationism
to the effect that: "there was simply nothing that Lockean
mental mechanism could do for an encore."
By far the major figure in the American school of as-
sociationism was Edward Thorndike (1874-1949), not only be-
cause he was a well-known and influential psychologist but
also because it is said of him that "he represents the
closest approach to a purely associationistic system since
211James Mill." Apparently, there was room for an encore,
i
and Thorndike made it . Thorndike saw psychology as the
study of stimulus-response connections but also went far
beyond the narrow traditional view of stimulus and response
Practically everything from external stimulation to hypo-
thetical internal states seemed to be connected with re-
sponses which themselves could range from muscle twitches
to mental arousal. He is best known for the so-called "law
of effect," which basically means that behavior which has a
welcomed effect is learned as the correct response (the re-
sponse became fixated by "connection" with the stimulus).
His later work, done with humans rather than cats, prompted
211Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology
pp. 116 - 117 .
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a revision of the theory in which the eoncepi „r reward
replaced that of effect as the key variable.
Thorndike led a long and active career in psychology
during which he published extensively on highly technical
subjects and did much, via his learning theory toward de-
fining human learning. This interest led him into mental
testing and also into educational practices. He published
a work in 1903 entitled Educational Psychology which was
closely followed by Mental and Social Measurements
. These
texts largely established the basis of educational psychol-
ogy as distinct from pedagogy and child-study. 212 In addi-
tion they also brought the first application of Galton-
Pearson correlative statistics into the area of predicting
educational success.
It remains to be said of Thorndike's psychology, that
because of the mechanistic determinism which is inherent
in the whole associationis t program, Thorndike found him-
self severely criticized for destroying human values. How-
ever, he did not see it that way; speaking of the need to
treat man and nature by the method of science, Thorndike
asserted
:
Thus, at last, man may become ruler of himself
as well as the rest of nature. For strange
as it may sound man is only free in a world
212Boring, ojd. ci t
.
, p. 5&9 •
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whose every event he can understand and fore-
see. Only so can he guide it. 21.3
Further, speaking in quite another context, he said of phi-
losophy and its relation to psychology:
Under no circumstances, probably, could I
have been able or willing to make philosophy
my business. 214
Thus, we see that the major popularizer of the doctrine of
associationism in this country also established the doctrine
as a methodology and was not concerned with either the phi-
losophical issues or those aspects of conscious life that
were ignored by the doctrine. Thorndike's psychology was
clearly in the tradition of psychology as a natural science
and we may therefore, safely assume that modern approaches
to educational psychology were established upon a very nar-
row view of the mind of man which was, in turn, based on an
impoverished philosophical doctrine.
After Thorndike retired, associationism declined in
systematic importance and degenerated into a medley of
methodological applications in which associations became
simply whatever it was that was going on between
the S and
the R in S-R psychology. Clark Hull used it
in his elabo-
rate hypothetical-deductive theory, Spence
and Guthrxe have
applied doctrinaire association theory in their
own theories
213Edward L. Thorndike, quoted in Marx and
Hillix,
op . cit .
,
p
.
1^4
.
21
4
. .Ibid
. ,
p
•
118.
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oi learning. In addition other important atlempts Lo use
the doctrine by alloying it with other types of psycho-
logical theory are to be found in the work of Miller and
Dollard, whose frustration-aggression hypothesis was a mix-
ture with Freudian psychology. Tolman achieved a synthesis
with Gestalt psychology which was concerned with the asso-
ciation of stimuli with each other into "sign-gestal ts
"
while Skinner, on the other hand, requires some sort of as-
sociation between the response and the reward in order for
the behavior of the animal to be modified. In all, it is
easy to casually agree with Marx and Hillix when they con-
clude :
It is clear that the associationistic princi-
ple must be accorded a key role in psychology,
whatever the ultimate fate of the various sys-
tems and theories which build upon it as a
necessary and sufficient principle. Some kind
of associationism is certainly necessary, in
a methodological if not systematic or theoret-
ical sense . . .
They continue by equating the longevity of the doctrine
with its vitality and conclude by stating:
It will be most interesting to observe the
fate of associationism under the increased
empirical and theoretical attack which it is
now sustaining, as in the rapidly expanding
research utilizing mathematical models. 215
We find several major problems with the above summary which
is a typical commentary on associationism. First, is the
^^^Marx and Hillix, Ibid . , p. 128.
suggestion that methodological associationism can somehow
be a useful doctrine. This statement clearly shows the
typical American disengagement from philosophical issues.
Observe the levels that must be transversed in order to get
to the real problem with associationism. Methodology would
have to fall back upon some systematic theory, which in
turn would require an appropriate epistemology which could
only meaningly be based upon a correspondingly harmonious
metaphysics. Yet, we rarely address these issues, pre-
ferring instead to elaborate more sophisticated methodo-
logical approaches while assuming that tilings like math
models can represent a challenge to the doctrine. If a
challenge did occur it could only be a methodological one
which was capable of destroying the one methodology which
it challenged and thereby serving only to prepare the way
for the regeneration of a new one from the underlying
philosophical basis. One may call such replacement "vital-
ity" but it hardly seems that either the death, transfigu-
ration or creation of such methodologies has anything to
add to the study of psychology as a human science.
4.0.2 STRUCTURAL PSYCHOLOGY
Structural psychology is the next system on our orig-
inal list and we mention it here solely for the sake of
continuity since there is nothing to add to the commentary
already provided in Section 3*0*3*
^.0.3 FUNCTIONAL PSYCHOLOGY
Functional psychology, it is widely held, is difficult
to classify because it has never developed a tightly defined
anc^ Formal systematic position. It can however, be broken
down into phases which coincide with major aspects of its
development. These are; its antecedents, its founders and
two styles of popularizers
. Taken in order, we have first
the antecedents who were William James (1842-1910), James
Cat tell (1860-1944) and G. Stanley Hall (1844-1942). James,
of course is the, best known of the group and we have already
considered his criticisms of Wundtian elementism in an ear-
lier section. Rather than repeating that material here, we
can consider the program which James offered in place of
the older doctrine.
James, good American that he was, was concerned that
psychology should be pragmatic. There needed to be some
value and use that could come from the study of psychology.
Accordingly, he stressed that psychology should study the
functions that man's behavior served in terms of his useful
adaptation to the environment. Of course, his most famous
contributions concern the character of consciousness. In '
the original contributions he made to this area, James in-
veighed against any view which did not account for the ob-
vious facts that consciousness was a unitary and individu-
alistic process which in addition to being able to make
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issuos wore doop philosophical issues and spent l ho later
portion of his career as a philosopher rather than a psy-
chologist. We will consider this aspect of his work in
greater detail in later chapters when we come to further
Whiteheadian implications for personaiity and educational
theory. Here, we will simply remark that James' concern
with the necessary philosophical basis of psychological
theory was shared by Whitehead who considered that one of
his "preoccupations" had been to "rescue their [James,
Dewey and Bergson] type of thought from the change of anti-
intellec tualism . " George Miller has provided a useful
summary of James' contribution in which he concludes that
it is easier to appreciate him than to attempt to evaluate
him. His inspiration, sensitivity to the richness of inner
experience, intelligence and penetrating prose all add up
to the fact that "it is obvious that he was and still is,
217the foremost American psychologist."
G. Stanley Hall and James Cattell were highly influen-
tial at the time of the dawning of American psychology.
Hall was the first American Ph.D., under James, and con-
tributed greatly to the actual founding of psychological
Row,
216
.
,Whitehead
,
217
‘George A.
1962 ), p. 78.
Process and Reality
,
p. vii.
Miller, Psychology (New York: Harper and
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science, founded the American Journal of Psychology and the
Journal of Genetic Psychology, and was twice president of
the American Psychological Association. He is known as a
genetic psychologist because of his concern with development
in humans and animals. His work was heavily influenced by
the rising tide of enthusiasm for Darwin's work. To Hall,
the study of children was the way to "reveal" the j>ast his-
tory of the human race. He was very impressed by the wide
and varied evidences of recapitulation that were to be
found in what he considered to be the original psychological
tendencies of the human race.
It is perhaps this very tendency to account for human
physical and psychological development in terms of its com-
parison with environmental aspects that was most responsible
for alleviating the need to create a highly abstract ex-
planatory theory. Hall described rather than explained and
as a result produced much data in the area of child devel-
opment and education. As such he left a legacy of impor-
tant data; unfortunately, his emphasis upon the evidences
of recapitulation created a dominant bias to see most child
behavior as evidences of lower-order phylogenetic phenomena
and therefore, was not led to emphasize the emergent as-
pects of that same evolutionary process. It is to James
Cat tell that we can turn for the creation of a dominant
preoccupation of American psychology-individual differences.
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Practically every author who deals with Cat toll or Wundt
and his first American Student, remarks about Cattell 's
aggressive insistence on becoming Wundt's first iaboratory
assistant and his further insistence on studying individual
differences, a topic for which Wundt feit no enthusiasm
other than labeling it "ganz Americanish" (completely
American)
.
Cat tell founded the journal Psychological Review and was
a major proponent of mental testing. Like Thorndike, his
student, he saw Galton’s measurement and statistical meth-
odology as an important method of quantifying people into
rankings and ratings. Because of the strong bias toward
the evolutionary aspects of development, Cattell's "mental
tests" were biased toward detecting differences in more
elementary bodily functions rather than higher-order mental
abilities.
Cattell, as might be expected, was a highly independent
individual
,
even to the point of living fourty miles out of
town and refusing to submit his children to traditional
schooling, preferring instead to allow their independent
exploration of both the physical and intellectual worlds.
Ernest Hilgard relates that Cattell used graduate students
to meet some of the highly individualized educational
requirements which developed out of the growth of the
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children's own independence. 218
Thus, Cattell, like Hall, did not contribute' a greal
body of theory but did manage to popularize a large amount
of the psychological tools which were at hand. As an indi-
cation of the gene tic/developmental basis of the mental
testing movement, John Dewey is reported to have accounted
for the fact that mental testing did not flourish in Eng-
land where it actually started because "a psychology of in-
dividual differences can only flourish in a democracy, as
the findings of a psychology of individual differences
never support the notion of innate class differences." 21 ^
That remark, coming as it does from John Dewey seems rather
astonishing in light of today's awareness (Arthur Jensen
and William Shockley to the contrary) of the ability of
those efforts to not only perpetuate but to re-create, in
each new generation, the same "innate" class differences
they pretend to measure. The "security" of the older view
must certainly have been a direct result of the mechanist
views of science which spawned the psychological inquiry.
In comparison with the European psychology of the time
and also today, for that matter, American psychology must
be seen as a sort of rough and ready shirt-sleeve affair,
pi O
Ernest R. Hilgard, personal communication.
21
^Donald P. Schultz, A History of Modern Psychology
(New York: The Academic Press , 1969 ) , p* 122 .
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bent upon the same type of pioneering exploration that
characterized the western frontier. As in national devel-
opment, psychological development, has subsequently found
that great "progress" along narrowly defined lines can, and
does, inevitably lead to serious ecological problems.
It is no doubt a deep appreciation of these problems
that led John Dewey (1859-1952) to become the founder of
what is recognized as the formal functional school of psy-
chology. Dewey at one point studied under Hall and was
always concerned with the molar environmental aspects of
behavior rather than the molecular approaches common to
introspection and physiological psychology. His classic
contribution to psychology is his paper on the reflex-arc
concept of behavior. For Dewey stimulus and response were
simply convenient, but misleading, abstractions from the
realities of man's unified conscious life and the continu-
ity of his physical environment. ^
Dewey's main concerns were however, with philosophical
issues and their relation to social practice. His intent
in progressive education is an outgrowth of the pragmatic
spirit which animated his philosophy. Education, for Dewey,
was life, learning was doing and the student was more im-
portant than the subject matter. In many ways his protest
was similar to that which we have labeled human scientific
and his basic feelings seem quite similar to some of those
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we have observed in Dilthey. For example, he felt that be-
havior should never be treated as an abstract artificial
construct which appeared to have meaning outside of its re-
lation to the organism and its adaptation to the environ-
ment. The total organism and its environment was the only
proper subject matter for psychology.
With this broad definition of the field of psychology
it seems little wonder that functionalism is so difficult
to classify. As a movement it was larger in scope than any
of its rivals, e.g., behaviorism (obviously), Gestalt psy-
chology and even psychoanalysis. It was the different
basis for the abstraction of its central concepts, life it-
self, that proved to be both its greatest strength and its
greatest weakness. Strength because it opposed artificial
abstraction and the useless reification of mentalistic
concepts and weakness because its lack of these same con-
cepts exposed the heart of its philosophical doctrines to
the "slings and arrows of outrageous fortune." Eventually,
especially after Dewey's retirement, the functionalist in-
sistence upon both the objective and subjective aspects of
I
behavior, the need for applied rather than pure psychology,
the use of mental operations as opposed to mental elements
and the functionalism that characterized the individual or-
ganism's relation to the environment, were all slanted back
again into the direction of natural scientific psychology.
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One of the basic reasons for this change is Hint Hie
true basis of psychological theory was neither discussed
for what it was, nor altered in directions suitable to sup-
port the functionalist epistemology. Functionalists of the
more experimental orientation used associationistic princi-
ples in their explanations of learning processes and
although they were primarily interested in the rate and
course of learning behavior rather than the hypothetical
basis of the internal processes, it must be said that their
position represented no greater metaphysical shift than
that which characterized Dilthey's psychology. Thus, it
seems quite natural that the demise of progressive educa-
tion in this country could have been realized at the hands
of a more limited but far more vigorous and rigorous empha-
sis upon the "scientific" aspects of psychological thought
which were the first cousins of functional psychology in
the family of metaphysical materialism.
The two important trends which emerged from function-
alism were started with James Angell (l897-t9^9) at Chicago
and Robert Woodworth (1869-1962) at Columbia. These
branches, the Chicago and Columbia schools of functionalism,
have left an important legacy of psychological theory and
data. Chicago is mostly known for its emphasis on verbal
learning, B. J. Underwood being one of its better-known
alumni
.
Woodworth stressed a dynamic psychology in which
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he had a del ini to place 1’or the contribution of the organ-
ism. His insistence upon this fact was originally symbol-
ized and is now immortalized by his alteration of the fa-
S—R formulation into the form S— 0—R. A primary
^er>ence between the two trends of functionalism was
Woodworth's emphasis upon motivation. In this, Woodworth
went a long way toward establishing the "drive" concept in
psychological thought as the mechanism by which the "pur-
posive" responses of the organism are activated. Thus the
drive concept was established early on and, like many other
aspects of functionalist thought, had a definite bias
toward more elementary bodily functions as opposed to
higher-order aspects of purposive behavior.
One of the major criticisms of the whole functional
approach has come on just that topic which was the closest
to their central position. Functionalism obviously focuses
upon the utility and purpose of behavior. It is therefore
also interested, by definition, in the "ends" of behavior.
However, mechanistic natural scientific psychology is
always found to be extremely intolerant of explanations
which imply a purposive teleology. As we have seen, "dead
matter can provide no reasons" and the same philosophical
problem which prevents the understanding of human freedom
is active here in functional psychology. The major effect
of this criticism was to force functional psychologists to
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focus upon immediately proximal stimuli as causally effi-
cacious in the behavior they described. Out of this bias
has grown the great reliance upon physiological explanation
of drive and need states so that the charge of teleology
can be avoided. We will meet this topic in later chapters
when we will consider just how "purposive" a "functional"
definition really is and will also explore the epistemo-
logical alternative of using levels of analysis which can
be equated with the Whiteheadian organismic alternative of
a multi-level metaphysics.
4.0.4 BEHAVIORISM
Behaviorism. Since classical behaviorism has figured
so prominently at several points of the presentation there
is little that remains to be said at this point. Instead,
we can simply catalog its main aspects. For Watson, and
those he influenced, behaviorism was "that division of
natural science which takes the behavior ... of people
220
as its subject matter." Its main postulates were:
a) behavior can be analyzed into elements by the methods
of natural science, b) behavior is composed entirely of
glandular secretions and muscle movements ultimately reduc-
ible to physiochemical explanations, c) every response has
a stimulus which determines it and d) conscious processes
22
°Marx and Hillix, Systems and Theories in Psychology ,
P« i4o.
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are vestigial remains of the earlier philosophical era of
psychology.
Watson, in spite of his anti theoretical emphasis, sup-
plemented the classical conditioning of Pavlov, which he
thought was basic to all learning processes, with a few
concepts borrowed from Thorndikian associationism
. That is,
the factors of frequency and recency from associationism
were required to explain, for example, the acquisition of
conditioned fear in infants. This is because the classical
conditioning paradigm involves the substitution of one
stimulus for another whereas, instrumental conditioning
involves the substitution of one response for another and
the associationi s tic variables are the only ones useful in
such a situation.
One of the longest standing and most authoritative
critics of behaviorism is Sigmund Koch who says:
I have given half a career as psychologist
to the detailed registration of scholarly
horror over the phenomenon--and strange
time course— of behaviorism ... I am
tired of "demonstrating" that the main
thread of continuity in the wildly erratic
50-year course of this "school" is a mis-
interpretated version of an epistemology
which even in its "proper" philosophical
formulations was monstrously deficient;
. . . it was always biased toward the se-
lection of nonsensical or trivial problems
. .
.
[and] has produced a science which
denies its subject matter in principle and
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insults it in practice. 221
We obviously agree
-with Koch's assessment and would on] y
like to add, in line with the comments we made in Section
1.2.4 when Watson was compared with Descartes, that the
main philosophical effect of Watson's psychology was to
mitigate the strict determinism demanded by a completely
reduc tionis tic natural science approach in favor of a con-
tingent determinism which "ought to make men and women eager
to rearrange their own lives." How the novelty of "rear-
rangement" was to be accounted for apparently did not occur
to Watson and in this he exemplifies Rogers' later criticism
of Skinner in which Skinner is ridiculed for his use of
subjective concepts. Rogers claims Skinner's story of how
he became a scientist is:
. . . studded by such phrases as, "This was,
of course, the kind of thing I was looking
for," . . . "Of course, I was working on a
basic assumption.
"
To Rogers, these phrases can only relate to an "intuitive
222trust which he [Skinner] placed in his own experiencing,
failing completely to realize, as also Watson did, that it
was those very experiences that guided his subjective
221 Sigmund Koch, Value Properties: Their Significance
for Psychology, Axiology, and Science
,
in Toward a Unity of
Knowledge
,
Marjorie Grene
,
ed.
,
Psychological Issues
,
VI,
No. 2, Monograph 22 (New York: International Universities
Press Inc., 1969 )* 251-252.
222
Rogers, On Our Science of Man in Coulson and Rogers,
eds
. ,
Man and the Science of Man
, pp . 62-63.
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apprehension of his proper scientific directions. While we
agree wxth Rogers, we, and surely also Rogers, would be the
last to claim that infallibility is also an important aspect
of the universality of man’s conscious and purposive life.
We should also note that there were others who assimilated
and carried the mark of behaviorism in their work. Albert
Weiss popularized the doctrine for many years, published a
text called Theoretical Basis of Human Behavior in which,
among other things, will power was seen as excess brain ex-
citations which built up because there was no immediate
outlet and subsequently spilled over once the inertia of
the system had been overcome. Perhaps Karl Lashley is the
best known of Watson’s students, who by virtue of his focus
on physiological psychology, gradually moved away from the
strict S-R position and became closer to a field- theoretical
position
.
4.0.5 GESTALT PSYCHOLOGY
Gestalt psychology is the product of the response to
elementism which Wundt's psychology generated in Germany.
The Americans went functional whereas some of their European
colleagues turned to the gestalt experimentalism which arose
after the initial loosening up had been provided by Dilthey,
Brentano and Stumpf.
One of the most important aspects of gestalt psychol-
ogy
,
for our purposes, is the nature of the new theoretical
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basis which it introduced into psychological theory. The
major characteristic of gestalt explanations is that they
are not elementalis tic and mechanical and as such differ
significantly from classical associationis tic approaches to
the explanation of mental phenomena. However, in terms of
one of the major themes of the argument presented here, it
s also true that gestalt psychology is just as physical—
istic in its orientation as had been the psychology of John
Locke or Wilhelm Wundt. A gestalt field is an equally re-
ductionistic borrowing from the physical sciences as were
the "elements" of the old view. The unique nature of ge-
stalt psychology is to be found in the advent of the field
I
concept in the physical sciences and subsequent application
to psychological theory.
There is an interesting repetition of history that is
associated with the development of the field concept in
psychology that demonstrates the influence of physicalis tic
reasoning in a very direct way. In Section 2.2.5 when we
discussed the eighteenth century psychology of David
Hartley, it was noted that his unique contribution to asso-
ciationistic psychology was the use of the Newtonian con-
cept of "action at a distance" as a major element in the
explanation he developed regarding the physiological proc-
esses which were responsible for the association of separate
ideas. What Hartley did was to assume that the physical
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principle of action at a distance, which explained how two
physically separated bodies could attract or repell each
other, must also have a mental counterpart which was based
upon some equivalent property of the nervous system. We
have seen that Hartley's formulation was not a major con-
tribution to the associationistic school and that, in gen-
eral, associationists tended to ignore the problem of actu-
ally specifying the physiological substrate of memory. The
interesting aspect of this discussion is that it is not
until we get rather well into the twentieth century and the
revision of the Newtonian concept that we find another and
far more serious attempt to tackle the problem of what is
going on in the brain during mental operations. That at-
tempt was the gestalt psychology that came as a direct out-
growth of the change from the old action at a distance con-
cept to the newer field theoretical constructs. Once we
see the main differences between the two concepts, the re-
lationships ol gestalt psychology to both natural scientific
and human scientific psychology will be much clearer.
Turning first to the older view, we find that Newton's
use of "action at a distance" was a direct outgrowth of the
basic metaphysical assumptions of the Galilean tradition.
In this tradition all physical phenomena had to be explained
in terms of matter in motion. Newton's difficulty was to
explain how bodies which were physically separated could
•jOl)
influence one another. There was obviously some sort of
"action at a distance" between two things that might be at-
tracting or repelling each other. But this is not easily
explained in terms of a metaphysics that consists of only
matter in motion. Unless, of course, one wants to result
to a "nonscientific " or spiritual explanation of the facts.
So what Newton did, in order to preserve the integrity of
the whole explanatory system, was to create a material
medium that could transfer the force from one body to the
other. He called this hypothetical material "ether" and
in so doing saved the materialistic metaphysic from a basic
inconsistency.
Without seeking out any of the exact details, we can
see that an ad hoc hypothesis about such a basic issue is
bound to cause trouble for the physical sciences. By the
early nineteenth century it was quite obvious to physicists
that there were such things as forces that were capable of
being propagated in empty space and in the complete absence
of any requirement for an "ether." Once forces had become
independent of any material medium and were seen in their
own right they then came to assume the attributes whxch
were originally thought to belong to the material ether.
Thus, forces became fields of force that had properties
like extension and configuration in space and also strength
which was a continuously variable function of the density
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of the field.
Seen in this light, Wolfgang Kohler is something of a
latter day David Hartley, since his application of the
field of force concept to psychology is exactly analogous
to Hartley's use of that concept's predecessor which had
been created by Newton. Before we consider the direct ap-
plication of the physical theory to psychological phenomena
we should take a brief look at the main psychological phe-
nomena that seemed in most need of a new interpretation.
The concept of a psychological gestalt was actually
developed in 1890 by Charles von Ehrenfels who discovered
that in the perception of musical form, the melody perceived
was not simply the sum of the tonal elements. That the same
melody can be composed of different tones or that different
melodies can be constructed of the same tones indicated to
Ehrenfels that perceptual form-quality was a more basic
factor than the explicit sensory elements. Form-quality
was seen to derive from the pattern of interrelationships
of the sensory elements. He actually called the form-
qualities "Gestalt quali taten" and even extended the con-
cept into other sensory modalities.
Even if the basic facts do seem a bit naive, this is
really a significant departure from the elementalistic view.
In Wundt's psychology, for example, there was only room for
punctiform sensations which were associated with one another
.
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On lhis view, the perception of a square was determined by
the fact that while the individual sensations which corre-
spond to (die lines and the various parts of the figure
could be perceived the "form" of the square was not given
in direct perception. This all important quaLity which
gave the meaning to the elements was thought not to be the
result of perception but, in fact, the result of appercep-
tion. That is, a process which is established as a result
of associative inference. This inferential process also
included information which was added by the motion of the
eyes in sensing the figure so that the additional informa-
tion as to the configuration of the' stimulation could be
obtained
.
From this it can be seen that the necessity of eye
movements is basic to the Wundtian elementalistic theory.
What the gestalt psychologists did was to show that there
were cases where the motion of the eyes was not required
for the perception of a quality that, on the basis of the
old theory, required the use of eye movement. Their cru-
cial experiment involved the use of alternately flashing
lights whose duration was too short to allow eye movements
but were, none- the-less , perceived as one light moving back
and forth rather than two flashing lights.
Armed with this sort of conclusive experimental evi-
dence the early gestalt psychologists sought out a
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l.liooj’c' I, i ca I bus L s to account l or i.lio phenomenon
.
Oi* con rso
,
the newly arrived conceptualization o (' field of force,
which was something both extended and configured, seemed
like a natural choice to explain a perceptual process which
seemed to possess inherent perceptual properties. Since
the brain is also a physical system, it was assumed to ex-
hibit the same configurational aspects which are found in
purely physical fields. The major assumption that was re-
quired, aside from the original one of field forces in the
brain, was that the perceptual processes of which we are
aware are actually isomorphic with the brain processes
which underlie them. Unless the gestalt psychologists
could insure that the physiological processes in the brain
were actually of the exact type that seemed to be required
by the nature of perception itself, they would have no
grounds for asserting the field interpretation of perceptual
processing. To accomplish this needed feature they postu-
lated the principle of isomorphism which asserts:
Experienced order in space is always struc-
turally identical with a functional order
in the distribution of underlying brain
pro cesses. 223
By projecting this definition back into the brain
process the gestalt psychologists were able to insure that
the hypothesis of field could be made functional. The basic
223Kohler, quoted in Marx and Hillix, ojd. ci
t
.
,
p. 183 .
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theoretical change this represented amounts to this. The
old theory assumed that elements of sensation were acted on
by brain processes which simply mediated the transfer of
these sensations to the various projection areas in the
brain. In this case, the final perception was seen as the
result of an apperceptive process that derived from uncon-
scious associative inference. In the new gestalt theory,
the mediating brain processes are no longer simply a one-to-
one transfer of sensation but, instead, actually become the
mediating brain processes that have the character of the
actual perception.
This new concept of active mediation by the brain pro-
foundly changed the old view which saw the brain as a pas-
sive receptor. Whereas the old theory basically considered
the brain as a telephone exchange with fixed neurological
pathways and interconnections the gestalt view definitely
predicted that there are distributed field-like forces in
the brain that account for its behavior.
It is possible to pursue the rise of gestalt concepts
into many and diverse areas of psychological thought. How-
ever, for our purposes it must be stressed that the field
theoretical concepts are just as reduc tionistic and deter-
ministic as those which they replaced. This is not to deny
that gestalt psychology did not provide a more reasonable
explanation of many phenomena than the associationist ic
'JO 5
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more inclusive than simple concatenation ol eLemojils and
one would expect a higher quality explanation to result.
What is to be denied however is that the gestalt approach
allowed any greater freedom to consciousness than its pred-
ecessor. Even though Kohler himself wrote about extensions
of the gestalt principles into widely diverse areas such as
ego, attitudes, emotions, will, memory, and learning, he
was forced to do so only by strict generalization of the
basic physiological field processes which had been postu-
lated as the basis of the whole gestalt process. Thus, in
order to talk about higher-order processes from the field
theoretical point-of-view one had to start with two impor-
tant assumptions. First, one had to assume that the field-
like qualities of gestalt configurations were actually a
direct function of the brain. That is, the brain itself
operates in a field fashion. Second, one had to extend
that reasoning by assuming that other psychological proc-
esses, the higher-order ones, are also dependent upon the
same brain function. Once this was done, all psychological
processes could be seen as amenable to the descriptive
principles which seemed to apply to pure perceptual phe-
nomena .
Thus, while gestalt psychologists did not deny con-
sciousness in theory, as Sigmund Koch says of the
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behaviorist s , thoy certainly did "insult it in practice"
since their principle of isomorphism implies some; form of
dualism but does not specify the matter clearly. Whatever
the status of that philosophical issue may be, it is clear
that for gestalt psychology consciousness is the isomorphic
phenomenal counterpart of the basic field-like operation of
the brain. Since physicists do not attribute any greater
inherent freedom to fields than they did to the atoms which
inspired the old view, it is reasonable and necessary to
conclude that the "dynamic" operation of the gestalt brain
is just as deterministic as the older traditions it sought
to replace.
It should be noted that the criticism of the exten-
sions of gestalt psychology which was made above, comes
from utilizing the basic criterion that applications oi the
first principles of a scientific explanation must be done
in a coherent fashion. Therefore, to imply that gestalt
psychology provides any greater basis for either the exis-
tence or freedom of consciousness is an incoherency in
terms of the doctrine. Similarly, to think one is doing a
"gestalt therapy" by doing anything other than directly
manipulating the character of psychophysical processes is
also an inconsistency. These problems are examples of the
problems he had in mind when in 1955 the physicist J. Robert
Oppenlieimer told the American Psychological Association
that he did not have the slightest idea of what a "psycho-
2211logical field" could be.
Yet, with it all, there is a uniqueness in the gestalt
doctrine since it is the first physicalistic psychology
that we have seen which was not based directly upon the
atomism of the entire era of modern science. In this light
it forms a further example of the inversion of the concepts
of matter and energy in which "mass becomes the name for a
quantity of energy considered in relation to some of its
dynamical effects," that Whitehead spoke of as the major
metaphysical change which occurred in nineteenth century
physics
.
4.0.6 PSYCHOANALYSIS
Psychoanalysis is a very large and involved subject
about which so much has been written from so many points-
of-view that the subject almost seems to become larger with
each attempt at description. Scientifically minded authors
are often moved to decry the theoretical foundation of the
system whenever they attempt to describe the character of
the psychoanalytic system. The following is typical:
Presumably the [psychoanalytic J theory exists
in the collected works of Freud . . . but no-
where is there a clear statement of what are
postulates, what are theorems ... in short
22
^j. Robert Oppenheimer, quoted in Marx and Hillix,
Ibid
. ,
p . 180
.
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one misses all the paraphernalia usually
associated with a scientific theory . 223
In searching for that scientific theory wo would have
to ask. Is i t clear that psychoanalysis Is another example
ol a phy s i ca L i s t i c natural scientific theory? The answer
to this question is an emphatic yes and this author con-
siders himself fortunate to have come across a rather com-
plete analysis of the psychoanalytic theory which was done
from just this perspective. The following account of
Freud's theory derives largely from the insightful work of
Richard Lowry and will focus upon the application which
Freud gave to many of the same physicalistic concepts we
have seen in other contexts.
Freud's first major theoretical work is a piece that
was not published until 193^* This work was called Project
for a Scientific Psychology in which Freud set forth a
neurological model which was designed to account for the
phenomena of memory, thinking, stress, pain, pleasure.
When reviewing the character of the theory which Freud pre-
sented the modern neurophysiologist Karl Pribram concluded
that many of Freud's ideas actually anticipated modern de-
velopments in neurophysiology, especially as concerns the
22 3
"Marx and Hillix, Ibid., p. 230.
226 See Lowry, Evolution of Psychol ogical Theory ,
Chapters 8 and 9*
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organization oi tho norvous .system. ~ it is also in tills
work that the physicalis tic bias of Freud's theory is the
most evident:
The intent of this project is to furnish us
with a psychology which shall be a natural
science: its aim, that is, is to represent
psychical processes as quantitatively deter-
mined states of specifiable material parti-
cles and so to make them plain and void of
contradiction .228
Freud elaborated that psychical processes were to be con-
sidered as a quantity of energy which was subject to the
laws of motion and that the material particles were the
neurons in the brain. The system which he created with
these categories predicated that the functional unit of the
nervous system as the neuron, which Freud also believed to
be a distinct cell that had, no connection with other cells.
It was the character of these cells that they had a tendency
to discharge energy--a process Freud called "the principle
of neuronic inertia."
It was from this basic character of neuronic inertia
that Freud derived the notion of primary and secondary
processes. Freud theorized that as an organism grows in
complexity there would be an ever increasing need to do two
227Karl H. Pribram, The Neuropsychology of Sigmund
Freud in Experimental Foundations of Clinical Behavior ,
A. J. Bachrach
,
ed
.
(New York: Basic Books
,
Inc
.
)
,
pp . 442-468
.
228
Freud, quoted in Lowry, Ibid .
,
p. 138.
'HO
things within I, ho nervous system. ()no would ho i he <|jw-
chargo of energy from Lho neurons of the neuronic systoni.
The discharge of this energy which had boon generated by
the internal needs of the body, hunger, etc.
,
was the pri-
mary function of the neuronic system, hence primary process.
On the other hand, there was also the need to store enough
of this energy to meet the demands of Lifo hence, secondary
function and secondary process. The idea of storing energy
led directly to the idea that there needed to be some sort
of contact-barrier that would regulate the passage of
energy. Thus some nourons were soon to be highly permeable
(these functioned in perception) and others were highly im-
permeable and therefore functioned in memory.
With this basic theory Freud could develop explana-
tions for such things as pleasure and pain, pleasure being
the rapid discharge of large quantities of excitation
wheroas pain resultod from the rap>id eruption of large
quantities of excitation in nourons which were relatively
impermeable. Ho wont on to add that each of those experi-
ences left bohind a "residue" which was responsible for
creating either an attraction or a repulsion for the memory
images of tho events which caused them.
I3y adding a few more explanatory hypotheses Freud came
up with a system he could call "ego." On this view, ego
was tho organization of neurons of various permeabili ties
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into distinct patterns such that they could control the
flow of the energy involved in primary and secondary
processes. Seen in this light, the ego's job is that of
diverting excitation away from the hostile memory-images by
the process of transferring it to associated neurons of
more suitable memory-images. The net effect of this trans-
fer was to "repress" the hostile image.
Adding all this up into one operating unit we have a
picture of mental functioning which was built upon the idea
of neuronic inertia which specified that neurons tend to
divest themselves of energy. From this it follows that the
primary function of the nervous system is to divest itself
of this energy, saving only that amount required to meet
the demands of life (secondary processes). Secondary
processes were seen as the prime mechanism of self-preser-
vation. The ego was the total of the various permeable
and s emipermeabl e neurons which had stabilized into rathei
permanent ways of handling and storing the psychic cneigy.
In the process of this energy transfer it was possible for
memory- images to attract and repell other memory-images and
I
thus to repress them from consciousness.
Certainly the physicalism in this approach is obvious.
From the initial statement of intent which appealed to the
"general laws of motion" to the use of the concepts of at-
traction and repulsion of memory residues Freud, was,
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through and through, framing his theory of mental func-
tioning by exact analogy to the physical sciences. Ulti-
mately Freud came to abandon this approach and felt that it
had been a total failure to attempt to bring a direct syn-
thesis between neurophysiology and psychology. For the re-
mainder of his career, and he had most of it left, Freud
concentrated upon clinical studies. The interesting tiling
is however, that although this transition brought a change
from neuronal to psychical systems, Freud still largely
used the same theoretical framework in his explanations.
A few examples from Lowry's treatment of the relationship
should suffice to make the point.
In his first purely psychoanalytic work Studies in
Hysteria on which he collaborated with another physician,
Joseph Breuer, Freud undertook to describe his observations
of the emotion laden hysterics who also were observed to
have a considerable amount of unconscious information that
could only be brought out under hypnosis. The interpreta-
tion he gave was entirely physicalistic . Thus, experience
was seen to be some sort of excitation in the nervous sys-
tem, whose task it was to discharge that energy through the
mechanism of voluntary or involuntary reflexes. If this
discharge is sufficient then all is well but ii it is not
then the remaining undischarged energy becomes "attached"
to the memory and eventually can only get relieved In
313
conversion into hysterical systems. Thus, we have the en-
tire rationale tor psychoanalysis:
It will now be understood how it Ls that the
psychotherapeutic procedure which we have
described . . . has a curative effect. It
brings to an end the operative force of the
idea [the excitation] which was not abreacted
[discharged] in the first instance, by al-
lowing its strangulated affect to find a way
out through speech. 229
In his last major theoretical work, The Ego and the Id
Freud sought to dispell some of the ambiguities that were
in his system. He attempted to clarify the exact mechanisms
of psychical processes by developing the concepts of ego,
id and superego. These concepts compare favorably to the
functions which Freud had assigned to the ego of his
"Project" of 1895. Lowry notes that for some reason Freud
had refrained from using the ego concept for many years,
referring only to "conscious" processes instead.
The ego of 1895 had three basic functions: l) to
store energy (secondary process) for the purpose of coping
with the demands of life, 2) to evolve various strategies
for carrying out the coping behavior and 3) 1° repress the
hostile psychical contents. In The Ego and the id , 1 1 eud
came up with the same breakdown of functions only this time
he was referring to psychical apparatus and not neuronal
apparatus. In this new view, ego got the job of "binding"
22
^Freud, quoted in Ibid . , p. 1^7*
energy for the purpose of coping with problems and also,
the collateral task of mapping out the strategies for that
coping behavior. The third aspect, super ego, came from
Freud’s long clinical observations to the effect that peo-
ple had a certain resistance to getting too close to re-
pressed materials. He established links from this repres-
sion behavior to what he thought were aspects of the per-
son s bisexual nature that had been attracted and repelled
during childhood by relationships with his parents. Out of
this Freud derived the Oedipus complex and the idea of
superego which was to have been the internal representative
of the old external parental authority.
Thus, it is possible to make a strong case that Freud'
theory is truly, in its inner most theoretical being, a
i
physicalistic theory. However, in the application which
Freud gave to that theory, he did something that no one had
presumed to do before him. He literally took the theory
directly into man's consciousness, and unconscious, and
proceeded to set up explanations based on clinical experi-
ences. Therefore, it is also possible to rather ironically
assert that in its inner most psychological being, the
theory is much like a human scientific theory. It is
ironic because we also find that Freud completely retained
the views of materialistic metaphysics while also being
able to talk about the human person with his "purposes,
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intentions and aims."
Now that we have seen the basis of Freud's theorizing
it is clear that he represents less of a radical change
than did Dilthey and Brentano. As a matter of fact, Freud
really did not represent a change in either the metaphysical
or the epistemological approach to the conduct of psychology
as a natural science. Also, it is quite true that his use
of the basic physical theory in this way represents a dis-
connection of the first principles of the science of such
great magnitude that one wonders if J. Robert Oppenheimer
would not have excused the gestalt psychologists on the
basis of a minor infraction.
4.1 THE AGE OF THEORY ( 1930-1950)
AND CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOLOGY
As the various orthodox schools of psychology passed
into history, the character of American psychology changed
by becoming far more eclectic in its approach to theories,
methods and concepts. The topics which came to captivate
the attention of most American psychologists were of a much
more circumscribed and restricted theoretical nature.
These theories are often referred to as "miniature" theo-
ries which attempt to deal with very small aspects of be-
havior in ways that are not designed to last for much more
than the duration of the immediate experimental context.
It is also true, that a substantial portion of current
31
6
rosea rob goes on in llio total absence of any formal I lico-
reticaJ. structure. The research simpJy goes from one topic
to the next one that seems most plausibly based on the re-
sults of the former, or to the one which is most likely to
get published, or to the one which is most likely to get
funded, or all three, or any combination there of. In all,
the dominant trend has been toward greater specialization
by individual psychologists into narrowly defined areas
which are concerned only with highly limited areas of
behavior
.
It was Sigmund Koch who coined the phrase "The Age of
Theory" as a description of the rush toward maturity that
followed upon the first three decades of adolescence which
we have covered in the development of the 1 schools.
Koch's major sentiment in the epilogue to the first three
volumes of Psychology: A Study of a Science which he edited
and from which the term "Age of Theory" is taken, was that,
by the time of his writing in 1959, there could be found
indications to the effect that:
For the first time in its history, psychology
seems ready— or almost ready--to assess its
goals and instrumentalities with primary rei -
erence to its own indigenous problems. It
seems ready to think contextually, freely,
and creatively about its own refractory sub-
ject matter, and to work its way free from a
dependence on simplistic theories of correct
scientific conduct. 2 ^0
23
°Koch, Psychology: A Study of a Science (New
York
McGraw-Hill, 1959 ) , YYI , 7^3
•
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There is clearly a contrast between Koch's sentiments
and those of the previous paragraph which suggest that a
greater convergence on narrower doctrines is the outstanding
characteristic of modern psychology. It is in this contrast
that we can find the same distinction of psychology as a
natural science and psychology as a human science that was
useful in the middle of the nineteenth century. The one
hundred years of progress which separates us from those
initial beginnings has in many ways served to heighten the
discrepancy between the two approaches. In addition, there
is now a well identified dissident element in American psy-
chology which is seriously questioning the motives and
goals of the traditional approach to the science of psy-
chology. We can therefore, most meaningly conclude our
consideration of the development of psychology with an ex-
amination of these two major aspects of current psychologi-
cal thought
.
Turning first to the natural scientific trend in psy-
chology, we can best describe the post-school period ol
development in terms of the various major varieties of
theoretical emphasis which derived from the earlier mono-
lithic schools. In addition, we should also point out t ha
i
as the systematic importance' of the theories themselves lias
weakened, the dominant focus has been to develop topical
areas of research. We will cover both of these topics
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briefly
; however, we can assert at the outset, that the
type of fundamental change we are seeking, the change that
would bring the insights of process phi Losophy into active
concern in psychological thought, is not to be found in the
extensions of natural scientific psychology. This limita-
tion not withstanding, we can best explore the major vari-
eties of psychological theories by categorizing them into
three main groups. These groups are the various varieties
of S-R Theory, Field Theory and Personality Theory. We
should also note our bias that the transition from schools
to theories to miniature theories to nontheore t ical topical
areas of research has done nothing toward improving the
scientific status of psychology. The reasons for this bias
are best shown in the actual history of the various schools
rather than in an abstract criticism of selected theoreti-
cal issues. Accordingly, we will be able to use the various
theoretical positions as a backdrop against which we can
develop a general assessment of the whole movement.
4.1.1 STIMULUS-RESPONSE PSYCHOLOGY
Stimulus response theory has been developed in two
main categories; the difference between the two lies simply
in the emphasis which is placed on the process by which the
stimulus is connected to the response. The besl known
group is called reinforcement theorists because the idea
of a reward for activity is given central prominence as the
3 19
fTicii-n factor which accounts for newly learned behavior. The
second major grouping of theorists are known as contiguity
theorists because they stress that it is simply the conti-
guity between the stimulus and the response that is the so-
called "reinforcing" aspect of the situation. In this ap-
proach one finds that a good deal of John Locke's associa-
tionistic psychology is alive and well and living in the
twentieth century.
The reinforcement theorists mentioned above can be
further divided into two groups and it is in these two
groups that we will find the major conclusions we wish to
draw from this aspect of psychological history. These
groups differ on the role that reward is believed to play
in the process of reinforcement. One group has focused on
the relation of reward to the change which the reward causes
in the organism's internal state and therefore defines reward
in terms of drive reduction. The other group has been con-
tent to focus on reinforcement as an external fact and
therefore has not been interested in dealing with the
underlying nature of the process, a position popularly
known as the psychology of the empty organism. The major
figures associated with each of these positions are Clark
Hull and his hypo the tico-deduc tive psychology of drive
reduction and B. F. Skinner and his psychoiogy of operant
conditioning. These are the two gentlemen we will use as
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the major examples of the predicament of modern psychologi-
cal theory. In themselves they are perfect examples of a
heavy handed deductive approach on the one hand and a
rigidly conceived methodological approach on the other hand.
In order to make the difference between the two as
clear as possible, it is necessary to introduce a few an-
cillary factors. Taking the hypo the t ico-deduc t ive approach
first, we need to clarify the nature of this type of ap-
proach. When we examine it we see that Hull created his
system as a direct copy of those which had been highly suc-
cessful in the physical sciences. It is a system which
starts with formal postulates and their corollaries which
in turn are used to deduce theorems. These theorems are
then translated into empirical statements that can be
tested experimentally. Should the deduction be confirmed
in this manner all is well; however, in those cases where a
discrepancy exists, the hypothesis of the experiment re-
quires revision. From this, it is obvious that the final
explanatory power of the system is going to depend directly
upon the extent to which the first principles of the system
include those aspects of human experience which are impor-
tant to life. Should it happen that the basis of
the sys-
tem is defined in a fashion which is so narrow that
it
ignores most of the meaning of the subject matter, before
the deductions have begun, then it is obvious
that the
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explanatory power ol' any deduction in the system will also
be limited to a subset of that original limitation. Thus,
the proper first level question to ask of the Hullian sys-
tem is, How inclusive are the first principles of the sys-
tem? We will do this after we have considered the character
of the Skinnerian approach.
The main characteristic of Skinner's psychology dif-
fers sharply from that of Hull. In Skinner we find an a-
theoretical psychology. His main emphasis is on a descrip-
tive approach to the acquisition of facts so that one can
discover the empirical relationships which exist before any
attempt is made to systematize then into a theory. In this
insistence on factual behavior he also is against any sort
of physiologizing
,
which is simply the attempt to explain
behavior via a hypothetical internal state of the organism.
The major question we need to ask of Skinner is, What are
the empirical facts of behavior that are so important to
building a proper psychology?
Now that we have the two crucial questions, we can ask
them and then compare and contrast the results. As we do
this however, we should reiterate that these are paradigm
cases for much of modern psychology. Because Hull was his-
torically first and also because his system has largely
died out we should take his system first as a preparation
for the reaction of Skinner to such approaches.
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We said that we needed to know just how inclusive the
first principles of Hull's system was. We can easily de-
termine this by examining Hull's intentions. A rather com-
plete statement of his formal position was contained in
Hull's 1937 presidential address before the American Psy-
chological Association. The title of this address was
"Mind, Mechanism and Adaptive Behavior," and in it Hull
dealt explicitly with each of the topics in the title. To
Hull, mind was simply another name for the adaptive behavior
of humans and animals. Since species are largely dependent
upon their ability to adapt to their environment, "mind" is
simply a name or inference which describes that very basic
form of purposefulness. Thus mind became the operation of
the second topic of the speech--mechanism . In this, Hull
felt that the behavior of an organism is learned by the
ultimate fate of the behavior itself. That is, a stimulus
response bond is strengthened by a reinforcing state of
affairs, and a reinforcing state of affairs is something
that results in the reduction of a drive state. Thus, Hull
created a system in which mind was just another name for
adaptive behavior and adaptive behavior itself was some-
thing that was tied into very basic need satisfaction and
survival requirements. Hull felt it was impossible to
meaningly consider any reference to mind when the hard
facts of adaptive behavior were before one's eyes.
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Since this is the framework within which Hull chose to
create his psychology, it would appear that there would be
little room for anything other than totally determined be-
havior. Hull provided his view on this age-old problem in
the last major theoretical publication of his career. He
said
:
The reader has seen by now that the organism
is here conceived as a completely automatic
entity; that in our approach to behavior
theory there is no entelechy, no disembodied
mind, soul, or spirit which in some way
tells the various parts of the body how to
cooperate behaviorally to attain successful
adaptation, i.e., how to achieve survival. 231
We may now take these examples of Hull's approach to
the study of behavior along with the hypothetico-deductive
framework and ask ourselves what is likely to come out of
that system that will be of use to anything other than sim-
ilarly defined systems, since to argue a point of Hull's
theory is to accept his premises and to throw away the most
meaningful aspect of man- -hi s consciousness.
Before closing accounts with Hull we can add two
things. First, one should not shut the door completely on
the possibility that some useful data might come directly
from Hull's approach or those which have the same general
form. We say this in the same way that we sajd that Freud's
2 ^ 1Clark L. Hull, A Behavior System (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1952), p. 3^+7, quoted in Lowry, op. cit.,
p. 201.
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man's conscious Life that in spito oi its fundamon ta 1 iy
mechanist orientation was able to capture something of the
pervasive spirit of what it is to be human. Similarly, we
can say of hypothe tico-deduc tive systems that they may do
the same thing but we should also observe that such gains
by either system can only come about as a result of an ar-
bitrary disconnection of the conclusions and the basic
premises of the system. At some point, in the development
of each topic, levels of meaning in excess of those con-
tained in the original premises must be introduced in order
to add the additional content. Since this is the case,
there is no way around the realization that sucli additions
also constitute an incoherence in the system. Thus, we
have meaning and psychological relevance only at the expense
of logical incoherence. The psychology which results from
these efforts is perhaps best described as a psychology
because of incoherence rather than a psychology of incoher-
ence; but, in any case, there is really no way around the
realization that the exactness of the system is a sham i I
it is also co-defined as insuring a meaningful psychology.
Turning to Skinner, whose system we have labeled a
methodological approach in contrast to a theoreticaJ system
like Hull's, we need be concerned with the empirical facts
and empirical relationships he hoped to discover by virtue
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of his methodology. One must say that Skinner's atheoret-
ical approach to psychology is really a theory about not
having a theory in which he can derive the same sort of
security from methodology that Hull did from the formal
logical nature of his system. As we have already seen,
Skinner can be meaningly criticized for ignoring the role
of his own subjective intentions as the main determinants
in guiding him to the atheoretical position he assumed.
It is also true that there is nothing in his writings that
suggests any concern about the atomism and mechanism of
natural scientific approaches to the study of man. In
fact, his approach is exactly in line with the main stream
of natural scientific thought. That is to say, Skinner's
basic assumptions are that one should seek to determine the
individual and clear-cut responses which can be directly
manipulated by various schedules of reinforcement and to
further define these responses as the basic facts of an em-
pirical, atheoretical psychology.
So, just what are the empirical facts that are impor-
tant to the creation of the behavioral psychology that
Skinner would have us adopt. Skinner maintains that these
facts are the facts which one can determine by the methodo-
logical approach which is based upon the study of a freely
operant form of behavior and then subseqiien tly demons t rat ing
that the behavior itself is dependent upon the result of
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the behavior, L.e., does it produce a reward. The scien-
tific credibility of this approach is buttressed by the use
of an elaborate laboratory environment in which animals can
be placed in precisely controlled conditions and then sub-
jected to various conditions of reinforcement under elabo-
rate methodologies. The types of operant behavior most
frequently studied in this type of experiment has been bar
pressing in rats and key pecking in pigeons.
Since Skinner believes that his method is producing
basic empirical facts of animal behavior there is an ever
present tendency to generalize the findings to all levels
of everyday-life situations of humans. Today, the world is
filled with this sort of spin-off from Skinner's behaviorism
and the diverse areas of social control, education, mental
health, technical training and animal training all seem to
be not only amenable to but also explained by the simple
facts of Skinnerian psychology.
What then is to be said of Skinnerian psychology in
terms of the need to understand man's higher-order human
characteristics? First, we can assume since Skinner does
not specify any rejection of the standard assumptions of
atomistic and mechanistic science that he is in complete
harmony with that approach. On this point, we note with
interest that his 1957 volume called Schedules of Ikon-
forcement is a work in which the results of over 70,000
'127
hours of continuously recorded data relating to over 250
million responses of individual pigeons is presented. ~
One could hardly believe that a human being could mus-
ter the sort of commitment and energy to produce a compen-
dium of this magnitude if there was not a basic belief in
the certitude of the approach. Second, and most important,
we can explain the apparent utility of the behavioral ap-
proach in psychology in the same fashion that we were able
to summarize both Freud's and Hull's contribution to the
understanding of man's nature. To repeat slightly, we have
asserted that the real human meaning which could come from
those systems had to be of a rather ad hoc nature. That is
to say, because the first principles of the approach were a
direct function of a mechanical cosmology in which life it-
self is somehow explained away as an epiphenomcnon , there
was no way which the issues of human freedom and dignity
could be addressed from within any system which was limited
to those abstractions. The result was that one essentially
had to smuggle in those aspects of human character that
were expressed in the system. Now, let us look at Skinner's
psychology. Skinner's atheoretical approach really only
specifies a methodology and the fact that it can be applied
in a wide variety of situations is a testament to its free
~
^Skinner and C. B. Ferster, Schedules of Reinforce -
ment (New York: Apple ton-Century-Crofts , 1957)-
Thus,
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floating nonsystomatic nature. in order Lo be of any
use to human situations, the system must be cloaked in the
relevance which people bring to the situation. It matters
not whether one is a humanist or a facist, a theist or an
atheist, the principles of behavioral methodology can oper-
ate to manipulate some forms of behavior but then, so do
voodoo dolls and the incantations of medicine men.
In forming these conclusions about Skinner's system,
we must also slightly shift the basis of our argument from
what it was with Freud and Hull. Those earlier attempts
wanted to derive behavior from theory and hence to explain
it in the sense that Dilthey used the term. In Skinner's
psychology, we really have something quite different, in
place of explanation we really have something approaching
a descriptive form of psychology but a seriously circum-
scribed effort at description. Skinner would have us be-
lieve that the meaningful universe of human behavior is to
be explained in the same type of terms that he found to be
applicable in the limited four-walled universe of rising
and setting reinforcement bars which he created for the
study of animal behavior. Even if he created this world in
six days and rested on the seventh, there is no way to
escape the obvious fact that any methodology, and especially
one as limited as this one, can only serve the purposes of
its creator. The essence of our argument is that we need a
view of psychology which itself roco^nizos and makes ex-
plicit the purposiveness of human behavior’. Since Skinner
effectively assumes this by being athcore tical he has al-
lowed many others to assimilate his doctrine to their own
purposes. In many ways the effect has been salutary; how-
ever, only at the expense of making a complete muddle out
of the possibility of achieving a more useful and truly
scientific study of what it means to be human.
There remains one major type of S-R theorist to
discuss-- the so-called contiguity theorists. Contiguity
theory as we have said is essentially a replay of Lockean
associationism which is however devoid of its philosophical
context. As one might expect, a twentieth century version
of this theory will usually find itself couched in a mathe-
matical or probabilistic context rather than a philosophical
context. Seen in this light, the simple idea of an S-R
connection is just the kind of unitary thing about which
abstract mathematical treatments can be built. A main ef-
fect of the added mathematical sophistication has been to
mitigate to some extent the compulsive determinism of many
of the older views. In this more modern case, we find be-
havior considered as a probabilistic rather than determinant
function of the mechanical stimuli which impinges on the
organism. Thus, while a statistical learning theory may
allow the organism to sample the stimulus field before the
response is decided upon, that sampling procedure is, none-
the-Jess, constrained to be a random process. Since ran-
domness is not equivalent to purposiveness, one can expect
to find little except "random" flashes of insight within
the "purposive" framework of statistical learning theory.
U.1.2 FIELD THEORETICAL PSYCHOLOGY
The next major variety of theory to be considered is
Field Theory. Since we have already covered the status of
the field interpretation in Section 4.0.5 in connection
with Gestalt psychology we need not reconsider it at this
point. Since there is a close relationship between modern
field theory and classical Gestalt psychology, we find
field theorists focusing on the role of the totality of
events in the organism’s environment as the important fact
of behavior. The different field theories have simply dif-
fered on the role of these factors without also questioning
the basic field concept or arguing it among themselves.
The two most important names in this area are Kurt
Lewin and Edward Tolman. Lewin's use of "field" is typical
of the later stages of most of the developments which fol-
lowed upon the doctrinaire positions of the "schools."
Lewin modified the key Gestalt doctrine of Isomorphism by
thinking of the environment and the individuals in it as a
field. Even though this meant that field was now a socio-
logical rather than physiological concept, Lewin thought
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it had important explanatory characteristics:
The possibilities of a "field theory" in the
realm of action, emotion, personality are
firmly established. The basic statements of
field theory are that a) behavior has to be
derived from a totality of coexisting facts
b) these coexisting facts have the character
of a "dynamic field" in so far as the state
of any part of this field depends on every
other part of the field. . . . According to
field theory, behavior depends neither on
the past nor on the future but on the present
field. . . . This is in contrast both to the
belief of teleology that the future is the
cause of behavior, and that of associationisrn
that the past is the cause of behavior. 233
From this, it is clear that Levin intended a rather
metaphorical use of field but was none- the-less willing to
truncate man's relations with the past and anticipations of
the future by allowing the field concept to introject. the
idea that the forces which determine a physical field are
obviously immediate and causal. However, it is also true
that by viewing field in this way Lewin was able to overcome
many of the limitations of atomistic views and as a result
found many new and exciting areas of experimentation and
theorizing open to him.
We will not cover the explicit character of his psy-
chology at this point and will only have opportunity to
mention aspects of it in later sections. In the present
2
^Kurt Lewin, Formalization and Progress in Psychol -
ogy t University of Iowa Studies in Child Welfare, XVI
,
No. 3, 33, 36 quoted in Robert S. Woodworth and Mary R.
Sheehan, Contemporary Schools of Psychology (New York: I he
Ronald Press
,
1964 ), p . 24l
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context he is a prime example of' an important characteristic
ol modern American psychology. We have already mentioned
the fact as the original systematic position has softened,
the subsequent popularizers often transport the concept
into areas for which it has no other validity than the fact
that it sounds good. Sounding good and making plain sense
is obviously an important characteristic of any doctrine;
however, it does become quite confusing to someone trying
to make sense out of the scientific status of the resultant
and J. Robert Oppenheimer seems to be a good example as we
have mentioned. Lewin's use of the field concept fits this
category perfectly.
Tolman made much less use of field theoretical concepts
than Lewin. Tolman' s system is known as a purposive behav-
iorism because he felt that a role for cognitive expectancy
was required in a description of behavior. His focus on
cognitive aspects of behavioral situations provided a stark
contrast to Hull and his followers and has led to many new
and varied research problems. It should also be pointed
out that Tolman was a so-called "rat psychologist" because
he felt that it was possible to study "most of the under-
lying laws of intelligence, motivation and instability" in
rats as well as men.
2
^Edward C. Tolman, A Stimulus-expectancy Need -
Cather's Psychology ) Science ( 19^5 ) » Cl, loo quoted in
Marx and Hillix, op . ci
t
.
,
p. 288.
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Tolman's emphasis on the cognitive role in behavior
led him to the development of the concept of intervening-
variable and also to the formulation of the distinction
between learning and performance. Both of these concepts
have received wide recognition in circles concerned with
psychological theory. The intervening variable was a
highly useful device for Tolman because it is a hypothetical
intra-organismic function that can be used as a sort of
summary for one's intuitive feelings about the reasons for
a particular kind of behavior. While this can be a useful
approach it is clearly open to great abuse if taken too
seriously or used too freely. Had we gone into the details
of Hull’s learning theory we would have seen both styles of
this abuse which followed from Hull's adaptation of this
aspect of Tolman's theory.
Tolman's distinction between learning and performance
has been an important theoretical tool because it permits
the experimenter to recognize that the animal's motivational
status is also important in behavior. In itself it repre-
sents a shift from the purely machine-like analogy of
learning processes. It also sparked vigorous debate between
Tolman and Hull due to the fact that Tolman's formulation
of cognitive factors and motivation as distinct from per-
formance were exactly contrary to Hull's position which was
asserting that drive reduction produced by reward was the
efficacious factor in learning.
We can conclude this very limited treatment of field-
like theories in modern psychology with a few general re-
marks relating to the character of field theory as con-
trasted to the older S-R and associationistic approaches.
Obviously, the natural bias that one finds in the field
concept toward the appreciation of fields of organization
creates a basic shift away from focusing on discrete ele-
ments and connections. In some very important ways, the
two alternative approaches form an interesting complement
for each other. Since the traditional approach had been so
intent on the peripheral aspects of behavior, the field
oriented theorist with his concern for perception and cog-
nition tended to provide a needed corrective influence in
the direction of psychological thought. Thus, Lewin could
open up the new areas of personality and group-dynamics and
Tolman could, for the first time in theoretical psychology,
find room for the concept of purposiveness as it relates to
actual observed behavior.
We can therefore conclude that the advent of field
theoretical constructs had, and is still having, an impor-
tant effect on the breadth and depth of psychological the-
ory. We must also note however, that since the field
theory is essentially a metaphor which produces useful ap-
proaches to various phenomena, it will continually be
V3 r)
diluted by Inappropriate application* which totally divorce
the concept from its first principles and therefore actually
do a disservice to the cause of psychological theory. As
we have seen in this section, there is no direct relation-
ship between the Gestalt theoretical physiological field in
even the most orthodox modern psychological field theorist,
Kurt Lewin. As a matter of fact, Lewin explicitly modified
the Gestalt concept of Isomorphism and spoke of "field"
rather than field as the Gestalt psychologists had done.
Our opinion is that a truly scientific psychology cannot be
built upon a system of thought which is made incoherent by
such separations between theoretical statements and the
first principles upon which they rest. We will further as-
sert that the ultra-modern trend of shifting to forms of
cognitive theorizing which are increasingly based on com-
puter models of thinking processes has done little more
than to teach and old dog new tricks. Also, the closely
associated developments in ever increasingly sophisticated
experimental techniques, while they may dazzle the woi Id
and make an apparently rigorous curriculum for graduate
students, are themselves limited to the analysis of the now
tricks that we would attempt to teach the old dog. The ini -
ther operation of this form of theory development and esca-
lation of experimental techniques can do nothing therefore
except blur the already vague and hazy distinction between
VJ6
the concepts which separate the different divisions of psy-
chological thought. One might gratuitously call this sort,
of development eclecticism but in reality it only amounts
to the gradual grinding down of differing shapes and sizes
of ideas into a homogeneous mass of minute data which is
unified only in the fact that its parts are in no way di-
verse from each other.
4.1.3 PERSONALITY THEORY
The last major variety of modern theory to be consid-
ered is personality theory. We are going to defer treat-
ment of the more organismic aspects of personality theory
until they can be considered in the context of the White-
headian organismic approach to personality and will there-
fore, following a brief over-view, only consider the more
mechanistic types of personality theory in this section.
The general class of theories that have attempted to
focus on the issue of personality are primarily noteworthy
in that the nature of their subject matter has caused them
to be much more complete than those theories we have con-
sidered to this point. Personality theorists have, in
general, recognized the functional autonomy of individual
personalities and have been willing to admit such factors as
survival, adaptiveness, purposiveness and motivation, as
important aspects of the whole person in his natiu at habi-
tat. This emphasis on real aspects of whole people in
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na I ina I environments is obviously ana l.lioma to tin* I t ad i
-
tionaL psychological theorist who tends to specialize in
the hypothetical mechanisms underlying narrow aspects of
statistical subjects in a highly specialized laboratory
environment. It is hardly surprising that one finds such
little commerce between the two approaches. It is also
interesting to note that some of the outstanding develop-
ments in psychological theory have, none- the-less
,
come
from those who indulged in the theories which are closely
associated with human life as it is lived. Sigmund Freud
is the outstanding traditional example of this category and
in modern times we can perhaps turn to Gordon Allport for
the impetus toward a new view of psychology. We will have
more to say about Allport's role and the movement of which
he was a member in the conclusion to this section after we
have considered those types of personality theory which are
closest to traditional psychological theory.
The outstanding example of a personality theory which
includes both a traditional stimulus response orientation
and a psychoanalytic orientation is to be found in Neal
Miller and John Dollard's use of the overarching scope oi
psychoanalytic theory as the vehicle in which to transpoi
t
the highly restricted independent and dependent variables
which are found in S-R theory. They chose to use Hullian
theory both because of its elaborate structure and because
'H8
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portions of the two theoretical structures. For example,
Freud saw an important organismic role in the process ol‘
tension reduction (pleasure) and Hull's central notion was
the idea of drive reduction (reinforcement), as the effec-
tive stimulus in learned behavior. Hull also developed
numerous intervening variables to deal with such things as
the build-up of inhibition as a result of practicing the
same task and this type of concept seemed to fall fairly
well in line with Freud's ideas on repression.
Thus, with Hull's theory as the methodological model
and Freud's psychoanalysis as the content mode L , Mi Ller and
Dollard set out to produce a theory of personality. They
developed a behavioristic account of the development of
learning of a neurosis and also saw its cure during the
process of psychoanalysis as an "unlearning" or relearning
of something more functional. In addition to this small
example, their work has probed into many areas of psycho-
analytic theory and also has produced feedback into Hullian
theory which Hull himself adopted as a meaningful addition
to his theory.
Miller and Dollard' s work can be seen as an expression
of the need to find a complete context into which the nu-
merous partial psychologies of the various branches can be
integrated and also, to find a way to bring the more global
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concepts of personality theory to some meaningful experi-
mental test. As important as this attempt has been it
seems to have died, out as an active line of research and
its creators have become occupied with other areas of re-
search. We might point out in passing that as important
as synthesis is, whatever problems are common to both sys-
tems in the synthesis will also be common in the resultant.
In this case, since both Freud and Hull shared the mecha-
nistic model then we can expect a mechanistic resultant.
Another attempt at the methodological production of
personality theory has been the use of the factor analytic
approach to the analysis of data which are thought to bear
some important relationship to personality. This trend is
a direct spin-off of the factor analytic methodologies
which were developed to analyze the statistical character-
istics of intelligence tests. The idea is to obtain data
on a large number of measures from a large number of people
and then to correlate each measure with every other measure
so that the common factors which account for most of the
observed variance can be found by the process of i actor
analysis. Factor analysis is a highly complex and extremely
cumbersome technique that, were it not for the modern com-
puter, would not find nearly as much use as it does.
From this it is easily seen that the particular con-
tent of the personality theory which is based on a factor
yio
analysis is Utile inlluoncm] by the analyllcaJ methodology.
As long as some numerical representation can bo achieved
for the data one thinks relevant, then a factor analysis
can be performed. To date, even though there are factor
analytic personality theorists of widely recognized status,
this sort of approach has only demonstrated its ability to
analyze factors which are contained within the inclusive-
ness of the theorists' formulations. Like behavioral tech-
niques, factor analytic methodology will serve any master
who can master its technique.
4.1. <4 HUMANISTIC PSYCHOLOGY
At this point, rather than going into the various
types of organismic, analytic and self-theories of person-
ality, we will leave those details for later discussion and
conclude our consideration of the development of psycho-
logical thought by considering the rise of the newest self-
proclaimed factor in the history of psychology. We are re-
ferring to the gradually increasing level of criticism
which has arisen since the early 1950 's which has called
itself a movement toward humanistic psychology. The cham-
pions of this young revolt that seeks basic reform in psy-
chology have been men like Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslov,
Gardner Murphy and Carl Rogers.
The strongest bond of unity in the whole movement lias
been a reaction to the narrow artificiality of the
1 jU ho I < i l.o t y
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studies and emphasis on animal behavior fall, they assert,
to oncornpass those aspects of man, his h Lghly subject ivo
qualities and capacities, which set him apart from the rest
of animal life. Humanistic psychologists are not reductive
analysts who think that the beauty and complexity of human
life is somehow synonymous with beautifully executed and
elegant laboratory experiments. Such efforts they feel
have added little to our understanding of man.
The humanistic view point has not attached its goals
and aspirations to some now theory or even methodology
which is to become the panacea for the il Ls of contemporary
psychology. Rather, the humanist movement is an effort to
reorient psychological thought so that it takes account of
the same sort of factors that we have seen to be the con-
cern of the originators of human scientific psychology in
the middle of the nineteenth century. The first president
of the American Association for Humanistic Psychology,
J. F. T. Bugental, included the following sentiments in his
presidential address given in 19&2.
Humanistic psychology has as Its ultimate
goal tho preparation of a complete descrip-
tion of what it means to be aLive as a human
being. . . . Such a complete description
would necessarily include an inventory oJ
man's native endowment; his potentialities
of feeling, thought, and action; his growth,
evolution, and decline; his interaction with
various environing conditions . . . the
range and variety of experience possible to
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him; and his moaningf'uj place in I ho mi i -
verse .^35
Wllile such sentiments are, for humanistic psychologists,
something of an orienting goal rather than an envisioned
attainment, the humanists are, none- the-less
,
vitally con-
cerned with experience as it relates to those aspects of
daily living which are important to the process of life
and are quite willing to talk about issues such as love,
purpose, fear.
One oi the earliest champions of the movement, Abraham
Maslow, coined the expression "third force" as a character-
ization of those psychologists who see psychology as "ho-
listic rather than atomistic, functional rather than taxo-
nomic, dynamic rather than static . .
.
purposive rather
than simple-mechanical." On this interpretation, one
could perhaps go back to the publication of Kol'fka's
Gestalt Psychology in 1935 or perhaps even Lowin' s A Dynamic
Theory of Personality also published in the same year, for
the antecedents of the latter day "third force" psycholo-
gists. However, the field theorist revolt against the
atomistic and associationistic psychologies of old is not
the same as the emphasis which is found as the common
23 5
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thread that binds the humanistic psychologists together.
The "third force" people share a common position in their
concern for the unity of the human person--the person and
his problems as they are manifest in the webs of life's
interrelationships. Nevitt Sanford's often referenced
article says of this movement:
The critique is not of the experimental ap-
proach in psychology or of general psychology
as a discipline; it is of a state of affairs
in which the advocates of a particular kind
of p sycho logy- -psycho logy-without -a-person-
-
have been able to gain power through putting
across the idea that they are the represen-
tatives in psychology of true science . ^37
Although Koch has stated the position negatively to the ef-
fect that the central factor in the "third force," a term
which is an unhappy metaphor to Koch, is nothing more than
"a feeling of disaffection from the emphases of recent
poO
American psychology," J the central position of the whole
movement was eloquently and succinctly stated by Carl
Rogers as a problem relating to which philosophical view of
man is chosen as the basis for one's theoretical framework:
Each current psychology has its own implicit
philosophy of man. Though not often stated
explicitly, these philosophies exert their
^^Nevitt Sanford, Will Psychologists Study Human
Problems
?
,
American Psychologist ( 1965 ) , XX , 19 3, Sanford's
emphasi s
.
2
^Koch, Psychology and Emerging Conceptions of Knowl-
edge as Unitary in Behaviorism and Phenomenology , Donald T.
Warm
,
ed
.
(Chicago : University of Chicago Press, 1964),
p. 44.
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influence in many significant and subtle ways.
For the behaviorist, man is a machine.
. . .
For the Freudian, man is an irrational being,
irrevocably in the grip of his past and the
product of that past, his unconscious.
It is not necessary to deny that there
is truth in each of these formulations in
order to recognize that there is another per-
spective.
. .
.
[Man] is a person in the
process of creating himself, a person who
creates meaning in life, a person who embodies
a dimension of subjective freedom. He is a
figure who, though he may be alone in a vastly
complex universe and though he may be part
and parcel of that universe and its destiny,
is also able in his inner life to transcend
the material universe; he is able to live di-
mensions of his life which are not fully or
adequately contained in a description of his
conditionings or of his unconscious . 239
We agree with Rogers’ contention that the problem lies
in the choice of a proper philosophy of man as the basis
for psychological theorizing. However, it should also be
evident that our view as to what constitutes the proper
philosophy of man differs rather distinctly from that gen-
erally found in the traditions of regular psychology or,
for that matter, humanistic, "third force" psychology. It
is clear from the preliminary sketch of the philosophy of
organism and some of its implications for psychological
theory which were presented in Section 3*3 and also from
the "third force" psychology mentioned above, that it is
the central concern for the individual human, for a
psychology-wi th- a-person
,
that marks the main point of
2
^Rogers, Toward a Science of the Person in Wann , ed.,
.
,
p . 129
•
Ibid
similarity between the two approaches. However, we can
also push the similarity a little farther with the recog-
nition that the dominant theoretical framework for many
humanistic psychologists is the existentialist perspective
which itself is an outgrowth of the phenomenological school
of Husserl and Brentano- two individuals that we were abLo
pl^ce in close contact with the development of psychology
as a human science in the middle of the nineteentli century.
In some very important ways, modern psychology has
come full circle. In a limited frame of reference, one can
say that there is a return to the earlier thought of Dilthey
and Brentano. In a much more inclusive frame of reference,
one can say that in some very important ways western thought
is once again asserting man to be the pinnacle of sensi-
tivity and the essence of the evolving cosmos. The philos-
ophy of organism, because of the fundamental difference in
its basic metaphysical postulates offers a true alternative
to the problems which face those who seek human meaning in
scientific psychology. We can state the central issues
involved in the need for a basic change in the metaphysical
approach in a few central factors as follows: First, as
we have seen, the development of the various types of psy-
chological theory which has taken place since the middle of
the nineteenth century, has been overshadowed by the use of'
the natural scientific model as the paradigm for psycho-
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logical theory. Second, since progress in science is usu—
thought of as growth toward new abstractions that have
larger explanatory power, a unifying theory in psychology
will have united what is of value in each of the several
highly specialized areas of psychology. Third, since it is
an impossibility for the unifying principles, which must
have a larger generality, to come from within any of the
narrower specialized fields of psychology (the whole is
greater than the part), some new solution is required to
yield the guiding principles for the unification of psycho-
logical thought. Fourth, since the various specialized
fields of psychological thought, whose history has been
covered in these chapters, all share the common parentage
in the Galilean/Newtonian paradigm, the only place princi-
ples of greater generality can be found is in a system of
thought which is more general than the basic metaphysical
categories of the atomistic and mechanistic universe that
has existed for the last three hundred years. Fifth, the
philosophy of organism is the only system, yet devised,
that speaks to these issues in a coherent and applicable
fashion.
Gordon Allport has stated the issue in a way that
places the problem directly upon the threshold of the phi-
losophy of organism. Speaking of the inversion in our
logic which is caused by excessive particularism Allpoi t
says :
Vt7
All analogies and models are derived in the
first instance from a perceiving and cognizing
mind. It is from our own experience with our
regulatory process that we derive the idea of
regulatory systems in both animate and inani-
mate nature. The analogy we create does not
include the creator. Rather the analogy is
dependent upon (is an aspect of) the creator.
Thus it is only aspects of our total life
that are like computers, like biochemical
compounds, rats in a maze, or like the sociaL
behavior of insects. It is only the tail as-
pect of an elephant that is like a rope. 2^0
As we have seen, the philosophy of organism is a system
which precisely accomplishes the task of creating an
"analogy" which does include its creator and because of this
fact, provides an answer to the enigma which has faced any-
one who sought to find a more general unifying solution for
the various specialized approaches to the psychological
study of man. Allport put his finger directly on the prob-
lem when he said.
The truth is that we can never have a fully
systematic eclecticism until we can resolve
the two central antimonies-- the issue of du-
alism and the problem of purpose
.
With this, we can bring this lengthy consideration of
historical issues to a close. Those who agree with All-
port's sentiment in the quotation immediately above, must
2Z+0
Gordon Allport, The Fruits of Eclecticism: Bitter
or Sweet? in The Person in Psychology , Allport, ed . (Boston
Beacon Press, 1968 ) , pp . 13-1^ > Allport ' s emphasis.
2/,1
Ibid.
,
p. 19.
also recognize that the issue of dualism and the problem of
purpose are not simply problems for a meaningful eclecticism
in psychology, but are, rather, issues which are endemic to
the entire tradition of modern science.
We began Chapter One, and this excursion through psy-
chological history with the assertion that the whole of the
movement toward science, was itsell , based upon the centu-
ries long tradition of revealed religion and faith in the
order of nature. This faith, which was seen to be "an un-
conscious derivative from medieval theology," was not sim-
ply the faith of the church but instead was the faith that
"springs from direct inspection of the nature of things as
disclosed in our own immediate experience." In the contin-
uation of this thought, Whitehead went on to assert, "To
experience this faith is to know that in being ourselves wo
are more than ourselves: to know that our experience,
dim
and fragmentary as it is, yet sounds the utmost
depths ol
reality: to know that detached details merely in
order to
be themselves demand that they should find
themselves in a
system of things: to know that this system
includes the
harmony of logical rationality, and the harmony
of aesthetic
achievement: to know that while the harmony of
topic lies
upon the universe as an iron hand necessity,
the aesthetic
harmony stands before it as a living ideal
moulding the
general flux in its broken progress towards
finer subtler
Vi 9
Vi 2
I SKUOH. "
Now that wo have come to tho ond oi' the hundred-year
odyssey that began with the awakening of a new awareness of
detached details which wanted to find themselves in a sys-
tem of things, and which eventually did find themselves in
a system of logical harmony and aesthetic achievement, we
are, once again, in possession of many new facts which
appear to contravene the iron hand necessity of the old
system. In this sense history has repeated itself, for we
are midst of a new era of detached details in which the
ablest tool man has to apply to the task of renewing his
vision is that same faith that springs from direct inspec-
tion of things as disclosed in our own immediate experience.
We must, once again, have the faith that the only thing
which can cement the detachment of novel detail into the
validity of logical rationality and aesthetic achievement
is our own experience, dim and fragmentary thought it may
be, since in all the world, it is only in the shadow of
man's image that there can be any change in the general
flux toward finer subtler issues.
2k2Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , p. 18.
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5.0 TOWARD AN ORGAN 'I SM 1.0 PSYCHOLOGY
The purpose of this chapter is to explore ways in
which the relationship of psychology and science can be
clarified and also to extend these considerations by at-
tempting to establish a connection between them and philos-
ophy. This treatment, from which there seems to be no re-
treat if the type of problem encountered as a result of in-
terpreting psychology as a human science is to be meaningly
treated, will explore the ideal of bringing the three sepa-
rate areas of discourse into a joint contribution toward
increased human understanding. It should also be added
that this does not entail seeking to amalgamate these sepa-
rate disciplines into some new discipline; rather, we
shall simply attempt a coordination of basic ideas such
that each discipline can make its maximum contribution to
the others with a minimum of infringement. Since we are
suggesting that the changes which might result from this
analysis will be the greatest in psychology, we will dis-
cuss it last after first presenting our position on the
character of science itself and following that with an in-
troductory defense of the Whiteheadian metaphysical philos-
ophy which is our primary philosophical orientation.
5.1 THE CHARACTER OF
SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE
"Science is the attempt to make the chaotic diversity
of our sense-experience correspond to a logically uniform
systom of thought. In this system single experiences must
be correlated with the theoretic structure in such a way
that the resulting coordination is unique and convincing."
This was Albert Einstein's opening paragraph of an essay he
wrote in 19^0 in which he undertook to explain the attempts
he was making toward finding a unifying theoretical basis
for the various separate and specialized fields of physical
research. He continued:
The sense- experiences are the given subject-
matter. But the theory that shall interpret
them is man-made. It is the result of an
extremely laborious process of adaptation;
hypothetical, never completely final, always
subject to question and doubt.
According to Einstein, the scientific way of forming con-
cepts does not differ significantly from the methods which
are used in daily life. One finds that the scientific en-
terprise is simply a "more precise definition of concepts
and conclusions" with the ultimate goal of reducing "all
concepts and correlations to as few as possible logically
independent basic concepts and axioms."
In this light, science is seen to be simply a special-
ized form of human activity that also happens to have its
own methods, goals and characteristics. Important for the
present context is the idea of sense-experience as it
^^^Albert Einstein, The Fundaments of Physics in
Readings in the Philosophy of Science , Herbert Feigl and
May Broadbeck, eds
.
(New York: Apple ton-Century- Cro Its,
1953), P. 253.
underlies the processes of' building a body of interpreta-
tive theory. At this very preliminary level we must be
careful not to assume a highly abstract definition of
sense-experience. Obviously, we are on guard against the
type of interpretation that was basic to Wundt's elementism
and are searching, instead, for a definition that will con-
tain a larger meaning. Phillip Frank has observed that
science actually deals with two distinct poles of experi-
ence which are formed by the contrast between cornmonsense
experiences (direct observations) and the general princi-
ples that seem to apply to them. To Frank:
The central problem in the philosophy of sci-
ence is how to get from cornmonsense statements
to general principles . 2^
We would therefore, like to insure that the sense-experience
which goes into psychology as a human science retains the
meaning of a cornmonsense, experiential term which is used
in the "extremely laborious process" of forming an inter-
pretative adaptation or theory. Xn this same vein, Wernex
Heisenberg has asserted that the concepts of natural lan-
guage, even the vague ones, are more stable in the expan-
sion of knowledge than are the precise terms ol scientific
language since these latter terms derive from an idealiza-
tion stemming from limited groups of phenomena. The
2Uphill ip Frank, Philosophy of Science (Englewood
Cliffs, N. J . : Prentice-Hall , 1957 ) > P* 2 •
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formed in immediate experience with reality and therefore
represent reality. It is this immediate contact with real-
ity which is lost when the scientific attempt is made to
get a closer correspondence with a more defined aspect oi
nature. Heisenberg believes that it is the intrinsic sta- -
bility of natural language that accounts for the fact that
after the nineteenth century belief in the scientific
method and precise rational terminology had passed away,
we find new versions of the age-old concepts of life, soul
and God which seemed to have had no place in the circum-
scribed skepticism which characterized the closed frame of
scientific thought. In this, Heisenberg feels that modern
physics, by its dissolution of rigid concepts, has perhaps
opened the door to a wider outlook on the relation between
the human mind and reality.
2 ^ 5 On this same point, Michael
Polanyi asserts:
There is in fact no aspect of sciences, in-
cluding even mathematics, in which the funda-
mental presuppositions, the methods of in-
vestigation and the criteria used for vet it i-
cation have not undergone a series of marked
changes since the inception of modern science
300 years ago .
^
2
^Werner Heisenberg, Physics and Philosophy (New
York: Harper and Row, 1 9 5 8 ) , PP • 196-202.
246Polanyi, Science Faith and Society (Chicago: Uni
versity of Chicago Press, 1964 ) , p
.
89 .
5-1.1 OBSERVATION AND INTER-
PRETATION IN SCIENCE
It is those latter aspects of the scientific enter-
prise which form its "never completely final" and "always
subject to question and doubt" character that warrant the
greatest attention in the present context. We are con-
cerned with the path between the two poles of data and in-
terpretation, of internal realization and external descrip-
tion, and can make several basic observations about the
nature of the "rites of passage" which are appropriate to
theory formulation.
First of all, we have the following statement by
Polanyi which seems clear enough in light of the history
presented in earlier chapters:
Every interpretation of nature, whether sci-
entific, nonscientific
,
or anti-scientific,
is based on some intuitive conception of the
general nature of things. . . . The premises
of science on which all scientific teaching
and research rest are beliefs held by sci-
entists on the general nature of things.
There is, in fact, a certain background of presupposition
in anything we do. To perceive is to select and to abstract
in accord with our conceptual framework; this amounts to a
complex interaction between the mind and its object. This
vital aspect of discovery in science, is a part which is
usually lost in idealized accounts of the scientific method
2k7 Ibid
. ,
p . 38 .
3 ^0
or in the cut and dry procedures established by a teacher
for the "discovery" of the objective of the lesson. This
selective interpretation shows the subjectivity of the sci-
entific enterprise. ft is also a subjectivity in which the
complexity and focus of the interaction is under the direct
influence of the orientation of the observer. Of this in-
fluence, Jacob Bronowski has written in another but related
context
:
For relativity derives essentially from a
philosophic analysis which insists that
there is not a fact and an observer but a
joining of the two in an observation.
This is the fundamental unit of physics.
The actual observation. And this is what
the principle of uncertainty showed in
atomic physics: that the event and the
observer are not separable. 440
At the very basis of science itself then, is the perceptive,
presuming and inquiring mind of the scientist. The true
picture of this enterprise is far different than that which
usually evolves from more positivistically oriented accounts
which look to the collection of pure facts and see theory
as simply a convenient way of classifying those tacts. I he
problem with this approach is that it fails to recognize
the role of the creative intelligence of the scientist be-
cause that sort of data has been excluded as irrelevant by
the narrowness of the presumptions on which the theory rests
2t>8
Bronowski, The Common Sense of Science (New York:
Harper and Row, I960 ) , pi 175
•
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This leads directly to a second important character of
modern science. In the tradition of scientific thought
there have been two main approaches toward the production
of theoretical accounts of nature. Barbour summarizes them
succinctly in terms of the Baconian inductive ideal and the
249
Popperian deductive ideal. In the case of the tradi-
tional Baconian method, collecting data and cataloguing
facts were seen as the main stays of scientific advance.
These inductive procedures were thought to simply involve
the generalizations necessary to interpret the data and
failed completely to recognize the fact that hypotheses are
not simple summaries of the data but in fact are mental
constructs that have an entirely different status than the
simple data. The deductive approach in science which de-
velops much later, arose as a reaction to the assertions of
the pure inductive method because there was often no ob-
servable way that the inductive statements could be tested
or disproven. This approach recognized the hypothetical
character and different logical status of theory and ob-
servation and prescribed the opposite of the inductive ap-
proach namely, that the general theoretical statements
should generate testable hypotheses. Tn this case, we con
249Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion , pp. 142-lVj.
find useful data on how theories are to be tested but very
little insight into how they are created. Thus both common
approaches to theory formulation are decidedly naive as
regards the actual role of the creative leap of imagination
which is required for the production of theories. Of this
type of behavior in which there are many important parallels
to artistic creativity Norman Campbell has written:
For it has been admitted that through discovery
of laws depends ultimately not on fixed rules
but on the imagination of highly gifted indi-
viduals, this imaginative and personal element
is much more prominent in the development of
theories; the neglect of theories leads di-
rectly to the neglect of the imaginative and
personal element in science. It leads to an
utterly false contrast between "materialistic"
science and the "humanistic" studies of liter-
ature, history and art. . . . What I want to
impress on the reader is how purely personal
was Newton's idea. His theory of universal
gravitation, suggested to him by the trivial
fall of an apple, was a product of his indi-
vidual mind, just as much as the Fifth Symphony
(said to have been suggested by another trivial
incident, the knocking at a door) was a product
of Bee thoven ' s
.
^^0
We have seen examples of the two classical forms ol theory
in the inductive procedure proposed by B. F. Skinner and
the deductive procedure that was followed by Clark Hull.
Certainly, there is nothing in either of these theories to
suggest either that creative imagination exists or that it
transcends the process of purely logical reasoning.
and
2 50Norman Campbell,
Co., 1921), pp- 97,
What is Science? (London: Methuen
102
.
quoted in Ibid ., p. 1**4.
IV)
A third important asporl of Uio r.'lal ion between ob-
servation and interpretation is the problem oJ' evaluation
and proof. The problems in this area are difficult because
the explicit relation between theories and experience is
often not very direct. There are several reasons for this
condition that are of vital importance in the present con-
text. Starting with the basis in experience first we have
the problem of what Margenau has called "rules of corre-
spondence . "
Experience, in becoming complete and inte-
grated, moves from the sensory and sponta-
neous to the rational and reflective. By
this transition, the elements of the given
take on orderly traits and allow reason to
take hold of them. Among the peculiarities
of bare sense data is a certain logical
haze, a tangled connectedness, which
defies classification of mere data as in-
dividuals. . . .
The passage to orderly knowledge in-
volves the positing of constructs, which
are the rational elements to which datal
experience is made to correspond. . . .
Experience moves from data to con-
structs via guiding relations which are
called "rules of correspondence."^^
The important thing about these so-called "rules" is not
whether we can actually define them at this point but
rather, the fact that the scientific theories are connected
to sense experience by a network of interconnected con-
structs (concepts, laws, guiding relations). This inter-
Henry
York: McGraw
Margenau
,
The Nature of Physical Reality
Hill, 1950), pp. 72-73.
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connection exists in such a fashion that it is not possible
to give one simple proof of a theory nor is it possible to
assert that the one theory is the only possible explanation
of the data at hand; for there are often great competitions
between rival theoretical camps.
Of the things which seem true about the character of
theories and their relations to experience is the fact that
as the theory becomes more general, the obvious connection
with the "logical haze" of bare experience becomes more re-
mote. One finds that a whole network of ideas is implicated
by the various subordinate components that comprise the one
comprehensive system. Margenau also speaks of "circuits of
verification" in this context because it is often the case
that a set of observations must be connected to each other
via a matrix of interlocking concepts, whose logical path-
ways are only remotely connected with experiental data.
Thus, the inferences which can be drawn from the observa-
tions often lose immediate or obvious applicability to ex-
perience or new observations. Given this sort of complex
environment, care must be taken to account for: a) the re-
lationship of the theory to the data it represents, b) the
internal consistency of the whole body internal connections
between the concepts of the internal structure of the the-
ory and c) the comprehensiveness of the theory so that it
will not only account for immediate data but will also
suggest new applications and hypotheses. 2 ^ 2
5.1.2 THE PERSONAL AND COMMU-
NAL NATURE OF SCIENCE
These various complexities of the scientific enter-
prise all suggest that the "royal road" to scientific cer-
titude, the closing of the gap between the poles of common-
sense and general principles, is not the secure and infal-
lible type of knowledge that it was often thought to be.
Today, we find many modern scientists, some of whom we have
quoted, that are of the opinion that science is a highly
personal affair. The classical work in this area is Michael
Polanyi
' s Personal Knowledge in which he completely dis-
pels the notion that a scientist is something of a truth-
f'l^iding machine. In the place of such views in which a
predominantly external perspective is taken, Polanyi argues
convincingly for "passionate" interest that motivates a
scientist in his search for new facts and their proper in-
terpretation which he himself must ultimately accept as
true. Of this sort of enterprise in which the scientist is
a player in a game in which he also helps to make the rules
and applies them as he sees fit, Polanyi asserts:
This process is not specifiable in terms of
strict rules, for it involves a modification
of the existing interpretative framework.
2 52Barbour, ojd. ci t .
, pp . ikk-lkG
.
253Polanyi, Personal Knowledge
,
see especially Part I,
pp . 3-68.
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it crosses a heuristic gap and causes thereby
a self-modification of the intelligence
achieving discovery. In the absence of any
formal procedure on which to rely, he is
guided by his intimations of a hidden knowl-
edge.
. . . Where great originality is at
work in science or, even more clearly, in ar-
tistic creation, the innovating mind sets it-
self new standards more satisfying to itself,
and modifies itself by the process of innova-
tion so as to become more satisfying to itself
in light of these self-set standards
.
2 5^
When the innovative acts of the mind of man are viewed from
the outside, in an external or explanatory framework, the
passionate insistence of the innovator as the underlying
factor whereby the individual improves his own mind, becomes
lost in the determinism of the standards of interpretation
which are imposed. Yet the scientist is no more devoid of
passions and commitments than is anyother human being.
Neither, for that matter, is a student on whom we would im-
pose the structure of our program. However, the fact that
in each and every case, we confront the inquiring mind of a
seeker of truth and understanding does not force the conclu-
sion that knowledge is a subjective affair that is devoid
of objectivity. On the contrary, this position is intended
to assert, in Bronowski ' s phrase, "That the event and the
observer are not separable," it is the recognition that it
is the whole person in meaningful contact with his environ-
ment that forms the ground rhythm of man's individual and
25 ^Ibid.
* pp* 395-396.
363
collective intellectual advance.
An important aspect of this interrelation of the
knowing mind and its environment is the community of peers
in which the scientist operates. In this light, the highly
singular aspects of the individual quest for understanding
are also seen to be shared in many important ways by the
scientists' community of fellows. Science is, after all,
a corporate enterprise which thrives by the gradual growth
of historically based ideas which is carried on by indi-
vidual scientists under the impetus of the mutual criticism
discussion and stimulus. Speaking of this community nature
which has the usual attributes of human communities, Harold
Schilling writes:
It is a group of likeminded people with simi-lar interests, predilections, goals, modes of
thought, intellectual equipment, training and
experience. A group of likeminded people be-
come a community as it develops a common way
of life and work, a language of its own as
well as other means of communication, group
ideals, ethical and moral codes, sanctions,
institutions and organizations, patterns of
responsibility and authority, a collective
style of thought, customs, orthodoxies, and
so on. As all others, this community is af-
flicted by the usual vagaries, adequacies and
shortcomings of human beings. It has its
politics, its pulling and hauling, its pres-
sure groups; its differing schools of thought,
its divisions and schisms; its personal loyal-
ties and animosities, jealousies and hatreds,
and rallying cries; its fads and fashions . 255
Harold K. Schilling, Science and Religion (New York
C. Scribner's Sons, 1962), pp . 5^- 55 .
In this rather vivid portrayal of the communal function of
science we can find something of the same theme which has
been extensively developed by Thomas Kuhn in his Structure
Scientific Revolutions
. Kuhn maintains that there are
changes in the assumptions of science which occur
from time to time and which are responsible for what he
calls a "paradigm shift" in the basic assumptions that de-
termine how scientists see the "facts" which are before
them. One of the examples he uses is the development of
Copernican astronomy which we treated in Chapter One. An-
other would be the rise of the concept of energy as opposed
to the concept of mass, a change whose importance to the
history of psychology we documented in the mid nineteenth
century. We cannot enter into Kuhn's work in detail but
there is one aspect of it which is of prime importance to
the present context.
5.1.3 THE LOGIC OF DISCOVERY AND
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RESEARCH
In developing this theme we can also open the way to
concluding this brief excursion into the inner workings of
science. The contrast to be developed here epitomizes the
difference between the internal and external views of the
processes of science and highlights the general problem of
ignoring the critical function of creative, personal judge-
ment. The external view is provided by Karl Popper in a
work entitled The Logic of Scientific Discovery and the
internal prospective is provided by Kuhn's Structure of
3651
Scientific Revolutions
. The crux of this argument has
been detailed in an article written by Kuhn in response to
2 56critics of a "Popperian" mind. In this article Kuhn
points out that Popper sees the progress of science as a
logic of discovery in which the scientist attempts to solve
the problems in which his theories have involved him. To
Popper, the resolution of these problems provides a test of
the theory in question, which, of course, is why Popper
places such great stress upon the idea of "falsifability"
as an important criterion of theories. This follows from
the fact that theories can never be proven to be true but
can only be proven wrong, that is, falsified. This sort of
account, which is widely believed to be accurate, ignores,
according to Kuhn, a vital factor in the conduct of re-
search. Kuhn's argument is that we need to focus upon the
psychological processes of research, that is, its personal
or internal aspect rather than its extrapersonal or external
aspect as indicated in the phrase "logic of discovery."
Kuhn uses the term "puzzle" as opposed to Popper's "problem"
precisely because in his ordinary work the scientist uses
current scientific theory as a premise on which to build
2 ^ 6Thomas S. Kuhn, Logic of Discovery or Psychology of
Research? in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge , I.
Lakatos and A~ Mu sgrave , eds . ( Cambridge : Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1970 ) » PP* 1 - 23 *
the rules of his game but his real objoel is to solve the
puzzle which confronts him as a challenge to liis ingenuity.
The difference betwoon the two schemes may seem sma I 1. uni. i I
it is pointed out that vastly different conclusions are
drawn from them.
To Popper, solving problems means tosting the theory
whereas, to Kuhn, solving puzzles or attempting to solve
them is a test of the scientist. On this latter view, it
is a puzzle which is a challenge to the integrity of the
scientist such that if the test he devises is a failure it
is only his scientific integrity which is impugned and not
the corpus of current theory. This distinction between the
two approaches is central because it points up two key as-
pects of the character of science that are ol importance in
this context. In the first place is the fact that major
changes can and do occur in the basic assumpt ions ol sc-
i
-
ence. It is in this sense that Kuhn agrees with Popper,
that is, there are times when the theory is tested and
times in which it is in fact falsified. The result of this
falsification is a new paradigm for the science in quest ion
and it represents a major change in the whole orientation
of the scientific community, this holds for small highly
specialized communities or for the general scientific com-
munity in the case of major changes. But, by definition,
these changes are extraordinary occurrences so that
in the
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second place we see that far’ and away the most frequent,
modus operandi of the individual scientist is in the normal
puzzle solving mode. In this mode he pits his own bril-
liance against that of others in an effort which the cur-
rent theory serves to define and also to guarantee that
given a sufficiently sanguine approach the problem can be
solved
.
Kuhn's characterization of the mode of "normal" science
is obviously in harmony with positions taken by the others
whose thought we have presented in an effort to focus upon
the "subjective" aspects of the processes of science. The
increasing realization of the nature of the individual com-
mitment which is involved in the conduct of scientific
inquiry also helps to explain the corporate nature of the
scientific enterprise and the development of the intense
"loyalties, animosities, fads and fashions" which are to be
observed in science in general and which have obviously
operated in the history of psychological theory. It is im-
portant to note, and this is one of the main points we wish
to draw from the above discussion, that this same role of
the individual, the nature of his intellectual processes,
the character of his interaction with man's intellectual
history and with his fellow man, has been completely invis-
ible within the vast majority of the theories of psychology
which we have covered to this point. We count it as an
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extreme irony that psychology, the study of man, has pro-
duced so little in the way of understanding the man whose
efforts at the production of physical science it has been
trying to reproduce in psychological science. In this, the
irony seems compounded for not only have the devotees of
the physical sciences led the way toward establishing the
original paradigm which the psychological sciences have
adopted but they have also administered the final insult of
demonstrating, by their own growth, that the model which
psychological theory is pursuing is no longer valid. Kuhn
observes that the "transfer of allegiance from one paradigm
to another is a conversion experience that cannot be
forced." In this, he urges, an individual's resistance is
"not a violation of scientific standards but an index to
the nature of science itself." However, it is also true
that prolonged resistance to the changes taken by the sci-
entific community eventually become illogical and unscien-
tific. Therefore, Kuhn feels that the historian is justi-
fied in concluding that:
the man who continues to resist after his
whole profession has been converted has
ipso facto ceased to be a scientist. 2 ^'
We would simply extend this statement to apply to psychology
as a science with the realization that should it persist in
its refusal to relinquish the narrowness of those theories
^^Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, p. 151*
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which are the direct result of the mechanistic world-view,
then, it may well find that ipso facto it has ceased to be
a science. These are strong words yet, what psychologist
is not more than a little embarrassed by the insights into
human nature which are provided by the Fechner's, White-
head's, Einstein's, Polanyi's, Barbour's, Bronowski ' s
,
Margenau's, Schilling's and Kuhn's, who are, to the man,
physical scientists and not psychologists? That each of
them has made substantial contributions to areas other than
their original field--contributions which, by and large,
point up the central role played by persons who belong to a
community, who have faith in its methods and who work to
x
understand the world by accumulating a corpus of reliable
theory which is systematically related to direct observa-
tions--is to be taken as an indication that there is an im-
portant similarity in the basis of all scientific theory
and its disclosure of reality. This leads us to the last
topic we will treat in this brief characterization of the
nature of science namely, What is the relation of a scien-
tific theory to reality? That is, What kind of truth is
disclosed by science?
5.1.4 MODERN ALTERNATIVES
TO NAIVE REALISM
Since such questions are obviously philosophical prob-
lems, we must turn to the various philosophical interpreta-
tions that have been offered to account for the relation
between theory and reality. We have seen that a dominant
characteristic of early scientific thought was a naive
realism in which the scientist held a strong commitment to
the ideal that a scientific description was a direct, lit-
eral description of the true character of reality. Newton
believed that it was "the business of true philosophy to
derive the natures of things from causes truly existent,
and to inquire after those laws on which the Great Creator
actually chose to found the most beautiful Frame of the
World." We label this view naive realism and are sometimes
unkind in our treatment of it; however, it is also obvious
that each past scientist, in his turn, has confronted the
task of science with the same wholeness of mind, spirit and
commitment that we have come to believe is operative in
modern scientists. What has happened is that there has
been a paradigm shift in which, since the eariy part of
this century, the fundamental basis of this type of realism
has been destroyed. Since that time, scientists have come
to realize that theories are not literal representations of
"the most beautiful Frame of the World." Four basic phi-
losophical interpretations which are alternatives to the
old realist view and which are current in modern thought
are: l) theories viewed as summaries of data--posi tivi sm
,
2) theories viewed as useful tools--instruinentalism,
3) theories viewed as representations of the world--realism
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and >1 ) theories viewed as mental structures— idealism. 258
Ity mentioning each of these briefly we can provide a
useful introduction to the type of realism which is appro-
priate to the organismic approach we have introduced in
earli©r sections and which will occupy an increasing por-
tion of the remainder of this presentation. Taking the
various positions in turn we first come to positivism.
Positivism is something of the extension into modern
times of the empiricism of Bacon and Hume. Percy Bridgman
whose work Logic of Modern Physics and approach to opera-
tionism we have mentioned earlier was an important modern
exponent of this view. For the positivist, theories are
summaries of the data which simply categorize the data ef-
ficiently and conveniently. On this view the proper starting
place for the theory is simply the bare sense data which are
the basic observations of fact. Our position which has been
repeatedly asserted is that there is no such thing as an
"uninterpreted fact." This interpretation was introduced
in connection with Whitehead's denial that:
the primary activity in the act of experience
is the bare subjective entertainment of the
datum, devoid of any subjective form of re-
ception. This is the doctrine of mere sensa-
tion [sensationalist principle ]. 2 59
258Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion , pp . 162-171*
25
^Whi tehead
,
Process and Reality , p. 183 .
J7'-
Whitehead also credits Kant with the recognition that Hume’s
problem required the imposition of some form of subjective
impression upon the data. Additionally the accounts of
Einstein, Polanyi
,
Kuhn, etc.
,
all point to the fact that
there are simply no uninterpreted facts. Interpretations
are the products of a selective and abstractive theoretical
framework. The failure of the empiricist and positivist
approaches to recognize the critical role of theories in
the conduct of research is also a clear indication that
they would totally fail to appreciate the role of the the-
orist--a criticism we have more than once placed upon B. F.
Skinner's psychology.
The idea of theories as useful tools or Instrumental i sm
gives more credit to the role of the theorist than posi-
tivism. Here theories are seen to be the rules of the game
by which a scientist accomplishes the task of investigation.
The problem is that theories then become disconnected from
the character of reality and do not need to have any defi-
nite observable correspondence with real entities. Clearly,
theories which float in this manner are at a definite dis-
advantage when it comes to comparing alternative theories
about the same topic. How is it possible to adduce evidence
for or against either theory? Put simply, it is not. It
is also to be noted that a good portion of psychological
theory can be categorized in this way. Recall the shi t t we
observed in the gestalt field interpretation in which its
original physical and physiological basis was given over
to the methodological form of "field" used by Kurt Lewin.
Freud's theory may be taken as another case in point though
the similarity is not as obvious without the type of analy-
sis given earlier. Instrumentalism can and does give rise
to a lot of critical discourse between individuals and
between individual schools of thought. Kuhn however,
points out that theories of this type are not at all unlike
the theories of astrology before the advent of modern
astronomy. On this view, astrological theories are seen
to provide reasons for and explanations of the various phe-
nomena in the heavens but they fail to provide the all-
important "puzzles" that a scientist can struggle with.
This is the case because everyone expected the astrological
theories to be of low accuracy and had many cogent reasons
for these inaccuracies; reasons which were the subject of
much critical discourse. For the mind-bending scientific
puzzles to develop it was required that the practitioners
of the science should share an explicit method and criteria
which related the theory to the reality of the observed
occurrences. In this way, it was possible for failures to
lead to puzzles which could prompt the generation o± new
^^Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions , pp . 52-
97 .
calculation, observations and instruments. Unless the in-
genuity of the individual scientist can be challenged
within the corpus of a theory which makes some meaningful
statement about actual things, the level of discourse will
remain critical but also astrological in character. Only
puzzle solving is capable of preparing the way for its own
replacement, hence scientific development, since critical
discourse can easily explain away the basis for further
inquiry unless it is checked by recourse to experimental
data
.
The third major alternative is Idealism
. In this, we
find the ultimate step in the recognition of the contribu-
of the knower. That is, the structures of reality are
all seen as being imposed by the mind of the observer.
This is also an important factor in the Whi t eheadian frame-
work since the direct effect of this approach is to estab-
lish the fact that conscious experience is the foundation
of all experience. While we easily accept this position,
Whitehead explicitly denies it. Recall that for Whitehead,
conscious experience is the culmination of experience and
not the beginning of it. This is a typical example of the
Whiteheadian "inversion." Kant is credited with the inno-
vation in philosophy which recognizes the subjective con-
tribution of the individual, but Whitehead was quoted as
saying "For Kant, the world emerges from the subject; for
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the [>l i i J o sophy ol organism, I lie snbjec:t emerges from I In'
world .
"
Idealism then, requires that:
the datum in the act of experience can be
adequately analysed purely in terms of
universals . ^°1
This statement refers to what Whitehead calls the "subjec-
tivist principle" which is the companion of the "sensation-
alist principle" mentioned under positivism. Obviously
both of these principles relate to what we consider the
process of perception to be all about and are therefore,
intimately connected with issues in psychology, ancient and
modern. Clearly, they are also importantly related to the
philosophical history which was covered earlier. Whitehead
uses both of them in his analysis of the various philoso-
phies because they are important ways "to scrutinize . . .
the character to be assigned to the datum in the act of ex-
perience. The whole philosophical system depends upon
[this all important act of scrutinizing the way these prin-
ciples are applied]."
Not all idealists have been philosophers of old how-
ever. Among moderns there has been Arthur Eddington,
The fundamental laws and constants of physics
are wholly subjective . . . for we could not
p /T I
Whitehead, Process and Reality , p. 183.
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have this kind of a priori knowledge ol laws
governing an objective universe .26^
and also Henry Margenau who we quoted earlier on theory de-
velopment ends up by concluding:
Science defines a dynamic kind of reality,
one that grows and changes as our under-
standing grows and changes. ... I am per-
fectly willing to admit that reality does
change as discovery proceeds . 263
From this it is safe to conclude that idealism is not
going to provide any necessary reasons as to why some the-
ories give accurate predictions about empirical relations
and others do not. Unless some reasonable method can
be
obtained for establishing such a correspondence between
events in the world and the structures of our theories
there seems little hope of progress. Fortunately,
there is
an alternative to be found in the last category
of philos-
ophical theory to be considered.
Realism
,
the doctrine that we criticized earlier,
also
has a modern counterpart which asserts that
what we know of
nature does in fact have some objective relationships
in
nature. In this view, theories are not
simple positivistic
summaries of facts, neither do they float
in an idealistic
void. They are also more than simple
tools for the
2^ 2Arthur Eddington, The Philosophy
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
quoted in Barbour, o£. ext .
,
p* 1 (•
263Margenau, The Natur e of Physical
quoted in Barbour, Ibid., p. l68 ‘
of Physical Science
19^9), P* 1°5,
_
Reality
,
p* 288,
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instrumentality of conscious understanding. A realist is
one who accepts the fact that being is prior to knowing and
that it is only by accurate reference to the world that we
can develop any understanding of it.
From the introduction to the philosophy of organism in
Section 3*3» we can see that Whitehead's organismic meta-
physics require a realist epistemology as a result of the
"ontological principle." The importance of this premise is
stated in many forceful ways by Whitehead, having already
used one version, we can substitute another at this point:
The actual world is built up of actual occa-
sions; and by the ontological principle what-
ever things there are in any sense of "exis-
tence" are derived by abstraction from actual
occasions. Apart from the experience of sub-
jects there is nothing, nothing, nothing,
bare nothingness. The most general term
"thing"--or, equivalently, "enti ty"--means
nothing else than to be one of the "many"
which find their niches in each instance of
concrescence .264
Whitehead's comments on the sensationalist principle as it
applies to positivism, Hume being a prime example, and also
on the subjectivist principle of Kant's philosophy, make it
clear that his realism entails that the world be viewed as
to its wholeness rather than an assemblage of isolated and
Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
quoted in A Key to
Whitehead's Process and Reality
,
Donald W. Sherburne, ed.
( Bloomington : Indiana University Press, 1966), p. 18.
Sherburne's treatment of Whitehead involves assembling
segments of text found throughout Process and Reality into
one complete segment. Thus, the above quotation is Sher-
burne's cogent patchwork of several Whiteheadian sentences.
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quiring mind. The reason Tor Whitehead's formulation of
idea of "actual entity" or "actual occasion" was to
underline this very point. Actual entities exist in a
unity of interrelatedness which is determined as a result
both their external relatedness and also their internal
or process aspects. The point to be made here, is simply
that the events which constitute reality, exist in inter-
related networks, do in fact have an inner (process) and an
outer (reality) and that in the process of knowing these
events we must abstract from the character of these entities
by using a selective and symbolic system of representation.
One of the first implications of this view for theories
in the human sciences, is that our experience of the world
is actually a unity of experience in which it is only by
dint of high abstraction that we create the isolated mental
states of awareness which so much of past philosophy and
psychology has assumed to be the basic elements of knowl-
edge. This is the Whiteheadian "inversion" argument again
and shorthand summary of the more detailed "Fallacy of Mis-
placed Concreteness" which was discussed in Section 1.3*
Since that discussion also included the scientific thought
of the seventeenth century, we are left with two important
realizations. First, since much of the fabric of our
present psychological theory is a direct outgrowth of the
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basic approach inherent in seventeenth century thought, we
are
»
an reality only working with a small sampling of the
true interrelations which are important to the actual en-
tities of the world. Said differently, scientific concepts
represent selective aspects of the richness of meaning that
constitutes the true "concreteness" of reality. The second
point is that by building our understanding of ourselves
out of such narrow aspects of reality, by placing our trust
in the "misplaced concreteness" of what appeared to be
separate substances, we have ignored the unity of process
that is also a part of our own nature. We may therefore
assert that there are many rich and important aspects of
the human self which have been overlooked in our fascina-
tion with the highly elaborated and brightly shinning
"baubles" of sophisticated intellectual knowledge. In re-
lation to these high abstractions, the missing knowledge is
really rather "primitive" in the sense that it comes first
and is vague in comparison to the shrill clarity of intel-
lectual knowledge. Yet, is not this "primitive" sort of
knowledge just what we have been looking for in the tradi-
tion of psychology as a human science and in the urging of
the various romantic reactions to abstract science? Our
conviction is that Whitehead's form of philosophical realism
is in fact just the missing link for which we have been
searching. It is the method by which the apparently dual
580
aspects o.l’ man's mind uinl mail's Imdy, his rr<*«» and deter-
mined natures, tlie depths ol' his emotional being and the
heights of his intellectual knowledge, can be reunited into
an actual entity whose unity is known both in terms of its
objective and subjective realities. This amounts to the
development of a new awareness of man's self-consciousness
in which we become aware of ourselves in rapport with and
participating in the processes of nature which extend
beyond ourselves.
5.1.5 THE UNIFYING CHARACTER
OF CRITICAL REALISM
In pulling together the various comments about the
nature of science and it's theories, we can start by agreeing
with Barbour that the scientific enterprise is a many-
faceted phenomenon.
Its genius has been precisely the interaction
of components which oversimplified accounts
have portrayed in isolation. It involves
both experience and theory, neither of which
taken alone constitutes science. It requires
both logical processes and a creative imagi-
nation transcending logic. Its theories are
evaluated at once by empirical agreement, ra-
tional coherence, and comprehensiveness. In-
dividual activity and originality are signif-
icant but occur within the tradition of a
scientific community and under the influence
of its paradigms. Scientific language does
refer to the world, but only symbolically and
partially, sometimes using analogies or models
of limited scope. 265
In addition to this, we can observe that the critical
265Barbour, op . cit
. ,
pp. 173 - 17 ** •
realism of Whiteheadian philosophy provides a useful cor-
rection to the various "oversimplified accounts" of the
nature of science which characterize earlier philosophy of
science. The divisive abstractions of the positivists,
idealists, instrumentalists and naive realists can now be
balanced into a new harmony. This new harmony is formed by
the intersection of the separate dimensions of thought
which have been created by the two sets of polar opposites.
On the one hand,^positivism has asserted the meaningfulness
of empirical data to the exclusion of its opposite, ide-
alism, which has asserted the meaningfulness of intellec-
tual coherence. While on the other hand the instrumen-
talists have attempted to use the tools of their trade to
unlock the reality with which the naive realist finds him-
self theoretically at one. Critical realism is the fulcrum
upon which each of these separate dimensions can be bal-
anced. It agrees with the positivist on the importance of
empirical statements and with the idealist in his search
for intellectual coherence. With the instrumentalist,
critical realism holds that theories are the only guide to
useful scientific investigation while at the same time it
can agree with the old naive realist position that many
important aspects of being do, in fact, exist prior to
knowing
.
The modifications which critical realism provides to
'ih :
'
oarh of these views are all rolatocl to a more accurate ap-
preciation of the complete character of the role played by
creative human intelligence in the realization of scien-
tific knowledge. As man's true role in the production of
the scientific understanding of nature becomes clarified,
we can and should expect corresponding increases in man's
scientific understanding of himself.
5.2 SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY: A
METAPHYSICAL INTROSPECTION
The inclusion of the word "introspection" in the title
of this section, is meant to perform a very important func-
tion with respect to the relation of the philosophy of or-
ganism and its possible uses in the formulation of psycho-
logical theory. On this matter, a slight digression seems
to be in order.
Introspection as a method is obviously very old within
the field of psychology; a method that has had many and
varied uses. These uses have been so varied in fact that
the role of introspection in theory formulation has come to
mean simply a description of however it is that one finds
whatever it is that one finds when he considers his subjec-
tive reality. What we would hope to add to this history of
the introspective method, is an interpretation of the same
process which is based upon the alternative metaphysics of
the theory of organic mechanism.
Of the various introspective methods which have been
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discussed, the most limiting as to its scope was probably
that which was developed by Wilhelm Wundt. The basic limi-
tation of this approach was the fact that it was explicitly
tied to materialistic metaphysics by virtue of the atomistic
epistemology that Wundt was constrained to use. We assert
that Wundt was constrained to use this view because if lie
had not, he may well have ended up as Dilthey did. Dilthey
developed a more fulfilling introspective description but
only at the expense of severing any explicit contact with
the reigning epistomology and metaphysics. He therefore,
ipso facto, became in the eyes of his contemporaries a phi-
losopher rather than a scientific psychologist.
The main character of this discussion will be to es-
tablish a basis for introspective analysis which combines
the much needed epistemological emphasis of Wundt with the
necessary subjective validity which is found in Dilthey.
This task can be achieved by enveloping them in the larger,
more inclusive framework of organismic metaphysics. We
have argued that the main limitation inherent in traditional
science, philosophy and psychology has been its emphasis
upon the mechanistic metaphysics of the modern era. As a
first approximation of creating a replacement for this
older view, the first level relation between organismic
metaphysics and conscious experience will be described.
We have asserted in many ways that it is a truer
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apprehension of the character of man's being in the world
that will be the basis of a more satisfactory intellectual
understanding of man's psychological nature. In seeking
this expanded perspective, we are mindful of the fact that
any discussion of this sort must be humble, and in many
ways, a worshipfully meditative enterprise; yet, to seek
the transcendence of perceived limitations also calls for a
certain speculative boldness and willingness to modify
tradition
.
If we use our own internal awareness as a model, it is
clear that the external scientific descriptions of our own
bodies, even to the extent of allowing a neurophysiologist
to record electrical potentials deep in our brains, would
not be the same as the self-consciousness we experience di-
rectly as "I." In this vein, we can characterize the long
asserted desire of the human scientific psychologists, the
phenomenologist s and finally the existentialists as an
effort to realize the "within" of nature that has been ex-
cluded by excessive concentration on the "without." There
is, in fact, no room for the scientific appreciation of
consciousness, willing, feeling and valuing except by virtue
of a change in the emphasis of the formulations upon which
the scientific enterprise rests.
The limitations of the old system, because of its con-
centration on the without of things, have been most acute
in dealing with the human self because this self is the
most elaborate and evolved self in nature yet, it is now
beginning to appear that the same limitation also applies
in ever lesser degrees to ever lesser levels of being. We
are, therefore, in the position of asserting that it is no
accident that the scientific approach which focuses prima-
rily upon the external aspects of nature has been most suc-
cessful in describing those levels of nature in which the
external aspects dominate. Thus, the highly developed
state of physics and chemistry is in part attributable to
the fact that the character of the phenomena with which
they deal is primarily determined by the external aspects
of their natures since the internal aspects of determina-
tion are negligible. Of this condition Whitehead quips to
the effect that if we desire an uninterpreted record of ex-
perience we must ask a stone to record its autobiography. 266
Scientific knowledge represents an approach to reality
which is a selective and abstract process that is described
m various symbolic languages. The outcome of this process
yields the familiar laws, hypotheses and mathematical de-
scriptions of the external aspects of the phenomena we ob-
serve. An important characteristic of science is that it
has developed a tremendous instrumentation and technology
which has helped to elaborate and refine the precision and
266
Whitehead, Process and Reality
, p. 18.
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depth oi empirical statement that science can make. How-
ever, it is evident that the primary effect of this elabo-
ration is simply to extend the type of conceptual framework
in which the technology resides. For all of its sophisti-
cation and value, this type of approach really only yields
data which is applicable to the framework of abstractions
from which it originally started. We may assume therefore,
that the various approaches which are evident in the spe-
cialized sciences provide a picture of reality which is in
varying ways an assemblage of partial abstractions expressed
in symbolic terms, and which do not necessarily provide an
exhaustive description of reality as a whole. It is also
true that the various methods of science produce specialized
information about vastly different levels of reality. For
this reason, the external explanatory character of tradi-
tional physical science has been most successful with meas-
uring and quantifying those aspects of nature in which ex-
ternal determination predominates. On this view, the often
mentioned "primitive" state of psychological theory is not
simply attributable to the newness of scientific psychology
as a discipline but is, rather, a direct result of the
basic characteristic of science itself. There is an in-
herent loss of explanatory power and exactness of measure-
ment as the level of investigation shifts away from physics
and chemistry to biological and finally to psychological
387
investigation. This variability in the efficacy of scien-
tific explanation is a direct result of the fact that as
the transition to higher levels of phenomena is made, the
requirement to become more sensitive to the role of the in-
ternal rather than the external factors is increased. The
importance of subjective factors reaches its zenith in the
study of man and therefore levies the requirement that a
major segment of scientific data must be drawn from man's
analysis of his own awareness of what it means to be. It
is with this realization that we can turn to the broader
aspects of the formulation of the philosophy of organism
and inquire into the role which is ascribed to the highest
level of subjectivity in nature--the being of man.
5.2.1 EXPERIENCE AND
SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY
In stepping outside the traditional framework of sci-
entific approach to psychology it is important to define
just how far we are required to travel with such a step.
We can put all ambiguity about the matter aside with the
following thought that Whitehead included in the Preface to
his major work, Process and Reality .
. . .
the movement of historical and philo-
sophical criticism of detached questions,
which on the whole has dominated the last two
centuries, has done its work, and requires to
be supplemented by a more sustained effort of
constructive thought . 267
267 t , .Ibid.
,
p. ix.
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tachod questions and have the problem of attaching them
into some unified framework. This replacement process is
also detailed by Whitehead as being:
. . . the true method of philosophical con-
struction [which] is to frame a scheme of
ideas, the best one can, and unflinchingly
to explore the interpretation of experience
in terms of that scheme. 268
We see the philosophy of organism as a scheme of ideas
which is highly applicable to the "interpretation of expe-
rience" and have therefore, chosen to draw the parallel
between it, the problem of introspection and the interpre-
tation of psychology as a human science. That the problems
of scientific psychology are a matter for "philosophical
construction" is, we feel, amply demonstrated by the mate-
rial which has been presented in the first section of this
chapter. On this same point, Whitehead asserts that:
. . . all constructive thought, on the various
special topics of scientific interest, is dom-
inated by [a basic metaphysical] . . . scheme,
[which is] unacknowledged, but no less influ-
ential in guiding the imagination . -69
Philosophy to Whitehead is the consistent and "unf 1 inching"
effort to make such schemes explicit so that they can be
criticized and improved. We have had an ample taste of the
criticism which devolves upon the materialist scheme when
268
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one assumes the organismic point-of-view
,
and the time has
now come to consider those aspects which form the basic
scheme of the philosophy of organism and which purport to
contain a useful interpretation of experience.
In entering this topic, we should also include the
final remark which Whitehead felt was an appropriate con-
clusion to his opening remarks in the Preface.
There remains the final reflection, how shal-low, puny and imperfect are efforts to soundthe depths m the nature of things. In phil-
osophical discussion, the merest hint of dog-matic certainty as to finality of statement
*
is an exhibition of folly. 270
To unflinchingly explore an interpretation of experience
which is formed as best one can but which is, nevertheless,
shallow, puny and also poised upon the brink of manifest
folly is a big order indeed. Whitehead explores these
issues in the first chapter of Process and Reality in what
has become famous as his "Defense of Speculative Philoso-
271plly * The importance of this argument to metaphysics in
general is underscored by the fact that Whitehead saw fit
to begin his presentation with it and also by the fact that
it is the most widely quoted part of the volume.
Speculative philosophy in Whitehead's eyes is the
endeavor to frame a coherent, logical, neces-
sary system of general ideas in terms of which
270
271
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,
p. ix.
Sherburne, A Key to Whitehead's Metaphysics
,
p. 191
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every element of experience can be inter-
preted.
. .
.
[interpretation means that]
everything of which we are conscious, as en-
joyed, perceived, willed, or thought, shall
have the character of a particular instance
of the general scheme. Thus the philosophi-
cal scheme should be coherent, logical, and,
in respect to its interpretation, applicable
and adequate. 272
The four key words of that last sentence, coherent, logical,
applicable and adequate, are the hallmarks of Whitehead's
creation and are also the reason why the philosophy of or-
ganism sounds so foreign to someone on first contact with
it. Focusing briefly on each notion will serve as an im-
portant basis for appreciating the more detailed metaphysics.
It is important to bear in mind that this discussion con-
siders those topics which are appropriate to the develop-
ment of an adequate scheme of ideas and does not refer di-
rectly to the ideas themselves. Nevertheless, this is the
basis that forms the interpretative elements of the final,
system. That we find such an explicit statement of philo-
sophical first principles strange is simply another way of
recognizing the implicit character of the traditional system
of root ideas.
Coherence in the system of fundamental ideas means
that each basic term in the system must presuppose the
other terms. Since Whitehead holds that no entity can be
conceived in complete abstraction from the rest ol the
^^^Whi t ehead
,
o£. cit .
,
p. 5*
universe, the character’ of coherence demands that the fun-
damental ideas should be taken as mutually defining each
other in ways which are impossible if the unity of the sys-
tem is destroyed in attempts to isolate one or more terms
into an abstractive context. By way of forming a stark
contrast, we can note that Einstein saw the goal of science
as reducing "all concepts and correlations to as few as
possible logically independent basic concepts and axioms."
We must bear in mind that the contrast here is the differ-
ence between the goals of an explanatory physical science,
which can and does, seek to formulate "logically independent
basic concepts and axioms" and the philosophical goals of a
complete descriptive system that would exclude nothing from
its preview before it starts the process of systematization.
In other contexts, Whitehead uses the term "assemblage" to
convey the meaning of the large-scale notions which form
the basis of the more particularized systematic accounts of
experience which are found in specialized contexts.
The term logical refers to the usual sense of logical
consistency and freedom from self-contradiction. Whitehead
is, however, at pains to point out that the "scheme of log-
ical notions" must also be contained within the more general
philosophical system. Whitehead proposed this condition in
1929 before two famous discoveries within the field of logic
made essentially the same point in 1931 * We are not really
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interested in arguing Whitehead's apparent philosophical
priority but wish to underline the character of these dis-
coveries and their major implications. One of the best
nontechnical discussion of the discoveries of Kurt Godel
273has been provided by Jacob Bronowski . Godel ' s work is
striking because he established the formal proof that any
logical system of more than trivial complexity can neither
prove itself to be complete nor can it guarantee that all
possible deductions from its axioms will be consistent with
those axioms. Still another and deeper limitation was sub-
sequently demonstrated by Alfred Tarski with his proof that
every attempt to establish a system of formal language will
contain assertions which cannot be demonstrated to be
either true or false. Bronowski, in a vein reminiscent oi
our earlier discussion, attributes these critical limita-
tions in logical systems to their lack of "self-reference.
That is, he views the limitations of the logical systems as
being related to those very aspects of the creative and
imaginative mind of the scientist that are ignored in sys-
tems which are designed to explain the external natures of
things
.
In returning to direct consideration of Whitehead's
thought, we find that the twin requirements of coherence
^Bronowski
,
On the Limits of Sci entific Knowledge m
Man and The Science of Man , Coulson and Rogers, eds .
,
pp . 31-^9
•
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and logical necessity are obviously mutually impl icative
and cannot be arbitrarily disconnected without sacrificing
some of the generality of the system that is an absolute
necessity at this level of argument.
The last two special topics of applicability and ade-
quacy can be taken together and labeled the "empirical side"
of speculative philosophy as opposed to the requirements of
coherence and logic which are the "rational side" of the
system. It hardly seems necessary to point up the simi-
larity of this division with that of within as contrasted
to without and internal as contrasted with external which
has figured prominently in previous discussion. In this
context applicable means that some items of experience are
in fact interpretable by the system and the idea of ade-
quate is intended to assert that all items of experience
can be so interpreted. To emphasize the generality of this
demand, we need only recall that it includes "everything of
which we are conscious, as enjoyed, perceived, willed or
thought." In short, all aspects of immediate experience
must be capable of interpretation as a particular instance
of the general scheme.
Now that the programmatic character of speculative
philosophy is apparent, we can begin to focus more closely
upon the role of metaphysical interpretation in science and
psychology
.
PSYCHOLOG l CAL M IOTA PHYSICS
Metaphysics must be thought of as the search tor gen-
eralities which unify diverse areas of experience into a
whole such that the particular parts find additional
meaning by virtue of such inclusion. This fact is often
ignored or played down by the tremendous bias that is pro-
duced as a result of interpretations of intellectual be-
havior which ignore the role of the individual creative
intellect in the formation of new knowledge. Since the
more complete aspects of the actual role of the creative
intellect have figured so prominently in the previous dis-
cussion, we need not dwell on their justification here.
Instead, we can focus on Whitehead's use of the idea in the
context of metaphysical construction.
The idea behind strict empiricism as interpreted by
the Baconian method of induction implies that facts are
sufficient into themselves and do not need to be explained
by any constructive efforts on the part of the scientist.
Whitehead, of course, categorically denies this. He ex-
pressed his feeling on the matter in a very apt and often
quoted metaphor as follows:
What Bacon omitted was the play of free imag-
ination, controlled by the requirements of
coherence and logic. The true method of dis-
covery is like the flight of an aeroplane.
It starts from the ground of particular ob-
servation; it makes a flight in the thin ait
of imaginative generalization; and it again
V) r,
lands Ion renewed ohservation .pondered acute
by rational interpre tat ion
.
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Without an appreciation of the imaginative construction
which is the basis of the "wholes" by which specific "facts"
become meaningful there can be little to be gained through
consideration of metaphysical problems.
The basic presupposition upon which the entire quest
for metaphysical insight rests is that the part, or indi-
vidual element of experience, is given meaning by and can-
not be separated from the whole in which it occurs. To
speak of isolated parts is a restriction of generality to
the precise extent that the part becomes an isolated frag-
ment. Conversely, it is impossible to interpret any expe-
rience except from the perspective of an assumed whole
which functions to structure the reality of the observation.
Against the tradition of science which venerates isolated
facts and objects to metaphysics Whitehead asserts:
Unfortunately for this objection, there are
no brute, self-contained matters of fact,
capable of being understood apart from inter-
pretation as an element in a system. When-
ever we attempt to express the matter of im-
mediate experience, we find that its under-
standing leads beyond itself, to its contem-
poraries, to its parts, to its future, and to
the universals in terms of which its definite-
ness is exhibited. But such universals, by
their very character of universality, embody
the potentiality of other facts with variant
types of definiteness. Thus the understanding
274Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 7*
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physical interpretation as an item in a world
with some systematic relation to it. When
thought comes upon the scene, it finds the
interpretations as matters of practice. Phi-
losophy does not initiate interpretations.
Its search for a rationalistic scheme is the
search for more adequate criticism, and for
more adequate justification, of the interpre-
tations which we perforce employ. 275
Thus, not only is it true that metaphysics cannot be
completely avoided, it is also clear that the paradigm case
for metaphysical interpretation is our attempts "to express
the matter of immediate experience." This is a basic point
in the character of metaphysical formulation. Since "the
elucidation of immediate experience is the sole justifica-
tion for any thought; and the starting point for the thought
is the analytic observation of components of this experi-
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ence," and since we directly observe the fact that under-
standing immediate experience leads beyond it to its con-
temporaries, to its parts, to its future and the potenti-
alities for other types of definiteness we are justified in
the assertion that assumptions which involve the nature of
reality as a whole cannot be avoided. While it is true
that we can often bracket these larger contextual issues
for the purpose of considering specific issues in special-
ized contexts, it is also clear that those enterprises are
275 Ibid.
,
p. 18.
276Ibid.
,
p. 7*
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constrained lo function within the Larger picture and can-
not manifest attributes and characteristics of which the
whole is devoid.
From what has been said so far, it is clear that the
metaphysics to which Whitehead has reference is a meta-
physics which is constructed to describe this world and not
some abstract ideal which is removed from the context of
life as it is experienced. As in creative scientific
thought, the "aeroplane must again land for renewal obser-
vation rendered acute by rational interpretation." Ln this
case, the goal is the "elucidation of immediate experience"
and the truth claim of Whiteheadian metaphysics is simply
the comparison of the metaphysics by the standards of co-
herence, logic, applicability and adequacy with the world
as we experience it. One good reason for dwelling upon
this type of role for metaphysics has already been provided
by Hume. In addition to the earlier commentary concerning
the nature of his empiricism and philosophical skepticism,
it is instructive to consider what Hume, the man, thought
of the true character of his metaphysics.
Most fortunately it happens, that since reason
is incapable of dispelling these clouds [deep
philosophical dread and anxiety], nature her-
self suffices to that purpose, and cures me of
this philosophical melancholy and delirium.
... I dine, I play a game of backgammon, I
converse, and am merry with my friends; and
when after three or four hours 1 amusement , I
wou'd return to these speculations, they ap-
pear so cold, and strain'd and riduculous,
that I cannot find in my heart to enter into
them any farther. ^77
We gladly agree with Hume that nature does suffice to the
purpose of dispelling the deep darkness of skepticism; how
different indeed, would the history of philosophy have been
if Hume had listened to the promptings of his heart and as-
sumed with Whitehead that:
The proper conclusion of this discussion is,
first, the assertion of the old doctrine that
breadth of thought reacting with intensity of
sensitive experience stands out as an ultimate
claim of existence; secondly, the assertion
that empirically the development of self-
justifying thoughts has been achieved by the
complex process of generalizing from particu-
lar topics, of imaginatively schematizing the
generalizations and finally renewed comparison
of the imagined scheme with the direct expe-
rience to which it should apply. 2 ?
^Me"etaphysics then
,
is really a confession of faith as
to what the ultimate claim of existence is^/ For modern man
there is no other rational recourse but to confront the
fact that he is not going to find meaningful answers by
exclusively relying upon either the rational side of phi-
losophy or the empirical side of science for the develop-
ment of solutions to the intractable problems which have
confronted standard scientific and philosophical interpre
tation. Abstract science and or philosophy alone cannot
2^Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature , quoted in Jones,
A History of Western Philosophy , p. 801.
2
^®Whitehead
,
Process and Reality, p. 20.
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provide the answer because every question they can pose
I
must necessarily contain some reference to the metaphysical
presumptions of their world-view. The same applies to
methodological procedures and epistemology; even logic,
language and technical philosophical methods are all seen
to contain necessary assumptions about what is finally the
case with reality.
Organismic metaphysics can offer an alternative to the
views of the last two hundred years, which Whitehead claims
have done their work, by asserting the basic truth of the
type of synoptic whole which is constituted by the basic
intuitions of the human mind as they are known in immediate
experience. Of this type of experience, Whitehead claims
that the primordial experience of man:
. . .
arises out of the past: it enriches
with emotion and purpose its presentation of
the contemporary world: and it bequeaths its
character to the future, in the guise of an
effective element forever adding to, or sub-
stracting from, the richness of the world.
For good or for evil.^79
The world is clearly prior to the advent of an individual
mind and therefore must have structures which exist inde-
pendently of that mind and which are the basis of its expe-
rience. This view does not however, restrict the totality
of that mind to those aspects which are reflected in that
279Whitehead, Symbolism; Its Meaning and Effect (New
York: Capricorn Books , 1959 ) > PP • 58-59
•
encounter
.
e of organis-On the contrary, it is the essenc
mic metaphysics that it asserts the priority of immediate
experience without also imposing upper limits as to its
precise potential or attempting to enforce ultimate conclu-
sion as to what the future should contain. In this we have
something of a paradox since at the same time the ultimate
transcendence of the human mind is asserted, the metaphysic
is also asserting that the world itself is greater, there-
fore transcendent
,
in relation to the knowledge we have of
it. Surely it is one of the functions of purposive human
actions to attempt the resolution of this double paradox by
expanding the general consciousness of what is actually ex-
perienced. Such an expansion has been the result of the
continual "demand for intellectual justification of brute
,,280 ^ ,experience which has characterized the being of man.
In this last characterization of immediate experience
we have imbedded it in the two-way transcendence of its own
ineffable relation to its existence beyond itself and also
to its naively held grasp on the totality of the material
world. Another way of talking about his distinction is to
refer to the institutions of knowledge which have developed
around these basic poles of being. In the case of the
transcendent self, we have religion and in the case of the
transcendent world we have science. In between, there are
280Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 19 *
tho various coordinate
hOl
nC sc homos of' philosophy, metaphysics,
epistemology, etc.. These two polarities have rather oppo-
site functions. The institution of religion and acts of
religious nature in one's life have the function of ex-
panding individual interest in the direction away from the
^ culari ty of the world and its scientific description
and treat issues which relate to the formation of the ex-
periencing subject himself. By contrast, science deals
with the relation of the experiencing subject and the out-
side world of objects. In both cases however, it is the
focal center of the experiencing subject that seeks expan-
sion into greater harmony with these two major categories
of experience.
This sort of interpretation is plainly true of the
early history of the epoch of materialistic science. By
way of extreme contrast, it is also reasonable to assert
that it can even be applied to the utopian thoughts of non-
mentalistic and nonspiritual theoristists like J. B. Watson
and B. F. Skinner. Both of these men have sought to dis-
play the hypothesized efficacy of their highly abstract,
specialized concepts in the arena of generalized goals
which relate to man's transcendent nature.
It is fitting to close this discussion of metaphysics
with the observation that the basic descriptive principles
which were of central importance in past discussions of
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efforts toward the creation of psychology conceived as a
human science, namely, the reality of the wi thin of expe-
rience as opposed to the without of experience, find exem-
plification and expansion in organismic metaphysics. In
the organismic framework which centers on the validity of
the internal sensitivity of the experient subject, and
which sees the demand to justify experience as being created
by man's natural propensity toward expanded awareness, are
to be found the means to foster a deeper awareness of both
the scientific and spiritual aspects of man.
Organismic metaphysics enhances appreciation of the
fact that science and spirituality concern singularly dif-
ferent areas of individual experience. On the one hand,
there is the relationship to the transcendence of self by
the unknown potentialities of human nature while on the
other hand, there is the transcendence of the physical
world in relation to man's understanding of it. In between
these two poles of transcendence, there is the sensitive
reaction of the experiencing individual which is seeking to
harmonize both aspects into expanded awareness. Toward
what is generally considered to be the spiritual side of
this relationship, it is evident that the task coni renting
the individual is to seek to harmonize emotion, purposes
and the influx of man's transcendent nature with experiences
which are derived from rational thought and interaction with
^03
U '° r,°rCOiVed WOrld * T—
' what Us generally considered
to be the material side of this relationship, the task con-
fronting the individual is to bring rational thought into
harmony with the physical world as experienced.
These aspects of being have traditionally been insti-
tutionalized in society in the divergent areas of science
and religion. To the extent that "civilized progress" has
tended to sunder their immediate relationship within the
individual’s awareness of life processes then, to that ex-
tent, which has been considerable, the "progress" of man
has been positive but destructive of the true unity of
spiritual and rational life. The message of organismic
metaphysics is to seek positive but constructive progress
toward enhanced being. Tts chief innovation in the crea-
tion of such positive and constructive goals is the recog-
nition of the reality of the fact that the true processes
in the world of man are none other than those which are
found in the experiencing subject himself.
This is the unity with which an enlightened science of
psychology must deal. Psychology no longer needs to derive
its methodology, epistemology, and metaphysics from those
sciences which study lower levels of being in which external
factors predominate. It no longer needs to believe that it
can somehow collect enough pieces of man's nature to de-
scribe him usefully. While psychology will always have a
Wi
place for empirical precision and direct observation, it
can only meaningly engage in such activities after it has
assumed the role of being the expositor of the wholeness of
man, a wholeness which it has first recognized as deriving
from the manifestation, within the individual experiencing
subject, of the unity and harmony of spiritual and rnateriaJ
existence. Such a psychology will not shrink from the fact
that the influx of man's spiritual nature does in fact
create phenomena in the world which science can attempt to
examine and predict but which it will never control. By
the same token, it will also recognize that the individual
experience of its subjects is also partially determined by
conceptual experiences which derive from scientific under-
standing and rational reaction to the world as it is known.
In the place of trivializing the true nature of man's
participation in the world and his transcendence of it,
organismic psychology venerates man by taking him as the
womb of scientific creativity and spiritual originality.
5-3 SCIENCE PHILOSOPHY
AND PSYCHOLOGY
At the beginning of this chapter it was indicated that
the separate areas of science, philosophy and psychology
could be fashioned into a meaningful whole by a coordina-
tion of the basic ideas of each discipline. At this junc-
ture, it is more easily asserted that the key element in
both science and philosophy is the role of the individual
sentient human being. In discussing science, which histor-
-L cal Ly has been most closely identified with the material
half of man's awareness, the modern innovation in the char-
acter of our understanding of that enterprise centered
around the role of the creative intellect of the puzzle
solving scientist. This critical factor in the whole
scheme of science was long ignored as a result of the same
external bias that frustrated attempts to create a human
scientific psychology and also caused great consternation
among the more poetic and artistic individuals of the
modern era.
In discussing the metaphysics behind philosophy, the
common metaphysical outlook of materialistic science and
past philosophy was apparent. The problem of greater unity
in this area was resolved by the advent of organismic meta-
physics which asserts that the whole aim of any intellectual
enterprise is the elucidation of experience which is impor-
tant to people. This basic assertion was amplified in the
further requirement that the starting point for such an
analysis is, in fact, the observation of the experience
itself. Once again, the statement was made that it is the
character of the individual that has priority in the devel-
opment of scientific understanding. This time however, the
statement is stronger. Whereas the discussion of the char-
acter of science focused simply on the role of the creative
hoG
intellect
,
the discussion of organismic metaphysics in—
eludes that rninor realization in tlie sweeping changes which
it proffers for the character of the scientific enterprise
itself. An understanding of science which venerates the
creative intellect requires the further elucidation of a
metaphysics which can support both halves of the reality of
man's existence which are transcendent in relation to the
awareness of the individual's immediate experience.
That both previous discussions have converged upon the
role and nature of the individual is particularly fortunate
for a discussion which is to touch upon the relationship of
science, philosophy and psychology. It is with this type
of background that we can hope to develop an approach to
psychology that harmonizes with the past traditions of
science, philosophy and psychology and yet also adds to
these particular traditions the penetration of insight
which results from an expanded consideration of the personal
reality of internal experience.
5.3.1 ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY
: The psychology which one can envision as growing out
I
of the organismic metaphysics will, none- the-less , be a
specialized form of human experience with its own aims,
methods and standards which will serve to distinguish it
from other areas of science and philosophy. Psychology
however, has the unique task of not only recognizing that
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its prime subject matter is the sensitive reaction of the
experiencing individual but also, that the dynamic charac-
ter of that sensitive reaction is a joint product of the
individual's faith in the character of the ultimate real-
ities referent to the spiritual side of life as well as the
particular existential situation that the individual finds
himself in the material world. Psychology will need to
recognize the causitive character of both these poles of
being. Past psychology has sought the "message" for man as
a result of his situation in the world, future psychology
can admit the partial validity of that approach while in-
cluding it in the further realization that man is also the
medium by which the message of the spiritual side of life
is conveyed.
Actually, traditional psychology can be said to have
realized the necessity of search for some permanence in
beingness, and to have further recognized the need to seek
out some universally normative core of understanding that
will satisfy the desire for expanded awareness of the con-
ditions of life. The history of psychology which has been
considered in earlier sections amply demonstrates this
fact. The contention which is asserted here is that those
efforts, which were also carried forth by a desire to ex-
pand the individual's awareness of existence, have pushed
the limitations of traditional methodology, epistemology
and metaphysics to their natural culmination in a worJd-
view which is essentially devoid of awareness of I hie real-
ity of man.
The intent of the organismic approach in psychology is
not to suggest that some new desire and ability, of which
it was previously devoid, has suddenly been visited upon
mankind. On the contrary, its assertions, though revolu-
tionary, are far more humble than that. As is evident from
the historical discussions of earlier chapters, the basic
ideas involved in both the materialistic and organismic
understanding of man and the world have a long and intimate
history. The organismic interpretation is a variant which
is formed by the modification, sometimes more and sometimes
less, of certain key assumptions of the background of
belief that animated the era of materialistic science.
Thus, its new ventures in psychological understanding are
related to past traditions as is each generation to its
predecessors. That past psychologists have largely sought
the normative understanding of man by regarding only his
material aspects was simply a product of the me taphysica J
-
existential materialism of the age. A more complete modern
psychology is required to develop a description of man
which involves both aspects of the whole individual.
Thus, the differences between science, philosophy and
psychology can be portrayed by examining the relationship
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O r sc i once and philosophy I <> 1 In* total human being which is
the basis of the organism ic approach to psychology. lhis
sort of perspective is important because it requires the
nature of psychology to be open to both the spiritual and
material aspects of being. The psychology of the organism i<
whole is not however, an attempt to encompass the complete
understanding and approach to the spiritual aspect ol man
since it is obviously the task of religion to be concerned
with the ultimate being and value of the universe. Iv'hat
this perspective does for psychology however, is to open
its consideration of the factors which derive from this ex-
pression of the ultimate and insures acceptance of the
reality of this aspect of man. That is to say, a psychology
which includes this premise will be protected 1 torn
the
debilitating task of attempting to find the whole oi man
reflected in his isolated parts. In its relation to
the
coordination of the rational and material aspects of
man,
organismic psychology will be freed to directly and
un-
flinchingly focus upon the problems of existential
meaning
in the material world and will be able to
utilize the
retical problems of the structure of reality
with which the
physical and biological sciences deal as
important resources
in the quest for increased self-knowledge
of the material
side of life. Therefore, in line with
the limitation which
keeps psychology from encroaching upon
the explicit
4 10
territory of religion, there i» a I ho a prohibition against
ignoring the meaning which La to bo derived from the more
quantitative physical and biological sciences.
In this characterization of the tasks of organismic
psychology the attempt has been made to establish the role
of psychology as a sort of mid-point in man's attempts to
understand his being. The concern has been to show that
the divergent poles of being can be viewed internally or
externally. Man's awareness of his self- transcendence as
it relates to his nature and purpose and his awareness of
the fact that the physical world transcends his knowledge
it is an internal point —of—view which has its counter-
parts in the external cultural orientations which are of-
fered by the great traditions of religion and science. It
may therefore be said that the true unity of religion and
science is found at the point where the implications of the
two views meet in the experience of the individual . Since
psychology has the task of recognizing both of these aspects,
considering this relationship in greater detail will be a
fitting close to this initial discussion of the psychology
which is indicated as a result of the development of the
organismic approach.
5.3.2 EXPANSIONS ON THE THEME
OF ORGANISMIC PSYCHOLOGY
In elaborating the character of the psychology which
occupies the mid-scale position in terms of man's awareness
J*ll
of the spiritual and the material, it is evident that such
a psychology would have many diverse and important func-
tions. If we truly attempt to construct a psychology
which is sensitive to and descriptive of immediate experi-
ence, then we will be required to not only draw from both
sources but also to criticize those discordant aspects of
the interface between the scientific and the religious
point s-of-view. In this sense, psychology will have a
closer relationship to each of these enterprises than they
will have to each other. It is also true that in its co-
ordination of outlook between the two poles of being psy-
chology will find that science is most useful in areas
where the spiritual perspective is of least value and that
correspondingly, the strong points of spiritual influence
are to be observed in areas where science is of smallest
value. Again, since both of these enterprises are aspects
of the unity of the individual they can be seen to summate
meaningly in the expansion of awareness as long as their
attributes and implications are in harmony.
It is quite natural that a main contribution of the
scientific enterprise is to manifest a concern for physical
survival and to help to insure the continuance and better-
ment of physical life. The direct outgrowth of this ap-
proach for theories of evolution is obvious since the idea
of physical survival is the central aspect of what is
412
considered to be the traditional explanation of the process
ot evolution. Yet, man, at Least, is also vitally concerned
with the idea of living well in addition to simply living.
There is, in fact, a qualitative aspect to the processes of
man's life that is not touched upon by the explicit methods
of naturalistic physical science. Specifically, the great
issues of meaning and purpose are almost completely opaque
in relation to the type of illumination which is derived
from the quantitative precision of scientific investigation.
The ultimate concerns which are typical of the spiritual
aspect of man are least explicable in terms of quantifica-
tion and observational testing.
Given this type of approach, it is not necessary that
we formulate a strict dichotomy between the spiritual and
material aspects of being as Fechner did. By virtue of the
organismic metaphysics, it is evident that the material and
spiritual are two aspects of the same sensitive individual
and are in fact united in that sensitive individuality.
Where Fechner was constrained to see a clear line of demar-
cation between the two aspects of being, a sort of linear
interface that could be submitted to quantitative expres-
sion, the psychology of the organismic approach finds as
its primary datum the wholeness and completeness of the ex-
periencing subject himself. In such a psychology, science
can help to provide the operational exemplification of the
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content of experience which is derived from the spiritual
aspect of man's transcendent self, but it cannot yield di-
rect answers to matters which refer primarily to the higher-
order transcendence of that nature. However, as if to re-
dress the balance, this view of psychology is also required
to recognize that while the content of spiritual existence
may well add to the meaning and ultimate direction of the
scientific investigation, it does not also provide explicit
insight into the details of the observable physical world.
To carry the comparison to another level of detail,
we can assume the position of this sort of center-scale
psychology and consider the character of various issues as
they interact in our sensitive experience which is a joint
product of both poles of being.
Such an outlook finds the emphasis of facts to be pri-
marily a virtue of scientific understanding in the material
world whereas a concern for values is surely a product of
the spiritual side of being. Where material science ven-
erates physical survival, spiritual insight prizes fulfill-
ment of existence. Science finds peak experiences in
statements of precise theory, spiritual concerns focus on
the final generality of knowledge. Ideal science is ex-
pressed in terms which are completely devoid of reference
to a person, spiritual matters are completely devoid of
meaning if the person is not included. Science requires
4l4
public verifiability of its data, spiritual insights are
often not reproducible and certainly are not publicly veri-
fiable in the same sense. Unique events have no meaning
for normative science whereas uniqueness is apt to be the
hallmark of an experience which can alter the whole basis
of the spiritual life of an individual or, for that matter,
mankind.
We are confronted then, with a complex being that is
complexly aware of many levels of generality. In our
earlier consideration of scientific thought, the ability
to test a theory was seen as closely linked to the gener-
ality of the assertions it was making about the nature of
physical reality. As the generality of statement increased,
the difficulties of actually verifying the theory became
such that no true verification was possible because a
"whole network of ideas" is always implicated as a result
of the generality of statement. In this same way, we can
look to the possible generalities of the spiritual side of
life as also entailing a large network of interconnected
beliefs which also make precise examination or refutation
impossible. As a result of this sort of understanding of
the nature of the enterprises which cluster around the two
main aspects of being, organismic psychology can be seen to
have the task of not only being concerned with the complex
interrelations of the various avenues of understanding but
415
also and more importantly, of rostering an increased appre-
ciation
,
among those whose life it touches, of their per-
sonal role in the expansion of man's individual and collec-
tive awareness of his transcendent nature. With organismic
psychology, faith in man and his transcendent destiny is
now added to the centuries long traditions of faith in rea-
son and faith in science. The art of being and the process
of becoming are wedded in the unity of the experient indi-
vidual .
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6.0 THE PROBLEM OF PURPOSE
It is possible to summarize many of the discussions
that have arisen in connection with earlier topics under
the general heading of the problem of purpose. This topic
provides an unusual opportunity to summarize key aspects of
the organismic position while also affording the possibility
of integrating other types of data from diverse fields into
the general topic of psychology and education.
A recurrent theme of this presentation has been the
importance of the role which is played by the background of
belief that is the over-all orientation for the culture and
the personal commitment of the individual scientist. Also,
we have characterized the advent of the Whiteheadian organ-
ismic approach as a change of emphasis and outlook that
amounts to what Thomas Kuhn would call a paradigm shift in
the basic assumptions of science. These aspects of our
past concern can now be combined into the task of formu-
lating a basic orientation toward the problem of purpose.
This orientation should not only masquerade as a paradigm
shift in scientific inquiry must also make a basic state-
ment about the appropriate background of belief which is
required to support an augmented role for the idea of pur-
pose as a meaningful explanatory parameter of scientific
understanding
.
Past discussions have been freely critical of the
4l8
scientific and philosophical problems which are created in
the wake of the mechanistic approach to understanding man
and his world. The problems of determinism and reductionism
have been cast as major factors in frustrating the growth
of increased appreciation of the nature of life and the
true character of man. Against these overpowering forces
it has been impossible to do much more than to assert some
atavistic sounding form of spiritualism or an even weaker
attempt to instill a form of vitalism as an explanation of
the living phenomena of the world in which we live.
In attempting to surmount these limitations we have
seen that the dominant response of those who have considered
the full meaning of human life has been to divorce the ex-
planatory or epistemological structure of their system from
the metaphysical basis which was designed to explain dead
matter and the immutable laws by which it operated. As a
result of this basic inconsistency between an explanation
and the fundamental principles upon which it rests, there
have been those, like Bertrand Russell, who, as we have
seen, were forced to conclude that man is the "product of
causes which had no provision of the end they were
achieving; that his origin, his growth, his hopes and
fears, his loves, and his beliefs, are but the outcome of
accidental collocations of atoms." Against such views
which assert the belief that life is purposeless and without
419
moaning
,
Lhoro aro those who beliovo that purpose and
meaning are only to be found in the reality of man's exis-
tence and that the rest of the cosmos is meaningless.
Thus, the existentialist is concerned with man's "thrown"
condition or the "thrown" plight of man from which existen—
, . ,
.
, . 281tial anxiety arises. For the man who takes himself as
the epistemological center of the world there is only a
strange confusion as to his metaphysical relation to the
rest of the world as long as that basis is defined along
the lines of the materialist cosmology. Why else would the
existentialist find meaninglessness and emptiness, loneli-
ness and isolation to be some of the major anxieties he
must face as a result of being thrown into his plight in
the world?
These divergent interpretations of man and his world
and also those which have marked the difference between
psychology interpreted as a natural science and psychology
interpreted as a human science have the common property of
arising from the basic inconsistency between man's organic
awareness of himself and his mechanistic understanding of
the world about him. Since there have been those who can
find no meaning or purpose anywhere, and those who can only
find some meaning and purpose in their self-awareness, it
is clear that to add significantly to the understanding of
pO 1
Bugental, The Search for Authenticity , Chapter 2.
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moaning and purpose we must portray them as elements of the
world itself. Here, we come to the central idea with
regard to purpose as it functions in the organismic context,
and are now in a position to delineate the basic assumptions
of the following discussion of the problem of purpose.
The position taken with regard to the general topic of
purpose is: a) that the world which we know in science and
in human experience is both purposeful and full of meaning;
b) that its proper understanding requires a teleological
interpretation but one which is also consistent with con-
temporary scientific knowledge; c) that this framework
denies philosophical views which are primarily concerned
with substances and the laws by which they were invested
with attributes and focuses upon the fact that that which
endures is the actuality of patterned action, action which
must be characterized both in terms of its internal and
external reality; d) that to the scientific view which
focuses upon observed processes and structures but which
does not see the inner life of organisms we must add the
metaphysical intuition which recognizes that there is a
drive in things—an advance in the universe. This advance
is the expression of the fundamental creative urge which
underlies the evolutionary hierarchy of valuing, experi-
encing organic beings—beings whose own reality consists in
the dynamic realization of their potential; e) that it is
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in the realization of this potential, which is a process
basic to all forms of life, that the experient individual
actualizes his own self- transcendence by seeking his satis-
faction in the experience of increased subjective value.
Thus, we have purpose as a statement of the primary
process in the universe. No longer is it necessary to con-
ceive of the universe in static terms. We can recognize
the advance in the universe as a basic characteristic of
the cosmos. Objectively we can view this advance in terms
of increased complexity of structure, subjectively it can
be viewed in terms of the increased satisfaction which is
felt by increasingly sophisticated experient individuals.
This conceptualization of purpose is also a way to describe
the dynamic reality of social processes in which the unity
of the whole functions meaningly in the fulfillment of the
purposes of the interacting parts. It then becomes a state-
ment of the interconnectedness of societies and the series
of events which comprise the society. But this inter-
connectedness can be seen in two ways. First, it is an
expression of the contemporary relation between the part
and the whole to which it belongs. In this, it is some-
thing of a statement of horizontal relationship. Second,
it can become an expression of a directional interconnect-
edness in which the idea of purpose can function meaningly
in the description of the emerging hierarchical forms which
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we observe as the transition of complexity from atoms to
Adam
.
With these thoughts in mind, we can turn to the con-
sideration of specific aspects of the general topic of pur-
pose with the intention of relating what we know scientifi-
cally and what we know experientially to the view that the
evolutionary cosmos is a purposeful rather than a purpose-
less process.
6.1 A BASIC CONTRAST BETWEEN
PHYSICAL DETERMINISM
AND EVOLUTIONARY PURPOSE
In a series of lectures given in 1929 » Whitehead as-
serted that:
The function of reason is to promote the art
of life . 282
This assertion provides a definite contrast to an important
aspect of theory in the physical sciences contained in the
science of thermodynamics. Thermodynamics is something of
a manufactured science in that its explanatory power is
"brought about by principles operating above the plane of
laws, principles unable in themselves to generate laws but
pQo
able to give them scope and substance." Notwithstanding
the fact that its central concepts are rather more like
2 ® 2Whitehead
,
The Function of Reason (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1958), p. 4, Whitehead's emphasis.
2
^Margenau, The Nature of Physi cal Reality, p. 212.
principles Ilian the usual scientific law, thermodynamics is
commonly spoken of as containing laws. The combined opera-
tion of two of these laws characterizes what Whitehead
refers to as the "stealthy inevitableness" of the "degrada-
tion of energy" in which, the "sources of energy sink down-
284
ward and downward." In contrast to this over-all decay
physical nature, the rising tide of biological evolution
is seen to be a force of equal importance and opposite di-
rection. From this perspective, it is a greater apprecia-
tion of the true function of reason that can provide an
insight into why the trend of evolution has been upwards
while the trend of the physical universe appears to be
downwards
.
We can make the contrast between the physical and bio-
logical aspects of nature more explicit by touching upon
the two laws of thermodynamics that are in question here.
The first law of thermodynamics asserts a variant of
the law of conservation of energy and gives elaborate
meaning to the quantitative relationships involved in
physico-chemical energy exchanges. It is the second law
that is responsible for adding the downward direction to
these energy exchanges. This law, which is also known as
the concept of entropy, is a statement of the irreversi-
bility of thermodynamic processes. That is, it states that
284Whitehead, ojd. ci
t
.
,
p . 1
.
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heat can naturally flow in only one direction, from hot to
cold. On this view, since each physico-chemical change
involves a transfer of heat energy, the amount of heat
energy, or the difference between hot and cold, is gradually
diminished; therefore, there is a fundamental irre-
versibility of the cosmos which will one day result in its
"heat death." Further inquiry into the details of the
thermodynamic argument is not necessary to support the
over-all assertion which is important in this context. Our
concern is simply with the fact that what we know of the
material universe indicates that it will not be able to
continue on its way indefinitely. Somewhere in the distant
eons of time, the cycle of the material world is destined
to end in a state of unusable energy where there is only a
=3 1 u I I i Tying smtiouopp among all sources >! on»Tgy— n imily
in which tlioro is no diversity and UieroJoro no I ilo.
Whitehead is not the only one who sought a contrast to
the laws of the material universe in the function of reason.
For example, in speaking of the growth of reason as the
elaboration of greater consciousness, Teilhard de Chardin
finds a similar counterpart to the function of entropy:
This absolute of physics [entropy] has thus
far not only resisted all attempts at rela-
tivisation, but, if I am not mistaken, tends
to find its counterpart in a current moving
in the opposite sense, positive and construc-
tive, which is revealed by the study of the
earth’s biological past: the ascent of the
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Universe towards zones of increasing improba-
bility and personality. Entropy and life;
backward and forward: two complementary ex-
pressions of the arrows of time. 285
In another and more poetic expression Teilhard characterized
views of nature which fail to recognize that the trend of
evolution has been upwards as being constrained to see life
and reason as a phenomenon
. . . that only bursts to be extinguished; an
eddy rising on the bosom of a descending cur-
rent ....
So says science: and I believe in sci-
ence: but up to now has science ever troubled
to look at the world other than from without ?286
Thus, once again, we have the standard physical interpreta-
tion of the world from without contrasted with the deep
seated requirement to appreciate the within of things that
is responsible for the upward trend of evolution. In this
case however, we have perhaps the ultimate form of the con-
trast since the example of entropy and life is surely one
of the fundamental dualities in the universe. Teilhard
calls the ordinary observable kind of physical energy "tan-
gential" to the process of complexification and intensifi-
cation which is indicated in the rise of life processes and
which he views as the product of a "radical" energy.
In speaking of the character of living things, Jean
285Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, The Future of Man (New
York: Harper and Row, 1969)* P* 51*
28
^Teilhard de Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man (New
Harper and Row, 196l), p. 52, Teilhard's emphasis.York
:
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Piaget concluded in his extensive essay on the relations
between biology and knowledge that:
. . . the fundamental reality about living
things is constituted neither by timeless
structures, . . . nor by a historical succes-
sion of chances or crises. . . . All that
needs to be said here is that in all levels,
whether historical stages or echelons of some
organizational hierarchy, we find the simul-
taneous intervention of exogenous factors,
causing disequilibra but also setting off
"responses" and endogenous factors, producing
these responses and acting as equilibration
agents . 287
Since Piaget's concern is to reveal the similarities between
organic processes and cognitive processes, his assertions
about the function of reason do not go as deeply into the
heart of the matter as do those of Whitehead and Teilhard.
Nevertheless, it is clear that his understanding of the
"fundamental reality of living things" also implicates the
role of internal factors in the regulation of transactions
with the environment. In fact, Piaget's thesis is much
stronger than mere implication; a guiding hypothesis oi tu s
entire approach to psychological theory is that cognitive
functions are an extension of organic regulations and actu-
ally constitute a differentiated organ for regulating ex-
changes with the environment. " Cogni t ive processes serHii
to be," Piaget writes,
2
^Jean Piaget, Biology and Knowledge: An Essay of
the Relations Between Organic Regulations and Cognxtiv£
Processes (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971 ),
p. 3^7
•
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at one and the same time the outcome of or-
ganic autoregulation
,
reflecting its essen-
t ial mechanisms, and the most highly differ'
entiated organs of this regulation at the
core of interactions with the environment,
so much so that, in the case of man, these
processes are being extended to the universe
itself . 288
Piaget's thesis, for which he marshalls a considerable
amount of biological and psychological evidence, is impor-
tant in this context because it asserts the absolute con-
nection between cognitive processes and life processes. In
making this assertion Piaget also finds it necessary to
point up the limitations of two important aspects of our
traditional understanding of evolution, i.e., his relerences
to the uselessness of views which are based eithei on
"timeless structures" or "a historical succession of chances
and crises." We can pass over reference to the problem of
"timeless structures" here since it is recognized to be
essentially a philosophical problem, which is eliminated
once we accept the evolution as a viable concept, and focus
our main concern upon the second aspect of his criticism.
Piaget's assertion that the "fundamental reality about
living things" is not to be found in "a historical succes-
sion of chances or crises" is simply a flat denial oi
the
standard evolutionist doctrine of "the survival of the
fittest" which is said to be a joint expression of the twin
processes of random variation and natural selection.
The
288Ibid.. p. 26 , Piaget's emphasis.
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problem with th.i s traditional view is that in focusing upon
the idea of mere survival, it misses the main characteris-
tic of life which is to reach beyond survival. On this
same point, Whitehead asserts that the fallacy of this doc-
trine "does not consist in believing that in the struggle
for existence the fittest to survive eliminate the less
fit," this condition he is willing to accept as a plain
fact whose evidence is too obvious to dispute. "The fal-
lacy," rather, "is the belief that fitness for survival is
identical with the best exemplification of the Art of
289
Life." Whitehead's intent here is to draw attention
to the fact that many things survive for great periods of
time and that the more complex organisms are, the lower
appears to be their survival value in relation to other
organisms. This is the same point Teilhard was making when
he spoke of "zones of improbability and personality" as
being the second expression of the universe and the comple-
ment to the condition of entropy. Obviously, there is an
important sense in which the traditional doctrine is true
since it does appear to offer an explanation of the process
by which the struggle for existence between organisms can
produce the survival of some at the peril of others. We
are, instead, searching for a more general principle— one
which will offer some account of the principle (s) by which
2
^Whitehead, The Function of Reason , p. 4.
such complex organisms over evolvod in the first place.
Why has the trend of evolution been upwards ?^ )()
This key question goes directly to the heart of the matter.
Since standard accounts focus primarily on the without of
things, it is natural to see the environment as being the
responsible agency by which the rules-of- the-game are im-
posed upon those who must play the game in order to exist.
However, the central factor of upward evolution indicates
that the rise of life is accompanied by an increasing power
to modify the environment and which acts to diminish the
environments' ability to modify the organism. A portion of
this meaning is contained in the traditional view; yet, it
is also true that the role which is ascribed to the internal
factors is usually negligible.
In light nl' the previous discussions of philosophy,
science and psychology, it is natural that selective em-
phasis has been placed upon the exogenous aspects of the
organisms' relation to the environment and that the endog-
enous reality of organic life should be largely missing
from man' s accounts of the history of the world. Surely
,
since the dominant trends of man's efforts to understand
his own nature, of which he is directly aware, have Iuj goly
failed to capture the fullness of lived experience and have
often denied their own existence or proclaimed their own
29
°Ibid.
,
p. 7, emphasis added.
absurdity, we have only the narrowest of grounds on which
to expect the scientific description of evolution to yield
insight into the increasing ability of organisms to modify
their environment.
Modification of the environment requires more than the
basic notion that life's aim is to be alive.
It is from this perspective that Whitehead explains that
the function of reason is to promote the art of life, since
"the primary function of Reason is to direct the attack on
heretical character of this view since it demands that
reason be considered to be an element in experience that
functions to direct and criticize. It is the urge towards
goals which are potentialities for actualization and not yet
actualized in fact* But what is this except a statement of
the fact that there is a certain type of "freedom" asso-
ciated with the phenomena of life?
The point here, is simply another statement of the cen-
tral argument that animated previous discussions. Here
however, by contrasting the downward entropy laden processes
2 ^ 1 Ibid.
,
p. 8, Whitehead's emphasis.
In fact, the art of life is first to be alive
secondly to be alive in a satisfactory way,
’ 1
’ to acquire an increase in satis-
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the environment." Whitehead is quick to point out the
431
of the material cosmos with the upward expansion of life as
represented in evolution, we find a primary ground upon
which to assert the limitations of the methodologies and
metaphysics of the physical sciences. There is an absolute
requirement to recognize that the mysterious counter-agency
which is the impulse for the energy of the universe to run
upwards is not meaningly treated within the materialistic
framework
.
By applying the idea that the growth of reason is a
way to characterize the evolutionary process, principles
can be developed which are in harmony with the fact that
there has been a gradual development, over vast periods of
time, of increasingly complex beings which are increasingly
effective in modifying their environment. The most impor-
tant aspect of this view is that reason is elaborated
beyond the everyday mode of problem solving in the contem-
porary world and is seen in the function of dealing with
the puzzles of existence, of being that agency in the con-
duct of human affairs which also underlies the ability to
direct behavior toward desired ends. This aspect of reason
deals with the problem of purpose and the notion of final
causality, those very aspects which were least congenial to
views of the world which relied on physical principles.
However, it is well not to get ahead of the story.
Before we begin to talk of the character of human life as
432
it impacts immediately upon issues in personality and edu-
cational theory it is necessary to consider principles
which can account for the emergent evolution of life.
Again, the basic contrast which is the foundation for this
discussion is that the old notion of causality in the
physical world, which related physical effects to physical
causes, can only end in the realization of the downward
trend of the physical universe. In place of physical de-
scription, we are searching for organic principles which
are descriptive of more than mere survival and which, in
fact, encompass the expansive upward development which has
led to mankind. This view sees evolutionary emergence as a
value creating system of structured processes which are
capable of self- transcendence and recognizes that the world
which we know in our science is both purposeful and full of
meaning
.
A good portion of the following discussion of the
principles which apply to the upward tendency of evolution
can be seen as an attempt to consider the scientific evi-
dence which fills the gap between the organic and the
physical in the following description:
In our experience we find appetition, ef-
fecting a final causation towards ideal ends
which lie outside the mere physical tendency.
In the burning desert there is appetition
towards water, whereas the physical tendency
is towards increased dryness of the animal
body. The appetition towards esthetic
433
salisJ ucl, ion by somo orijoymont oi' boauly is
equally outside the mere physical order. 293
Whether we refer to the low-order or the high-order aspects
of appetition, the craving for water or the ardor for aes-
thetic achievement, we are dealing with the problem of
interweaving efficient and final causation into a coherent
system. In earlier discussions, we have treated the prob-
lem on a philosophical and metaphysical basis, here we can
develop some correlation between that philosophical per-
spective and the present-day scientific understanding of
evolution
.
As we begin to consider the evidence which supports
the view that evolution can be interpreted as an increase
in the power to manifest purposive behavior, it is appro-
priate to call attention to an explicit bias which is held
by the author. Rather than being animated by the purpose
of attempting to prove that life processes can be completely
explained in physico-chemical terms and therefore are pur-
poseless
,
this author is motivated by the purpose of demon-
strating that the idea of purpose is not only valid, but
also essential, if we are to conceive a basis for the reso-
lution of the two central antimonies which Gordon Allport
saw as the prime impediments to formulations of meaningful
psychological theory--the issue of dualism and the problem
^ ^ ^Ibid
. ,
p . 8 9
•
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of purpose.
6.2 A METHOD FOR INTERPRETING
THE PURPOSEFUL COSMOS
In attempting to synthesize the scientific knowledge
and metaphysical intuitions of earlier sections, we can
start from the explicit premise that an adequate metaphysics
must account for both the inner and outer aspects of expe-
rience. In this light, the "dualism” which derives from
the analysis of the duality of human experience, i.e., the
internal mental and external bodily aspects of experience,
is the most profound clue to the nature of the whole of
r>eality. This type of dualism applies to the highest levels
of the evolved cosmos while, at the same time, affording
increased understanding of the lowest levels of that evolu-
tion that are described in the twin concepts of entropy and
life. The hierarchical reality suggested by this view in-
dicates that we should look for aspects in the relationship
which are indicative of the transition to higher forms of
consciousness. Teilhard expresses the basic Whiteheadian
insight into the use of concepts in science which are anal-
ogous to some aspects of human experience as follows:
It is impossible to deny that, deep within
ourselves, an "interior" appears at the heart
of things, as it were seen through a vent.
This is enough to insure that, in one degree
or another, this "interior" should obtrude
itself as existing everywhere in nature from
all time. Since the stuff of the universe
has an inner aspect at one point of itself,
there is necessarily a double aspect to its
435
s l.ruo Lu re
, . . . co-ox t ohm ivo wi th their
Without, thoro is a Within to thinr.H .&Pi
Our concorn is to focus upon the "ono dogree or other" in
which the "interior" obtrudes itself as existing everywhere.
This view can be characterized as a panpsychism which as-
sorts that the duality of inner and outer applies to the
whole range of organisms from the lowest to the highest.
In the extreme case, we recognize that experience for atoms
is vastly different than for man. This however, should not
hinder the realization that the idea of an organic event
means that there is always a possibility for a typo of in-
ternal awareness of being which is appropriate to the level
of process of the being involved. That all levels may bo
said to have some degree of this self-enjoyment demands
that there should be principles which describe how such an
arrangement can bo structured.
Whitehead has proposed a rough division of six major
types of occurrence in naturo which ranges from the first
level of human existence, mental and physical, to the
second level in which all lower forms of animal life are
grouped. The third level encompasses vegetable life and
the fourth is comprised of single living colls. The fifth
and sixth levels refer to large scale inorganic aggregates
294 sTeilhard do Chardin, The Phenomenon of Man
, p. >
emphasis added.
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and Id i o microcosinj c oven ts o!‘ modern physi cs respoc lively •
Of this hierarchical arrangement it is important to note
that the various classificatory levels do not exist in
sharp separation from each other. On the contrary, the
repeated Whiteheadian assertion that all things influence
each other can be said to demand that each level ol being
should be required by the others. This mutual implication
predicts that the different modes of natural occurrence
should fade off into the transition between levels; in the
classification of real things it is always a hazardous
process to attempt to draw a sharp distinction between
levels of being.
6.2.1 STRATIFIED STRUCTURE
AND ITS BOUNDARIES
The main problem in reaching a more satisfactory ex-
planation of life processes is explaining the achievement
which is represented in life's basic ability to
contradict
the dictates of pure physical processes. In life
processes
we recognize achievement and purpose as
important factors
which are not contained in inanimate matter.
In physical
and chemical descriptions of the world of
matter, the con-
cepts of achievement and purpose are meaningless.
Similarly
one does not use these terms with machines
which are the
achievements of the human intellect and are
constructed to
295Whitehead, Modes of Thought , pp . 156-157-
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suit its purposes. For machines we can only speak of per-
formance and not achievement since the "achievement" of a
machine is to extend the powers of human achievement via a
296
specific performance.
A prominent and consistent advocate of appreciating
the irreducible structure of physical and life processes
is Michael Polanyi , whose over-all position is quite simi-
lar to many of the arguments which have been advanced in
earlier sections:
Our comprehension of a living individual
entails a subsidiary awareness of its parts
which is not wholly specifiable in more de-
tached terms. This understanding acknowl-
edges a particular comprehensive--! . e . ,
"molar"—achievement of the individual sell
.
Since our knowledge of this molar function
is not specifiable in "molecular" terms,
the function itself is not reducible to
molecular particulars; it must be acknowl-
edged therefore as a higher form of being,
not determined by these particulars. We can
reach this conclusion by recalling that the
understanding of a whole appreciates the
coherence of its subject matter and thus ac-
knowledges the existence of a value that xs
absent from the constituent particulars.
Polanyi’ s use of this basic position is, however, a
hxghly
developed system for the comprehension of the structure
of
living things. In particular, he makes it evident
that a
296Defining the problem of purpose in relation to
ma-
chines is best delayed until the problem of
purposive be-
havior can be treated as a complete unit. See
Section 6.5
Delaying the introduction of the concept will
not, however
hinder the development of the more general
topxcs.
2 97
p
0 panyi f Personal Knowledge, p. 327.
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biologist in dealing with living things must use a "logic
of achievement" to describe phenomena which are not factors
in the physical sciences but which, in fact, are the very
subject matter of biology. For example, there are no acts
which achieve a purpose in physical and chemical processes;
however, in living organisms we can recognize both physical
and chemical processes and purposive acts.
Polanyi develops many explicit contrasts relating to
the concept of levels of functioning in which the same
logical structure that pertains between inanimate nature
and nature alive can also be found to exist between other
levels of functioning. A favorite Polanyian example is the
situation which pertains between man and his machines. A
machine for Polanyi is something which has been constructed
by man for some purpose. He points out that the structure
and working of machines are shaped by man while their mate-
rial and the forces which operate them obey the laws of
inanimate nature. From this relationship he concludes that
machines operate under the control of two distinct princi-
ples: the higher, or the principles of the machines'
design and the lower, or the physical and chemical processes
appropriate to the materials involved.
In describing a wrist watch by this type of argument,
Polanyi points out that the task of keeping time via the
uncoiling of £ spring which is controlled by various parts
439
fashioned for that purpose, is carried out by principles of
operation which can not be described in terms which apply
to the inorganic nature of the parts. Even a complete
physical and chemical topography of the watch would not
reveal that it is a device for telling time. Such analysis
can only reveal the composition of the object. Clearly,
the operational principles of the watch transcend the
chemical processes of its parts and are not amenable to
description in those terms. Applying this same logic to
the problem of physiologists and biologists, we have:
Any coherent part of the organism is indeed
puzzling to physiology, and also meaningless
to pathology, until the way it benefits the
organism is discovered. And I may add that
any description of such a system in terms of
its physical chemical topography is meaning-
less except for the fact that the description
may covertly recall the system’s physiological
intorpre tation—much as the topography of a
machine is meaningless until we guess how the
device works, and for what purpose. 298
From this general relationship, Polanyi asserts that
the living organism, like the machine, incorporates two
different principles of operation to account for the phe-
nomena which are observed on different levels. This leads
to the concept of "boundary condition" and an important
characteristic of the logic of achievement which applies to
a hierarchically organized system of interdependent but
298Polanyi
,
Life's Irreducible Structure in Knowing
and Being
,
Marjorie Grene , ed
.
(Chicago : The University of
Chicago Press, 1969), p. 227 .
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irreducible levels.
Boundary conditions describe the relation between the
higher-order organizing principle and the lower order
processes which are thereby harnessed for the transcendent
purpose. There are two types of boundary conditions. The
first type is the type we have already discussed; namely,
the situation in which restrictions are imposed of the
lower order processes to harness them to our purposes. In
this situation, the primary interest is on the effect of
the boundary condition and not on the laws by which the
lower order operates. An example is the strategy that one
would use in a game of chess. The strategy imposes bound-
aries on the number of possible moves which follow the laws
of chess; however, our interest is not primarily in the
specific rules which apply to the various pieces on the
board but in the strategy (the boundaries) which are super-
added to the basic laws. The meaning is in the strategy
and not in the moves as examples of the laws. The same
situation is true of a painter or a sculptor who imposes
boundaries on his material so that we can appreciate them
(the boundaries) by way of being interested in his creation
and not in the material as material. These boundaries are
referred to as "machine boundaries" since the interest is
always "in the boundaries which are imposed by a comprehen-
sive restrictive power rather than the principles harnessed
44l
299by them." The second category of boundary is known as a
"test-tube" boundary because it is the difference between
constructing a machine and setting up an experiment. In
the latter case, the primary interest is not in what is
imposed on the material but is rather in the material it-
self. That is to say, restrictions are placed on the lower
order phenomena in order to observe their behavior.
"A boundary condition is always extraneous to the
process it delimit s , Polanyi asserts by way of ex-
plaining that the structure of a machine is not to be de-
scribed in terms of the laws which are harnessed. With
both types of boundary, it is true that the laws of physics
and chemistry or the type of materials available for con-
struction do not determine the interest or the purpose of
the scientist or engineer. An expanded example of this
relationship and one that makes the applicability of the
argument to multi-leveled hierarchies more obvious is pro-
vided by the following example which demonstrates that each
level of the hierarchy relies upon the workings of the
levels below it but is nevertheless irreducible to a de-
scription in terms of those lower levels. Polanyi demon-
strates this type of hierarchical structure by considering
the five levels that make up a spoken literary composition.
2"lbid
.
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The lowest level is the production of a voice-he second, the utterance of words; the third’,the joining of words to make sentences; the
w°rkinS ° f sentences into a style;
the tex^30?
nd hlShe5t 13 thS comPosition of
Clearly, the principles which operate on any one level are
under the control of the next higher level. "The voice you
produce is shaped into words by a vocabulary; a given vo-
cabulary is shaped into sentences in accordance with a
302grammar; etc.." This example demonstrates the principle
of dual control which applies to the various levels of the
hierarchy. On the one hand, there are the laws which con-
trol by applying directly to the elements themselves, i.e.,
the rules of grammar or of chess while, on the other hand,
there are controls which are imposed by the laws of the
powers that control the entity which is formed by the ele-
ments in the construction.
In examining the relation between levels of the hier-
archy, it becomes evident that "such multiple control is
mado possible by the iact that the principles governing the
isolated particulars of a lower level leave inde t erininant
conditions to be controlled by a higher principle
. In
the example of communication given above, this means that
301
302
303
Ibid.
,
p . 233
.
Ibid.
Ibid
.
the words of a vocabulary loave open tho ability to combine
into an indefinite number of sentences which aro controlled
by tho laws of grammar.
With this sort of logic, wo can return to tho ovor-all
c Lassii i ca t Lon which Whitehead set up regarding the six
niejor divisions of the actual hierarchy of life processes,
in the sequence of levels which places living beings near
the top of tho hierarchy, we can assert that the processes
on the lowest levels are caused by the forces of inanimate
nature and that the operation of higher levels is only
possible by virtue of boundary conditions which aro left
open by the laws of inanimate nature. Thus, vegotativo
life is seen to operate in intimate contact with the open
boundaries of tho inanimate world while at the same time
supporting, by virtue of its own open boundaries, tho pos-
sibility for the development of the muscular operations of
animal life. And so it goes, on up the line until in man
wo have the ability to appreciate still higher principles
of moral, esthetic and spiritual value.
This view is also descriptive of tho unity and inter-
connectedness of nature. Since each love! rolies on the
one below it and also delimits tho operation of tho lower
level by channeling the operation of its principles into
the unique character of its own functioning, there is a
system of graded control in which the control is transmitted
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successively downwards to the lowest level. In line with
our earlier discussion we will use this view in the service
of an outlook that describes the evolutionary process as
one which represents the emergence of an increasing degree
of complexification, the development of new stages of life
in which each new level represents a distinct principle of
operation that can harness the open boundaries of the level
below it while at the same time is not also reducible to
those principles.
In Whiteheadian terms, we can characterize the opera-
tion of each level as entertaining the capacity for some
form of self-expression in which the latent potentiality of
the level below it is awakened into realization into its
level of being. Thus, the latent potentiality of lifeless
matter is made manifest in the functioning of vegetable
life, while the animal grade is seen to add yet another
ability by virtue of its capacity to exceed the average
ex-
pression of survival of the vegetable world and add to
it
the particular aim at value as manifest in its
ability to
modify the environment. In this sense, it is
possible to
assert that each basic element of inanimate matter
is pos-
sessed of a capacity to express the virtues of
the universe;
every atom of the interconnected physical
universe possesses
or reflects all of the virtues of life.
It is also true
that upward press which is the countertendency
to the
increase of entropy or "negative entropy" as it is some-
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times defined, is the product of a single power which ani-
mates and dominat.es all things. Whitehead's characteriza-
tion of the function of reason as promoting the art of life
is perhaps only a first approximation of what that "radial"
energy of the evolving cosmos might be; however, it seems
sufficient for present purposes in that it permits greater
theoretical coherence in views about evolution and ulti-
mately about psychology.
To make the application of this hierarchical view to
psychology more explicit, we can recur to the idea of
"inversion" that has been expressed in many and varied con-
texts ranging from the eighteenth century to present times.
This time we can treat the topic in a new way; that is,
from the perspective of a hierarchically organized struc-
ture of interdependent and irreducible levels. By utilizing
the familiar concept of within and without, we can contrast
a relatively low level of the hierarchy to an upper level
of the hierarchy as follows. At the level of nonliving
entities, it can be said that the average character of the
entity exists in total conformity with the laws of nature,
there is no individuality of expression and no choice
but
to conform to the formalities of the laws of nature--
there
is the "physical tendency towards increased
dryness of the
On the other end of the scale, we have
the
animal body."
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reality of human individuality that is so far removed from
the compulsion of physical law as to be unaffected by
them--"the appetition towards esthetic satisfaction . . .
which is outside the mere physical order." While it is
clear that the individuality of human expression is also
constrained by these formalities, it also passes beyond
them to the realization of purpose and the achievement of
intimate and delicate forms of expression.
Thus, the growth up through the hierarchy of an in-
crease in the function of reason is also a growth which
attributes greater emphasis to the function of the within
of things as represented by the emergence of new compre-
hensive principles of operation which apply to each nev
level. It is within this sort of a context that Whitehead
asserted
:
Consciousness is the first example of the
selectiveness of enjoyment in the higher
animals. It arises from expression coordi-
nating the activities of physiological func-
tionings . 30 ^
We can come to the point of this treatment of
inver-
sion in the following way. In the hierarchical
view, con-
sciousness first arises from "expression coordinating
the
activities of physiological functionings" and it
is not
until we get to the most evolved levels, i.e.,
mankind,
that the ability to formulate reference to
the environment
3°^whitehead
,
Modes o f Thought, p. 29-
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in symbolic terms is manifest. Obviously, this agrees with
conventional interpretation but it also passes quite glibly
over the essential character of this relationship. In
terms of our true relationship with the world of nature,
the organic permanences which are derivative from lower
levels of consciousness are actually of far greater perma-
nence than the ordinary type of relationship with the envi-
ronment which we maintain by virtue of the outer powers of
sensory functioning. Whitehead claims that "there is a
baseless notion that we commonly observe those activities
of nature which are dominant in our neighborhood," when in
truth "the exact opposite is the case." ^ In other words,
human and animal sensory apparatus are most attuned to that
which is changeable in nature and not that which xs perma-
nent. Of course, this is simply another way of sayxng
that
human actions arise from the coordination of lower levels
but also introduce a new level of individuality xn
terms of
expression and reception that can be purposeful, intimate
and emotional. However, it is also true that we do
not
easily discriminate the character of our dependence
on our
bodies unless there is some particular reason for
doing so.
Unless we have some sort of sickness or pain, some
specxal
signal from our lower order levels of connection
with the
world, we are quite content to rely upon
305Ibid
the results of
sensory experience as being our most important contact with
the world and to take the intimate connection and infinite
complexity of our derivation from the physical cosmos quite
for granted.
"The first principle of epistemology should be that
the changeable, shifting aspects of our relations to nature
are the primary topics for conscious observation, is
the way Whitehead phrased the notion that the type of rela-
tion with the environment that animals maintain via their
sensory apparatus is to be highly sensitive to the change-
able elements in the environment. It is in the most
changeable aspects of the environment that an animal finds
the greatest opportunity to catch its food and also the
greatest source of danger from other animals. Speaking of
the importance of this sort of sensory contact with the
wox'ld J. J. Gibson writes:
It is clearly of biological importance for
a sentient individual to be able to distin-
guish or discriminate plant from animal,
prey from predator, own species from other
species, and mate from rival. . . .
The environment consists of opportu -
nities for perception, of available infor-
mation, of potential stimuli. Not all
opportunities are grasped, not all informa-
tion is registered, not all stimuli excite
receptors. . . . The animate environment
affords even more than the physical envi-
ronment does since animals have more
306Ibid.
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characteristics than things and are more
changeable . 307
The purpose of this discussion is not to dispute the
pragmatic value of sensory experience in providing useful
information about the environment. Further, it is obvious
that this sort of information is also the type about which
something can be done by the sentient individual, that is,
he can respond to the environment in accord with his own
desires. What is at issue here is the fact that the tradi-
tional tendency in philosophy, science and psychology has
been to focus purely upon the data which are supplied by
sensory experience and to assume that these changeable and
superficial data represent the only way to understand
either the reality of the physical world or the reality of
man. This, in fact, was the dominant outlook throughout
the entire era of materialistic science and was the basis
for the naive realism which characterized pre- twentieth
century science. As long as man was secure in the fact
that he actually observed reality with his senses, that
atoms were really indestructible and separate, that there
was only one geometry of three dimensions rather than an
infinite number of geometries and dimensions, etc., there
was no problem with the epistemology and metaphysics which
James J. Gibson, The Senses Considered as Percep -
tual Systems (Boston: Hought on Mifflin Co .
,
1966 ) , p. 2 3 >
Gibson’s emphasis.
was built exclusively in terms of the absolute realism of
sensory information. That view, of course, was scientifi-
cally exploded in the twentieth century and in the wake of
those shattering revelations has come exactly the type of
awareness which led to the view of the world as structured
along organismic rather than mechanistic lines. What else
is the so-called "Fallacy of Misplaced Concreteness" except
a criticism of exactly this type of orientation toward the
character of sensory data as being the sole source of in-
formation about the world?
It would seem that we have come rather far afield from
our original discussion of the character of a stratified
hierarchy. But have we really? Recall that we entered
this discussion by attempting to explicate the character of
the relationships that exist between various levels of a
hierarchy while at the same time considering the whole
hierarchy as the expression of an undefined yet plainly
evident upward progression of greater and greater levels of
consciousness. In this trek through the various levels we
finally came to the contrast of human consciousness with
lower levels of consciousness and asserted, in the process,
that the human ability to entertain conceptual novelty that
is free from any direct infringement by the boundary condi-
tions which are determined by the physical world, was an
outstanding characteristic of the station of man. Since
human consciousness has burst through the limitations of
animal instinct and is to be distinguished from lower
levels by its ability to conceptually entertain unrealized
possibilities in novel ways, we were led to consider the
most important aspects of this most highly developed form
of consciousness. To relate this discussion to the earlier
material the topic was handled as an example of idea of
"inversion" of experience that has figured so prominently
in previous discussion. This time, it was the superficial
character of sensory experience in relation to the other
forms of consciousness that are also a vital part of man's
true nature that was at issue. To be sure, the topic is
far from exhausted but it has, however, served to bring the
discussion to the desired outcome. Namely, the assertion
that the level of consciousness which applies to man, that
is, the reality of man, is not usefully described in philo-
sophical, scientific and psychological terms whose primary
contact with reality is maintained via an analysis of man's
sensory understanding of the world about him.
As useful for worldly purposes as they are, it is an
absolute certainty that the ultimate greatness of human
life does not derive simply from the ability to take account
of sensory data. However complex our analysis of these
data may be and however abstract our systems of logic, phi-
losophy, psychology, art, science, history, economics, etc.,
h 32
may become, sensory faculties are but the outer relation of
man's inner being to the underlying necessities of his true
nature. Analytical minds have been led to repudiate the
deep intimacy of being because the vagueness of those
depths did not harmonize with the fashionable fables about
the character of an underlying reality which is only
knowable via the method of clear logical analysis of dis-
crete sensory information.
It is this type of understanding of the character of
"inverted" knowledge that can begin to pave the way for the
type of organismic approach to psychology that was inlro-
oqo
duced in earlier sections. In those sections the topic
was introduced in terms of the contrast between the material
and spiritual aspects of existence that derived from exten-
sions of the relationships between science, philosophy and
psychology. In the present context we are making essen-
tially the same point but from within the framework of an
organismically inspired hierarchical characterization of
the structure of reality. It is not possible to pursue the
characterization of human consciousness which develops from
this type of approach further at this point without aJ so
detracting from the immediate purpose of this chapter which
is to consider the character of the scientific data which
support the organismic position. Instead, we can conclude
Sections 5»3»1 and 5 » 3 » 2 .
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this introduction of stratified structure and its boundaries
with the following example which is expressive of the more
complete generality which separates man's understanding of
reality from the immediate dictates of sensory experience.
Should it be objected that sensory experience and a
clear logical intellect are in fact the primary aspects of
man's reality and his only means of seeking to develop his
understanding of himself and his world, it will be useful
to consider the experience of someone who was cut off from
the world of man by the crushing weight of the combined
deficits of deafness and blindness. Speaking of her "two-
fold solitude," Helen Keller described her release from the
"invisible hands" which held her as follows:
As the cool stream gushed over one hand she
spelled into the other the word water
,
first
slowly, then rapidly. I stood still, my
whole attention fixed upon the motions of her
fingers. Suddenly I felt a misty conscious-
ness as of something forgotten--a thrill of
returning thought; and somehow the mystery of
language was revealed to me. . . . That word
awakened my soul, gave it light, hope, joy,
and set it free! 309
And further, speaking of her ability to participate so ef-
fectively in the full character of human life, she declared
It seems to me that there is in each of us a
capacity to comprehend the impressions and
emotions which have been experienced by man-
kind from the beginning. Each individual has
a subconscious memory of the green earth and
3° 9Helen Keller, The Story of My Life (New York: Dell
Publishing Co., 1969 )> P* 3^*
murmuring waters, a blindness and deafness
cannot rob him of this gift from past genera-
tions. This inherited capacity is a sort of
sixth sense—
—a soul— sense which sees, hears,
feels, all in one . 310
To this we would add that the "soul-sense" of which
Ms. Keller speaks need not be restricted to the "gift from
past generations" and is, in fact, not simply an effect in
relation to its past but also a cause in relation to its
future
.
In the terms of our earlier discussion, we can say
that the basis of our primary consciousness is a large
generality that includes sensory information as but one
aspect; it is an aspect that interfaces with consciousness
precisely because the character of sensory data provides
open boundary conditions which can come under the control of
a higher-order operating principle.
It is recognized that the above discussion is a de-
scription rather than an explanation of the character of
conscious processes; however, it is also clear that such
descriptions are more nearly free from the debilitating con-
flicts between epistemological analysis and metaphysical
beliefs which were the hallmark of interpretations deriving
from the sensory oriented materialistic framework of tradi-
tional scientific psychology.
310Ibid
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6.3 PURPOSE AND MODERN
PHYSICAL THOUGHT
In demonstrating the connection between the type of
purposive issues we are interested in and the character of
modern physical thought, it will be helpful to establish
its plausibility by first comparing the classical view of
the physical world with the view of modern physics.
Up to this point, Whitehead's treatment of the charac-
ter and development of the era of modern science has been
used almost exclusively because his is the only such analy-
sis that is also a part of a larger interpretative schema
which is capable of generating direct implications for psy-
chology and education. Other authors have developed inde-
pendent accounts of the same era which harmonize with
Whitehead's analysis and also provide additional insights
into the history of the transition to new foundations for
modern science. In addition to the familiar works of
311 312 313Barbour and Capek, Harris also provides an account
of this transition which is very congenial to the approach
taken by Whitehead. Speaking of the nature of physical
311Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion
,
Chapter 10 .
312Capek, The Philosophical Impact of Contemporary
Physics
,
Part II, pp. 143-399*
313 . .Errol Harris, The Foundations of Metaphysics m
Science (New York: Humanities Press, 1963 ) , Part iTj
pp. 37-159*
phenomona as they arc known today Harris suggosts that:
. . . contemporary philosophy, to be in har-
mony with science, should expound a meta-
physic holistic in type, and a logic of order,
system and hierarchical structure. A plu-
ralism devoid of any overarching principle of
unity would be entirely out of keeping with
scientific trends, and an atomistic logic of
propositions independently true or false
would be irrelevant to physics. 31^
With this type of orientation in mind as a goal of this
discussion, we can briefly consider the summary character-
istics of the old order.
6.3.1 THE OLD VIEW OF MATTER
AND ITS REPLACEMENT
The metaphysical outlook of the classical physical
sciences was essentially unchanged from the time of Galileo
until the end of the nineteenth century. During that time
the world was thought of as consisting of hard impenetrable
particles which moved in space and time according to the
immutable laws of nature. It was just as common to think
of space and time as independent of each other as it was to
believe in the "Laplacian Illusion" that knowing the com-
plete state particles in the world at one point would make
prediction of the future possible. The outstanding charac-
teristics of this entire era are its naive realism and re-
ductionism .
^
J It was a primary belief that the true
~^^Ibid
.
,
p. 158 .
315Barbour, op . ci
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p. 273.
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reality of the world was picturable in the common sense
ideas that apply directly to everyday life. Additionally
the theoretical world machine which operated with indi-
vidual parts (atoms) that were externally connected with
each other easily created the apparent requirement to view
the whole function of any system or its parts as being
completely defined in terms of its component parts.
Capek calls this the corpuscular-kinetic view of na-
ture and suggests that although the scientific veracity of
the classical physical concepts has been completely dis-
credited, we cannot turn our backs on its concepts for two
important reasons. First, its pronouncements still remain
valid for the macroscopic three dimensional world of our
daily lives, which is part of the reason why we still teach
these concepts in our schools; and second, the standard
habits of thought in the classical view are so ingrained in
our culture that they form a part of the very fabric of
common sense. These hidden habits of classical thought re-
main as an influence on our thinking, especially in the
human sciences, and constitute a sort of "Newtonian-Euclidian
subconscious" that requires the modern epistemologist to
behave rather like a psychoanalyst in order to reveal the
remnants of classical thought beneath the rhetoric of modem
316
science
.
316Capek, oj3. cit . , p . xv.
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Capek also makes the observation that the difference
in meaning between the terms "classical picture" and
"modern conception" of matter reveals an important differ-
ence between the two periods of scientific development.
He feels that the long-standing and seemingly unquestioned
reliance on visualization and pictorialization of scienti-
fic concepts was one of the most salient epistemological
characteristics of the classical theories. In forming
visualizations of their concepts, classical theorists used
two main channels of input information namely, the
visual
and tactile senses. Tactile information was
thought to
reveal the impenetrability or solidity of matter
by the
sensations of contact and resistance and visual
terms were
viewed as the appropriate vehicle to express
the mechanical
properties of matter which were constructed out
of our tac-
tile sensations.
The particles of matter were imaging to pos-
sess a certain bulk, shape and position;
thei
positions were imagined to vary in time, or,
in more ordinary language, the particles
were
imagined to move through spaceJ ‘
This view of the sensory character of
classical science
agrees well with our earlier discussions
on the role and
place of sensory experience in man's
interpretation of the
world about him.
317 Ibid., p. 5, Capek' s emphasis.
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In considering the character of the "modern concep-
tualizations" which have replaced the "classical pictures"
of nature, we find complete corroboration for the White-
headian views which were incorporated as the interpretative
basis of the earlier philosophical and psychological mate-
rial. Capek believes that:
Not a single component of this . .
.
[tradi-
tional corpuscular-kinetic] model of nature
remained unaffected by the contemporary storm
in physics. 318
And Harris makes the highly restrained criticism that:
Some biologists and psychologists also seem
to lag behind in their awareness of the ex-
tent to which modern physics has cut away
from their sciences the old materialist-
mechanist conceptions of reality. 319
In place of the old ideas of space, time, matter and energy,
we now have one complex whole rather than an assortment of
independent elements. The modern concern is with the total
system of mutual interdependence. Space and time are not
absolute pre-existent containers of matter in motion, but
are instead part of an interdependent matrix of systems of
interrelated activities. This revolution is largely due to
the two basic reinterpretations that affected modern physics.
On the one hand there was the challenge to the macroscopic
views of classical physics which came from the advent of
^^Ibid
.
, p. 361 .
319Harris, ojd. ci t . , p. 37.
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relativity physics, whose salient effect has boon tho
uni 1 i i a t i on and coalescence of the earlier discrete compo-
nents into a systematic whole. On the other hand, there
was the development of modern quantum theory which created
an entire new aspect of microphysics whose effect upon the
old structure was no less shattering than had been the de-
velopment of relativity. Matter could no longer be viewed
as tiny bits of impenetrable stuff moving in space, but
rather became a series of events in which the units (enti-
ties) are only resolvable into subordinate chains of ac-
tivity—probability--waves became more fundamental units
321than the old planetary atom.
. . . the physical world has been revealed as
a single, continuous whole of interconnected
parts, distinguishable but interdependent
both for their existence and for their char-
acter. It is not, however, a static whole--
a mere pattern of differentiations--but a
spatio-temporal process, a dynamic totality,
or a flux of energetic activity, structured
both in space and time . 322
This statement underlines the repeated Whi t eheadian asser-
tions about the realities of the universe being actual en-
tities whose main character is that of an event. Events
occupy a certain minimum of space and a certain minimum of
time and must be considered as to their internal and external
320
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aspects
. Wo oan put the matter back into a complete White-
headian context with the following:
For the modern view process, activity and
change are tho matter of fact. At an instant
there is nothing. Each instant is only a
way of grouping matters of fact. Thus since
there are no instants, conceived as simple
primary entities, there is no nature at an
instant. Thus all interrelations of matters
of fact involve transition in their essence.
All realization involves Implication in the
creative advance. 323
Wo can now turn from explicit consideration of the
character of the dynamic, complexifying physical world
which has given rise to progressively more complicated
forms of organization to the consideration of the general.
philosophical implications which flow from the revised
character of modern metaphysics.
6.3.2 PHILOSOPHICAL IMPLICATIONS
OF MODERN PHYSICAL SCIENCE
Since this entire presentation can also be read as an
investigation of the "philosophical implications" of modern
physical theory, it is obviously unnecessary to attempt
anything comprehensive here. Rather, the main intent is to
consider narrower issues which are directly related to the
hierarchical model of interrelated processes. Tho goal is
to connect the findings of modern physical science with
organi smic metaphysics and thereby provide additional sup-
port for its continued usage.
323Whitehead, Modes of' Thought , p. 146.
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Uio philosophical uaagu of a hierarchical model comes from
a predominant characteristic of physical theory that may be
characterized as the recognition of the unity in the diver-
sity of phenomena that man can investigate. While the con-
cept of unity in diversity can be utilized in the descrip-
tion of all levels in a hierarchical structure, in the pre-
sent context of physical theory we can assert a characteri-
zation of it that derives from the most fundamental charac-
teristic of what we now know about the physical world of
microcosmic elements.
In entering this discussion, it is also important to
keep in mind that the hierarchical model does not inforce
strict discontinuity between its various levels and that
i here Hfp imporloiil wny.s in which nil levels run be snid to
be similar. Whitehead phrased this thought, while el the
same time reaching from the highest to the lowest level of
the hierarchy, in the following way:
The key notion from which construction [of a
cosmology built in terms of our experience]
should start is that the energetic activity
considered in physics is the emotional inten-
sity entertained in life . 32
Perhaps, one can say that the primary emotion in the world
of creation is the idea of love conceived as the power
which binds together all things— the unifying power in the
32k
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diversify o( the world, The point, hero howovor
,
is not to
doJ i no the character of this power but, instead to point to
its existence and the fact that the interrelatedness we
speak of that exists between all levels is not simply an
arbitrary characteristic but is, in fact, an expression of
the unity of all things.
There is a basic relationship between the logic of the
hierarchy and the behavior of atomic phenomena. This rela-
tionship demonstrates a fundamental principle about the na-
ture of a whole and its parts and is also one which com-
pletely obliterates any meaning that might still attach to
the possibility of explaining a whole in terms of its
pax'ts, in other words, the old problem of reduc tioni sin
.
Barbour summarizes the extended argument provided by
325Margenau in a most useful way.
Barbour is always appropriately cautious about extra-
polating the explicit concepts of physics to other levels
of reality and points out that in this case, the physical
phenomena are indicative of a pattern that appears at other
levels and therefore this similarity of pattern is worthy
of comment. He has reference to the Pauli Exclusion Prin-
ciple which is "a law concerning the total atom that cannot
conceivably be derived from laws concerning individual
^^Barbour, o£. cit . , 29^-298. Margenau 's work is
The Nature of Physical Reality , Chapter XX.
electrons.
’ This principle assorts that no two elec-
trons in an atom can have exactly the same quantum states;
quantum states take account of the electrons' energy,
angular momentum, orientation and spin. This means that a
new electron which enters a molecule is apparently influ-
enced by the presence of those already present so that its
state will indeed be unique; that is, some possible states
are excluded. The influence on the electron is only
apparent because quantum theory is explicitly different
than the old mechanistic reasoning of classical physics.
Barbour uses Margenau 1 s statements on the requirement of
modern physical theory to analyze the system of things as
whole as follows:
The essence of mechanistic reasoning is seen
to cluster around two beliefs: fnrst that
entities are divisible into parts, and second
(hut those parts uro LocalizabLo i n space and
time. . . . Prior to [the exclusion principle],
all theories had affected the individual na-
ture of the so-called "parts"; the new prin-
ciple regulated their social behavior. With
respect to a single particle it has nothing
to say. . . . It is as though here, for the
first time, physics had discovered within its
own precincts a purely social law, a law that
is simple in its basic formulation and yet
immense in its collective effects. Mechanistic
reasoning, already far behind, has gone out ol
sight as a result of this latest advance. . . .
In the Pauli principle is a way of under-
standing why entities show in their together-
ness laws of behavior different from the laws
which govern them in isolation. . . . The
emergence of new properties on composition is
326Ibid.
,
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a rather general phenomenon in modern physics
and owes its occurrence to the exclusion
principle . 327
Important in this context is the fact that this physical
theory establishes something of a "social” law even at the
level of atomic events, thus even modern physics is con-
strained to consider the organic nature of an organized
system as a whole. In this way too, matter and energy and
space and time are indissolubly united. The similarity to
the more general treatment of hierarchical logic which is
found in Polanyi's work also constitutes an important as-
pect of the present discussion. Polanyi's position on the
general nature of hierarchical logic is clear enough:
The higher principles which characterize a
comprehensive entity cannot be defined in
terms of the
themselves
.
And, in a less abstract way, he is willing to assert that
what seems to be logically true of hierarchies is also true
of the reality of things— an assertion that seems well an-
chored in reality by the Pauli Principle. Of the evolu-
tionary progression toward increased complexity and intel-
lectual capacity in living things, he maintains:
We can recognize then a strictly defined pro-
gression, rising from the inanimate level to
^ 2
^Margenau, The Nature of Physical Reality , pp . 442,
444 quoted in Barbour, Ibid ., p. 29&
,
Margenau's emphasis.
328Polanyi, The Structure of Consciousness in Knowing
and Being
,
Marjorie Grene
,
ed.
,
p. 217*
aws that apply to its parts in
U<jG
f>vor higher add! t j ona I principles of life.
Thi.s, of course
,
is a reiteration of a basic theme in the
earlier discussion of stratified structure (hierarchy). 330
It also serves to underline the fact that wholeness, unity
and organic structure are as much a part of reulity as the
older views of plurality, individuality and diversity.
Atomistic, independent facts have now boon roplaood by a
logic which stresses the necessity of organic unity and tho
necessity of recognizing tho internal relations which are
appropriate to each level of reality.
Thus far in our consideration of specific philosophical
implications of modern physical thoory wo havo focused pri-
marily upon the now typo of unity which is implied by the
hierarchical view and elements of quantum theory* equally
important in tills regard is the associated emphasis which is
placed on ac t i v i ty and creativity in nature. This aspect is
demonstrated by the development of novo] forms of organiza-
tion which have become the elaborate hierarchy of tho
evolving cosmos. On this aspect of what is already a fa-
miliar topic, wo can add to the development of the previous
material by considering an analogy which is developed by
Capek in his treatment of the search for now ways of
329 Ibid., p. 2’y I, emphasis added.
330Cf
.
,
Section 6.2.1 above.
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understand i ng the implications of modern physics. 33 ^
Starting with Whitehead’s observation that;
the texture of observed experience, [illus-
trates a] philosophical scheme, . . . such
that all related experience must exhibit the
same texture. 332
Capek develops the idea that the past fascination of sci-
entists and philosophers with the information they derived
about reality from visual and tactile stimulation has
caused them to emphasize the constancy of matter and the
unchanging nature of space at the expense of appreciating
the truly dynamic nature of things. By way of correcting
this deficit, Capek suggests that auditory sensations pro-
vide an important cluo which is obscured by the other modes
of sensory knowledge. To make the contrast vivid, he
points out that arithmetical units are like the indivisible
atoms of the old view. That is, they can be grouped together
but such grouping does not affect their nature in any way.
The relationship is entirely external to the meaning of the
unit. Thus, "the relation of arithmetical units to their
sum total is the same as the relation of the parts to the
333
whole in space [classical space, that is]."
The importance of the shift in sensory modality becomes
331Capek, 0£. ci
t
. ,
Chapter XVIII.
332Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 5> quoted in
Ibid
.
,
p . 370
.
333Ibid.
,
p. 371 .
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clear when ho develops the analogy by considering the oxpe-
ricnoe of listening to a piece of music.
The musical phrase is a successive differen-
tiated whole which remains a whole in spite
of its successive character and which remainsdifferentiated in spite of its dynamic whole-
ness. Like every dynamic whole it exhibits a
synthesis of unity and multiplicity, of con-tinuity and discontinuity; but it is not the
unity of an undifferentiated simultaneous
whole nor is it the plurality of juxtaposed
units; it is neither continuity in the mathe-
matical sense of infinite divisibility nor is
it the discontinuity of rigid atomic blocs.
For this reason, paradoxical as it may sound,
the traditional distinction between succes-
sion and duration must be given up. 33^
Thus, Capek sees a parallel between musical wholes and the
physical phenomena of modern science which makes for much
greater intuitive clarity in our apprehension of the char-
acter of becoming. He summarizes the main qualities offered
by auditory models as follows: first, they stress the in-
completeness of becoming and its pulsational character;
second, they provide for the emergence of novelty within
the causal influence of the past; third, individual events
are retained in the continuity of the flux; fourth, they
demonstrate the futility of attempting to take instantaneous
cuts of the whole while retaining its meaning; fifth, what
before could only be interpreted as contemporaneous, iso-
lated things can now be thought of as the co-becoming of
33 ^Ibid
.
, pp. 371-372, Capek' s emphasis.
related events.
The parallel of this sort of ''imageless dynamic model"
to both the hierarchical interpretation and Whitehead's
organismic position is obvious in the following.
Thus m the organic theory, a pattern need not
endure in undifferentiated sameness through
time. The pattern may be essentially one of
aesthetic contrasts requiring a lapse of timefor its unfolding. A tune is an example of
such a pattern. Thus the endurance of thepattern now means the reiteration of its suc-
cession of contrasts. This is obviously the
most general notion of endurance on the or-
ganic theory, and "reiteration" is perhaps
the word which expresses it with most direct-
ness. But when we translate this notion into
the abstractions of physics, it at once be-
comes the technical notion of "vibration."
This vibration is not the vibratory locomo-
ti°nj it is the vibration of organic defor-
mation . 33o
the argument has again converged upon the central
themes of a) unity in diversity, as represented by the fact
that the hierarchical interpretation can span levels ranging
from the realization of "aesthetic contrasts" to the "vibra-
tion of organic deformation" at the molecular level and
b) the dynamic and creative as represented by the fact that
patterns endure but not necessarily in "undifferentiated
sameness through time."
335Ibid
.
,
p. 378.
Ibid.
336Whitehead
,
, P- 375.
Science and the Modern World, quoted in
CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PUR-
POSE AND PHYSICAL THOUGHT
The destruction of the eld materialistic, mechanistic,
and deterministic views of classical physics also amounted
to a destruction of the basis for substance philosophy.
In their place, there is emphasis upon chains of events and
a hierarchically structured universe. It is however, of
vital importance that we do not repeat the modern version
of past reductionist thought. It is erroneous to assume
that the content of the now physics applies directly to
human experience and to education. A protection against
reductionist theorizing is afforded by the hierarchical
model in that its purposive and organismic interpretation
of reality is also open-ended in the sense that it places
man at the pinnacle and therefore invites meaningful com-
parison with issues of human free-will and the spiritual
nature of man. Of this condition Barbour writes:
Atom i (• i rnln tormina c
y
and human freedom are
not . . . directly related to each other, and
occur on very different levels. They are
both examples of "weak causality" in which a
sot of potentialities is determined.
. . .
1 nd i v i dim I events display some unpredicta-
bility, whereas exact laws are the result of
large numbers. Insofar as man is a collec-
tion of particles, atomic indeterminacy is
lost in statistical regularities. But insofar
as human experience is an integrated event,
it displays a new type of unprodic tabili ty-
-
not derivative from atomic inde terminacy
,
but
from its organization at a higher level.
Perhaps coordinated individual events, at
various levels, have multiple potentialities,
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though only at higher’ levels is there free-
dom . 337
Tlius, even though we can derive a meaningful corroboration
of the model from physics, physics is and always will re-
main based upon a very limited set of phenomena and the
suggestive implications of its ideas will always require
correlation with other sciences and ultimately with the
data of human experience. Physics can never be the basic
source of definition for the whole of concrete reality.
Further exploration of the relation between human
freedom and the character of the hierarchical model will be
considered in later sections here, in relation to the im-
plications of physical thought for the problem of organic
purpose, we should observe that the physical world which
spawned the now defunct concepts of classical physics is
still the same old world that seemed to function according
to that type of causal concept and law. It is also true
that within the old limits of understanding those old laws
are still valid. They work because the abstractions in-
volved "explained" the everyday three dimensional world
that was assumed to be concrete reality. That we have come
to the more complete modern understanding of both the char-
acter of the physical world and the possibilities involved
in human freedom is itself the result of the continuing
337Barbour, op. cit., p. 314, Barbour’s emphasis.
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«* vo hi I. i on o I Mm* purposive cosmos. Man lias no t only
deepened his understanding of the nature of the levels
wliirli lie below him but has also heightened his awareness
ol the possibilities of seeking his true nature in that
which lies ahead and is transcendent in relation to his
present position.
6.4 PURPOSE AND MODERN
BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT
We can now seek to match our organismic, unified and
dynamic view of the nature of physical processes with a
compatible explanation of the nature and mechanisms of bio-
logical evolution.
In opening this subject, it is hard to circumvent
appreciating its historical aspects since it is obvious
that the theory of evolution which was widely popularized
by Darwin is one which grew up in the materialistic era of
scientific thought. It therefore naturally assimilated the
idea of a completely lawful universe. Evolution was thought
to be a process equally as absolute, universal and deter-
338
ministic as the orderly behavior of a chemical reaction.
But the view was not without rival for in much the same
fashion as we have observed in the growth of psychological
thought, there wore those who departed significantly from
this thesis. To go back into history a little, we find
338George G. Simpson, This View of Life (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc . , 1964 ) , p. 177*
that an important name among those who dissented was that
of Jean Baptiste Lamarck who, in 1809, published a complete
theory of evolution. This theory was an outgrowth of the
eighteenth century version of the Aristotelian hierarchical
view that the world consisted of a Great Chain of Beings
who were arranged in increasing complexity from inert mole-
cules, to living molecules, to microscopic animals, etc.,
until finally man is reached. The philosopher J. B. Robinet
affirmed that:
The Scale of Beings constitutes a whole in-
finitely graduated, with no real lines of
separation. . . . This great and important
truth, the key to the universal system, and
the basis of all true philosophy, will day by
day become more evident, as we progress in
the study of Nature. 339
Following this quotation, Lovejoy points out that a dominant
approach to the topic of evolution was to divide the "dii-
I'oreii t orders which constitute the scale of being into four
general classes: l) inorganic, 2) organic but inanimate
(i.e., plants), 3) organic and animate, but without reason,
4) organic, animate and rational .
,l^° The principle ol
continuity of being had important philosophical consequences
because it seemed to demand that all beings should have some
degree of any quality which is possessed by anything. Thus,
339j. B< Robinet, De la Nature , quoted in Lovejoy, J_he
Great Chain of Being , p. 275*
3^°ibid.
,
p. 275 , emphasis added.
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we find Robinet expressing sentiments that have a certain
familiarity with a major theme of the organismic philosophy
of Whitehead.
For myself I would rather give even intelli-
gence to the least atom of mat ter--provided
it were in a degree and of a quality suitable
to it--than refuse organization to the fos-
sils and make them isolated beings, having no
connection with others. It is to no purpose
to tell me that this is a bizarre opinion,
and that it is not possible that a stone
thinks. I should deem it a sufficient reply
to say that I am not responsible for conse-
quences correctly deduced, . . . if the law
of continuity is admitted, we ought likewise
to admit all that follows from it; . . .it
is inexcusable to abandon so general a prin-
ciple without a sufficient reason. 341
Thus, while there are important similarities to modern or-
ganismic thought, the fact that it was based on a deductive
conclusion from an abstract logical principle renders the
view incompatible with scientific thought. One of the
things which Lamarck added to this approach was the attempt
to establish a mechanism by which such a chain of being
could be produced. Lamarck’s solution was to add to the
continuity interpretation of evolution the ability ol or-
ganisms to make habitual adaptations to their environment.
He further believed that it was from such adaptations that
structural changes would result in the animal owing to the
use or disuse of various organs and that these changes
341Robinet, in Ibid . , p. 277*
would bo immediately inherited by subsequent generations.
Lamarck 1 s theory, though popular at the time, did not
survive because of two main faults; first, he was in trouble
with the upholders of the biblical account of creation as
any early evolutionist would be; and second, the fact that
he put so much stress on the upward striving of organisms
to increase their complexity made his argument sound en-
tirely too teleological to those who were seeking scientific
explanation. Therefore, when Darwin published his Origin
of Species in 1859 (fifty years after Lamarck) , in which he
explained evolution in terms of mechanical principles that
did not rely on any sort of outside reference, he met with
the instant and lasting approval of the scientific commu-
nity. The reaction of the religious community aside from
being well known, is also of little interest in this con-
text .
It would be counterproductive to pursue a strict his-
torical treatment of the rise of evolutionary theory here.
Our purposes will be better served by focusing on specific
topics that have bearing on the modern scientific interpre-
tation of evolution and the relation of those issues to
modern psychology. In relating evolutionary thought to
psychology, there are two general observations that should
^^ 2 Simpson, The Meaning of Evolution (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 19^9) » PP • 266-267.
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be made. First, the type of psychology that reached its
new maturity in the latter half of the nineteenth century
in Germany (and this includes both psychology as a natural
science and psychology as a human science), was primarily
oriented toward the study of adult intelligence and did not
concern itself with any investigation of the development of
children into adults. Of this condition Lowry colorfully
remarks
:
Nor was it merely accidental that this was so,
for, however great its scientific enthusiasm,
the "new" German psychology was guided through-
out by two assumptions that were hoary with
age and questionable at best: the first, that
psychological processes find their clearest
expression in the "human, normal, adult mind";
the second, that all such processes may be
referred back to sensations and their vicissi-
tudes in perception and thinking. 343
There was practically no direct influence of the Darwinian
evolutionary view upon the nineteenth century birth and
adolescence of psychological theory. This condition is a
direct outgrowth of the empirical psychology and philosophy
of earlier times and also the fact that the science of
physiology provided a direct link with the physical world
through which man's operation could apparently be under-
stood.
A second important
theory in psychology is
characteristic of evolutionary
that it provided the concepts with
343Lowry, The Evolution of Psychological Theory , p. 111.
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which to correct the above condition. Once it was reason-
ably held that man's past was somehow immanent within him
and that the evolutionary ancestry of man might be there-
fore available for study, the goal of psychological inquiry
became more than the study of the adult human mind. Theo-
rists now had just cause to pursue such studies as "devel-
opmental psychology" and "comparative psychology." In this
way, psychology received a great redirection into many and
diverse areas of investigation.
6 . 4.1 STANDARD EVOLUTIONARY THEORY
Today, it is commonly accepted that the Darwinian view
of evolution can be summarized as follows:
What do we mean by twentieth-century Darwinism
and what do we mean by the synthetic theory
of evolution? I think its essence can be
characterized by two postulates: l) that all
events that lead to the production of new
genotypes, such as mutation, recombination
and fertilization are essentially random and
not in any way whatsoever finalistic, and
2) that the order in the organic world,
manifested in the numerous adaptations of
organisms to the physical and biotic environ-
ment, is <’ to the ordering effect of natural
This position with regard to the total efficacy of random
variation and natural selection is, of course, precisely
the same interpretation which was considered earlier in
selection
q44Ernst Mayr, quoted xn
of Life (New York: Atheneum,
C. H. Waddington, The Nature
1962), p. 85.
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connection with the general problem of purpose.^ 5 At that
time this doctrine was criticized from the perspective
which was generated by the contrast between entropy and
life. In the present context, we can continue the search
loi expanded meaning in the concept of purpose by consid-
ering some of the alternatives which are offered by modern
biologists
.
Of those who stress that chance variation and natural
selection are necessary but not sufficient elements in ex-
146plaining the evolutionary processes are G. G. Simpson,
347
a paleontologist, and C. H. Waddington, a biologist.
Essentially, their approach is one that stresses the com-
plex interactions between a population and its environment;
these are interactions which also occupy extended periods
of time. It is from the intermixture of these factors that
evolutionary processes are believed to produce a certain
amount of direc tedness
,
creativity or quasi-purposiveness
which acts to balance out the effects of pure randomness.
In speaking of the insufficiency of random mutation
and natural selection, Waddington uses an interesting phrase
that we have seen in quite another context:
345Cf
.
,
Section 6.0 above.
^^Simpson, This View of Life
, pp . 63-84.
^
'^Waddington, The Nature of Life
, pp . 72-98 and The
Ethical Animal (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
I 960 ), pp. 84-100.
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I" my op biology has already mado nil
Ul° discoveries of matters of principle which
can be reached by this way of formulating the
situation. The time seems to have come when
we need to take account of two further aspects
of the evolutionary mechanism
.
348
The phrase, "The time seems to have come" is interesting
for two reasons. First, Waddington is asserting the need
to modify a long-standing tradition and therefore is defi-
nitely in a heightened condition of using his own creativity
and beliefs as a primary basis from which to maintain that
change is necessary. We have, therefore, an example of the
type of theory formulation that was the chief topic of the
earlier discussion of the character of scientific thought.
Second, this is the exact phrase that was used by J. B.
Watson when he launched behavioral psychology. The main
effect of Watson's dictum was to read consciousness entirely
out of the picture of scientific psychology; the main effect
of Waddington' s thought is going to be to begin to reassert
the role of other than material factors in the behavior of
animal s
.
Waddington' s two additional aspects of the evolutionary
mechanism are: l) the epigenetic system and 2) the exploit-
ative system. Thus, Waddington postulates a four-factor
evolutionary system as follows:
348Waddington, The Ethical Animal, p. 89, emphasis
added
.
, ... j w uiu , wiu.uii engenders now vari-
ation by the process of mutation and transmitsit by chromosomal genes; 2 ) an epigenetic sys-tem, which translates the information in thefertilized egg and that which impinges on itfrom the environment into the characters of
the reproducing adult; 3 ) an exploitative sys-tem by which an animal chooses and modifies
the environment to which it will submit itself;
and f) a system of natural selective pressures,
originating from the environment and operating
on the combined result of the three other sys-
tems. 349
Doth of the aspects which Waddington is proposing are seen
to operate in between the role of the two traditional fac-
tors of evolutionary theory. In other words, they refer to
the endogenous factors or the within of things as opposed
to the strict external interpretation of traditional theory
Of the epigenetic system, Waddington observes that the
pressures of the environment do not operate on the genetic
inn tori ul if so I I' but instead operate on the organisms as
they develop from fertilized eggs into reproductive adults.
Assigning indices of selective value to individual genes is
he points out, only a convenient mathematical shorthand
which ignores the reality of the developing individual. He
and others have performed experiments which demonstrate
that the epigenetic system is one which coordinates the
isolated notions of acquired and inherited characteristics
into the combined notion that "In reality all characteris-
tics are both acquired and inherited." Of this mechanism
349Ibid
.
,
pp . 9^-96.
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which he refers to as "genetic assimilation"
character, he says:
of an acquired
Although this mechanism is quite different
from the Lamarckian inheritance of acquired
characters, being entirely based on the con-
cepts of orthodox Mendelian genetics, it can
-'-n play in evolutionary theory the very
role for which Lamarckian hypotheses have
often been invoked . 350
Thus, after more than one hundred and fifty years, we have
a scientifically acceptable version of a form of teleo-
logical behavior. The importance of this formulation and
the need for it is demonstrated by Jean Piaget's ready
usage for the concept as a very suggestive analogy in the
construction of his psychological theory:
Waddington has suggested the name "chroods"
(necessary routes) to describe developments
particular to an organ or a part of an embryo,
and he applies the term epigenetic system
(or, epigenetic "scene") to the sum of the
chreods
,
taken as being--to a greater or a
lesser degree--channeled
. . . . It is . . .
a new concept of equilibrium as something
which is, as it were, kinematic, and which,
in determining such processes, is nevertheless
quite distinct from homeostasis: there is a
kind of "homeorhesis
"
(guidance) when the
formatory process, deviating from its course
under outside influence, is brought back on
e interplay of coercive compen-
And now, with the additional terms of "chreod" and "homeo-
rhesis" which Piaget has taken over as a way of describing
3 50Ibid.
,
p. 94.
351Piaget, Biology and Knowledge
,
p. 19*
tho ovor-all epigenetic process, the analogy with mentaJ
functioning can be fully developed:
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In the cognitive field, chreods can indeed be
singled out which are more or less independ-
ent, each with its own homeorhesis, and forms
of final equilibrium (in the sense that they
continue to exist in stable condition while
s till being capable of eventual integration
into wider fields of equilibrium) which might
be the cognitive equivalent of homeostasis . 352
In addition to the obvious applicability of the epigenetic
concept to psychology, there is a basic similarity between
Piaget's idea that a "stabilized" homeorhetic equilibrium
is the basis for "eventual integration into wider fields of
equilibrium" and the hierarchical logic of boundary condi-
tions which Polanyi advances as a generalized schema for
under s tanding the relationships between successive layers
of operating principles.
The reconsideration of biologicai evolution which is
offered by Waddington and adopted by Piaget as a meaningful
way of describing cognitive evolution, as well as biological
evolution, is, by its very nature, a criticism of mechanical
causality on the one hand and traditional empirical phi-
losophy on the other. Both Piaget and Waddington recognize
this point and speak to it directly. Waddington for his
part, takes Whitehead as a major guide toward reworking
concepts in embryology and genetics and Piaget, though he
352Ibid
. ,
p . 25 •
cJ()('s not mention Whitehead for anything other than his
early work in mathematics, and then only to point up the
Jact that mathematics has progressed since Whitehoad pub-
lished in that field in 1911, has been guided by the pro-
ductiveness and cogency of his years of research into the
problem of genetic epistemology to appreciate the impor-
tance of the view which was inspired by Whitehead and de-
veloped in biology by Waddington.
As would be expected therefore, we find that Piaget
dovotos a lengthy discussion in his Biology and Knowledge * * *
to the issues of evolution taken in the Aristotelian sense
oi final causality, the idea of vitalism in biology, the
formulations of Descartes, the problems of empiricism and
Lamarckism, and the philosophy and psychology of associa-
tionism. In short, he touches on many of the major per-
plexities that have been considered in earlier chapters.
No attempt will bo made here to reproduce Piaget's argument
for the validity of the over-all position taken by Wadding-
Ion. He says in summary,
It took a great embryologist turned geneti-
cist, like Waddington, to make clear, at Last
,
how out of the question it is to explain evo-
lutive variation simply in terms of preforma-
tion or chance. . . . As soon as it is recog-
nized that . . . the environment is just as
much organized by the organism as phenotypic
variation is directed by the environment, then
353
137.
Piaget, Biology and Knowledge , Chapter III, pp. 70-
it becomes possible to speak of the "cyber-
netic circuits"
. . . and development can be
seen as a series of organizational ladders,
all different and all perpetually subject to
cyclic causality .354
Wliat xs xmportant in this context is that Piaget analyzes
the new position on evolutionary development in terms of
the xnsight s provided by cybernetic models and develops his
version of the over-all life force in the following way:
[with cybernetics], we can today retain all
that is positive in the idea of finality but
at the same time replace the notion of
"final cause" by an intelligible feedback
causality .355
Once again, we can point to the similarity of Piaget's
"series of organizational ladders" and Polanyi ' s generalized
hierarchical logic and also to the fact that Piaget readily
recognizes the idea of process in which the environment is
as much organized by the organism as the organism is di-
rected by the environment. What is most significant here
however, is the fact that there is no attempt to generalize
the insights derived from this study as is found in White-
head. This seems natural because Piaget is a psychologist
interested in circumscribed issues while Whitehead had a
philosopher's view of the cosmos. This very fact points up
the all-important role which is played by the over-all
orientation of the theorist. Since Piaget is concerned to
354Ibid.
,
355
p. 135 > emphasis added.
Ibid
. ,
p . 132
.
explain the mechanisms of cognitive development and to make
as much sense out of the relation between biological and
cognitive development processes as possible, he is satisfied
to accept a limited view of teleological processes which
develops by analogy with cybernetic circuits. From this,
he gets the concept of "cyclic causality" as a replacement
foi 1 inal causality." The problem with this approach is
that it fails to answer the main part of the central ques-
tion with which evolutionary views must deal; namely: "Why
has the trend of evolution been upwards?" Giving various
levels of a hierarchical organization the prerogative of
"cyclic causality" may improve our immediate scientific
understanding of specific problems but it does little to
straighten out the over-all problem of the directionality
that exists as a result of the fact that life has indeed
arisen toward higher levels of attainment.
Piaget's work puts a challenge to the philosophical
position we have taken with respect to Whitehead's organis-
mic process explanation of reality. The challenge is this:
With the advent of the modern position on evolutionary
theory and the development of cybernetic theory, scientists
like Piaget can meaningly compare life processes (biological
and cognitive) to the behavior of goal-seeking machines.
The Lask then, is to decide if such orientations to the
problem yield a satisfactory solution to the problem of
purpose as it is manifest in evolution, as it exists in the
theories of scientific psychology, as we experience it in
our lives, and as it is manifest in the children we hope to
educate m schools. Our eventual answer to this question
will be that such explanations are insufficient to answer
these larger questions. The precise reasons for this con-
clusion will be considered presently after a few additional
considerations relating to the standard accounts of evolu-
tionary theory are introduced.
Before we go on however, we should note that Piaget
himself does not believe that his formulation is the ulti-
mate answer, but only that it is the most scientific one at
present. Thus, he says, near the final page of his Biology
and Knowledge that
:
It is to be hoped that biologists and psy-
chologists will collaborate in future, so
that together they may uncover the secrets of
the organizing organization, once they have
discovered those of the already organized
organization. 356
Clearly, since one must have some belief as to the nature of
the organizing organization before he can tackle the problem
of the organized organization, we must at some point address
that larger issue in a scientific as well as philosophical
way
.
In the expanded version of evolutionary theory the role
3 56 Ibid.
,
p. 348
.
ol process, the action within the organism, has been
stressed as an important determinant of the processes of
evolution; lacking, for the present, an appreciation of a
larger framework into which to fit the activity which
exists at various explanatory levels, the idea of causation
has been likened to cybernetic machines. This approach is
appealing to scientists because it provides a reasonable
mechanism by which an important problem can be understood.
Simpson demonstrates this by analogy to the age-old problem
of the chicken and the egg . 337 Naturalists, he says, have
always been more interested in hens whereas, geneticists
are partial to eggs. Hen-evolutionists, e.g., Darwin and
the Neo—Lamarckians and the Neo—Darwinist s , were primarily
concerned with the hen and her ability to survive the rigors
of the environment. Egg-evolutionis t s focused on the proc-
esses of reproduction and the importance of events in cells
during critical periods in the reproductive process.
Simpson's solution, and that of many biologists, has been
to point out that either view is incorrect when taken by
itself. There is, in fact, a hen-evolution and an egg-
evolution which are synthesized in the modern view. In
other words, it is recognized that what happens to the
chicken and to the populations of chickens sooner or later
will affect the eggs and, obviously, what happens to the
3 57 Simpson, This View of Life, pp . 64-65.
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eggs affects the chickens.
it comes to explaining the selective processes
that operate to counter the random mutations in genetic
material some biologists, Simpson being one of them, hold
that
:
It has been demonstrated both theoretically
and experimentally that selection acts in a
positive way tending to increase . . . the
chances not only of favorable genes but also
of favorable hereditary combinations . 358
Other biologists, Waddington and that part of Jean Piaget
which he still considers to be a scientific biologist,
stress the role of mentality and internal states in the
creation of adaptive behavior. Here, novel behavior and
opportunistic reactions on the part of an organism are seen
to indirectly give rise to acquired characteristics. It is
therefore a mechanism that "exactly mimics inheritance of
an acquired character, but one which depends not on the
direct induction of a hereditary variation, in the manner
suggested by Lamarck, but on selection operating on the
359genetical structure of the population.
The following statement of Waddington is a fitting
summary of the popular biological view of evolution and one
which also puts the central problem squarely before us:
^^^Ibid
.
,
p. 209.
^ J
^Waddington, The Ethical Animal , pp . 92-93*
It remains true to say that we know of no
other way than random mutation by which new
hereditary variation comes into being, nor
any process other than natural selection by
which the hereditary constitution of a popu-
lation changes from one generation to the
next. But if one confines oneself to the re-
mark that the basic processes of evolution
are not finalistic, this, while true, can no
longer be regarded as adequate. The non-
finalistic mechanisms interact with each
other in such a way that they form a mecha-
nism which has some quasi-finalistic proper-
ties, akin to those of a targe t-following
gunsight . 360
Here, of course, is the problem of purpose in man and tho
biologists' assertion that human purpose is similar to a
"target-following gunsight." The concept of human purpose
we are seeking sees man not as a "projectile" of the evolu-
tionary process but, rather, as a sell -guiding missile that
is aiming at a destiny entirely out of range of any target
a cybernetic gunsight might select for him.
6.4.2 PURPOSE AS A MECHANISM
OF BIOLOGICAL EVOLUTION
Sir Julian Huxley says, near the beginning of his
Evolution in Action , that in comparison with the immensity
of the inorganic sector, i.e., the whole ol space, those
bits of matter that are assembled into the galaxies and
stars show only the simplest of organization and of which
he believes:
^°Waddington, The Nature of Life , p. 96.
Nowhoro in ail its vast extent is Lhoro any
trace of purpose, or oven of prospective sig-
nificance
. It is impelled from behind by
blind physical forces, a gigantic and chaotic
jazz dance of particles and radiations in
which the only over-all tendency we havo so
far been able to detect is that summarized in
the Second Law of Thermodynamics-- the tendency
to run down. 361
Against this meaningless inorganic universe he projects two
other layers of moaning or increasing complex! ty-- the
organic or biological and the human or psycho-social. Of
these two segments he feels that evolutionary transforma-
tion is strictly a result of natural selection; however, he
admits a fundamental difference between them:
Evolution in the biological phase is still
impelled from behind; but the process is now
structured so as to be directed forward. 3&2
In considering development in the human sector, he finds
that due to the ability of humans to combine accumulated
experience with conscious purpose,
the main unit of evolution in the human phase
is not the biological species, but the stream
of culture, and genetic advance has taken a
back seat as compared with changes in the
^63
transmissible techniques of cultural advance.
and of the idea of purpose in relation to this human phase,
he asserts:
Julian Huxley, Evolution in Action (New York: The
New American Library, 1957 ) > PP • 11 - 12 *
^ ^ ^Ibid
.
,
p . 13*
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3
Ibid.
,
p. 14.
In a way most important, purposo lias now en-
tered the process of transformation itself;
both the mechanisms of psycho- socia I evolu-
tion and its products have a truly purposeful
component, and evolution in this sector is
pulled on consciously from in front as well
as being impelled from behind. 1
The key thing about Huxley's position is that the p>urpos-
iveness he is willing to grant to human evolution is still
basically a trial-and-error affair in which that which
exists today is simply the result of the accretion of a
certain configuration out of the numberless opportunities
which have occurred in the billions of years of which man
is aware.
Evolution is viewed as pseudo-purposive since, as
Simpson so clearly states,
Man is one of the millions of results of this
material process. . . .
He is by far the most adaptable of all
organisms because he has developed culture as
a biological adaptation. ...
A world in which man must rely on him-
self, in which he is not the darling of the
gods but only another, albeit extraordinary,
aspect of nature, is by no means congenial to
the immature or the wishful thinkers. ...
It is possible that some children are
made happy by a belief in Santa Claus, but
adults should prefer to live in a world of
reality and reason. . • •
It is a characteristic of this world to
which Darwin opened the door that unless most
of us do enter it and live maturely and ra-
tionally in it, the future of mankind is dim,
indeed--if there is any future. 36
5
364Ibid
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of a modern and respected biologist, they are an important
corroboration of the basic philosophical issues that have
plagued the modern era. Later on he says:
Adaptation by natural selection as a creative
process ... [is] the answer of the synthetic
evolution to the problem of plan and purpose
in nature.
. . . This natural process achieves
the aspect of purpose without the intervention
of a purposer, and it has produced a vast plan
without the concurrent action of a planner.
It may be that the initiation of the process
and the physical laws under which it functions
had a Purposer and that this mechanistic way
of achieving a plan is the instrument of a
Planner— of this still deeper problem^ the
scientist as scientist, cannot speak.
There can be no clearer exposition of the basic problems of
the entire modern era. Simpson says it all. God really i_s
the great mechanical inventor that the thinkers of the
seventeenth and eighteenth century came to understand, man
really i_s responsible to himself, for himself and by him-
self, existentialism is correct and scientists do feel that
they can be scientific without also having some sort of
larger background of belief that animates their lives. As
Whitehead says:
Scientists animated by the purpose of proving
that they are purposeless constitute an inter-
esting subject for study. 3^7
^ 6
6
Ibid.
,
p. 212.
367Whitehead, The Function of Reason , p. l6.
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It also sooms odd that it was possible to interpret many of
the modern discoveries in the physical sciences along lines
which fitted into the organismic metaphysical interpreta-
tion of Whitehead while there seems to be little room for
such insights in the very science that is supposed to study
the phenomena of life. In light of the above, it is rea-
sonable to assert that the field of biology is in many im-
portant aspects bereft of an appreciation of either l) the
extent to which its views are a product of the materialist-
mechanist era or 2) the extent to which modern physical
sciences have undermined those old materialist-mechanist
conceptions of reality.
Purpose, far from being simply an apparent process is,
in fact, the most significant and central aspect of evolu-
I i unary processes. Among those few biologists who have
been willing to admit this and to attempt to incorporate it
in their scientific studies was Edmund Sinnott. Sinnott's
biology is, in general, supportive of the type of outlook
that was contained in the characterization of organismic
368 3^9
psychology developed earlier. In Two Roads to Truth
he maintained that both reason and spirit give valid knowl-
edge of the universe and that the products of both areas of
3^8Cf
. ,
Sections 5*3*1 and 5.3.2.
^^Edmund W. Sinnott, Two Roads to Truth (New Yoik.
Viking Press, 1953) > P* 73*
human sensitivity should be incorporated into all fields of
scientific activity. The serious divisions in the world
today were, he felt, problems of understanding what man
really is, whether
Man's true nature [is that] . . . he is a
child of God with an immortal soul and actu-
ally a part of the great spiritual power that
rules all nature, or whether he is simply a
clever brute, risen out of the primordial
slime; a chemical mechanism that has evolved
into a glorified calculating machine whose
aspirations, seemingly so exalted, are nothing
but motions among molecules, a puppet whose
fate is no longer in his own hands. 370
Sinnott clearly saw that the belief a person holds about
himself is closely related to his concept of nature and his
beliefs about God.
For Sinnott to profess such views was one thing, to
give scientific meaning to them was quite another. His
solution was to view mental life and the physical body as
but two aspects of the same protoplasmic process. Proto-
plasmic goal-seeking was thought to provide a sufficient
basis upon which to assert that there is a teleology im-
plicit in every organism. The closest he seems to have
come to being able to explain the idea of purpose is to see
organic pattern as an:
Organized system, maintained by the regulatory
control of its activities, [this] implies the
370 Sinno 1 1 , Matter,
1968 ) , pp . 18-19
.
Mind and Man (New York: Atheneum,
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presence w i l/hin it oi' something lo which
those ac l..i vi ti oa tend to conform
,
a norm, a
. standard, a goal or end, what the philosopher
would call a telos
, inherent in the whole
living mass.37T
The main problem with this type of approach, in spite of
the provocative theme of the over-all proposal, is that it
is clearly open to the following sort of well deserved
criticism. Simpson says of Sinnott's earlier works, which
sounded even more spiritualistic and vitalistic,
The scientific problem was to explain bio-
logical regulation, and we have decided that
its cause is the principle of organization
.
That is not enlightening ! . . . I do not deny
and in fact rather envy Sinnott's revelation,
but it is a revelation private to him. With
respect to . . . biological considerations,
it is prejudice and not conclusion . 372
We can conclude from this that this approach to the problem
of purpose is really an effort to insert purpose into the
basic explanations of biological phenomena at a point before
the explicit metaphysical basis of the old theories has been
clarified. The net result is that purpose will always seem
to be an ad hoc concept (which it is in the old system)
that has been imported into the discussion in an effort to
explain something that did not need explaining in the first
place
.
371Ibid
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Another modern biologist who seems to have been mori
successful in treating the philosophical aspects of purpose
and teleology is Sewall Wright. Wright's main contentions
are not open to the same sort of criticism that the normal
use of teleological concepts is because he argues that
there is in fact a hierarchy of organisms in which there is
no discontinuity and that therefore:
If the non-living world is completely devoid
of mind, and if, as it seems necessary to
believe, there was a time when no life could
exist, how did mind appear?373
Wright finds that the only solution is to assume that
If the human mind is not to appear by magic;
it must be a development from the mind of the
egg and back of this, apparently, of the DNA
molecules of the egg and sperm nuclei that
constitute its heredity . . .
Therefore, he concludes:
The only satisfactory solution of these di-
lemmas would seem to be that mind is univer-
sal, present not only in all organisms and in
their cells but in molecules, atoms and ele-
mentary particles . 374
The thing that protects Wright from a rather embarrassing
repetition of the same sort of philosophical approach that
we saw in the eighteenth century thinker Robinet, who,
. . . would rather give intelligence to the
373 Sewall Wright
,
Philosophy of Biological Science xn
Process and Divinity
,
Reese and Freeman, eds
.
(LaSalle
:
Open Court, 1967 ), p. 113*
37 ^Ibid
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p . 114
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Least atom of matter—provided it were in adegree and of a quality suitable to it . .
is Uiut Wright develops a hierarchical structure for the
biological and physical sciences which allows him to appre-
ciate the character of the operating principles of each
level. Thus, if physical phenomena appear to be determin-
istic it is because of the lawful regularities that pertain
at that level. Similarly, if freedom of the will appears
to be meaningful at the human level, then it should be
addressed freely without fear of having to deny its own
nature because of the character of matter or of having to
deny the realities of matter because of its own character.
Wright believes:
The task of science is not complete until it
has followed phenomena through all levels of
the hierarchy, up and down as far as possible,
and after obtaining the best statistical de-
scription at each, has tied them all together.
Such a view is neither anthromorphic or mechanomorphic nor
is it simply a hopeful philosophical outlook. Wright goes
on to describe the utility and developed potential of such
a view.
In modern genetics, this has meant working
down from the statistical rules at the level
of the individual to those of chromosomes and
genes and to the chemistry of these, and up
again into the x^hysiology of gene action at
the level of cell, tissue, organ and individ-
ual, and finally to the properties of popula-
tions. All statements are ultimately in
terms of probabilities but all are related. ;
375Ibid
. ,
p . 123 •
More wo oaa ond our consideration of the problem of purpose
and biological thought and summarize the main points of the
argument before considering further aspects of the basic
definition of purpose.
6.4.3 CONCLUSIONS REGARDING PUR-
POSE AND BIOLOGICAL THOUGHT
The work of Waddington and Piaget goes a long way
toward establishing not only the reality of the internal
factors which constitute an organism but also the fact that
it is absolutely necessary to take these into account if
one s create a useful scientific description of bio-
logical phenomena. This realization which is now estab-
lished as an important parameter in modern evolutionary
theory is clearly a corroboration of those faint philosoph-
ically and mystically inspired urgings that came from an
ever-growing line of scientists, philosophers and psycholo-
gists. For our purposes it can be seen as a partial ful-
fillment of the quest for increased realization of the
wi thin of things that we first saw in the Romantic Movement,
that was evident in Fechner 1 s complete psychophysics, that
was the basis of Dilthey's descriptive psychology and that
has ultimately culminated in the existentialist philosophy
which focuses on the exclusive validity of internal expe-
rience. This is not an attempt to establish a clear-cut
causal link between these various diverse events. Rather,
it is a reassertion of the fact that the entirety of the
dovo I oprnont of modorn science has boon lr.vol.vod In an oru
wIikIi, though it has come to believe in the absoluteness
and completeness of its scientific descriptions, Is still
an era in which the total nocossary meaning for man's oxis-
tonco is not contained within the basic structure of its
scientific world-view. That we have observed a sporadic
outpouring of tho human spirit, here and there along the
way, is an indication of the fact that as a real element in
the structure oi reality, it had to be some place and in
i ts own pragmatic way seems to have taken up whatever tem-
porary quarters the doubting materialistic world was un-
cautious enough to leave "unexplained."
An important aspect of the present biological inter-
pretation is that it admits only to a form of causality
that can bo mimicked by machines, i.e., cybernetic "cyclic
causality." We have said that this is insufficient and will
consider why this is so in tho next section; here, it is im-
portant to underline the fact that this form of causality
can be regarded as a reflection of the fact that modern
physical science has disproven the validity of total physi-
cal determinism. Whether biological science came to this
understanding on its own or whether it did it with the aid
of physical discoveries is not important. Tho important
thing is that biological science also recognizes the inade-
quacy of deterministic, materialistic metaphysics. The
reus on that the particular metaphysical problem* that have
b0on 80 prominent in oarlior discussion* of physical sci-
Gnce have not been of prime concern in our treatment of
biological thought is found in the fact that biology, Like
psycho l ogy
,
grow up, assimilating the major assumptions of
tlio materialist ora. Slneo those assumptions have formed
(-lif’ background of its thought, biology has largely on I y
observed reflections of those basic issues in the fore-
ground of its analysis.
It remains to be said that the most likely solution to
the ovor-all problems with interpreting purpose from within
a scientific biological context is to be found in the type
of hierarchical view characteristic of Wright's interpreta-
tion of biological philosophy. Once again, we have found
the hierarchical process model to bo an Important way in
which explicit problems in an area of scientific investiga-
tion can be solved.
Here, as with the conclusions of physical science,
biological principles should not bo taken as the complete
description of reality. However, we can take the modern
biological interpretation of the limited cybernetic type of
teleology as a clear indication of the need for scientific
methods which are sensitive to the internal and external
relations of phenomena and also of the need for a clearer
appreciation of the character of purpose as it applies to
501
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Now that the discussions of physical and biological
sciences are behind us, it is clear that there is suffi-
cient corroboration of the hierarchical view to success-
fully counter the old claims of reductionist science. We
have yet, however, to see the problem of why the trend of
evolution has been upwards in its own right as the central
problem with which a complete science, philosophy and psy-
chology of man must deal.
6.5 TYPES OF PURPOSIVE EXPLANATION
This section considers types of purposive explanation
as they relate to the organizing perspective of the hierar-
chical process model of explanation.
As lias been indicated in a number of ways in earlier
discussions, the role of internal factors which are appro-
priate to each level of a hierarchy varies greatly in im-
portance. The internal factors of inert substances are
negligibly small while the personality and self-hood of
humans demand the most sophisticated conceptualization of
internal processes. Whitehead has, in fact, created an
elaborate description of the entire operating range of the
various levels of activity. Of central importance here, is
the fact that it is not until the higher forms of organic
life are reached that we find any appreciable amount of
consciousness. Since this is the case, and because our
502
over-ul J. concern i» with psychology and education, „e can
concentrate upon those levels which are closer to the top
of the hierarchy.
In earlier discussions, there has often been a need to
clarify the characteristics of purposive behavior as it
applies to various levels of operating entities. Whether
we have been talking about machines, evolving animals,
emergent cognitive processes, or the spiritual aspects of
human life the concept of purpose has had an important but
rather undifferientiated involvement. Barbour has provided
a cogent summary of four separate meanings of the concept
of purpose that are directly applicable to the present dis-
376 „cussion. Spocil ically
,
he breaks the concept down into
thb categories of a) functional behavior, b) self-regulating
behavior, c) goal-directed behavior and finally, d) pur-
posive behavior. By taking each type in turn we can build
an appreciation of the increasing importance of internal
factors at ever higher levels of teleological functioning.
The first category of meaning which attaches to the
concept of purpose is that of functional behavior. Entities
such as organs of the body act to perform a vital role in
the operation of the whole organism and are sometimes de-
scribed as fulfilling a specific purpose, o.g., filtering
blood, eliminating wastes, etc.. However, in such cases,
376Barbour
,
op . ci
t
.
, PP. 337-341.
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wh.vro Uion> is not a separaio purposive o»iU!,y bu I only one
tlial. i J i k a I,ask which contributes toward the mainte-
nance of the whole organism, the word function is a more
appropriate description of the activity.
There are many possible uses of this style of teleo-
logical behavior. Recall that this was the dominant mode
sxplanat i on that was used by the first truly American
school of psychology. As its name indicates, Functional
Psychology was primarily concerned with the functions which
were operating and the contribution they made to the total
organism. It is in this school that the concept of "drive,"
especially in the early work of R. S. Woodworth, received a
great deal of emphasis. It is here also that the great
emphasis on physiological explanation of drive and need
states became such important concepts in much American psy-
chology. A primary reason for this was to avoid the criti-
cism which came to those who attempted teleological expla-
nations .
Functional explanations are important in many contexts
because they permit a wide variety of complex and variable
things to be conveniently summarized. We recognize that
the functions of the heart, liver, and lungs, etc., are the
same even though most of their explicit physical character-
istics vary markedly from species to species. It is also
possible to refer to functional aspects of animal behavior
50 /i
ill Mils w ; i y . The «» l inos t endless variety spec i 1 i ,• 1, el,av-
i oral acts tl ia 1. comprise nesting, grooming or oven escape
behavior can be summarized and described in terms of the
functions they perform with the result that regularities
can be 1 ound and testable hypotheses can be formulated.
Functional behavior is then, an important category of
teleological explanation. But, since there is no explicit
reference to a specific goal, it is better thought of as a
low level explanation which simply recognizes functional
characteristics
.
A more powerful explanatory concept is found in the
idea of self-regulating behavior. This is the style of
explanation that has become popular in many areas of sci-
ence because of its direct relation with the science of
cybernetics
.
In terms of our interests, the fact that Jean
Piaget makes such extensive use of the concept indicates
its utility. In this case behavior can be called teleo-
logical because, by analogy to target- seeking gunsights and
the like, it is possible to define some sort of end state
which is not yet attained but which is the apparent goal of
the behavior, and also to recognize the ability of a cer-
tain adaptiveness in reaching the goal which can compensate
for changing conditions.
The key concept in such self-regulating cybernetic ma-
chines is the idea of a feedback mechanism. It is from
'jU'j
1,1,1 M Piaget gots hi h idea of
tlio I unction of feedback is to "c
I c y c I i c < '-tiu sail t y since
ycle" information relating
to the output of the system back to the input of the system
so that its performance can be adjusted toward the desired
The attractiveness of this view is obvious since it is
a much more inclusive concept than simple functional be-
havior. Yet, it is still a machine-like concept with
I
little intrinsic appeal as an important way to characterize
human behavior.
The next category of goal-directed behavior comes
closer to the kind of explanation that is needed for living
things. There is however, a close relation between the
ideas of self-regulating machine behavior and those of
goal -direc ted behavior. An animal, like a cybernetic ma-
chine, may be seen to act to achieve a goal and also to
exhibit the ability to cope with changing external condi-
tions which would otherwise prevent its success. However,
there is a main difference which forever prevents a total
explanation of animal goal-seeking in terms of self-
regulating cybernetic feedback. Animals do, in fact, find
novel ways of achieving standard goals, e.g., the lions on
game preserves in Africa that ride atop automobiles so that
they can more easily pounce on unsuspecting prey. In addi-
tion, animals also anticipate future occurrences, even to
end state.
U '° point or suukijit; objects, 1.0.
,
loud, when there j s
nono within sight or smoli. Thus, while there are many
important characteristics which are shared between the two
styles of explanation, animal behavior is not exhaustive]
y
explained via the self-regulation of cybernetic machines.
In the final category ol teleological behavior we have
that which is called purposive behavior. The term purposive
is reserved for cases where it is evident that higher-order
operatives like beliefs, desires and intentions are func-
tioning. It is this category which is obviously most ap-
plicable to man since the other modes of explanation do not
produce a description of teleological behavior that compares
with what we know to be true in our own life experience.
It is only in man that the full consciousness which undor-
I i os this type' of behavior is to bo found.
Tlius, while there are many similarities in the various
styles of teleological explanation, the all-important dif-
ferences which pertain to each mode are differences which
are most easily understood in terms of the hierarchical
status of the behavior in question.
The proper conclusion of this discussion is to return
to the earlier insight that causal and teleological expla-
nations are not mutually exclusive modes of analyzing a
particular pattern of events. The main difference between
the two modes is simply the perspective from which the
. j I l< !/••< ‘IIH *| I I i ,S III,- II I <> . V i ownil I'roni ou is i do w< • arc
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* ° HO ° l,ohavior a » caused by the presence of certain
stimuli yet on the internal perspective the same event has
the flavor of being the function of desired goals rather
than of mechanical causes. A statement of Whitehead that
was used m an earlier discussion makes this point very
clearly. Of the actual entities which are the only really
real things in the universe and which have an organismic
nature ho maintains that each "occasion arises as an effect
facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future. In
between there lies the teleology of the universe."
We can also look at the two poles of explanation which
are provided by the old dichotomy of efficient cause and
final cause with the realization that on the organismic
interpretation of reality, they are most meaningful when
viewed as aspects of the self-causation or self-creation of
377the entity in question.
6.6 THE CHARACTER OF HIERAR-
CHICAL EXPLANATION AND
THE FLOWERING OF HUMANITY
Since it is a pronounced characteristic of this docu-
ment that its discussions seem to involve trenching upon
issues which range freely over the surface of man's sentient
relationship with the world in which he finds himself, it
may have occurred to some readers that there seems to be no
377Cf
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Lopic which Aw immuno from the assertions of the
mlorpretation or the meddling of the present author. Such
concerns are not unfounded. When Whitehead said that
modern philosophy had been ruined by its assimilation of
the basic assumptions of the materialist era, ho meant it.
And when he offered the organ! smic alternative, he meant
that too. To take his viev seriously is to attempt to see
the world from an entirely new perspective. This document
is the result of one such attempt. But it must also bo
added that such recreated metaphysics do not assimilate aLl
of man's characteristics into their explanatory scheme. As
Whitehead said in the conclusion of his last book:
Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end,
when philosophic thought has done its best,
the wonder remains. 378
What wo want to assert here is that there is a definite
place at the top of the organismic hierarchy for just those
aspects of human existence which constitute that part of man
that is ever merging into the future of unrealized poten-
tial
. No metaphysics can touch it since it is the explicit
province of the Divine Providence that has been in evidence
throughout the traditions of Revealed Religion.
Whitehead says of the God that makes the organismic
world work,
378Whitehead, Modes of Thought
, p. 168.
No reason can be given for just that limita-
tion which it stands in His nature to impose.
God is not concrete, but lie is the ground for
concrete actuality. No reason can be given
for the nature of God, because that nature is
the ground of rationality . 379
While explicit consideration of such topics is obviously
out of the range of this discussion, there is a legitimate
sense in which we can, and indeed must, address those
issues. Why this is so can be brought out in the following
way
.
The development of modern science began as an "uncon-
scious derivative " from the theology which belonged to the
Middle Ages. An important effect of the Judaeo-Chris t ian
tradition of God as Creator of heaven and earth was to
foster an essentially static view of the world in which all
things were created in their given forms. This orientation
helped the early physical scientists to proclaim the world
to be a mechanical system which was completely determined
by physical laws. This amounts to a closed system of cause
and effect in which the original order in the world which
had been established by God could not now be violated by
God. The predominant effect of this orientation has been
to obscure the possibility of understanding the relation-
ship between personal experience and the impersonal material
world. Man has been cast in the role of an actor in a
Whitehead
,
Science and the Modern World , p. 17^.
divine drama which is played upon the stage of tho material
universe. In this case, it is the human who acts and
changes from scene to scone in progression toward the natu-
ral conclusion of the drama, while changes in the material
stage are illusory, superficial and in no way parallel to
the redemption which is obtained by the skilled actor who
is successful in his role of actualizing a portion of God's
Grace
.
In sharp contrast to the old static view, the organis-
mic alternative offers a dynamic interpretation of nature
in which there is both structure and flexibility. In addi-
tion to views which stressed the regularity of nature, tho
concept of a hierarchically arranged structure requires the
concept of novelty as an explanation of the fact that new
levels derive from the potentialities of lower levels and
also add new form to the developed potentialities of tho
evolving cosmos.
An important aspect of this view is that it is open to
a different role for God's immanence in the world. A
rather profane way of describing this relationship is to be
found in the importance which attaches to the "within" of
things as they are conceived to function in the organismic
hierarchy. In this view, creation is a continuing and
evolving process in which all levels, each to its own de-
gree, are directly related to the immanence oi God in
511
na lurn
.
Ihus, ovgii 11 oiio should wish to avoid all reference
to anything except the narrowest interpretation of what it
moans to attempt to be scientific, there is an important
sense in which it is not possible to do so since the history
of thought amply demonstrates that the background of man's
belief
,
as expressed in his deeply held religious convic-
tions, forms the framework of his view of the world.
The organismic position, with its operative under-
standing of the process of existence opens the way to the
recognition that self-cause is a more complete descrijition
of reality than the superficial dichotomy of physical cau-
sal i ly and spiritual teleology. This realization when com-
bined with the hierarchical model which has emerged in
modern literature, contributes to a more complete under-
standing of the spiritual generality of man's being in the
r n • 380following way.
In a hierarchy, it is clear that lower order principles
are harnessed by the more comprehensive operating principles
of the next higher stage. The result of this interaction is
the production of a new comprehensive entity which operates
according to principles which cannot be reduced to a
o oo
The place of spiritual factors iri the composition of
organismic psychology is treated more fully in Chapter 5>
Sections 5*3 through 5*3*2.
description in terms of those which apply to the lower
level. When we focus upon the idea of an actual entity in
the Whiteheadian sense, and realize that a comprehensive
entity occupies a specific level of the hierarchy by virtue
of the fact that it is mostly a Joint product of these two
main factors, we now have the basis for the creation of a
new model for psychological processes.
The psychological processes which accrue to actual en-
tities in such a hierarchy are most generally described in
the statement about the entity being an effect facing its
past and a cause facing its future. This implies that the
idea of process is inherent in reality; but it goes beyond
that point because we are also required to admit that the
teleology of the universe is operative in the turn around
from effect to cause which is the process of the entity.
When we place man at the top of the hierarchy of
evolved beings, an interesting thing happens. We are well
aware of the source of man's derivation from the physical
world and see many magnificent, though often horrible, ex-
amples of man's mastery over all those levels which are
subordinate to his station. However, since we know that all
levels of the hierarchical structure are the joint product
of both lower and higher-order principles of organization,
we are also obliged to acknowledge that if man is to bo
considered as a part of the natural order of things, lie too
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highor-ordor nature tlian those which have produced being-
ness at any subordinate level. Two important consequences
follow directly from this realization. First, all attempts
to obtain an exhaustive description of man and his psycho-
logical and educational needs in terms of the content which
is to be found at lower levels must necessarily fail.
Second, it must also be true that some aspects of human na-
ture are capable of being influenced by the operation of
those higher principles.
Note that there is no injunction hero that would in
any way letter the true search for knowledge and under-
standing. It is not a statement of what science should
find as the result of its labors but an indication of the
structui e of things wi thin which scientific investigation
is carried out. There is also a very real limit to the
specificity of this knowledge since, by definition, those
higher-order principles which are transcendent in relation
to our present level are in fact transcendent and therefore
are unknowable through the outer capacities of the senses
and the clarity of the rational intellect which deals most
effectively with lower-order phenomena. This is whal
Whitehead had in mind when he said, "no reason could bo
given for the nature of God, because that nature is the
ground of rationality.
"
Slated plainly, the nature of man provides open bound-
ary conditions lor the operation of higher-order principles
that, are responsible for the formation of a new comprehen-
sive entity at a new level of the hierarchy. Yes, the
teleology of the universe does operate in the being of man
as he carries the change-over from effect to cause in the
process of his life.
But this asserts that the most important, indeed, the
evolving aspect of mankind is something about which he can
not have explicit knowledge. How is this possible? This
is wiiere the critique of materialism which is found in
Whitehead comes in. The essence of that position is that
what we know about the world is not to be defined solely in
terms of the way we are connected to it by the outer powers
of our sensory apparatus. This is the INVERSION of knowl-
edge that has often come up. There is something more,
something of a greater generality, an inner nature of man
that has additional capacities which permit the open bound-
aries to be maintained toward the higher principles of the
evolving cosmos.
Why else would Helen Keller have the ability lo demon-
strate in her actions and to believe in her heart that each
individual has a subconscious memory of the green earth and
murmuring waters, that blindness and deafness cannot rob
from him? Where else could the basis of this gift from
pawl, generations bo maintained but in Lho larger generality
which, is more complete, transcendent, in relation to spo-
cilic sensory information and a clear logical intellect?
Since the crux of this orientation hinges upon the
ability of man to respond to and be influenced by something
which is spiritual, that is, nonmaterial and not explicitly
knowable in the rational sense, it will be helpful to ob-
serve the operation of a similar mechanism at lower levels
of the hierarchy that we can explicitly understand.
This example comes from the biologist Alister Hardy
who used it in a sense very similar to that which Wadding-
ton and Piaget develop as a description of the necessity to
consider internal as well as external factors in the process
38l
of evolution. Though the evolutionary mechanics to which
Hardy has reference are similar, his example goes beyond
theirs because it demonstrates that the role of transcendent
and unknown forces can have a vital effect upon lower-order
levels of living things.
External factors play an obviously important role in
shaping the destiny of the organism. However, Hardy at-
tributes those adaptations which have been responsible for
the main diverging lines leading to new groups of animals,
e.g., the development of running, digging, swimming and
o Q 1
Alister Hardy, Another View of Evolution in Biology
and Personality
,
I. I. Ramsey
,
ed. (Oxford: Basil Black-
well, 1965 ), pp. 77-78.
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llyxng, to the creative behavioral selection of the animal
himself. This selection process is seen to be the source
from within that can give rise to novelty. It is also true
that such creative selection on the part of animals, in-
cluding man is a continuing process and that novelty of
form and function in animal life is not a thing of the past
but a continuing process that forever gives rise to novelty.
Our concern is to describe a possible mechanism for
this advance into novelty that can fit into the hierarchical
structure while also avoiding the limiting mechanical in-
terpretations which are based on random mechanism and the
lack ol insight inherent in a simple vitalism which does
not explicitly relate to what we know of the world. Wo can
observe the operation of a mechanism of this type by
dropping down a couple of kingdoms in the hierarchy of
living things to observe the paramount differences between
the plant and animal kingdoms
.
The organic life of plants is of a lower order than
that of animals and the structure of the plant is largely
determined by the external selective forces of the environ-
ment . Animal life, on the other hand, while being subject
to the same external forms of selection as plants, also
demonstrates a much greater ability for internal selection
of alternative behaviors. It is in this sense that we
began this chapter on the note that "the function of reason
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is to promote the art of life." The companion assertion
that life's aim is beyond simple survival to levels of in-
creased satisfaction, is also demonstrated in the ever in-
creasing ability of higher levels of the evolutionary
hierarchy to modify their environment.
It we examine the various adaptations to the external
environment which have been made by plants, one class of
adaptations stands out as an important and striking example
of the hierarchical mechanism we are seeking. In developing
the fantastic variety of color, structure and odor of their
flowers, plants have responded in a most beautiful way to
the external selective pressures which mainly derive from
the behavior patterns of pollinating insects.
Pollinating insects are, however, a kingdom above
plants; the possessors of qualities and capacities forever
unknowable to the plants whose structure they serve to de-
termine. In this example then, we have the type of situa-
tion which is asserted to be true of man at the top of the
hierarchy. Obviously, this is not to insist that there is
any concrete similarity between the two cases. We can how-
ever, assert that finding such examples at lower levels of
the hierarchy where we can explicitly understand the rela-
tionships in question, also makes it possible to postulate
the operation of similar functional mechanisms at the
highest level of the hierarchy where we, like the plants,
r>L8
arc not explicitly aware of the forces that mold the flow-
ering of our own beings.
6
. 7 SUMMARY
1 rom what wo have seen of the old system of ideas, it
is clear that it does not contain a coherent explanation of
the dillerent ontological status of living and nonliving
entities. The dead matter of that system has consistently
frustrated attempts at unifying observed phenomena into a
single system of explanation and has forced philosophers,
from Descartes on, to formulate a strict mind-body dualism
in an effort to provide some place for the characteristi-
cally human sentience they knew in personal experience.
The problem of vitalism which is apparent in modern biology
also has deep roots in traditional dualistic philosophy.
Within this view, the traditional style of scientific ex-
planation has been in terms of physical causality which is
based largely upon the supposed mechanism of the physical
world. Efforts to go beyond pure physical causality have
been generally categorized as teleological and relegated to
the ephemeral half of the dualistic position.
Fortunately, we now have ample grounds on which to
assert that the strict division between living and nonliving,
mind and body, freedom and determinism, cause and purpose,
etc., are useful but misleading dichotomies which do not
stand up in the face of developments in modern science.
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Against the standard form of scientific explanation
which is predominantly roduc tionistic
,
and seeks the epit-
ome of scientific explanation in terms of the mechanism of
physico-chemical processes, popular developments in many
areas have been asserting that (die simple one — levelled meta-
physics of materialism is too restrictive to explain the
"purposiveness" of many phenomena. Aided primarily by
analogy to cybernetic machines, the concept of simple
physical causality (efficient cause) has been augmented to
include the cybernetic type of cyclic causality. However,
since the apparent "purposive" behavior of machines is the
obvious result of a collection of inanimate parts, this
sort of higher-order behavior is generally understood to be
a direct result of the complexity of organization of the
parts. One may find useful analogies in the behavior of
such machines, but to equate human behavior with machines
by requiring that the cause of behavior must be as exactly
specifyable as the input of a machine, as in behaviorism,
is to ignore the essence of what it means to be human.
A first approximation of an approach that can begin to
uncover the more complete meaning of the problem of purpose
is also one that grows out of modern insights into the
topic of a multi-level analysis. What we have seen of (his
style of explanation in this chapter clearly indicates that
there are important scientific reasons for maintaining that
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li i gho r- 1 ovol concepts and theories are not complete! Ly re-
ducible to the terms of explanation of lower levels. i'li is
view, in which, neither the higher or the lower are loss
real, creates an obvious need to explain the transition
between ievels. The character of this transition is
clearest when we are dealing with biological phenomena be-
cause at this level of complexity it is most obvious that
mechanical and teleological explanations need to be balanced
with each other. When viewed from without, the mechanical
tendency is to analyze events in terms of "causes" and when
viewed from within, the teleological tendency is to analyze
events in terms of the goals or purposes of the individual
enti ty
.
Ln this type of discussion the single most important
aspect of a multi-level explanation is the additional in-
sight which opens the way toward appreciating the fact that
the two styles of explanation (mechanical/causal vs. teleo-
logical/purposive), are in fact simply different ways of
regarding the same complex entity with its pattern of events
through time.
It is interesting to compare these insights which now
have firm footing in the theories of modern science with
the view of an individual that is of great importance to
the history of psychology. The words ol the pioneer o f ex-
perimental psychology, Gustav Fechner, echo across the
r
) i
decades wLtli a resonance almost loo I, me lo i mailin'; he
said
,
in a previously quoted passage:
The natural scioncos consistent I y employ the
external, standpoint, . . . the human! tios aro
internal. Tho common opinions oi' everyday
life are based on changes of the standpoints,
and natural philosophy on the identity of
what appears double from two standpoints. A
theory of the relationship of mind to body
will have to trace the relationship of the
two modes of appearance of a single thing
that is a unity.
11, is at this point that tho insights due to White-
head's metaphysics become most important. By now, it is
obvious that Whitehead did not intend to simply create an
explanatory schema that had some hierarchical properties.
On the contrary, the basis of the Whiteheadian assertion is
that the actual entities whoso principles of operation and
interrelation he describes are in fact metaphysical enti-
ties. He is insisting that those levels also have a being-
ness--that they are, in fact, the real objects of which the
world is composed and of which wo can bo directly aware.
Fechner believed this to bo true but he could not amass the
sort of evidence that is available today which supports
such a view.
The reality assertion which Whitehead makes i s sup-
ported by those developments of modern science which stress
the importance of the system of events that aro rightful
and irreducible properties of the whole which occupies a
level in the hierarchy. From the exclusion principle in
5~’2
physios l.o tho opigonotio systems of modorn biology, one!
beyond, support can bo found for this stylo of i n torpro Lo-
tion . It should also bo no tod that the position of "cri li-
eu I realism” which was reached after examining the rela-
tionship between science, philosophy and psychology also
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supports this conclusion. *' Further, the Initial consid-
erations as regards the organ i smic interpretation of psy-
elm Logical process also find a more complete moaning
within the reality of a metaphysical hierarchy.
With the model provided by tlio flowering of plants in
mind, wo can scale the evolutionary hierarchy to the highest
level of personhood in the world- -mankind , with the realiza-
tion that the boundaries which we recognize at the borders
of our awareness are, in fact, the conditions of our lives
in which we entertain the potontiality for obedience to
higher demands. Man's collective and individual becoming
resonates to the highest order of his attained status via
the transcendent generality of his spiritual nature which
functions to include tho emotions, purposes and enjoyment
of life as the boundary conditions of the experienced world
which is the material basis of his existence.
It is in this model of man and his potential i ties that
we find tho grounds to invert knowledge by removing the
* 2 Cf
.
,
Chapter 5, Section 5.1.5.
)85 Cf., Chapter 5, Section 5*3*
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factual and the material from the center of our view of the
cosmos and to replace it with the sensitive reaction of the
experiencing subject himself as the ultimate determinant of
the texture of reality. A reality which is constructed in
this fashion reflects a recognition that man's desire to
find meaning and purpose in experience comes from deep
within his being and is an expression of that same upward
press which in past ages was responsible for mere survival
of the species and is, today, urging him onward to new at-
tainments far removed from mere physical survival.
Thus, the human striving which we know in our own ex-
perience can be directly related to the metaphysics and
epistemology of the hierarchical process interpretation of
reality. It is from the internal consistency which is af-
forded by this interpretation that we can derive the grounds
on which to assert that it offers a coherent solution to
the age-old problems of jDsychological theory--the issue of
dualism and the problem of purpose.
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7.0 TOWARD AN 0UGANISM1C J3ASIS
FOR PERSONALITY AND EDUCATION
This final chapter has the goal of collecting the in-
sights afforded by the philosophy of organism into the be-
ginning of a model for human psychological processes. This
task can be viewed as a natural outgrowth of the organismic
position because, in itself, that system is an effort to
frame a philosophical scheme which is a "coherent, logical,
necessary system of ideas in terms of which every element
of experience can be interpreted." The past discussions of
the philosophy of organism in Chapter Three and the material
of Chapters Five and Six, have largely been descriptive of
the contrasts between mechanism and organism and explicative
of the character of reality which derives from the organis-
mic interpretation. There remains the task of being pre-
scriptive of a framework of ideas that relates to that por-
tion of experience which the organismic interpretation
defines as the creative activity of the individual who
stands as a cause facing his own future.
The psychology of personality is the most natural area
of psychology in which to begin the organismic reinterpre-
tation because the philosophy of organism is, after all,
based on the paradigm of human experience. The topic of
education is important not only because it is the vehicle
for conveying the enlivened knowledge which derives from
the hierarchical realism of organismic metaphysics but also,
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because it is an important factor in molding the internal
experience of human beings. Since earlier discussions have
clearly shown that those who think deeply about the char-
acter of human psychological processes, also tend to see
the potential of man from within the explanatory framework
of their psychology, it is important that the insights of
the philosophy of organism should be elaborated within the
framework of a model of psychological processes that can
replace those old models while also opening the way to an
increased appreciation of the reality of man.
Chapter Five introduced the philosophical position of
critical realism which evolves into an organismic psychology
appreciative of the two-way transcendence in which the being
of man is embedded. These divisions were roughly described
as the material and spiritual aspects of man and were fur-
ther seen to be institutionalized in man's scientific and
religious expressions. Central to the whole discussion was
the basic metaphysical intuition of the philosophy of
organism: namely, its confession of faith in the fact that
the ultimate claim of existence and the true processes in
the world of man, are those found in man himself. Chapter
Six continued the development of an outlook which can pro-
vide a valid place for the role of internal factors in the
constitution of actual entities by developing an interpre-
tative framework of hierarchical processes. It is a basic
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cliaiac Loris lie or this view lhaL the complexity o i struc-
ture increases, so does the ability to experience increased
satxsfac txon
; it was seen that the experient individual
actualizes its own self- transcendence by experiencing in-
creased subjective value. This hierarchical view, as sup-
ported by evidence from the physical and biological sci-
ences, ended in the realization that human experience, as
the upper level of the hierarchy, was not only most removed
from the compulsion of lower-order physical laws, but also
was open to the influx of unknowable higher-order principles
which could mold the flowering of its own being. Thus, we
have a description of the possibility of purposive behavior
in humans which requires recognition of spiritual factors
as higher-order operatives and also subsumes the more lim-
ited notions of efficient cause and final cause under the
category of self-causation.
With this material as a background, we can turn to the
examination of issues in personality and education. In so
doing however, it is important to keep in mind that the
orientation taken toward these topics will be that which
derives from the perspective of an actual entity, in this
case man, in the system of a hierarchy of beings which is
both purposeful and full of meaning. It is important to
stress this point and to take this position because to do
less than this would be to trade off much of the uniqueness
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of the organismic explanation before any application of its
basic ideas is attempted. The material that follows uses
more of Whitehead's special vocabulary and is a more tech-
nical approach to the Whiteheadian system that which has
characterized the previous discussion. This is not an
arbitrary choice expressive of the writer's penchant for
technical detail. Rather, the issues are so closely in-
volved with the specialized vocabulary that Whitehead
created that they cannot be totally divorced from it at
this point.
This discussion also attempts to bridge a gap which
exists in current interpretations of Whitehead. There are
many erudite technical philosophical accounts of White-
head's philosophy. These efforts, while illuminating to
the professional, are essentially written by philosophers
for philosophers with little concern for practical applica-
tion. On the other hand, the usual interpretation which
popularizes Whitehead's thought is generally written with
considerable disengagement from the technical details of
the system. The result is usually a highly suggestive
prose that is apt to foster creative ideas for practical
applications
. However, these ideas are easily pushed aside
by the latest version of a long-standing approach to a par-
ticular activity. As an example, £he suggestions for an
"organismic psychology" presented in Chapter Five have just
529
this status.
One more thought is important before beginning the
actual topic. In each and every instance where the details
of orgamsmic cosmology have come up, an extreme effort has
been required to avoid getting trapped into uncovering one
level of detail after another at the expense of making some
sort of coherent progress across the many opportunities for
deep involvement. Nowhere however, is that problem more
acute than in the present chapter. There are two main re-
this condition. First, the discussion will not by
any means go into the depths that are involved. Second, the
fina l level of discussion will necessarily be a general
statement of orientation as regards psychological and educa-
tional theory.
In describing the basis for the organismic approach,
Whitehead was quoted as saying, "the true method of philo-
sophical construction is to frame a scheme of ideas, the
best one can." Since this scheme of ideas has been somewhat
elaborated, we are now on the threshold of the next step,
which is to "unflinchingly explore the interpretation of
experience in terms of that scheme."
7.1 THE ORGANISMIC BACKGROUND
The concept of personality in the organismic framework
is an important aspect of the being of man that is related
to both his higher and lower-order characteristics. One way
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to phrase this condition is found in the earlier contrast
between the spiritual and the material. Whitehead, at one
po±nt, referred to this as the immortal and mortal aspects
of man by way of indicating that "the two words refer to
two aspects of the Universe which are presupposed in every
experience which we enjoy. It is important to note that
there are three major factors here; while the higher and
the lower-order factors seem clear enough, it is necessary
to stress that our concern is the experiencing being that
exists as a real element on a level of the hierarchy. Not
only is he our primary concern, he is also, as we shall see,
the vehicle by which the two other factors are brought
together. Recall that the ontological principle states "in
separation 1 rom actual entities there is nothing merely
non-enti ty-- the rest is silence."
Prom the position of the experient individual, either
aspect of the Universe can only be evaluated by reference
to the other. Thus, while the World of Value is conceived
to be timeless and immortal, with an essence that is not
"rooted in passing circumstance" and "the World of Activity,
the Creative World, the World of Origination, creates the
38^4
Whitehead, Immortality in The Philosophy of Alfred
North Whitehead
,
Paul A. Schlipp, ed
.
( Evanston : North-
western University Press, 19^l), p. 683.
385Whitehead's article on Immortality provides the
framework for this discussion and his terminology for the
major categories involved is largely preserved.
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Present by transforming the Past and by anticipating the
Future ," 386
The description of either of the two Worldsinvolves stages which include, characteristicsborrowed from the other World. The reason isthat these two Worlds are abstractions fromthe Universe; and every abstraction involves
reference to the totality of existence.
There is no self-contained abstraction . 387
This is also another way to characterize the familiar
theme of within and without that has come up in many dif-
ferent contexts. If it seems unfamiliar here, it is because
it is couched in its most general form as the two aspects
of the Universe. Starting the definition of personality at
this level of generality would seem strange indeed were it
not for the. fact the essential criticism we have made of
the past foundations of psychological theory is that it is
based on premises which are abstractions of very limited
generality
.
Wbile it is true that. Value and Activity are only com-
pletely understood as to their interaction in the world, we
can discuss them separately. In particular, the World of
Value must be understood as a "general name for an infinity
O Q O
ol' Values." This multiplicity of Values provides a
method of describing the fact that there is order, structure,
386Ibid
. , p
.
684
.
387 Ibid.
, p. 683 .
388Ibid.
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and system in the Universe. Given that there are different
grades of Value, and that all Values have a capacity for
realization in the World of Action, then:
The World of Values must be conceived as ac-
tive with the adjustment of the potentialities
for realization. This activity of internal
adjustment is expressed by our moral and
aesthetic judgement s . 389
We now have a statement of the process of the Universe con-
ceived as the internal appreciation by actual entities of
graded values. The result is that an "immortal factor of
390Value enters into the active creation of temporal fact."
In other words, the World of Activity, in conjunction with
the World of Value can also be seen as the world of open
boundary conditions and the world of higher-order principles
such that their essential junction creates a new compre-
hensive entity. The resultant comprehensive entity, as
with all comprehensive entities, can only be described in
terms of the value which is actualized (its level of value
cannot be explained in terms of lower-order values) while
the open boundary conditions which are provided by the
operation of values on lower levels can be seen as poten-
tialities for the realization of the higher value.
7.1.1 PERSONAL IDENTITY
Actual entities, as the results of this process, can
389Ibid
.
390Ibid.
,
p . 687
•
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bo said to bo involved in a process of evaluation. The
idea of evaluation refers to the fact that an entity in the
World of Activity, by being more open to some values than
to others, is making an internal judgement for the embodi-
ment of the Value. Since the internal judgement of the
actual entity (the within of things) plays such an important
ro ^ e •*-n the realization of Value in Fact, Whitehead asks,
"Can we find any general character of the World of Fact
which expresses its adjustment for the embodiment of Value?"
He responds:
The answer to this question is the tendency
of the transitory occasions of fact to unite
themselves into sequences of Personal Iden-
tity . Each such personal sequence involves
the capacity of its members to sustain iden-
tity of Value. 391
Here, we have personal identity as a description of the way
order, structure and system are introduced into the world
by the influence of value and it is easy to see how personal
identity can function as a description of the internal con-
sistency of the actual entities on any level of the hier-
archy. The entity whose process forms "a whole sequence of
actual occasions, each with its own present immediacy, is
such that each occasion embodies in its own being the ante-
cedent members of that sequence with an emphatic experience
of self-identity of the past in the immediacy of the
391 Ibid.
,
p. 688, emphasis added.
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present. This is the realization of personal identity
.
A little further on Whitehead asserts:
This problem of "personal identity" in a
changing world of occasions is the key ex-
ample for understanding the essential fusion
of the World of Activity with the World of
Value. 393
Personal identity then, is the concept that makes it pos-
sible to understand how immortal values can be involved in
an entity whose essential character is that of process and
mortality.
Personal identity is exhibited when the
change in the details of fact exhibits an
identity of primary character amid secondary
changes of value. This identity serves the
double role of shaping a fact and realizing
a specific value. 394
If personal identity is the means by which a character-
istic unity is introduced into what would otherwise be an
endless confusion of nothingness in the World of Fact, then
it follows that the unity of that identity must be such
that it functions to create a new comprehensive entity by
adding its intrinsic value to the open boundaries of the
elements of the World of Fact that are already structured
by values of lower order. Thus, personal identity is far
more than a simple aggregation of Fact into an entity of
392Ibid
.
393Ibid.
394
p. 689 .
Ibid.
, pp . 689-690.
essentially passive character, it is, rather, a concept
which expresses the dual aspect of the actual entities in
the world; namely, that they shape the world and are also
the vehicles for the realization of value.
The intent of this discussion becomes more obvious
when it is pointed out that of all the personal identities
which comprise the world of realized fact, human "person-
ality is the extreme example of the sustained realization
a type of value. " That is to say, "when we enjoy
'realized value' we are experiencing the essential junction
396between the two worlds." By introducing the idea of
personality as an extreme example of the case of personal
identity, we can recap the derivation of the concept in
less technical terms that are more recognizable as applying
to human experience.
Since personality is an elaborated example of personal
identity which, in turn, is an expression of how the World
of Action is internally adjusted so as to manifest a spe-
cific coordination of the World of Value, and since the
infinity of Values are all interrelated into an ordered
scheme, the maintenance of a specific character of person-
ality can also be conceived of as being the relation that
exists between the realized potential of the actual world
395
396
Ibid
.
,
Ibid.
p. 690.
P- 688 .
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ami I I lo In r.iji.L l.tido of possibility that is Lho charac Lor of
the World of Values. Each human personality is not only a
product of the most elaborated realization of the World of
Value in the World of Activity, but of equal importance,
that personality may also be viewed as to its relation with
the infinitude of possibility of the World of Values. This
condition is the birthright of every actual entity in the
organismic cosmology but for man it means that human poten-
tiality may largely be seen as the realization of those
higher grades of value which are recessive and yet to be
actualized in the fact of his existence.
7.1.2 PERSONALITY, HIERAR-
CHIES AND KNOWLEDGE
Now that we have come to the use of a familiar concept
via a route that is unfamiliar and strange, it is well to
pause to take account of our position. One of the basic
reasons for the unfamiliarity is that the orientation of
the argument has shifted from what it has been throughout
the majority of the previous discussions. In the earliest
phases we discussed the narrow abstractive character of past
philosophical and scientific concepts, and gradually elabo-
rated the growing recognition that phenomena in the world
must be regarded as to their within as well as their with-
out. From the early philosophical recognition of this truth
into its modern elaborations in the physical and biological
sciences, the emphasis has been on substianting the validity
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of the "internal " against the slings and arrows of a disbe-
lieving, materialistically oriented intellectual world.
In extreme contrast to that approach, this discussion
of personality, by assuming the orientation of the philos-
ophy of organism, has started from the validity of internal
experience and has proceeded with the analysis of the Uni-
verse from that position rather than through a set of
abstract categories that only bear a tangential relation
to the completeness of lived experience. Thus, the rather
weak metaphorical statements of the previous chapter which
refer to the possibility that the flowering of man's being
could be the result of transcendent values of which he is
only dimly aware, i.e.
,
his religious sense as opposed to
his intellectual forcefulness and clarity, have become
transformed in this chapter via a different perspective on
the Universe.
Since we may now define ourselves as beings in the
hierarchy of organismic levels, beings who are obviously
aware of their own internal experience, we already have two
of the three key elements in the composition of a compre-
hensive being at our disposal. In descriptions of all lower
comprehensive beings, we have been able, according to the
logic of hierarchical relations, to define a) the lower-
order principles which provide the basis upon which, b) a
higher-order principle can formulate, c) a new comprehensive
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<, y with its own distinctive characteristics. In con-
sidering ourselves, it is most truthful to say that we are
primarily aware of ourselves as comprehensive beings with
distinctive characteristics and that we are only secondarily
aware of the explicit character of either set of principles
which border our being and mold its character.
Of the two sets of principles, it is certainly true
that our intellectual understanding of the various subordi-
nate grades of being in the hierarchy has occupied the
greater portion of modern man's efforts. These efforts are
known under the general heading of "Science" and are gener-
ally explicitly recognized as being the product of man's
intellectual analysis of the data which are presented to
his sensory faculties. Man obviously has a great capacity
for this type of activity. His mind is a supreme instrument
of analysis, apparently capable of penetrating the mysteries
of all phenomena that it can know through sensory processes
and analyze with the rational intellect.
However, the information gained in this fashion tells
only part of the story. It necessarily only refers to the
analysis of lower-order levels of being and beyond that, it
has been primarily concerned with the analysis of the ex-
ternal aspects of those phenomena. The meaning of materi-
alism in science and society is to be found in just this
aspect of our cultural heritage. Our predominant orientation
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has been toward the external aspects of lower-order phenom-
ena. Obviously, scientific knowledge is a powerful instru-
ment of great value to humanity. But it is an abstraction
m the complete Universe. It has been developed primarily
m abstraction from the World of Values and does not contain
an elaborated reference to the totality of existence.
The growth of philosophical and scientific concepts
that have increasingly come to support the validity and
necessity of recognizing the role of internal factors in
the composition of phenomena has provided the second major
element in the hierarchical triumvirate. But we have not
been allowed to become complacent in this realization; the
character of the explanation itself requires the existence
of the third major element. It is the function of this
element to provide the higher-order goal that is to become
actualized in the level upon which a new comprehensive en-
tity is being formed. We may also say that it is in the
operation of this element that we can find the mechanism to
answer the problem of why the trend of evolution has been
upwards. All entities have an essential reference to the
World of Value, and since that World is a multiplicity of
ordered Values, the evolutionary course of the actual world
must follow the graded structure of the World of Value.
7 . 2 THE ORGANTSMIC FOREGROUND
Formulating a model for personality processes that is
5^0
in harmony with the organismic approach requires an inves-
tigation of the idea of actual entity. As we have seen,
Whitehead has based his philosophical formulation on the
use of this concept which was derived by analogy to human
experience. Of course, the human experience he refers to
is significantly different than the model of human experi-
ence that was the basis of the early formulations in science
and philosophy. In. that case it was assumed that sense
experience was the only means by which the reality of the
physical world could be known. It seemed reasonable at the
time that a dualism of mind and matter should exist and
that matter was essentially inert and of a completely dif-
ferent realm. Whitehead's use of human experience involves
the notion that all things in the world have a "beingness"
that involves experience. That is, even atomic "things"
are seen as atomic events which are connected with one
another in much the same way that successive occasions of
human experience are interconnected.
7.2.1 THE ACTUAL OCCASION
AND HUMAN EXPERIENCE
In defining the character of an actual entity Whitehead
maintains
:
. . . the actual world is a process, and that
the process is the becoming of actual entities.
Thus actual entities are creatures; they are
also termed "actual occasions . "397
397Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 27, emphasis
added. It is important to keep this similarity in mind.
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It is lioro that one finds tl.o basis of "procoss" philoso-
pliy-- " the actual world is a process" and actual entities
are, in fact, occasions in that process. The idea of oc-
casion is important because it permits experience to be
unitized without also making disconnected particles out of
things. In relating the idea of an actual occasion to ex-
perience as we know it, Whitehead holds that "an occasion
of experience is an activity, analyzable into modes of func-
tioning which jointly constitute its process of becoming."
He further asserts that, "each mode is analyzable into the
total experience as active subject ." 398 His concern here
is to avoid the dissolution of the occasion into pieces
that would appear to take on a separate reality in addition
to that of the actual occasion. An actual occasion must be
considered as to its unity which, since it is an event in
the life of an individual, be it an atom or a person, is
best characterized by regarding it as to its subjective
forms of self-enjoyment.
While the doctrine sounds strange, it does function
well in the integration of scientific information. For ex-
ample, Whitehead demonstrates that the vector transmission
of energy in the physical sciences can be explained as a
succession of "physical prehensions" (to be defined below)
and says of his doctrine:
398Whitehead, Adventures of Ideas, p. 176.
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In the language of science, it describes howthe quantitative intensity of localized
energy bears in itself the vector marks ofits origin, and the specialties of its spe-
cific forms; it also gives a reason for the
atomic quanta to be discerned in the building
up of a quantity of energy. In this way, thephilosophy of organism-as it should—appeals
to the facts. 399
In focusing our concern on the actual entity of the
high grade human personality, we can best start from the
familiar topic of inversion. It is in the analysis of an
actual occasion that the topic finds its clearest expres-
sion. Sense experience, as would be expected, does not
play a fundamental role in the determination of an actual
occasion; its role is important but not fundamental. Sense
data, as the most variable element in our lives, also appear
to be the most definite and are traditionally thought of as
being the basis for the mind against which all other expe-
riences should be evaluated, i.e., emotions, fears, love,
hate, intentions, etc.. Whitehead denies this for several
reasons: a) loss of sensory modalities does not necessarily
mean death, b) states of sleep, meditation and prayer have
nothing to do with sense perception and c) after birth the
use of sense data is only a gradually acquired art of corre-
lating fundamental experience with unique sense data.^^
Thus, the basic priority in experience is not dependent on
399Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 138.
400
Whitehead, Modes of Thought
,
p. 112.
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learning how to correlate sense experience with the envi-
ronment
. This is easiest to see at lower levels than man.
In the extreme case, even beings with a low level of bodily
organization, e.g., the amoeba, react to the external world
in ways that suggest that they possess a sense of being and
recognition of the objectivity of the world. On the other
hand, the most highly developed sensory abilities belong to
the animals and not man. Again, sense experience is im-
portant but it is, none- the-less
,
a product of our more
basic bodily experience; it therefore, enhances appreciation
of reality but it does not totally determine the character
of that reality.
This point is best seen in Whitehead's use of the evi-
dence of physics and physiology to support his position.
In applying this scientific evidence to an occasion in the
experience of a human actual entity, he asserts:
Unless the physical and physiological sciences
are fables, the qualitative experiences which
are the sensations such as sight, hearing,
etc., are involved in an intricate flux of
reactions within and without the animal body.
These are hidden below consciousness in the
vague sense of personal experience of an ex-
ternal world.
It is not necessary to go into the multitudinous data ref-
erent to the actual processes and physiology of the human
*+01
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.
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p . 113
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p. 121.
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organism to appreciate the point at issue. Our awareness
of the external world obviously involves many stages of
complex neural organization in the body and the brain.
Further, the result of this tremendously complex activity
is the experience of the world which is external to the
body. That is to say, molecular events in the external
world interact with light in such a way that when the light
strikes the retina, and the subsequent phases of processing
ensue, we have an experience of these events in our brain,
not as events in themselves, but as a quality of the ex-
ternal world which is projected back into space at the same
location where the original molecules are located. An
example will help to make the point more explicit; Whitehead
says
,
For example, "I see a blue stain out there,"
implies the privacy of the ego and the exter-
nality of "out there." There is the presup-
position of "me" and the world beyond. But
consciousness is concentrated upon the quality
blue in that position. Nothing can be more
simple or more abstract. And yet unless the
physicist and the physiologist are talking
nonsense, there is a terrific tale of complex
activity omitted in the abstraction.^0 ^
403This statement is an answer to the problem left open
in Chapter 2, Section 2.2.2 where the following statement
seemed unintelligible. "In the process framework, space and
time are not the containers into which matter can be placed
and therefore simply located; rather, a region of space and
time is a simply located unit of realized experience." The
material of the present section provides a further amplifi-
cation of this theme.
404
Ibid.
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This complex activity is obviously physical activity
in the normal sense of that term; that is, there is no con-
sciousness involved in any of those necessary complexities
that enter into the final conscious experience of the ex-
ternal world. Another quotation will help to provide a
basis for discussion of this topic;
This survey supports the view that the pre-
dominant basis of perception is perception
of the various bodily organs, as passing on
their experiences by channels of transmis-
sion and enhancement.
. . . According to this
interpretation, the human body is to be con-
ceived as a complex "amplifier’'-- to use the
language of the technology of electromagnet-
ism. The various actual entities, which
compose the body, are so coordinated that
the experiences of any part of the body are
transmitted to one or more central occasions
to be inherited with enhancements accruing
along the way, or finally added by reason of
the final integration. The enduring person-
ality is the historic route of living occa-
sions which are severally dominant in the
body at successive instants. 405
Thus, the final stages of conscious perception are the re-
sult of a myriad of events that go on inside our bodies as
a result of the impact of the physical world. Whitehead
terms this unconscious physical derivation of consciousness
the "physical pole"^^ of experience which is the means by
which we know ourselves as "a historic route of occasions."
That is, we experience a derivation from our immediate past.
405 .Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 140.
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Yet, at the same time, all those events are hidden from
consciousness. This aspect of the physical pole of expe-
rience Whitehead terms "physical prehension. Physical
prehension is the means by which one occasion of experience
is related to its predecessor such that the prior occasion
functions as a cause for the later occasion. This causal
relationship between actual occasions, which are the ele-
ments from which the final conscious occasion we know in
experience is constructed, is known as "causal efficacy."^08
My process of "being myself" is my origination
from my possession of the world. 409
Thus, one physical prehension follows upon the other as
thousands of them are involved in mediating the final pro-
duction of high-level conscious experience. Again, these
basic events which are causally efficacious in experience
are actual entities which function as building blocks in
experience; but we also know that these various actual en-
tities have to add up, in some fashion, to the central occa-
sion that is of the much higher-order level of experience we
know in consciousness. This latter mode of experience is
410known as "presentational immediacy, " it arises out of the
407
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causally efficacious background as a synthesis of its data.
It is in this mode experience that we find the basis for
the descriptions of sense data that have been the basis for
traditional philosophy. Whitehead's formulation makes it
clear that a more complete analysis of experience neces-
sarily involves a description in terms of the scientific
data we have regarding the operation of the causally effi-
cacious bodily functions that underlie final perception.
When this is done, it is seen that the objects in the envi-
ronment which we know in presentational immediacy and which
we generally assume to be the causally efficacious elements
in our perception of the world are, in fact, derivative
from the truly causally efficacious data that constitute
our physical prehension of the world of actual entities.
The role of the synthesis of actual entities that
leads up to the familiar aspects of presentational immediacy
we directly experience can be shown as follows. In an ear-
lier example, Whitehead demonstrated that forming the idea
of a patch of blue, located in the environment, was in fact
a very abstract concept. This is so because we know that
the events which take place in the retina and various other
parts of the brain do not, in and of themselves, have any
quality that resembles "blueness." Since neurons most cer-
tainly are not blue, it must be that some quality is ab-
stracted from the causally efficacious events that yields
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the final percipient event of "I see a blue stain out there."
It is in this sense that the final perception of a quality
"out there" in the environment may be said to be both simple
and abstract. It is simple because it appears that the oc-
casion of experience is a direct function of the thing expe-
rienced. It is abstract because the exact opposite is the
case; the object in the environment is actually a contribu-
tion of the experiencing subject whose lower-order causally
efficacious physical prehensions have been "transmuted"^411
(transformed) into an occasion of experience. This is also
known as the "mental pole" of the occasion of experience.
Whitehead maintains that all actual entities are bipolar,
that is, they have both a physical side and a mental side.
However, only in the case of high grade entities does the
mental aspect play an important role. This, Whitehead main-
tains is the basis for the solution of the mind-body problem
412
of traditional philosophy and psychology.
Each actual entity is an integration of its physical
and mental aspects into a unity. As far as the mind-body
problem is concerned, it is the physical pole of the entity
that relates to the spacial aspects of nature while the
mental pole of the entity is primarily concerned with the
conceptual emphasis of aspects of the experience and also
4ll
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with the introduction of novelty. Whitehead says:
So though mentality is non-spacial, mentalityis always a reaction from, and integration
with, the physical experience which is spa-
cial.
. . . All the life in the body is thelife of individual cells. There are thus
millions upon millions of centers of life in
each individual animal body. So what needs
to be explained is not dissociation of per-
sonality but unifying control, by reason of
which we not only have unified behavior,
which can be observed by others, but also
consciousness of a unified experience
.
*413
It is the formation of this unified experience that is, as
Whitehead believes, the primary fact that needs to be ex-
plained in the determination of the final actual entity.
The model of hierarchical beings developed earlier helps to
*4
1
*4
clarify this point. The beings who are the actual enti-
ties on the lower scales of the hierarchy have very rudi-
mentary levels of integrated mental poles of experience.
It is only as one rises higher in the hierarchy that the
center of experience becomes more prominent in the composi-
tion of the entity. Finally, in man, centrality of control
is elaborated to its highest peak while the physical pole
or causally efficacious aspects of experience are relegated
to the background of experience.
In a living body of a high grade type there
are grades of occasions so coordinated by
their paths of inheritance through the body,
that a peculiar richness of inheritance is
*413
Ibid.
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enjoyed by various occasions in some parts of
the body. Finally, the brain is coordinated
so that a particular richness of inheritance
is enjoyed now by this and now by that part;
and thus there is produced the presiding per-
sonality at that moment in the body. ^5
This description, of the way the experiences of the lowest
level entities of the body are coordinated so as to be
transmitted to evermore integrated experiences, finally
culminating in the production of one of the central occa-
sions that forms an occasion in the life of a human person-
ality, should be looked upon not only as a solution to the
mind-body problem but also as a complement to two themes
that were of importance to earlier sections. First, in the
immediately preceding section, the idea of personal iden-
tity and ultimately of human personality was seen to be the
result of the most highly sustained realization of the World
of Value in the World of Fact. That interpretation was also
shown to be compatible with the model of hierarchical organ-
ization which thereby provided a means by which that very
abstract formulation could be related to more concrete mat-
ters. In terms of the present context, when speaking of the
integration of actual entities into higher-order occasions
of experience, it should be recognized that we have covered
two of the three elements which were descriptive of each
level in the hierarchy. The accounts of successively more
415 Ibid.
,
pp. 128-129-
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integrated actual entities describe an operational version
of the earlier distinction between a new comprehensive en-
tity and the lower-order principles of operation out of
which it arises. Thus, in the present context, for all of
its complexity, we have yet to provide for the role of the
all-important third element of hierarchical logic, namely,
the higher-order principles by which the new comprehensive
entity is formed. We will come to this element presently,
after considering the second theme of the earlier discus-
sion that is important to this context.
Here, we have reference to the familiar theme of within
and without that was developed as the mainstay of the argu-
ments of those who initially sought to surpass the limita-
tions of the mechanistic scheme. In the present context, we
can repay the debt of gratitude owed to this concept by ex-
plaining it from the perspective of an actual entity that
has both mental and physical (within and without) aspects.
Whitehead has done this in a way in which it seems certain
that Gustav Fechner and Wilhelm Dilthey, to name only two,
would have deeply appreciated.
In principle, the animal body is only a more
highly organized and immediate part of the
general environment for its dominant actual
occasion, which is the percipient. But the
transition from wi thout to wi thin the body
marks the passage from lower to higher grades
of actual occasions. The higher the grade,
the more vigorous and the more original is
'
'i
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the enhancement from the . .
. [mental pole
of experience !
.
Here, and in its proper organismic context, we can expand
upon the role of the within or the mental pole; this ex-
panded definition also opens the way toward appreciating
the true character of the formative third element that has
yet to appear in the discussion. Whitehead continues,
Pure receptivity and transmission gives place
to the trigger-action of life whereby there
is a release of energy into novel forms.
Thus the transmitted datum acquires sensa
enhanced in relevance or even changed in
character by the passage from the low-grade
external world into the intimacy of the human
body . 4l6
7.2.2 MENTALITY AND SUBJECTIVITY
Thus, the formative third element in the system of hi-
erarchical logic may also be defined as the mental pole or
the seat of the introduction of novelty into the formation
of higher-order actual occasions. There are complex char-
acterizations of the process by which this novelty is intro-
duced which can be omitted in the present discussion. In
its most general form the introduction of novelty is called
417
the "subjective form" of the prehension. This subjective
form is a product of what the actual entity prehends. Two
extreme cases will help to clarify the point. First, the
physical prehension, as we have seen, is one in which the
Ibid
.
,
p. l4l
,
emphasis added.
^~^Ibid.
,
p. 28.
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object oT the occasion is another actual entity. In this
case, the new occasion simply inherits the subjective form
that belongs to the antecedent occasion. This is the pri-
mary mode of low-order entities in which the mental pole is
not highly developed. Thus, the second case is one in which
the mental pole can be thought of as highly developed such
that it dominates in the occasion. Here, the prehensions
4l 8are called "conceptual prehensions" rather than physical
prehensions because the objects prehended are not in the
physical past of the occasion but are forms, qualities or
relations (pure potentialities) which can be considered in
abstraction from any particular actual occasion. The ob-
jects of this conceptual prehension are known as "eternal
419
objects." Of this condition Whitehead remarks:
Thus the process of becoming is bipolar,
(i) by reason of its qualification by the
detormina toness of the actual world, (physical
prehension) and (ii) by its conceptual prehen-
sions of the indeterminateness of eternal
objects. The process is constituted by the
flux of eternal objects into a novel determi-
nateness of feeling which absorbs the actual
world into a novel ac tuali ty . ^+20
Examining the role of eternal objects and the idea of novelty
more closely will help to round out this brief treatment of
Ibid . Whitehead also adds that "consciousness is
not necessarily involved in the subjective form of either
type of prehension.
"
^ 19Ibid.
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p. 38.
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Whitehead's detailed metaphysical statements and will also
open the way toward understanding his system in relation to
the logic of hierarchical relations, the third or higher-
order element of which is still unaccounted for.
It is first necessary to distinguish the idea of "sub-
jective form" from that of "subjective aim." In an earlier
statement, in conjunction with introducing the organic na-
ture of an actual occasion, the idea of subjective form of
self-enjoyment was used as a means of underlining the unity
of an actual occasion and its nature as an event in the life
of an individual (atomic or human). Subjective form de-
scribes how the actual occasion interacts with its environ-
ment. In Whitehead's terminology, "there are many species
of subjective forms, such as emotions, valuations, purposes,
421
adversions, aversions, consciousness, etc.." The unity
and character of a subjective form is derived from the eter-
nal objects which are involved in the prehensions of the
occasion. Physical prehensions contribute to the realiza-
tion of eternal objects which were included in the past
actual occasions prehended at the physical pole of experi-
ence. In addition to this way of contacting eternal objects,
the conceptual prehension of the present actual occasion, to
the extent that it is developed, also directly prehends the
eternal objects via the mode of conceptual prehension.
Up l
Whitehead, Process and Reality , p. 28.
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Conceptual prehension is the primary source of novelty be-
cause of its direct reference to a definite eternal object.
This definite reference provides additional grounds upon
which the subjective form of the actual occasion is modi-
fied. A conceptual prehension therefore, may be seen as a
valuing or devaluing of the eternal objects which were
present in the physical pole of the occasion. Thus, even
if there are no further grounds for the introduction of
novelty, the mechanism of conceptual valuation which results
from conceptual prehension can be seen to provide the basis
for autonomous action on the part of each new actual occa-
sion; this is "subjective aim."
7.2.3 THE SOURCE OF SUB-
JECTIVE ORIGINALITY
422
The concept of "subjective aim" adds an element to
the process of an actual occasion that is responsible for
actively shaping what the occasion is to become. Whereas
prehensions at the physical pole involve the use of past
actual occasions as objects (objectification) such that they
"constitutes the efficient causes out of which that actual
entity arises; the 'subjective aim' at 'satisfaction' con-
stitutes the final cause , or lure, whereby there is ... [a
determinant actual occasion]." In the formation of final
Z|22
Ibid
. ,
p. 24.
Z+2
-^Ibid.
,
p. 105
,
emphasis added.
556
cause Whitehead is referring to the fact that each actual
occasion is ultimately responsible for its own nature, it
may inherit from the past and it may introduce some novelty
via conceptual valuation of eternal objects, but there is a
much stronger sense in which each actual occasion is, in
fact, its own subject and by which it becomes a unique in-
dividual. It would therefore appear that some additional
input is required for the introduction of the character-
istics which constitute the individuality of the occasion
and its ability to transcend the data which are given to it
via its other sources. Such indeed is the case.
The initial stage of its aim is an endowment
which the subject inherits from the inevitable
ordering of things, conceptually realized in
the nature of God. ^24
However, this inheritance from God does not mean that the
actual occasion is thereby determined and without freedom.
It is more correct to say that the role of God is to provide
for each actual occasion a vision of the ideal that it might
achieve. Further, it is in the attainment of this vision
425that the actual occasion finds its maximum satisfaction.
On this point Whitehead maintains,
424
Ibid
.
,
p. 286.
42 5 Satisfaction as used here is a technical term that
refers to the idea of what the actual occasion will be once
it has completed the process of becoming. In terminating
its process of becoming (satisfaction) the actual entity be-
comes a datum for the physical prehension of future actual
occasions
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What is inexorable in God, is valuation as
an aim towards "order"; and "order" means
"society" permissive of actualities with
patterned intensity of feeling arising from
adjusted contrasts. In this sense God is
the principle of concretion; namely, he is
that actual entity from which each
. . .[actual occasion] receives that initial aimfrom which its self-causation starts. 426
Thus, it is in the nature of God's interaction with the
world that one finds the basis for the self-causation that
is required if there is to be any freedom in the world.
Subjective aim as derived from God's immanence in the world,
is the means by which the relevance of eternal objects in
conceptual prehension is determined and also, is the basis
for evaluating the physical prehensions of the actual enti-
ties which are in the past of present actual occasion. In
this way, God and the actual world are seen to jointly form
the character of the creative actual occasion. Since actual
occasions are bipolar, that is, since they have both a
physical and mental pole, then it is clear that whether the
outcome of the actual occasion is a simple physical re-
enactment of past pattern, therefore nonmental, or whether
the occasion achieves some highly novel form of mental in-
tegration that modifies the character of the whole occasion,
this process is one of self-determination in which the
actual occasion is always its own autonomous master.
426
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God's Immanence in the world in respect tohis primordial nature is an urge towards the
future based upon an appetite in the present.
Appetition is at once the conceptual valua-
tion of an immediate physical feeling com-bined with the urge towards realization of
the datum conceptually prehended. For ex-
ample, "thirst" is an immediate physical
feeling integrated with the conceptual pre-
hension of its quenching.
Appetition is an immediate matter of fact
including in itself a principle of unrest,
involving realization of what is not and
what may be. The immediate occasion thereby
conditions creativity so as to procure, in
the future, physical realization of its men-
tal pole, according to the various valuations
inherent in its various conceptual prehen-
sions . 427
On numerous occasions in past discussion, we have been
able to summarize important aspects of the topic at hand by
repeating a quotation. Here too, it is possible to do so
with the added advantage of also implicating those past dis-
cussions in the present context.
The point to remember is that the fact that
each individual occasion is transcended by
the creative urge (appetition)
,
belongs to
the essential constitution of each such
occasion. It is not an accident which is
irrelevant to the completed constitution of
any occasion.
In the formation of each occasion of
actuality the swing over from re-enaction
to anticipation is due to the intervening
touch of mentality. Whether the ideas thus
introduced by the novel conceptual prehen-
sions be old or new, they have this decisive
result, that the occasion arises as an
effect facing its past and ends as a cause
427Ibid.
* p. 37.
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. In between there is the
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We have, therefore, come to the final answer to the
major question which has been implicit in the last three
chapters. Organismic metaphysics and process philosophy
require the concept of God as an inseparable reason for the
advance of the world. Thus, implicit in those earlier dis-
cussions of teleology, organism, self-causation, science,
evolution, etc., has been the realization that God is the
ultimate urge toward the realization of potential. His
role is that of an all-pervasive influence that gives form
and direction to actuality; He is the single source of order
and His immanence is the ultimate answer to the question,
Why has the trend of evolution been upward?^29
It seems somewhat unnecessary to point out that we need
search no further for the answer to the question as to the
source of the third element in the system of hierarchical
logic that is responsible for the formation of a new compre-
hensive entity. Whitehead puts it thusly:
. . . God can be termed the creator of each
temporal actual entity. ^+30
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7.2.4 THE PROBLEM OF
ETERNAL OBJECTS
Up to this point, the role of "eternal objects" has
been implicated in the vital processes of an actual occa-
sion without much explanation, or at least any attempted
explanation, of their rather enigmatic character. Some of
the problems in dealing with eternal objects are easily
seen. First, there is Whitehead himself, who, in one of
his very infrequent personal letters, said to Charles
Hart shorne
,
There is one point on which you and--
everyone—misconstrue me— obviously my usual
faults of exposition are to blame. I mean
my doctrine of eternal objects. It is a
first endeavor to get beyond the absurd
simplemindedness of the traditional treatment
of Universals.^-^
Whitehead made this statement well after the doctrine was
widely publicized in a systematic fashion in both Science
432
and the Modern World and Process and Reality . Second,
it should be pointed out that Whitehead reserves the use of
the term eternal object for those contexts in which he is
developing his metaphysics in a systematic fashion. In his
other major works, i.e., Adventures of Ideas and Mode r-.—o_f_
^ 31Whitehead, Letter to Charles Ilartshorne in Alfred
North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy, George L. Kline
ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall , Inc . , 19 3 )
>
p. 199.
^-^The 'statement dates from 1936 whereas Science—arU
the Modern World was published in 1925 and Process
Reality was published in 1929*
561
Though 1- as well as the Iohsoi’ ones I i R<* Holigion in the
Making
,
Symbolism and The Function of Reason Whitehead only
used the term briefly (six times in Adventures of Ideas );
it does not occur in the remainder of his published works.
Third, there are many equivalent expressions which are used
to carry the meaning of the more precise terminology . ^
^
Fourth, the philosophical reasons for getting involved in
the concept are anchored deep in tradition and are also
contemporary problems. For example, Whitehead sees Plato's
use of Universals in the following way:
When Plato is faced with the problem of ex-
pressing the relationship of God to the World,
and of the relation to the World of those
Ideas which it is in God's nature to contem-
plate, Plato's answer is invariably framed in
terms of mere dramatic imitation. When Plato
turns to the World, after considering God as
giving life and motion to the ideas by inclu-
sion of them in his divine nature, he can
find only second-rate substitutes and never
the originals. For Plato there is a derivative
second-rate God of the World, who is a mere
Icon, that is to say an image. Also when he
looks for the ideas, he can only find, in the
World, imitations. Thus, the World, for Plato,
includes only the image of God, and imitations
of his ideas, and never God and his ideas. ^35
433William A. Christian, An Interpretation of White -
head's Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959),
p. 195-
434 / \Some examples from Christian's summary ( Ibid .
)
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as follows: forms, ideal forms, ideal forms of possibility,
abstract forms, eternal forms, possibilities, abstractions
and potential forms.
^^^Whi tehead
,
Adventures of Ideas
,
p. 215, quoted in
Ibid.
,
p. 198.
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It is Whitehead's feeling that metaphysics should admit to
no gap between God and the World; the union should be com-
plete and mutual. That is to say, "what metaphysics re-
quires is a solution exhibiting the plurality of individuals
as consistent with the unity of the Universe, and a solution
which exhibits the World as requiring its union with God,
and God as requiring his union with the World," the doctrine
436
of eternal objects was created to fill just this need.
It is the foundation of the metaphysical posi-
tion which I am maintaining that the under-
standing of actuality requires a reference to
ideality. The two realms are inherent in the
total metaphysical situation. . . . Eternal
objects are, in their nature, abstract. By
abstract I mean that what an eternal object is
in itself--that is to say, its essence--is
comprehensible without reference to some one
particular occasion of experience . ^37
We are thus provided with an important clue to the nature of
eternal objects. As in the previous section, where the de-
scription of either the World of Value or the World of Fact
necessarily involved characteristics borrowed from the other
world, here too, both the realm of actuality and the realm
of ideality are inherent parts of the whole metaphysical
situation. But what is the whole metaphysical situation?
Simply, according to the ontological principle, the answer
must be—actual entities. That is, what is real and concrete
^^^Whi t ehead
,
Ibid
.
,
p. l68.
Whitehead, Science and the Modern World , pp . 158-159-
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are the actual occasions of experience which belong to ac-
tual individuals. Thus events are concrete and object
s
are
abstract in the sense that they can only be understood in
relation to an actual occasion. There are only two classes
of objects in the Whi teheadian system and both have this
relationship. An actual occasion prehends the world in two
ways, at its physical pole and at its mental pole. At the
physical pole there are past actual occasions which have
become "objectified" as data for the new actual occasion.
While those prehensions at the mental pole of the occasion
are prehensions of "eternal objects." Whitehead says of
both types of prehension that:
The positive prehension of an entity by an
actual entity is the complete transaction
analyzable into the ingression, or objectifi -
cation
,
of that entity as a datum for feeling,
and into the feeling whereby this datum is
absorbed into the subjective satisfaction. *+3°
There are many things which could be said about the
nature of eternal objects that are outside the focus of this
discussion. Obviously, their nature as abstract pure poten-
tials for the becoming of actual occasions is a difficult
concept to express and Whitehead was clearly frustrated by
it. It is the opinion of this writer that much ot the dif-
ficulty in interpreting this concept is due to a failure to
take Whitehead's system on its own terms. Unless one is
^-^Whi tehead
,
Process and Reality , p. 66, emphasis
added.
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willing to explicitly grant, as Whitehead does, the central
role in Creation to God, then the concept of eternal object,
as forcefully put forth by Whitehead, appears inconsistent
with the way the world is usually thought of in science and
philosophy
. This writer has no trouble in agreeing with
Whitehead on this point. The role ascribed to God in the
philosophy of organism is the key term in recreating the
metaphysical basis for scientific and philosophical activity.
Since God is the ultimate element of coherence in the
Whiteheadian system, we can best close this account of the
details of Whitehead's cosmological system and the enigmatic
character of eternal objects with a brief summary of the
nature of God's participation in the processes of organismic
actual occasions.
7.2.5 THE IMMANENCE OF GOD
In entering this discussion of the nature of God as it
applies within the philosophy of organism, it is important
to remember that the discussion bears only on the metaphysi-
cal nature of God's action in the world as it appears from
within the system of organismic metaphysics. It is not the
intent of this discussion to make either theological or
religious assertions about the nature of God. Obviously,
there are implications which can not be ignored as regards
one's personal outlook; however, for the purposes of this
discussion the God of Whitehead's cosmology should be seen
363
as an al lo ilia live lo the Clod that w;is tin* "Father" ol the
mechanistic world.—view of the past scientific era.
Throughout the discussions of organism! c metaphysics,
the ontological principle has provided the explicit state-
ment that everything must be thought of as existing in some
actuality. That is, Whitehead does not believe that expla-
nations can float around in a void until they are needed to
explain some fact of actuality. On the contrary, in a
realist system, everything must be some place that is "real"
or it will be imaginary; that is to say, unreal. Therefore,
Whitehead locates the general potentiality of the universe,
that must be somewhere, in a very special actual entity
known as the nontemporal actual entity or, God.
Since the temporal actual occasions arise by their
participation in (prehension of) that which is timeless and
abstract, that is, the objectified world of past actual oc-
casions and the realm of eternal objects, some means of
combining that which is temporal with that which is nontem-
poral (objectified) is required. Whitehead maintains,
The things which are temporal arise by their
participation in the things which are eternal.
The two sets are mediated by a thing which
combines the actuality of what is temporal
with the timelessness of what is potential.
This final entity is the divine element in
the world. 439
Thus, God is seen to be the divine element which is the
439 Ibid.
,
p . 33
•
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ultimate ground for connecting Value and Fact, potentiality
and actuality.
It is also in this connection that the basis for the
creative advance is to be found. This is accomplished by
the condition in which it is in God's nature to value the
entire realm of eternal objects. That is, there is a cer-
^a ^-n "togetherness in the realm of eternal objects that
grades them into a hierarchy of relationships with one
440
another. Thus, the order inherent in the realm of eter-
nal objects and their reflection in the creative order of
the world are both a direct function of the relevance of
God. In the more general terms of the previous section of
this chapter, this means that God is both the "persuasive
coordination of the essential multiplicity of Creative
Action" and also, "he is the unification of the multiple
441personalities received from the Active World."
The earlier reference to God as a nontemporal actual
entity, that is, as the actuality wherein the potentiali tie
of the Universe are ordered and whereby creativity is condi
tioned, introduces an important aspect of the relation
between God and the World. Since the nature of God is not
subject to the temporality of the created world, i.e., He
is eternal, it cannot be said that there is a past for God.
^^Whi t ehead
,
Science and the Modern World , p. l60.
44l , .Whitehead, Immortality
,
p. 694.
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Further
,
since it is the past of an actual occasion that is
objectified in the prehensions at the physical pole of each
temporal occasion of experience, it is the conceptual or
mental pole of God's nontemporal nature that predominates
in the divine occasion. This is known as the "primordial
442
nature" of God in which the unity of conceptual feeling
includes all eternal objects, graded in the relevance of
God's vision. The physical pole of God's nature is known
443as God's "consequent nature" and derives from God's pre-
hension of the actual entities of the actual world. It is
in this way, therefore, that pure potentiality and actuality
are combined. Whitehead expressed this at one point as
follows
:
This is the conception of God, according to
which he is considered as the outcome of crea-
tivity, as the foundation of order, and as the
goal towards novelty. "Order" and "novelty"
are but the instruments of his subjective aim
which is the intensification of "formal imme-
diacy . "444
And, in a less technical terminology
The wisdom of [God's] subjective aim prehends
every actuality for what it can be in such a
perfected system--its sufferings, its sorrows,
its failures, its triumphs, its immediacies
of joy--woven by rightness of feeling into the
442Whitehead, Process and Reality , p
443Ibid.
444Ibid
. ,
p . 106
.
105.
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harmony of the universal feeling, which is
always immediate, always many, always one,
always with novel advance, moving onward and
never perishing.
. . . The image—and it is
but an image-- the image under which this
operative growth of God's nature is best
conceived, is that of a tender care that
nothing be lost.
The consequent nature of God is hisjudgement on the world. He saves the world
as it passes into the immediacy of his own
life. It is the judgement of tenderness
which loses nothing that can be saved. It
is also the judgement of a wisdom which uses
what in the temporal world is mere wreckage . ^5
And finally, there is metaphysical poetry,
What is done in the world is transformed
into a reality in heaven, and the reality
in heaven passes back into the world. By
reason of this reciprocal relation, the love
of the world passes into the love in heaven,
and floods back into the world. In this
sense, God is the great companion-- the fellow-
sufferer who understands. ^
We can conclude the investigation of the necessity of
including the role of God in organismic metaphysics on the
above note. It would appear that not only is the nature of
God a necessary element for the coherence of Whitehead's
system, but also, that the resultant intimate connection
between God and his creation resulting from the organismic
approach is one which opens the way toward enhanced depth
of feeling in individual experience. It seems quite cer-
tain that this is what Whitehead had in mind when he said
4Z+5
Ibid., pp. 407-408.
^^Ibid.
,
p. 413.
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"breadth of thought reacting with intensity of sensitive
experience stands out as an ultimate claim on existence.
It should also be added that the intent of this limited
consideration of Whitehead's detailed metaphysics has been
to prepare the ground for the next section. Though the
details considered above have been lengthy, even if very
sketchy, there are important elements that have yet to be
introduced. These topics will be considered as an intro-
duction to a summary statement of the key problems which
the philosophy of organism places upon the doorstep of con-
temporary psychology and education.
7.3 MACROCOSMIC ORGANISMIC RELATIONS
We can begin by noting that the disparity which exists
between the technical philosophical and popularized versions
of Whitehead’s thought, which was mentioned at the beginning
of the chapter, is also present in Whitehead's writings.
Whitehead himself had a problem in bridging the gap between
the systematic terminology of the philosophy of organism
and concepts which are used in the usual descriptions of
experience. The problem in the formulation of terminology
applying to eternal objects cited above, is a case in point.
However, a multiplicity of terminology does not mean that
Whitehead was unsure of the concept he had in mind. In
fact, it would seem that the clarity and forcefulness of
447Ibid
. ,
p . 20
.
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I-Ih' concept, in liis in i ruJ mu si, have boon at. Lho basis of his
usual ability to coino up with a highly suggestive metaphor
0:r a evocative words that could carry the meaning of
his more precise philosophical insights. While the rich-
ness added by such discussion is important beyond estima-
tion, it is, however, often difficult to tell whether
Whitehead is attempting to develop a systematic term or to
create a plain language bridge into a philosophical detail.
One such terminological problem lies at the base of those
aspects of the system that were reserved for inclusion in
this section.
Since the previous section focused primarily upon the
microcosmic nature of an actual occasion, there was little
opportunity to go beyond those details into a consideration
of how they are related to the macrocosmic world that we
know in everyday life. This section, therefore, considers
the macrocosmic aspect of the philosophy of organism. The
problem in terminology that is found in this aspect of
Whitehead's thought centers around the use of the term
"organism." Since Whitehead called his system the philoso-
phy of organism, it would appear that there is some precise
meaning in the term. But if microcosmic actual occasions
are organismic, what is the status of the macrocosmic or-
ganisms in the world that we know in experience? As it
happens, "organism" is not a systematic term for Whitehead
571
wlioii 1 1.0 i s dealing wiLh iiiacrooosiiiic
himself maintains that:
on Li Li os
448
Wh i Lohoad
In the philosophy of organism it is held that
the notion of "organism" has two meanings,
. . . namely the microscopic and the macro-
scopic meaning. The microscopic meaning is
concerned with the formal constitution of an
actual occasion. ... The macroscopic meaning
is concerned with the givenness of the actual
world, considered as the stubborn fact which
at once limits and provides opportunity for
the actual occasion. ^^9
Clearly, the meaning of organismic relations is different
in each case. For the actual occasion, organism refers to
the complex events that occur within the actual occasion.
In the macrocosmic sense, organic relations refer to the
interconnection of actual occasions and therefore are of a
different character than those of the actual occasion, and
require an additional set of concepts for their explication.
In the present instance, the terminological problem is not
very large since there is little chance of getting led too
far astray by the difference in usage. The problem will,
however, be more acute in future discussions; seeing it here
in a rather neutral context should be of benefit at those
times
.
7-3.1 INTERCONNECTION
As we have seen, the final indivisible entities in the
448Christian, ojd. cit
.
,
p. 158 .
449Whitehead, Process and Reality
,
p. 151.
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worl <1 are l.lu' iiioiikmi Lury actual occasions that arc mruioctod
by LI icir prehensions of each other. Entities which are
interconnected by their prehensions, that is, entities
which "objectify" each other, however loose the connection
may be, are said to form a "nexus. "*lj0 It is the strength
of interconnection that determines the character of a nexus.
_ 451Nexus are strengthened into a "society" when there is a
common eternal object in the prehensions of each actual
occasion in the nexus. By virtue of this common defining
452
characteristic, they may be said to have "social order."
The social order of a nexus provides an explanation of the
way actual entities become coordinated into the "things" we
know. For example, a molecule, a rock or an animal body
are all examples of a type of a nexus that sustains itself
with a certain type of order.
At this point, there is an interesting parallel to the
hierarchical logic of the previous chapter. Whitehead ob-
serves, that since each society is brought together out of
a larger background environment of actual occasions, soci-
eties do not exist in isolation and are, in fact, subject
to the influence (open boundary conditions) of their social
450
451
452
Ibid
.
,
p
.
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Whitehead,
24 .
form i
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^53background. Also, the laws which dominate the social
environment of the nexus are said to be the result of the
common defining characteristic of that background society.
Thus, the new comprehensive entity which is formed on the
open boundary conditions of the lower level (social back-
ground), is not reducible to a description in terms of its
parts or the defining properties of the lower-order society.
Clearly
,
two of the three terms of hierarchical logic are
evident in this account of nexus. The third or higher-order
term is present but submerged in this account since it is a
factor functioning wi thin the actual occasions of the nexus
whereas, the other relations are concerned with the wi thout
or external relations between actual occasions.
To recap briefly, the concept of a society of actual
occasions is seen to be one whose character can vary over a
wide range of organization and complexity. Since everything
that has gone before suggests that organization in the em-
pirical world of "stubborn fact" should be thought of in
hierarchical terms, it is not surprising to find that there
is a hierarchy of societies. Now that we are dealing with
the hierarchical relations of the societies that actually
compose the world, it is important to pay attention to their
character and a slight digression is required to demonstrate
453Ibid.
454Ibid.
p. 108.
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Whitehead's thinking on this matter.
Since Whitehead always seems to catch an idea in its
widest sweep, he defines the basis of the system of socie-
ties we know in our world, as but a part of a "vast nexus
that extends far beyond our immediate cosmic epoch. "
Thus, his cosmology would readily accept other epochs with
vastly different social orders. On this view, the fact
that our present epoch is characterized by three spacial
and one time dimension, or a four dimensional space- time
system, is something of an accident. That is, Whitehead's
system provides no intrinsic reason as to why there are
four dimensions in our epoch; there could just as easily
have been five or t if teen dimensions. Such considerations
serve mainly to help grasp the most general relations that
prevail in our epoch. Whitehead does not bemoan the fact
that there are only four dimensions in our system, he
accepts it as an empirical fact that does not require logi-
cal demonstration. Now we can return to considering the
character of the societies in our epoch.
Since all societies have the social relationship men-
tioned above, and since societies are hierarchical, the
lowest societies in the hierarchy of our epoch must have the
broadest application.
455^Ibid
.
, p. 115 .
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Thus the physical relations, the geometrical
relations of measurement, the dimensional
relations, and the various grades of exten-
sive relations, involved in the physical and
geometrical theory of nature, are derivative
from a series of societies of increasing
width (decreasing degree of order) of preva-
lence, the more special societies (higher,
more ordered) being included in the wider
societies. This situation constitutes the
physical and geometrical order of nature. 456
The important aspect of this, for our concern, is that the
societal order that determines the order of nature, is at
one and the same time the basis of the higher orders and is
also formed by the same means as all higher orders, i.e.,
nexus composed of actual occasions that are ordered by the
effect of the eternal objects that they prehend. This real-
ization will be of importance in subsequent contexts.
7.3.2 SOCIETIES
In moving to higher levels of the hierarchy, societies
rapidly become more complex as the various levels from elec-
trons to minerals, to vegetables, to animals, to man, are
traversed. As soon as the complexity is great enough to
support a society within a society, e.g., a molecule, soci-
457
eties become "structured societies." Similarly, a mole-
cule within a living cell is also a structured society such
that the lower—order society within the higher—order one is
^^Ibid
. ,
p. 110.
457 Ibid.
,
p. 121 .
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4 58said to be a "subordinate society." In the simple case
of a molecule, which is a society of actual occasions whose
members are related serially, i.e.
,
successive physical
prehensions, the society is said to have a "personal
459
order." In this case, the personal order is of a low
grade since the actual occasions which comprise the nexus
are primarily involved in prehensions of their physical
poles such that there is little opportunity for the intro-
duction of novelty into the actual occasion. Such novelty,
should it occur, would subsequently produce a change in the
character of the nexus. Since the novelty does not arise,
460
this type of nexus is called an "enduring object." Thus,
enduring objects may be seen as the basis of the stability
of the material world. In fact, they are the material
world. As a final step in this type of complexifying envi-
.
.
.
„46l
,
,
ronment
,
there are "corpuscular societies" that are com-
posed of varying degrees of union between enduring objects.
All of these societies of whatever complexity are pri-
marily characterized by the fact that they are specialized
for their environments. That is, since they are not given
to novelty, their complexity is such that it stands in a
458
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constant relation to the wider social environment; hence,
they are stable. Also, it should be stressed that the
degree of interconnection, though stabilized within a given
nexus, is highly variable across nexus
. Compare, for ex-
ample, the internal relatedness of atoms in a diamond with
those of a gas.
There is another type of highly complex society that
is not stabilized into such inert relations with its envi-
ronment. The living cell, for example, is a type of society
that exhibits a changing relationship with its environment.
According to the detailed account of actual occasions the
only way that the novelty associated with living societies
can be obtained is by the addition of conceptual prehensions
at the mental pole of the actual occasions in the nexus. It
thus becomes the definition of a living society that it is
one in which there is at least some touch of novelty arising
462
from the conceptual prehension of eternal objects. In
this way, mere repetition is transformed into basis for a
living occasion.
Extension of the role of mentality as it functions
within a nexus in the production of a living society, leads
to consideration of the extreme case where there will be a
living society such that all members of the nexus will
have mental poles that introduce novel reactions to the
462Ibid
. ,
p . 122
.
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t'nv i i oilmen t
. Since life Is defined ns involving at least
a touch of novelty, a nexus that is entirely involved in
novelty is said to be an "entirely living nexus . " ^
^
There is a shade of definition that is important to
the difference between nexus which are living and those
which are not. A nonliving nexus is a society that forms
an enduring object. That is, the endurance of the nexus is
not intimately dependent upon the support of the environ-
ment. In the case of an entirely living nexus the situa-
tion is quite the opposite, since a living nexus must be
thought of as one in which the final high-grade mentality
of the living body is an outgrowth of the lower-order levels
of nexus that comprise the various subordinate societies of
the body system. Thus, it is maintained that the complex
inorganic system of interaction is built up for the protec-
tion and maintenance of an entirely living nexus and that,
in return, the original novel actions of the living elements
in the system are protective of the character of the whole
system
.
There is, of course, a direct comparison between this
relation of the living to the nonliving and the accounts of
"cyclic causality" that were of such great value to Wadding-
ton and Piaget. Clearly, there can be no mxstakxng
Z+63
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the similarity of the two descriptions. Piaget, it will be
remembered, maintains that:
As soon as it is recognized that . . . the
environment is just as much organized by the
organism as phenotypic variation is directed
by the environment, then it becomes possible
to speak of "cybernetic circuits" . . . and
development can be seen as a series of organ-
izational ladders, all different and all per-
petually subject to cyclic causality . ^65
By way of emphasizing the similarity, we see that Whitehead
maintains that
:
A complex inorganic system of interaction is
built up for the protection of the "entirely
living" nexus and the originative actions of
the living elements are protective of the
whole system. On the other hand, the reac-
tion of the whole system provides the inti-
mate environment required by the "entirely
living" nexus. We do not know of any living
society devoid of its subservient apparatus
of inorganic societies . ^6
It is important to note that the correspondence between the
two systems of interpretation is a function of two entirely
different levels of explanation. Whitehead, by his own ad-
mission is "conjecturing" about the character of living
4
bodies based on the categories of his metaphysical system.
Piaget, on the other hand, is talking with reference to
empirical fact that has emerged in recent biological and
psychological science. Thus, just as it is possible to
f. /T g
^Piaget, Biology and Knowledge , p. 135*
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Whitehead, Process and Reality , p. 122.
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demonstrate a comparability between organismic metaphysics
and basic categories of physical phenomena, e.g., the vec-
468tor transmission of physical energy, there is also an
important sense in which it can be maintained that organis-
mic metaphysics also conform to the facts of the empirical
biological sciences. Yet, it is also true that a corre-
spondence with empirical data in this fashion does not
exhaust the meaning of the metaphysics. In fact, the mutu-
ality of the two views should lead to greater confidence in
the applicability of the metaphysics in other areas of sci-
entific activity, i.e., psychology and education.
Some of the additional meaning of the metaphysics can
be shown as follows. By defining life as the result of the
introduction of novelty not associated with the inherited
data from the physical pole of experience, the phenomenon
of life is not only inextricably bound up with physical
phenomena, it is also given the property of responding to
"values,” i.e., the development of subjective aim and all
469
that is implied by that process. The additional meta-
physical meaning is associated with the fact that life can
not be thought of as something abstract from the animal
body. That is, "entirely living" nexus, exist only as a
result of the protective environment provided by the animal
^^Cf
. ,
Chapter 7> Section 7*2.
**^Cf
. ,
Chapter 7, Section 7.2.2.
581
body. In this sense, life must be thought of as the name
for originality and not for tradition. Thus, the idea
of acting on and reacting to an environment can be viewed
a larger sense in which action and reaction are proper-
ties of all societies, living and nonliving. However,
special attention to the character of living societies
shows that their reaction to the environment is continued
by conceptual experience which functions to adapt reaction
so that it captures the maximum intensity of experience for
the organism as it is confronted with a broad range of envi-
ronmental circumstances. It is therefore asserted that the
reaction of a living body is dictated by the present and
471
not by the past; "It is the clutch at vivid immediacy."
But vivid immediacy is not license to complete freedom
of action. Living nexus, those societies which are depen-
dent upon the lower-order nonliving nexus, may be said to
be a living person in the sense that they can sustain a
thread of personal order from occasion to occasion; however,
when such a society clutches at vivid immediacy the degree
of originality is necessarily limited by its dependence upon
the limits of the nonliving society. Thus, mental origi-
nality as manifest in personal mentality must adjust its
functioning to insure the safety of the material organism
470
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upon which it depends; "Thus life turns back into society:
it binds originality within bounds, and gains the massive-
ness due to reiterated character.
Finally
,
the assertion must be made that of the var-
ious examples of "entirely living" nexus that support the
personal order of a living person, the human body and its
"entirely living" nexus must be thought of in the sense
that "our own self-consciousness is direct awareness of
473ourselves as such persons."
Yet, if we take the metaphysics seriously, there is
still something missing from an account that simply provides
that life processes have a cyclic feedback nature such that
physical order gives rise to mental originality which, in
turn, is so structured as to protect the physical order.
Organismic metaphysics also provides that the conceptual
generation of novel mentality is a direct result of the
relevance of God for the novel situation as it is expressed
in the ordering of the eternal objects involved in the ex-
perience. It is therefore the case, that all mental origi-
nality in "the temporal world is conditioned, though not
determined, by an initial subjective aim supplied by the
474
ground of all order and of all originality."
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7.3.3 THE PRESIDING OCCASION
Examining some further implications of the account of
living occasions given above, leads to an account of the
complexity of the animal body that reaches the rather
astounding conclusion that the functions of life within a
living cell are associated with the empty space within the
cell* "Life lurks in the interstices of each living cell,
and in the interstices of the brain.',/+^ Associating life
with empty space is a strange doctrine that requires some
explanation. Fortunately, the more familiar logic of hier-
archical relations will help since the concern really re-
duces to a form similar to the problem associated with the
formation of a new comprehensive entity.
A living society, as a complex structure of inorganic
societies which are woven together into the production of a
new comprehensive (living) entity, may be said to be built
upon the open boundaries of the material animal body. How-
ever, a comprehensive entity cannot be explained in terms of
the lower-order operating principles which formed the open
boundaries which support the integrated experiences of the
whole animal. Thus, its conceptual reaction to the environ-
ment, which constitutes the unity of the animal as a compre-
hensive entity, must be thought of as existing in some place
other than the space which is occupied by the lower-order
475Ibid.
,
p . 125 •
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entities. Clearly, since all the material entities
(enduring objects) which comprise the animal body are re-
stricted to pure physical prehension, the space which they
occupy cannot be thought of as containing the novelty that
is life itself.
The mainstay in the argument which Whitehead develops
to account for this state of affairs is that it is God's
purpose in the creative advance to evoke the intensities of
experience that characterize the unity of life on each
level of the hierarchy. He sums this up by saying:
So far as the functioning of the animal body
is concerned, the total result is that the
transmission of physical influence, through
the empty space within it, has not been en-
tirely in conformity with the physical laws
holding for inorganic societies. The mole-
cules within an animal body exhibit certain
peculiarities of behavior not to be detected
outside the animal body. In fact, living
societies illustrate the doctrine that the
laws of nature develop together with societies
which constitute an epoch. ^7 6
One final thing remains to be said about the order of
nature that is the result of this view. By providing for
the intimate interweaving of mental and physical experience,
the way has been paved to understand the integrated expe-
riences of the whole animal as they are summed into a
"presiding occasion" of experience that is not necessarily
^76Ibid.
,
pp. 123-126; cf. also, Chapter 7, Section
7.2.1 as regards the coordination of actual entities into an
enduring personality.
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restricted to any part of the body.
Thus, in an animal body the presiding occa-
sion, ... is the final node, or intersec-
tion, of a complex structure of many enduring
objects. Such a structure pervades the human
body. The harmonized relations of the parts
of the body constitute this wealth of inheri-
tance into a harmony of contrasts, issuing
into intensity of experience. . . . The human
mind is thus conscious of its body inheri-
tance. There is also an enduring object
formed by the inheritance from presiding
occasion to presiding occasion. This endur-
ance of the mind is only one more example of
the general principle on which the body is
constructed . ^77
In coming to this description of the presiding occa-
sion of human experience as it has developed out of the
details of the microcosmic and macrocosmic accounts of the
philosophy of organism, we have once again come to the posi-
tion that was adopted in the first section of this chapter.
That is to say, the enduring object that is formed by the
inheritance from presiding occasion to presiding occasion,
is the detailed cosmological way of phrasing the problem of
"personal identity in a changing world of occasions [that]
is the key example for understanding the essential fusion
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of the World of Activity with the World of Value."
7.4 TWO MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR
PSYCHOLOGY AND EDUCATION
The extended development of organismic relations
4^Ibid
. ,
p. 129.
Z+
^ 8Whitehead, Immortality , p. 689 .
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considered in this chapter provides the basis for the fol-
lowing characterization of two topics which impact on con-
temporary psychology and education. Since these topics
derive directly from organismic metaphysics, we may look
upon them as the animating background of specific theoreti-
cal formulations and empirical investigations in exactly
the same sense that the mechanistic world-view fostered the
formulations of associationis tic stimulus-response models
of mental processes. No attempt need be made at this point
to recount the history of psychological thought or to sub-
stantiate the assertions about its metaphysical parentage.
That task has been addressed in Chapters One through Four.
Also, in an important sense, the present concern is not
with issues of metaphysics; instead, we are now faced with
the derivation of an orientation toward the appropriate
epistemology for an organismic psychology. Since the gen-
eral impact of the organismic approach has been considered
by interweaving its perspectives with the history of the
first four chapters, and also by considering the interpreta-
tions of modern science and organismic relations of Chapters
Five, Six and the first three sections of this chapter, the
proper concluding discussion should now consider the basis
for the organismic approach to psychological theory and edu-
cational practice.
The two major topics of this section are views of an
organismic opis tomology which derive from two distinct,
perspectives on the unity of human experience. The first
topic to be considered focuses upon the organismic perspec-
tive of man's immanence in nature while the second topic
opens consideration ol the organismic assertions regarding
man's transcendence of nature.
The following consideration of these two aspects of
knowing attempts to state the issues at hand without intro-
ducing new evidence or elaborate reconsideration of pre-
vious material. The narrower aspect of immanence will be
considered first before the broader topic of transcendence
can enter as a concluding theme. Both these topics may be
viewed as a more detailed account of the organismic psy-
479chology considered in Chapter Five. Or, to be more accu-
rate, the earlier organismic psychology may be seen as a
philosophical interpretation of organismic metaphysics while
the present discussion may be viewed as an epistemological
interpretation of the same metaphysical orientation.
7.4.1 IMMANENCE
In focusing on man's immanence in nature from the or-
ganismic point-of-view as it impacts on concerns relevant
to psychology and education, the basic fact to be considered
is the source of man's knowledge about his environment.
In entering this discussion, the problem of the use of
Chapter 5> Sections 5*3*1 and 5*3*2.
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terminology in tlio Will tolioadi an scheme arises as an initial
concern. As indicated above, in connection with the vari-
ous characterizations applied to the concept of "eternal
objects" and the separate meanings of the term "organism,"
the precise meaning of terms is often difficult to deter-
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mine • In the present instance there is an extreme ex-
ample of this problem and one which appears to be a major
factor in obscuring more detailed empirical investigation
of the validity of theories deriving from organismic meta-
physics. Also, the presence of a problem in terminology
should alert concern as to the special nature of the thought
which is so difficult to express.
Whitehead’s position on the problem of everyday knowl-
edge of the world is that there are three primary phases
involved. The ordinary mode of experience is called sym-
bolic reference which is considered to be a mixed mode of
knowing deriving from the two more primitive modes of
knowing considered earlier; namely, presentational immediacy
and causal efficacy. Of these two, causal efficacy is the
more basic. This is the mode that derives from physical
prehensions of past data. It is therefore, the mode in
which the inheritance of personal identity that involves
all layers of the material body is transmitted into the
present occasion of experience. Since Whitehead is always
480Cf
.
»
Chapter 7» Sections 7*2.4 and 7*3*
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cautious to contrast this mode of inheritance with tho data
derived from conceptual prehension at tho mental polo of
experience, i.e., presentational immediacy, he characteris-
tically uses terms for the physical fooling of past data
which emphasize its causal nature while at tho same time
denying or tending to deny any of the meanings associated
with the other mode. Thus
,
causal efficacy is given de-
scriptions such as vague, crude, inarticulate and massive
as a way of characterizing this felt efficaciousness of the
past
.
His reason for doing this is that one of his primary
insights into the nature of metaphysical knowledge involves
the assertion that normal knowing as considered in past
philosophy and science is really based on the mode of pres-
entational immediacy. It is a primary characteristic of
this mode of knowing the world that it is concerned with
that which is highly articulate, vivid, and sharp. Thus,
standard accounts of the world are couched in terms of iso-
lation in space and time which also emphasize the separate-
ness of the entities of the extensive world. These accounts
of experience are primarily based on visual perception and
consider the world in exclusion of the data which derive
from the past.
Whitehead does not argue that the knowledge of the
world which is derived from specific consideration ol the
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extensive world is wrong, rather, he maintains that it is
limited. The traditional emphasis is understandable since
the higher phases of consciousness are those which dominate
in our experience. It is also in this context that the
familiar topics of "Misplaced Concreteness" and "Inversion"
find their source and we can now sum up their meaning rather
easily
.
By relying on the previous detailed accounts of the
microcosmic and macrocosmic relations of actual occasions,
we can take the position that the final level of conscious-
ness in human experience definitely involves the "objectifi-
cation" of antecedent states of the human body as a basic
element. Since these antecedent states are really actual
occasions which exist on every level of the hierarchy that
leads up to the final percipient event, i.e., normal con-
sciousness, the character of those actual entities opens
another important factor for consideration. Actual occa-
sions are, as we have seen, dependent on the realm of eter-
nal objects as the determinant of the social order of all
enduring objects in the world. Thus, it can be maintained
that the material enduring objects which comprise the human
body are subject to the same requirements of possibility,
as determined by the structuring of the eternal objects, as
are the material enduring objects which are not part of the
body. The importance of this realization is seen in the
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are defined as having the same structure as the structure
of the world which is known in the higher phase of experi-
ence or presentational immediacy. Thus, on the organismic
view, the relations which we know to pertain between the
things in the world are exemplified for us by two separate
paths of knowledge which are grounded in the common deter-
mination of possibility in the real world.
A slight digression will help to clarify the above.
Whitehead’s cosmology is built upon the assumption that the
world of fact requires some reason to be structured. While
he is open to accepting any structure that has developed as
an empirical fact, his concern is to describe a mechanism
by which some limitation can be placed on the world of fact
if entities of specific characters are to develop. That is,
there must be a reason for the development of a specific
realization of Value in Fact. He proposes a solution to
this problem that asserts that each actual entity contains
a reference to the realm of graded value (eternal objects)
that is the basis for the structure of the world. Thus, a
basic fact like the construction of the physical world in
terms of three dimensions has also been determined in this
way. In fact, all of the basic determinants of the struc-
ture of the world we know in visual perception, which is
most of what we know about the world, may be said to be
1
,
I.
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represented through the inheritance of the body as veil as
through visual perception.
To return to the problem of epistemology, it can now
be asserted that Whitehead's use of terms such as heavy,
vague, crude, etc., as regards the character of inheritance
from the physical past (causal efficacy) is somewhat mis-
leading. It is misleading in the sense that it implies
that there can be no specific content in this sort of knowl-
edge whereas, the exact opposite is the case. When he talks
of vagueness and crudeness his primary reference is to a
comparison with higher forms of consciousness, i.e., pres-
entational immediacy and he does not mean to imply that
there is no specific information as to the actual construc-
tion of the world which is derived from this source. The
information as to the true structure of the world which is
supplied in causal efficacy is as precisely determined by
the realm of eternal objects as is the information which is
supplied by the input of visual perception in the mode of
presentational immediacy. This is true since from the
accounts of the actual occasions given above, there is abso-
lutely no grounds on which to assume that there is any arbi-
trariness involved in the way an actual occasion prehends
the defining aspects of the realm of eternal objects.
Thus, it can be maintained that the visual experience
of a young child for example, is determined not only by the
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enduring object he is looking at but also by his bodily
inheritance which has been structured by the properties of
the same environment from which the enduring object arises.
It is this characterization of conscious experience
that derives from two decidedly different modes of knowing
the world that can be the basis for theories relevant to
psychology and education. The organismic assertion that
experience is structured from within as well as from with-
out while not also involving predetermination of experience,
suggests important implications for psychological theory
especially in the areas of cognition and perception. Simi-
larly, traditional approaches to education which are also
thoroughly grounded in the type of empiricism that derives
from the analysis of higher grades of consciousness in ex-
clusion from the causal aspects of knowledge of the world,
can be modified so that undue emphasis is not placed on
"basic" concepts that are given as a result of being an
organism in a world of real organisms.
While the content of this section does no more than to
open the possibility that other approaches to the problem
of epistemology are possible, there are many levels of com-
plex description contained in Whitehead's philosophy that
can well serve the cause of supporting a detailed investi-
gation of the issues involved.
The need for investigations of this type is amply
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demonstrated by the following example of the approach to
knowledge that is current in the contemporary world of edu-
cation. Jerome Bruner maintains:
Knowledge is a model we construct to give
meaning and structure to regularities in ex-
perience. The organizing ideas of any body
of knowledge are inventions for rendering
experience economical and connected. We
invent concepts such as force in physics,
the bond in chemistry, motive in psychology,
style in literature as means to the end of
comprehension . 481
The intent of this quotation is not to attempt to label
Mr. Bruner an empiricist of the Lockean variety. Rather,
it is to assert that without the larger aspect of a more
complete view of knowledge which is provided by the compre-
hensiveness of organismic metaphysics, there will always be
a pronounced tendency to look upon knowledge as a mere model
which is constructed "to give meaning and structure to regu-
larities" that do not have any apparent relationship to the
meaning and structure of life as it is experienced. The
position which is taken here is that in order to have meaning
and structure in experience, the knower must believe that
his own being is a part of the beingness of the rest of the
world. Thus, considering knowledge as a mere model of the
world, one that is not also related to the realities of the
evolving cosmos, is antithetical to supporting a position
1181Jerome Bruner, On Knowing (Cambridge: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1964), p. 120.
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from which the knowing subject can establish a relation to
the other aspects of his nature that transcend his imme-
diate awareness.
7.4.2 TRANSCENDENCE
The second major topic which derives from the organis-
mic position and which impacts on psychology and education
concerns the possibility that there are other grounds for
knowing the realities of the evolving cosmos than the type
knowledge which is derived from perceiving the realities
of the world realized fact.
In the organismic scheme it is necessary to consider
this topic as an aspect of the more general topic which
concerns the role of God in the unfolding events in the
world. Whitehead's position is that God is the primordial
ground of order and is therefore involved in the subjective
aim of every actual occasion. In this way, the organismic
scheme defines God's role as that of eliciting the self-
creation of individual entities in a way that allows for
freedom as well as structure and directionality in the
processes of the universe.
The function of God's immanence in the world is espe-
cially important to man as the highest evolved creature.
Here, the graded relevance of possibility which is provided
by God as the ground of all order also functions as a lure
for actualization within the process of the individual. In
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this way, God is also the ground of all novelty.
Thus
,
the influence of God in the world of organ! smic
metaphysics is seen to be limited to the extent that his
valuation of possibility is experienced by the world. In
other words, the flowering of man's potential is a direct
J
function of the degree to which man actualizes the inevi-
table ordering of things as they exist in the nature of God.
Since the entire structure of organismic metaphysics
requires the defining role of God to be both the ground of
order and the ground of novelty, and since the realized
order of the world is included in the subordinate levels of
the being of man, it follows that the presiding occasion of
consciousness, which is man's awareness of his bodily in-
heritance, should also be primarily involved in the concep-
tual prehension of the increased grades of value which it
is God's nature to provide.
The important aspect of this discussion for the present
topic involves the fact that if any use is to be made of the
systematic nature of organismic metaphysics within the
fields of psychology and education then, it is absolutely
necessary to admit that the ultimate determinant of the
meaning and structure of life is not a set of arbitrary
principles that have been created to simplify the relation-
ships observed in the world. The structure of the world is
a gift of our physical inheritance of the world of created
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fact, an inheritance which is manifest in the processes of
knowing the subordinate world. On this view, educating the
conceptual process of children does not amount to the crea-
tion of relationships which are unavailable to the child.
Rather, the process is one of raising to the level of ex-
plicit recognition the characteristics of realized Value in
Fact that are a natural part of his physical inheritance.
However, just as organismic metaphysics can provide no
grounds upon which to assert that there must necessarily be
three spacial dimensions rather than thirty, no reason can
be given for limiting the extent to which it is possible
for the subjective reaction of the experient individual to
be influenced by the higher grades of value which are also
a part of God as the primordial ground of order. It there-
fore seems quite reasonable that the solution to many of the
perplexing problems in the psychology of personality and the
processes of education, is located in the increased subjec-
tive realization by the experient individual, of the grades
of value that border the upper level of his awareness.
Thus, when the structure of the knowledge is in harmony with
the true character of realized value that forms the subordi-
nate orders of his own being the child will experience a
sense of deepened awareness that provides its own motivation
toward greater understanding. It is in this sense that
knowledge may be said to be relevant to the learner.
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The ultimate importance of man's transcendent nature
lies not in the realization of the conceptual exemplifica-
tion of values which structure the realized grades of exis-
tence but in the creative appeal to increased depth of ex-
perience that comes with spiritual insight into the pur-
posiveness of God's valuation of a new order of achievement
for man to obtain. It is in this sense that the philosophy
of organism may be said to be open to the possibility of
religious experience as it has been known down through the
ages of mankind's existence. A primary value then, of the
organismic approach is that it opens God's participation in
all levels of nature. For man, at the top of the hierarchy,
there is prayer and meditation as the primary means of
knowing the increased grades of value that constitute the
advance of humanity and are the vehicle of his transcendence.
And should it happen, as it periodically does, that
mankind is given fresh insight into the Purposes of God for
man; then, he has the words of the Prophet to assure him and
guide him in the knowledge that his deepest urgings are not
Va Q+Jl. SLsl* /to-Zo ^ ?
simply idle fancies and vain imaginings r i Cf 1
-jijh.Te' ^ Te-J
,
Create in me a pure heart, 0 my God, and renew
a tranquil conscience within me, 0 my Hope!
Through the spirit of power confirm Thou me
in Thy Cause, 0 my Be s t -Beloved , and by the
light of Thy glory reveal unto me Thy path,
0 Thou the Goal of my desire!
Through the power of Thy transcendent might
lift me up unto the heaven of Thy holiness,
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0 Source of iny being, and by the breezes of
Thine eternity gladden me, 0 Thou who art
my God!
Let thine everlasting melodies breathe tran-
quility on me, 0 my Companion, and let the
riches of Thine ancient countenance deliver
me from all except Thee, 0 My Master, and
let the tidings of the revelation of Thine
incorruptible Essence bring me joy, 0 Thou
Who art the most manifest of the manifest
and the most hidden of the hidden! 482
482Baha'u'llah, Baha'i Prayers (Wilmette: Baha'i
Publishing Thrust, 1957 ) , p* 7 6 .
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